# Haymer v. Minor

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · July 7, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10438027

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** July 7, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10438027

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying Heck’s favorable termination rule in § 1983 action for malicious prosecution
- applying Heck’s favorable termination rule in § 1983 action for malicious prosecution

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

RICKEY HAYMER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) NO. 3:22-cv-00300
v. )
) JUDGE RICHARDSON
DANA MINOR, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a pro se complaint for alleged violation of civil rights pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1), filed by Rickey Haymer, a state prisoner in the custody of the
Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Plaintiff has also filed an
application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) (Doc. No. 2) and a motion to ascertain status. (Doc.
No. 7.)
The case is now before the Court for ruling on Plaintiff’s IFP application and motion, and
for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP
Under the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner bringing a civil action may apply for
permission to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Because
it is apparent from Plaintiff’s IFP application that he lacks the funds to pay the entire filing fee in
advance, that application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b) and 1914(a), Plaintiff is nonetheless assessed the $350
civil filing fee. The warden of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently housed, as custodian of
Plaintiff’s trust account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, the
greater of: (a) 20% of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s credit at the jail; or (b) 20% of
the average monthly balance to Plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period immediately preceding
the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the custodian shall submit 20% of
Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff for the preceding month),

but only when the balance in his account exceeds $10. Id. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall continue
until the $350 filing fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of Court. Id. § 1915(b)(3).
The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the warden of the facility where
Plaintiff is currently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining
to the payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement,
the custodian must ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of
confinement, for continued compliance with the Order. All payments made pursuant to this Order
must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.

INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
I. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court must conduct an initial review and dismiss the Complaint if it is facially
frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The review for whether the Complaint states a claim upon which relief
may be granted asks whether it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, upon “view[ing] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[.]”

Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). A pro se pleading must be liberally
construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However,
pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), nor can the Court “create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading.” Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)).
Plaintiff sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which confers a private federal right of action against

any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d
580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, to state a viable Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege (1) a
deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763
F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014).
II. ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS
Plaintiff sues Dana Minor, a prosecutor with the Rutherford County District Attorney’s
Office, alleging that his rights were violated (1) when he was charged with and convicted of
possessing a firearm in 2021, despite never possessing one; (2) when the state court admitted an
audio recording of testimony from a deceased witness, violating Plaintiff’s right to confront that
witness; and (3) when Defendant used unauthenticated text message evidence against him without
first disclosing that evidence to the defense. (Doc. No. 1 at 7–8.) Plaintiff also reports that he has
written the Board of Professional Responsibility about Defendant’s alleged misconduct (id. at 4,

8), and that he has a pending “civil rights (ineffective counsel)” case pending against a different
lawyer in Davidson County Court. (Id. at 3.) As relief, Plaintiff requests to be “financially
compensated” for loss of wages and for mental distress, and for “these bogus, embellished charges
to be dismissed from [his] record.” (Id. at 6.)
III. ANALYSIS
In this action under Section 1983, Plaintiff seeks to have his conviction expunged and
compensatory damages awarded based on constitutional violations that allegedly occurred during
his prosecution in state court. However, challenges to the validity of a prisoner’s confinement are
within the sole province of habeas corpus; they are not properly lodged under Section 1983.

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). Furthermore, regardless of the theory under which
Plaintiff claims damages resulting from his prosecution, “[w]hen success in a § 1983 prisoner
action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the prisoner
must first successfully pursue” relief from that conviction or sentence by having it “reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or . . . called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Gardner v. Morriss, No. 3:17-
cv-00747, 2017 WL 4805205, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 24, 2017) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994)); see Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 309 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying
Heck’s favorable termination rule in § 1983 action for malicious prosecution). The Complaint
before the Court does not suggest that Plaintiff has yet won any such relief.
If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims against Defendant Minor under Section 1983, he
must first win relief from his conviction. If he wishes to pursue a challenge to his conviction in
federal court—which would have to be done via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus—he must
first exhaust his available remedies in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). His current
Complaint does not support relief under any theory and must therefore be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
As described above, Plaintiffs IFP application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED, and the $350
filing fee is ASSESSED against his inmate trust account.
Plaintiff's motion to ascertain status (Doc. No. 7) is GRANTED in that the Court herein
has made clear that the status of this case is that it is hereby dismissed.
Upon initial review under the PLRA, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28
US.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) Gi).
This is the final order in this action. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
58(b)(1).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Shi Rucherdsean
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

' The Complaint reveals only that Plaintiff instituted state proceedings in January 2022, which remain
pending and which include a claim of “ineffective counsel.” (Doc. No. | at 3.)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10438027. Public record. Not legal advice.