# Settle v. CoreCivic, Inc.

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · November 22, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10437553

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** November 22, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10437553

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

MIKE SETTLE #207584, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) NO. 3:21-cv-00400
v. )
) JUDGE RICHARDSON
CORECIVIC, INC., et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Mike Settle, an inmate at Trousdale Turner Correctional Center (TTCC) in
Hartsville, Tennessee, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.
(Doc. No. 1-2.) Defendant CoreCivic removed the case to this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff asked
the Court to remand the case back to state court, and the Court denied his request. (Doc. No. 12.)
Plaintiff has now filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint incorporating a proposed
Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 14.) CoreCivic did not file a Response to the Motion. As explained
below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend will be granted, and upon initial review of the Amended
Complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), this case will be dismissed.
I. Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint
Because CoreCivic filed an Answer (Doc. No. 7) more than 21 days before Plaintiff filed
the Motion to Amend (Doc. No. 14), Plaintiff may not amend the Complaint as a matter of course.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) (explaining the time limitations for a party to “amend its pleading once
as a matter of course”). CoreCivic also has not given written consent to amend, so Plaintiff must
obtain the Court’s leave to amend the Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts “should
freely give leave when justice so requires,” id., and “a district court can allow a plaintiff to amend
his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA.” LaFountain v.
Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013).
Here, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is functionally a proposed Amended Complaint. (Doc.
No. 14.) The proposed Amended Complaint is complete in itself, and it names two additional

Defendants, clarifies certain factual allegations in the original Complaint, and requests specific
relief. (See id.); Trammell v. Rudd, No. 3:21-cv-00240, 2021 WL 1264555, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Apr.
6, 2021) (citation omitted) (noting that an amended complaint “must be complete in itself without
any reliance on [the] original Complaint”). Plaintiff also filed the proposed Amended Complaint
at an early stage in the proceedings, prior to the initial review required by the PLRA. In these
circumstances, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.
The Clerk will be directed to docket this filing (Doc. No. 14) as an Amended Complaint
and add Officer Burries and Officer Publa as Defendants.1 This Amended Complaint is now the
operative pleading in the case. See Bauer v. Fitzhugh, No. 3:18-cv-01293, 2020 WL 6134989, at
*1 n.1 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 2020) (citing Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299,

306 (6th Cir. 2000)) (explaining that an Amended Complaint becomes “the operative complaint”
“[u]pon its filing” and supersedes the original Complaint).
II. Initial Review
The Court must dismiss any part of the Amended Complaint if it is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (requiring review of a complaint “in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity”); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)
(establishing dismissal authority for claims brought by a prisoner “with respect to prison

1 Plaintiff refers to the Officer-Defendants as “John Does” despite providing their last names. (See Doc.
No. 14 at 1.) For clarity, the Court will refer to the Officers by their names.
conditions” that do not satisfy the statutory standard); Trusty v. Centurion Health Servs., No. 19-
5872, 2020 WL 548225, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2020) (citing Hutchison v. Wexford Health Servs.,
638 F. App’x 930, 932 (11th Cir. 2016)) (noting that a private entity considered to be a state actor
for purposes of § 1983 is also a “government actor[] for purposes of § 1915A”). The Court also

must liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to “less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
A. Factual Allegations
The Court has liberally construed the Amended Complaint to establish the following
summary of factual allegations for the purpose of initial review.
CoreCivic disregards Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) policies on inmate
hygiene, sanitation, heat, food, haircuts, and case managers. (Doc. No. 14 at 2, 4.) CoreCivic
intentionally subjected Plaintiff to thirty-degree temperatures in December 2020, and to twenty-
degree temperatures “all winter” (including on February 2, 2021). (Id. at 3, 5, 7–8.) For the past

year, Plaintiff has been denied haircuts. (Id. at 4.) For the past six months, Plaintiff has been
intentionally denied outside exercise, cleaning supplies for his cell, and hygiene products (despite
his indigence entitling him to hygiene products). (Id. at 3, 6.) For unspecified periods of time,
Plaintiff has been deprived of nutritionally adequate food, causing him to lose weight. (Id. at 3–4.)
CoreCivic also has not provided Plaintiff a case manager to assist with sentence computation,
parole procedures, and counseling. (Id. at 4.)
CoreCivic has a “policy or custom” of being understaffed, which causes Plaintiff and others
to be put on a “merge” lockdown. (Id. at 2.) CoreCivic also fails to guard against the risk of inmate-
on-inmate violence created by inmates “rig[ging] the cell doors” to open “whenever [inmates]
want.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff has “serious depression,” and on January 26, 2021, APN2 Scott Schuch
told Plaintiff that TTCC does not have any mental health programs. (Id. at 5.)
During a cell search on January 14, 2020, Officer Burries (who is white) told Plaintiff (who
is black) to “turn around ‘n*****’” and placed flex cuffs on Plaintiff. (Id. at 4–5.) Burries then

kicked Plaintiff in the testicles. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff “said or did nothing wrong” prior to this incident.
(Id. at 5.)
As relief, Plaintiff requests a declaratory judgment, monetary damages, and transfer to a
TDOC-operated facility (specifically, the West Tennessee State Penitentiary). (Id. at 2, 8–9.)
B. Legal Standard
To determine whether the Amended Complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted” under the applicable statutes, the Court applies the same standard as under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.
2010). The Court therefore accepts “all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, [and]
‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an

entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)). An assumption of truth does not extend to allegations that consist
of legal conclusions or “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
C. Discussion
“There are two elements to a [Section] 1983 claim. First, a plaintiff must allege that a
defendant acted under color of state law. Second, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s

2 Plaintiff does not explain what “APN” stands for, but given the context, the Court assumes that Schuch is
a nurse of some kind.
conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured under federal law.” Handy-Clay v. City of
Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
1. Officer Publa
Plaintiff names Officer Publa as a Defendant, but Plaintiff does not make any specific

allegations against Publa in the body of the Amended Complaint. Even under the lenient standards
for reviewing pro se pleadings, that is insufficient to state a claim. Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,
92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (“Merely listing names in the caption of
the complaint and alleging constitutional violations in the body of the complaint is not enough to
sustain recovery under § 1983.”). Accordingly, Officer Publa will be dismissed as a party.
2. Due Process Claims
Plaintiff asserts due process claims based on CoreCivic’s alleged failure to follow TDOC
policies on conditions of confinement and the provision of a case manager, and its failure to meet
minimum safety standards established by the Tennessee Corrections Institute (TCI). (Doc. No. 14
at 2–4, 6–7.) These allegations fail to state a due process claim for three reasons. First, standards

established by the TCI apply to local correctional facilities, not state prisons like TTCC. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 41-4-140(a)(1) (providing that the TCI “has the power and duty to [e]stablish
minimum standards for local jails, lock-ups and workhouses”). Second, even if TCI’s standards
applied, Section 1983 claims “can only be brought for ‘deprivation of rights secured by the
constitution and laws of the United States,’” so Plaintiff fails to state an independent claim based
on a violation of prison policy. Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 580–81 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted) (“[A] § 1983 claim may not be based upon a violation of state procedure that
does not violate federal law.”); see also Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983)) (“Failing to follow proper procedures is
insufficient to establish an infringement of a liberty interest.”). Third, although Plaintiff does not
specify the nature of his due process claims, the Court does not analyze claims under “the more
generalized notion of ‘substantive due process’” where another specific “amendment ‘provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government

behavior.” Kiser v. Kamdar, 831 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 273 (1994)). Here, as discussed below, the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provide the proper framework to analyze Plaintiff’s Section
1983 claims. Accordingly, any substantive due process claims are subject to dismissal as
duplicative.
3. January 2020 Incident with Officer Burries
Plaintiff alleges that, on January 14, 2020, Officer Burries (who is white) told Plaintiff
(who is black) “turn around ‘n*****,’” placed flex cuffs on Plaintiff, and kicked Plaintiff in the
testicles. (Doc. No. 14 at 4–5.) On this basis, Plaintiff asserts an Eighth Amendment excessive
force claim and a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim.3 (Id. at 4–5, 7.)

A prisoner’s claim “is subject to dismissal without any further proof if ‘the allegations
. . . show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.’” Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d
452, 458 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)). Section 1983 claims
borrow “the state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the
state in which the § 1983 claim arises.” Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631,

3 Plaintiff also asserts that Officer Burries violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. (Doc. No.
14 at 5.) But Plaintiff cannot use Section 1981 to sue state actors in either their individual or official
capacity. See McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 660–61 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing Jett v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989)) (“[I]n the context of state action . . . the more specific and express
cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.”). And Plaintiff
fails to state a claim under Section 1982 because it “prohibits racial discrimination relating to certain
interests in real and personal property,” Moniz v. Cox, 512 F. App’x 495, 501 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations
omitted)—interests not relevant here.
634 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cnty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir.
1997)). Tennessee’s statute of limitations for such claims is one year. Jordan v. Blount Cnty., 885
F.3d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)). The limitations period
generally starts running “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the

basis of his action.” Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir.
2015) (quoting Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005)).
For the purpose of initial review, the Court assumes that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims
against Officer Burries relate back to the original Complaint filed in state court on March 22,
2021.4 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are untimely if they
are based on an injury that Plaintiff knew or had reason to know occurred before March 22, 2020.5
Plaintiff knew of Officer Burries’ alleged discriminatory use of excessive force when it occurred
on January 14, 2020. Accordingly, it is clear from the face of the pleadings that Plaintiff’s Section
1983 claims arising from the alleged incident with Officer Burries are untimely.
4. Additional Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff asserts four additional Eighth Amendment claims, including for inadequate
conditions of confinement, food, and psychological health care, and failure to protect from the risk
of violence by other inmates. (Doc. No. 14 at 3–8); see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33

4 The Court deems the Complaint filed on the date Plaintiff signed it. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 11); Brand v. Motley,
526 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (explaining, “absent contrary evidence,” courts assume
a prisoner filed a complaint by giving it to prison officials for mailing “on the date he or she signed” it).

5 Although “[t]he statute of limitations for claims subject to the PLRA is tolled while the plaintiff exhausts
his required administrative remedies,” Surles, 678 F.3d at 458 (citing Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595, 596
(6th Cir. 2000)), there is no indication in the original or Amended Complaint that Plaintiff attempted to
exhaust such remedies specifically for the alleged incident with Burries. There is a grievance attached to
the original Complaint, but it is entirely unrelated to this alleged incident. (See Doc. No. 1-2 at 12–14.) The
Court therefore has no reasonable basis to assume that the limitations period was tolled for claims arising
from this alleged incident.
(1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment
imposes a duty on officials to “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and
medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates”). These
claims are not supported by sufficient allegations to proceed for further development.

These four claims all have objective and subjective components. See Richmond v. Settles,
450 F. App’x 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)) (“An
Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim [] contains both an objective and a subjective
component.”). The subjective component of these claims requires Plaintiff to demonstrate
deliberate indifference to his health or safety. See id. at 454–56 (conditions of confinement and
food); Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2003) (psychological health care);
Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766–67 (6th Cir. 2011) (failure to protect). To demonstrate
deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must “allege facts which, if true, would show that the official
being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he
did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.” Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703

(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834); Bishop, 636 F.3d at 766–67 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
The Court must evaluate whether Plaintiff has satisfied the subjective component for each official
individually. Bishop, 636 F.3d at 767 (citing Phillips v. Roane Cnty., Tenn., 534 F.3d 531, 542
(6th Cir. 2008)).
Plaintiff does not satisfy the subjective component for any of the four claims. That is, the
Amended Complaint does not identify any TTCC officer who perceived facts sufficient to infer
that Plaintiff faced a risk to his health or safety from inadequate conditions of confinement, lack
of food, inadequate psychological health care, or exposure to violent inmates. For this reason
alone, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim on these four bases.
Plaintiff also fails to satisfy the objective component for three of the four claims. First, as
to the deprivation of food, Plaintiff alleges that he lost an unspecified amount of weight because
he received small amounts of unspecified, nutritionally inadequate food for an unspecified period
of time. A prisoner’s dissatisfaction with the amount of food he receives does not satisfy the

objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim as long as “the prisoner continues to receive
adequate nutrition.” Richmond, 450 F. App’x at 456 (citing Cunningham v. Jones, 667 F.2d 565,
566 (6th Cir. 1982)). Plaintiff fails to provide any supporting facts for his conclusory allegation
that he lost weight, such as how much weight he lost and the period of time over which he lost
weight. Nor does he otherwise provide any supporting facts for his conclusory allegation that his
food was nutritionally inadequate, such as a description of the meals that allegedly caused him to
lose weight. He thus has failed to state a claim. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of. Am., 92 F. App’x
188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436
(6th Cir. 1988)) (“A complaint must contain allegations respecting all the elements to sustain a
recovery under some viable legal theory.”).

Second, as to psychological health care, Plaintiff alleges that TTCC does not have any
mental health programs to treat his serious depression. To satisfy the objective component of this
claim, Plaintiff “must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious,” and “a prisoner’s
psychological needs may constitute serious medical needs, especially when they result in suicidal
tendencies.” Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As
serious as Plaintiff’s alleged depression may feel to Plaintiff, Plaintiff does not allege that this
condition has been diagnosed by a doctor, that he has been prescribed medication for this
condition, or that he is at risk of self-harm. Plaintiff’s bare allegation of depression is not sufficient,
standing alone, to demonstrate a sufficiently serious psychological need for the purpose of an
Eighth Amendment claim. See Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 897 (6th Cir. 2004)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (“[A] medical need is objectively serious if it is
one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”).

Third, as to Plaintiff’s physical safety from other inmates, Plaintiff alleges that he faces a
risk of violence on a daily basis because inmates “rig the cell doors” to open “whenever they want.”
(Doc. No. 14 at 6.) The objective component of a failure-to-protect claim requires Plaintiff to
allege that “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Bishop,
636 F.3d at 766 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833). Plaintiff does not provide any specific factual
allegations to support the inference that he faces a substantial risk of harm due to the allegedly
rigged cell doors. In some circumstances, a prisoner may satisfy the objective component of this
claim through allegations “that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was ‘longstanding, pervasive,
well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past.’” Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,
102 F.3d 810, 815 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). But Plaintiff does not make

any such allegations here.
Finally, for part of one Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff may satisfy the objective
component. Plaintiff asserts a general conditions-of-confinement claim that the Court construes to
encompass his complaints about a lack of hygiene products, cleaning supplies, heat in his cell,
haircuts, and outside exercise. The objective component of this claim requires Plaintiff “to
demonstrate that he has been subjected to specific deprivations that are so serious that they deny
him ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Richmond, 450 F. App’x at 455 (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). Plaintiff “must allege ‘extreme deprivations’ to state an Eighth
Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim[,]” and “[a]llegations of temporary inconveniences”
do not suffice. Powell v. Washington, 720 F. App’x 222, 228 (6th Cir. 2017) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
To be sure, some aspects of this claim do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation. For example, Plaintiff’s alleged year-long deprivation of haircuts, without an allegation

of accompanying harm, is the type of unpleasant, “restrictive[, or] even harsh” condition that does
not violate the constitution. See Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (“Alleging that prison conditions ‘are restrictive and even harsh’ does
not suffice because such conditions ‘are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society.’”). Likewise, Plaintiff’s allegation of a six-month deprivation of
unspecified hygiene products, cleaning supplies for his cell, a broom, and a mop is not
accompanied by an allegation that Plaintiff personally suffered any harmful effects from these
conditions. Accordingly, these conditions, while unpleasant, fail to support an Eighth Amendment
claim. See Powell, 720 F. App’x at 228 (citation omitted) (“Although Powell claims that he was
not given appropriate cleaning supplies, his complaint fails to demonstrate that he was forced to

live in inhumane conditions.”); see also Richmond, 450 F. App’x at 455 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S.
at 304) (“[T]he totality of the circumstances do not otherwise implicate the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment because Richmond has not demonstrated that he was deprived of an
identifiable human need in combination with his conditions of confinement.”).
But liberally construing the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his cell
temperature and outside exercise may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff
alleges that he was subjected to twenty-degree temperatures “all winter” (Doc. No. 14 at 7–8) and
denied outside exercise for six months. The full context of Plaintiff’s exposure to these conditions
is not clear from the face of the Amended Complaint, but given the extremity and prolonged nature
of these alleged deprivations, they are sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component for
the purpose of initial review. See Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir.
2011) (citations omitted) (“[The Sixth Circuit] has said that claims of excessive cold or dampness
in a prison constitute Eighth Amendment violations, without even addressing whether such claims

rise above the PLRA’s de minimis standard.”); Rodgers v. Jabe, 43 F.3d 1082, 1086 (6th Cir.
1995) (quoting Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 1983)) (“[A] total or near-total
deprivation of exercise or recreational opportunity, without penological justification, violates
Eighth Amendment guarantees.”); Braswell, 419 F. App’x at 627 (citation omitted) (“[A] denial
of exercise for an extended period of time has been held to constitute more than a de minimis
physical injury.”). Nonetheless, because (as discussed above) Plaintiff fails to satisfy the subjective
component, he also fails to state an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim.
5. CoreCivic’s Liability
Plaintiff also brings this action against CoreCivic and Officers Publa and Burries in their
official capacities. (Doc. No. 14 at 1.) The Court takes judicial notice that CoreCivic is a private
entity contracted to manage TTCC.6 Because the Officers are CoreCivic employees (id.), the

official-capacity claims are essentially against CoreCivic. See Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810
(6th Cir. 2003) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)) (“[I]ndividuals sued in
their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent.”). And because CoreCivic
is named as a defendant, the official-capacity claims are subject to dismissal as redundant. See

6 See Trousdale Turner Correctional Center, TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,
https://www.tn.gov/correction/sp/state-prison-list/trousdale-turner-correctional-center (last visited Nov.
18, 2021); Davis v. City of Clarksville, 492 F. App’x 572, 578 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[The Court] may take
judicial notice of ‘a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute’ either because such a fact ‘is generally
known’ or ‘can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.’”)(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)).
Jackson v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t, No. 07-6356, 2008 WL 4915434, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2008)
(affirming dismissal of redundant official-capacity claims).
As for Plaintiff’s claims against CoreCivic (see Doc. No. 14 at 2–8), “a private corporation
cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Reed-

Bey v. Pramstaller, 607 F. App’x 445, 450 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Street, 102 F.3d at 818). “Rather,
the plaintiff must establish a policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation.” Id. (citing
Ford v. Cnty. of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483, 495 (6th Cir. 2008)). Here, for the reasons
explained throughout this Memorandum Opinion, Plaintiff fails to assert a viable constitutional
violation. And with no underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff cannot impose liability on
CoreCivic under Section 1983. See Zucker v. City of Farmington Hills, 643 F. App’x 555, 570 (6th
Cir. 2016) (citing Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014)) (“[T]here is no liability
[for the employing entity] -without an underlying constitutional violation.”).
6. State Law Claims
Finally, Plaintiff asserts several gross negligence claims under state law. (Doc. No. 14 at

2, 6–8.) Because Plaintiff’s federal claims will be dismissed, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). These
state-law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
III. Conclusion
Plaintiff alleges (albeit at times in merely conclusory fashion) circumstances and events
that are far from ideal. But this Court is not called upon to determine whether, according to
Plaintiff’s allegations, he could have been treated better. Instead, the Court must determine
whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. And for the reasons stated
above, the Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 14) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under federal law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
state-law claims, and this case will be dismissed.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10437553. Public record. Not legal advice.