# Hall v. Trump

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · March 5, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10436350

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** March 5, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10436350

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that personal liability “must be based on the actions of that defendant in the situation that the defendant faced, and not based on any problems caused by the errors of others, either defendants or non-defendants”
- holding that Ex Parte Young claim is appropriately brought against “Defendants who currently have official capacity to provide a remedy through declaratory or injunctive relief”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JON HALL #238941, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) NO. 3:19-cv-00628
) JUDGE TRAUGER
DONALD TRUMP, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on the motion by the defendant, Tennessee Department of
Correction (TDOC) Commissioner Tony Parker, to dismiss the plaintiff’s case against him due to
lack of personal involvement. (Doc. No. 24.) The plaintiff has responded in opposition (Doc. No.
31), and the matter is ripe for review.
Also pending before the court is the plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint in order to
“clarify and elaborate on the fact that Defendant Parker sets the policies and procedures that have
led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights” and “further explain why Defendant
Parker is an appropriate and necessary party to this case.” (Doc. No. 32 at 1.) The defendants
oppose the amendment on the basis that it is insufficient to overcome Defendant Parker’s pending
motion to dismiss and is thus futile. (Doc. No. 35.)
Because these motions are related, the court has analyzed them together.
I. PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take all of the
factual allegations in the complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. Id. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice. Id. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief. Id. at 679. A legal conclusion, including one couched as a factual allegation, need not be
accepted as true on a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678; Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d
718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010).
The Iqbal Court suggested that a district court considering a motion to dismiss “can choose
to begin” its analysis “by identifying pleadings that . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Iqbal, 555 U.S. at 679. As indicated above, pleadings that do not constitute factual allegations,
including “bare assertions,” a formulaic recitation of the elements, and “conclusory” or “bald”

allegations, need not be accepted as true. Id. at 681. The question is whether the remaining factual
allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Id. If not, the pleading fails to meet the
standard of Rule 8 and must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 683.
As a general rule, matters outside the pleadings may not be considered in ruling on a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), unless the motion is converted to one for summary judgment under
Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, documents attached to the pleadings become part of the
pleadings and may be considered on a motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). In addition, when
a document is referred to in the pleadings and is integral to the claims, it may be considered without
converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v.
Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335–36 (6th Cir. 2007); Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194
F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999).
B. ANALYSIS
Defendant Parker argues that government officials cannot be held liable on the basis of

respondeat superior and that supervisory defendants are only liable when they are personally
involved in unconstitutional conduct, at least by authorizing, approving, or knowingly acquiescing
in such conduct. (Doc. No. 25 at 4–5.) He asserts that the plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
does not state a claim against him under this standard because it simply “essentially argue[s] that
Commissioner Parker approves the policies and procedures related to death row inmates but has
done nothing to release Plaintiff from solitary confinement.” (Id. at 6.)
The plaintiff’s proposed Third Amended Complaint, which he offers in direct response to
Defendant Parker’s motion, adds a number of allegations directed specifically at Defendant Parker.
Specifically, the plaintiff would amend his complaint to allege that: a due process violation in
connection with his psychological health and solitary confinement status “arises directly from the

policies and procedures of the Tennessee Department of Corrections, which Defendant Parker runs
and has the authority to change” (Doc. No. 30 at 2); the relief the plaintiff seeks “is systemic in
nature and involves changes to the policies and procedures set and controlled by Defendant Parker”
(id. at 3); Defendant Parker, as Commissioner, “provides final approval of rules applicable to death
row inmates and is ultimately responsible for TDOC’s policies and procedures, as well as for
funding necessary to provide resources to prisons, prison personnel, and ultimately to prisoners,”
“has the authority to make changes in [the plaintiff’s] procedures and living conditions,” and “is
the only Defendant with the authority to provide all of the systemic changes and resources [the
plaintiff] seeks in this case” (id. at 4); many of the conditions about which he complains arise
“[p]er the policies and procedures that Defendant Parker has set and has the authority to change”
(id. at 6, 7, 10, 11); Defendant Parker “has failed to provide the resources in the form of training
and pay commensurate with the level of training” required to work with the plaintiff and others
who are severely psychologically impaired (id. at 9); “Defendant Parker is the only official with

the authority to provide” the necessary “systemic change to TDOC’s policies and procedures—
including but not limited to adequate training, psychological and medical care, more humane
conditions, and funding for the above” as well as “ultimately an alternative to interminable solitary
confinement.” (Id. at 12, 17.)
The defendants argue that even the plaintiff’s proposed new allegations would fail to state
a claim “because they do not address Defendants’ central concern that the allegations do not
demonstrate that Commissioner Parker is personally involved in Plaintiff’s alleged solitary
confinement.” (Doc. No. 35 at 3.) But the defendants overlook the fact that the plaintiff sues
Defendant Parker only in his official capacity for prospective injunctive relief.
The plaintiff asserts in both his proposed Third Amended Complaint and his response to

Defendant Parker’s motion to dismiss that Defendant Parker is an appropriate official-capacity
defendant pursuant to Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). (Doc. No. 30 at 11 n.1; Doc. No. 31
at 2.) The Ex Parte Young doctrine “allow[s] federal courts to enjoin state officers in their official
capacity from prospectively violating a federal statute or the Constitution.” Mich. Corr. Org. v.
Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 774 F.3d 895, 904 (6th Cir. 2014). It provides a narrow exception to the
general rule that official-capacity suits against state officials are suits against the state and are,
therefore, barred by sovereign immunity. Id. Accordingly, demands for injunctive relief are
properly brought against a TDOC official in his official capacity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989) (“Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when
sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for
prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.”). To pursue such a claim against a
state official in his official capacity, the official must only “have some connection with the
enforcement” of the rule of law whose constitutionality is in question. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.

at 157. Proper defendants to an Ex Parte Young claim include “officials who have direct
responsibility in the area in which the plaintiff seeks relief.” Bartlett v. Wengler, No. 1:12-CV-
00312-EJL, 2014 WL 4773959, at *5 (D. Idaho Sept. 24, 2014); see also Muhammad v. Crosby,
No. 4:05CV193-WS, 2008 WL 2229746, at *19 (N.D. Fla. May 29, 2008), aff’d sub nom.
Muhammad v. Sapp, 388 F. App’x 892 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that Ex Parte Young claim is
appropriately brought against “Defendants who currently have official capacity to provide a
remedy through declaratory or injunctive relief”). That is a very different standard than the one
asserted by Defendant Parker.
Citing cases such as Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1984), Defendant Parker
asserts that the plaintiff must allege Parker’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation in

order to state a claim against him. (Doc. No. 25 at 4–5.) Another district court in this circuit has
concisely explained why that assertion is incorrect in the context of an official-capacity claim for
injunctive relief:
Defendants are simply incorrect on how the law operates here. It is true that in a
suit for money damages against a state official sued in his or her individual capacity,
the plaintiff must allege that the defendant was personally involved in the actions
constituting a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory rights. See, e.g.,
Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984) (a § 1983 plaintiff must show
that each defendant “encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some
other way directly participated in it”). But when only prospective injunctive relief
is requested, that type of showing is unnecessary. The proper defendants in such an
action are the ones who have the power to provide the relief sought, whether or not
they were involved in the allegedly illegal conduct at issue. Otherwise, plaintiffs in
these types of situations would potentially be left without any remedy if the groups
of defendants who violated the law and those who could fix the problem if ordered
to do so were mutually exclusive.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157, states the applicable principle in this way: “In
making an officer of the State a party defendant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement
of an act alleged to be unconstitutional it is plain that such officer must have some
connection with the enforcement of the act. . . .” That is a different standard than
the “personal involvement” test applied in cases like Bellamy v. Bradley, which are
concerned with liability for money damages. As noted in Luckey v. Harris, 860
F.2d 1012, 1015 (11th Cir. 1988), “[p]ersonal action by defendants individually is
not a necessary condition of injunctive relief against state officers in their official
capacity. All that is required is that the official be responsible for the challenged
action.” This Court has expressly followed that holding. See, e.g., Brown v. Collins,
2008 WL 4059887, *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2008) (Kemp, M.J.), adopted and aff’d
2009 WL 152315 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 20, 2009). Even the governor of a state can be a
proper defendant for purposes of obtaining prospective injunctive relief in the
proper circumstances based on the governor’s duty to enforce the law. See, e.g.,
Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 665 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1982).
Taaffe v. Drake, No. 2:15-CV-2870, 2016 WL 1713550, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2016).
Even cases cited by Defendant Parker ultimately support this distinction, either expressly
or implicitly. For example, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court stated
broadly that government officials “may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents”
and that such an official “is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Id. at 677. But that holding
was in the context of an action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur.
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which can only be pursued against federal officials in their
individual capacities.1 See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 370 (6th
Cir. 2011) (“[W]hile Plaintiffs characterize their claims as being asserted against Defendants in
their ‘official capacities,’ many of the allegations in the Amended Complaint appear to raise
Bivens-type claims that may be asserted against federal officials only in their individual
capacities.”); Lathan v. United States, No. 3:18 CV 2175, 2019 WL 857963, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb.

1 In fact, the dissent in Iqbal observed that the questions under review in that case were: (1) whether
certain allegations were “sufficient to state individual-capacity claims” against the defendants,
and (2) whether a “high-ranking official may be held personally liable” for the actions of
subordinates. Id. at 690 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
22, 2019) (holding that “Plaintiff cannot bring a Bivens claim against the United States, its agencies
or its employees sued in their official capacities for denial of his constitutional rights” because
“[t]he United States has not consented to suit in a Bivens action.”). The same is true of Shehee v.
Lutrell, 199 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 1999). Those decisions did not involve official-capacity claims

like the ones raised in the present case.
Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1988), is similarly distinguishable, because the issue
on appeal in that case was whether state officials were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 420.
The case does not include any discussion of the capacities in which the state official defendants
were sued, but qualified immunity is a defense to damages suits against public officials in their
individual capacities and is “not an available defense in an official-capacity suit.” United Pet
Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 768 F.3d 464, 483–84 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1985)). Accordingly, Poe, too, dealt only with the standard for
a defendant’s liability in his or her individual capacity.
Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010), did involve a prisoner’s claims against

prison officials in their official and individual capacities. The Sixth Circuit first effectively
disposed of the official-capacity claims by holding that the plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief were moot and that the defendants were immune from suit for damages in their
official capacities. Id. at 289. After turning to the claims against the defendants in their individual
capacities, the court discussed the personal-involvement standards to make prison officials
“personally liable” under Section 1983. Id. at 292 (emphasis added). Those standards were not
the basis for its dismissal of the official-capacity claims. Likewise, the Sixth Circuit in Grinter v.
Knight, 532 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2008), approved dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for damages
against prison officials in their official capacities before separately addressing the requirements
“for a supervisor to incur personal liability.” Id. at 572, 575 (quoting Miller v. Calhoun Cty., 408
F.3d 803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). And in Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444
F.3d 725, 751–52 (6th Cir. 2006), the Sixth Circuit addressed the liability of individual city
employees separately from the liability of the city—the equivalent of any claims against them in

their official capacities.
In Miller, the Sixth Circuit expressly determined that the lack of allegations that an official
was personally involved in a violation indicated that the plaintiff’s claim was against the
defendants in their official capacities:
Because § 1983 liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior,
proof of personal involvement is required for a supervisor to incur personal liability.
Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80–81 (6th Cir. 1995). On appeal, Miller
makes no argument that Byam or Cook should incur personal, supervisory liability.
Indeed, Miller presents no evidence or argument that these two defendants had any
personal involvement in the alleged misconduct. Accordingly, as it appears that
Byam and Cook are being sued in their official capacities, we treat the claims
against them as being claims against the County.
Miller, 408 F.3d at 817 n.3. The court found that the claim for county liability failed for other
reasons, but the lack of personal involvement by the official-capacity defendants was not the basis
for rejecting the claim.
Of all the cases cited by Defendant Parker in support of his motion to dismiss,2 the only

2 In their response in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion to amend, the defendants also cite this
court’s recent dismissal of Defendant Parker for lack of personal involvement in Hugueley v.
Parker, No. 3:19-CV-00598, 2019 WL 3890367, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 16, 2019). But that
opinion, too, is distinguishable for several reasons. First, Defendant Parker was sued in that case
in both his individual and his official capacities, so the personal-involvement standard
appropriately applied to the individual-capacity claim. This case does not involve an individual-
capacity claim against Defendant Parker. Moreover, there were no allegations in Hugueley, as
there are here, that Defendant Parker is the only defendant with the authority to provide the full
extent of relief sought through the official-capacity claim. After finding that Plaintiff Hugueley
failed to state a claim against Defendant Parker in his individual capacity, therefore, there was no
reason in that case for the court not to dismiss the official-capacity claim against him as redundant
to those against the other defendants in that case, as it did: “Any injunctive relief available to the
plaintiff will still be available from the remaining defendants in their official capacities.”
one that is not clearly distinguishable is Bellamy, in which the Sixth Circuit affirmed a directed
verdict for supervisory prison officials where the plaintiff did not show that they had “actively
participated in or authorized any harassment” of the plaintiff. Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421. Aside
from the phrase “in their official capacities” in the caption of the case, Bellamy contains no

discussion of the capacity in which the defendants were sued or the type of relief the plaintiff
sought from them. But whatever question Bellamy might raise about the scope of the personal-
involvement standard is adequately answered by more recent cases like Heyerman v. County of
Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642 (6th Cir. 2012), in which courts are perfectly clear that the standard applies
only to individual-capacity claims:
Persons sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 can be held liable based
only on their own unconstitutional behavior. See Murphy v. Grenier, 406 F. App’x
972, 974 (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (“Personal involvement is necessary
to establish section 1983 liability”); see also Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532,
535 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that personal liability “must be based on the actions of
that defendant in the situation that the defendant faced, and not based on any
problems caused by the errors of others, either defendants or non-defendants”).
. . .
Section 1983 liability, however, cannot be premised solely on a theory of
respondeat superior, or the right to control employees. Hays v. Jefferson Cty., 668
F.2d 869, 872 (6th Cir. 1982). Supervisory officials are not liable in their individual
capacities unless they “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in
some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum, a plaintiff must show that
the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Id. at 874. Heyerman’s attempt
to hold Mladenoff liable in her individual capacity for her alleged failure to
adequately supervise assistant county prosecutors or for her adherence to or
continuation of a policy that, in Heyerman’s words, “abdicated” her responsibility
“to act on remand orders,” “improperly conflates a § 1983 claim of individual
supervisory liability with one of municipal liability.” Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534

Hugueley, 2019 WL 3890367, at *2; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (authorizing courts to strike any
“redundant [or] immaterial” matter); Jones v. Heyns, No. 1:12-CV-1341, 2014 WL 1607621, at *3
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2014) (“Although the Court recognizes that most cases dismissing redundant
official capacity claims involve claims against both the entity itself and employees of the entity,
courts also dismiss multiple official capacity claims in the prison context, allowing actions to
proceed solely against a warden or director in his or her official capacity.”) That is not the case
here, in light of the plaintiff’s distinct allegations.
F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Miller v. Calhoun Cty., 408 F.3d 803, 817
n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (indicating that where there is an absence of evidence of
personal involvement in the underlying misconduct, failure-to-train claims against
individual defendants are properly deemed to be brought against them in their
official capacities and are treated as claims against the county).
Id. at 647–48 (emphasis added); see also Harvey v. Campbell Cty., Tenn., 453 F. App’x 557, 563
(6th Cir. 2011) (holding that neither defendant “can be held liable in his individual capacity unless
he ‘either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated
in it,’ but that either of them might still be “liable, if at all, in his official capacity, i.e., rendering
the County liable”) (emphasis in original); Price v. Edwards, No. 17-10601, 2018 WL 802025, at
*5 and n.5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2018) (holding that plaintiff stated an Ex Parte Young claim against
state officials in their official capacities, even though his “failure to allege any personal
involvement by either . . . defeats the individual capacity claims”); Burke v. Thompson, No. 5:15-
cv-00007, 2016 WL 2587212, at *8 (W.D. Ky. May 4, 2016) (“A claim that an official failed to
supervise, without more, must be brought against a supervisor in his official capacity, not his
individual capacity.”); Hundal v. Lackner, No. EDCV 08-00543-CAS MA, 2011 WL 1935734, at
*6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. EDCV 08-00543-CAS,
2011 WL 1979044 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2011) (rejecting defendants’ personal-involvement
argument in context of an Ex Parte Young claim and explaining “[t]he issue here is not defendants’
personal responsibility for the alleged RLUIPA violation, but whether their duties and
responsibilities are such that, if plaintiff prevails in this action, they have the authority to grant him
relief”).
Accordingly, Defendant Parker’s argument for dismissal is without merit, and his motion
to dismiss will be denied.
II. AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”
“However, a motion to amend may be denied where there is ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility

of amendment, etc.’” Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 520 (6th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). On the point of futility, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained that “where a proposed amendment
would not survive a motion to dismiss, the court need not permit the amendment.” Thiokol Corp.
v. Dep’t of Treasury, State of Mich., Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376, 383 (6th Cir. 1993). Whether to
grant or deny an amendment under Rule 15(a) is usually a matter within the district court’s
discretion, but it must state a basis for any denial of such a motion. Riverview Health, 601 F.3d at
512.
B. ANALYSIS
This case presents several factors supporting leave to amend, including the complexity of

the case and the lack of any indication of bad faith or intentional delay in amending the complaint.
Moreover, the plaintiff’s motion was filed well before the March 20, 2020 deadline for motions to
amend in this case. (See Doc. No. 28.) The defendants expressly “do not contend there has been
any undue delay in filing, bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or undue prejudice” in
connection with the plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. No. 35 at 2.)
Instead, the defendants suggest the motion should be denied because “Plaintiff’s counsel
gave no notice of an intent to amend the complaint, be it through a phone call, email, or other
correspondence.” (Id. at 3.) They devote much of their response to arguing the question of whether
the plaintiff was authorized to file his amendment without agreement or leave of court. (Id. at 1–
3.) But that question was rendered moot when the plaintiff filed his motion for leave, and the
defendants do not cite any law for the proposition that the plaintiff was obligated to notify them
before doing so. Any implication that the amendment might have been accomplished by consent
but for the alleged lack of notice is belied by the defendants’ current opposition. The lack of
advance notice, therefore, is not a basis for denying the amendment.
The defendants also oppose the plaintiff’s motion to amend on the basis that it would be
futile. (Doc. No. 35 at 3-4.) But for the reasons the court has explained herein, the plaintiff's
complaint as amended would withstand Defendant Parker’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the
plaintiff's motion to amend will be granted.
Hil. CONCLUSION
Defendant Parker’s motion to dismiss is grounded on a standard that does not apply to this
case and will be denied. For that reason, the plaintiff's timely motion to amend his complaint is
not futile, and the defendants have not established any other reason to deny it. The motion to
amend will therefore be granted.
An appropriate order shall enter.

bith tong —
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10436350. Public record. Not legal advice.