# Williams v. US Corrections, LLC.

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · September 24, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10435982

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** September 24, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10435982

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying standard articulated in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 102, 104–05 (1976)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JUSTIN WILLIAMS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) NO. 3:19-cv-00463
)
US CORRECTIONS, LLC, et al. ) JUDGE CAMPBELL
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Justin Williams, an inmate of the Northwest Correctional Complex (NWCX) in
Tiptonville, Tennessee, has filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1.)
Plaintiff has also filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) (Doc. No. 2)
and a Motion for PLRA Screening. (Doc. No. 6.)
The case is before the Court for ruling on the IFP application and for initial review pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e.
I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP

Under the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner bringing a civil action may apply for
permission to file suit without prepaying the filing fee of $350.00 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).
Because it is apparent from Plaintiff’s IFP application that he lacks the funds to pay the entire
filing fee in advance, his application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. However, the Court declines to
assess the filing fee because the fee has already been assessed against Plaintiff in connection with
his original attempt to file this lawsuit (Case No. 3:19-cv-00261), which was dismissed without
prejudice.
II. INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
A. PLRA Screening Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss any IFP complaint that is
facially frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Similarly, Section 1915A
provides that the Court shall conduct an initial review of any prisoner complaint against a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, and shall dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof
if the defects listed in Section 1915(e)(2)(B) are identified. Under both statutes, this initial review
of whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted asks whether it contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”
such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Applying this standard, the Court must view the complaint in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff and, again, must take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Tackett v.
M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551
F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). Furthermore, pro se pleadings must be liberally
construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However,
pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), nor can the Court “create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading.” Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)).

B. Section 1983 Standard
Plaintiff seeks to vindicate alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color
of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, to state a
Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person
acting under color of state law. Carl v. Muskegon Cty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014).
C. Allegations and Claims
Plaintiff alleges that on February 3, 2019, at 3:00 a.m., he was picked up in a prisoner

transport van driven by two unnamed Defendants, for transport from Gainesville, Florida to
NWCX in Tennessee. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) He alleges that the van was overcrowded, with seven
prisoners on board, and that the drivers had contacted dispatch to see if a larger van were available
but were denied. (Id.) Within ten minutes of beginning the 13½-hour trip, “the air-conditioning
and ventilation system completely stopped functioning.” (Id. at 2–3.) After about fifteen minutes
of banging on the side of the van, the prisoners succeeded in getting the drivers to stop the van.
(Id. at 3.) After being informed that the ventilation was not working, the drivers “fiddled with
several wires and switches for about 5 minutes” before determining that they could not fix the
problem. (Id.) The drivers advised the prisoners that they had “contacted dispatch and [were] told
to continue onward because no other vehicles were available,” and that “it was just a short ride to
the holding facility at Waycross, GA.” (Id.) They further stated that “it was Super Bowl night and
they couldn’t accept [any] delays because no matter what they had to be at home before the game.”
(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the van continued traveling north for approximately four hours before
arriving at the next stop, an “unknown county jail” where the prisoners exited the van and
“hydration” was made available. (Id. at 3, 4.) Plaintiff alleges that the group of prisoners “advised
the drivers that they needed to call another vehicle or get the a/c fixed,” but the drivers advised
that the destination was “like 30 minutes” away. (Id. at 3.) The prisoners got back in the van and
“continued onward for another 6 hours before the next stop.” (Id.)
By the time the van reached the next stop, Plaintiff “had suffered delusions and had lost
consciousness at least one time” due to the lack of air conditioning and ventilation. (Id.) When he
advised the drivers that he had severe heat exhaustion, the drivers gave him “a small sized
[G]atorade” but told him that they would not call 911 unless he appeared to stop breathing, because

they could not afford any delays. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that when another prisoner lost
consciousness in the drivers’ presence, they told him to “stop faking.” (Id.) The van continued on
after this stop for at least three hours before arriving in Waycross, Georgia. (Id. at 3–4.) During
that time, Plaintiff “continued to have delusions and exhibit signs of severe exhaustion, severe
dehydration, and possible heat stroke.” (Id.) He alleges that upon arrival at the Waycross holding
facility, he vomited twice. (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff alleges that the nurse at Waycross confirmed “that since [he] was not an inmate
of the county, the transport company would not pay for any kind of medical care except medicine
disbursement from [what] the detainees [had] with them . . . and medical emergencies.” (Id.) He
alleges that he was kept at the Waycross holding facility for four days, during which he was not
provided any medical treatment. (Id.) He “was then placed in a second transport van and
transported to [his] final destination without further incident.”
Plaintiff has sued US Corrections, LLC and US Prisoner Transport, entities he alleges to

be located in Nashville, Tennessee, as well as the unidentified drivers of the van who he alleges
work for US Corrections, LLC. (Doc. No. 1 at 1–2.) He claims a deprivation of his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment “by being subjected to extreme
heat and lack of ventilation and also for denying medical treatment(s).” (Id. at 5.) He seeks five
million dollars in compensatory damages “due to physical and emotional injuries,” and ten million
dollars in punitive damages. (Id. at 6.)
D. Analysis
As a preliminary matter, although the complaint describes events that took place in Florida
and Georgia, it alleges that the Defendants are based in Nashville and are residents of this judicial
district. Accordingly, venue is appropriate in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (c)(2).

Furthermore, although Defendants US Corrections, LLC and US Prisoner Transport appear to be
private companies, the Court assumes for purposes of this initial review that they and their drivers
were operating as state actors in this case, as they were performing an “exclusive government
function” in transporting state prisoners, something they could not have done without state
authorization. See Nguyen v. Prisoner Transportation Servs., No. 3:18-cv-00871, 2019 WL
429678, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 4, 2019) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939
(1982)).
1. Eighth Amendment Claim––Objective Component
Plaintiff claims that the conditions of his confinement during his transport from
Gainesville, Florida to Waycross, Georgia violated his right under the Eighth Amendment to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment. To state a viable Eighth Amendment conditions-of-

confinement claim, Plaintiff must allege a deprivation that is objectively, sufficiently serious.
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992). “Not every unpleasant experience a prisoner might
endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987). The Constitution does not
mandate comfortable conditions of confinement, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981),
but tolerates “routine discomfort” as part and parcel of the punishment criminal offenders must
endure. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
“It necessarily follows, then, that a pre-trial detainee or prisoner has not been subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment simply because he has been made to feel uncomfortable during the
course of a transfer from one prison to another.” Nguyen, 2019 WL 429678, at *5; see Myers v.

Transcor America, LLC, No. 3:08-0295, 2010 WL 3619831, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 9, 2010)
(allegations about physical conditions in prison transport van properly analyzed as conditions-of-
confinement claim under Rhodes). Rather, it is only those conditions that result in the denial of the
“minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” which constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. To meet this objective standard, “extreme deprivations are required.”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
Presuming the truth of Plaintiff’s factual allegations and viewing the complaint in the light
most favorable to him, the Court nonetheless finds that the conditions of his confinement on
February 3, 2019, were not so extreme as to make plausible his claim of cruel and unusual
punishment. While the Court does not doubt that the lack of air conditioning and ventilation in a
small, crowded space produced an uncomfortable environment, “uncomfortable and even harsh
living conditions are part of the penalty of incarceration.” Bain v. Transcor America, LLC, No.
3:08-0656, 2009 WL 4348598, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 24, 2009) (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347);

see also Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that cell temperatures
around 85 degrees during summer months, and reaching as high as 95 degrees on seven days during
July and August, were “to be expected in a residential setting in Florida in a building that is not
air-conditioned” and did not satisfy objective component of Eighth Amendment claim). Plaintiff
was confined to that uncomfortable environment for roughly 13 hours, which is not an excessive
period of time under the circumstances. Cf. Myers, 2010 WL 3619831, at *9 (finding that factors
including temporary nature of uncomfortable conditions in prison transport van, “affecting the
plaintiffs for only a day or two during their transport trips,” weighed against any constitutional
violation); Bain, 2009 WL 4348598 at *5 (finding that fluctuation between extreme heat and
extreme cold in transport van lasted “for only two days” and did not cause “condition so extreme

as to violate contemporary standards of decency”).
Furthermore, the van made two stops on the trip, during which Plaintiff was either
permitted to exit the van and hydrate or was provided a bottle of Gatorade. Although Plaintiff
alleges that he suffered delusions and, at some point prior to the final three hours of the drive, “at
least one” instance of loss of consciousness due to the heat in the van (Doc. No. 1 at 3), he does
not allege that he required emergency medical treatment or suffered any residual injuries. It thus
appears that the conditions of his transport, while unpleasant and uncomfortable, were not
unconstitutional. See Ricard v. P.T.S. of America, LLC, No. 3:14-cv-02308, 2015 WL 247883, at
*3 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 20, 2015) (dismissing complaint at screening stage for failure to allege “any
type of injury arising from” conditions on transport bus, which did not allow prisoner who had had
surgery on both knees to stretch his legs during 3-4 day trip); Wright v. J & S Extradition Servs.,
LLC, No. 3:11-0464, 2012 WL 1681812, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. May 11, 2012) (holding that even if
prisoner transport “had wantonly inflicted discomfort upon Plaintiff, it does not appear that the

acts complained of ‘required immediate medical attention or evidence[d] physical injury besides
discomfort’”) (quoting Quinlan v. Pers. Transp. Servs. Co., 329 F. App’x 246, 249 (11th Cir.
2009), which affirmed screening dismissal on basis that temporary chest pain, headache, back pain,
difficulty breathing, and denial of prisoner’s request to use asthma inhaler during transport van
ride were no more than de minimis injuries).
In short, the complaint fails to plausibly allege conditions of confinement extreme enough
to support the objective component of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. Cf. Nguyen, 2019 WL
429678, at *6 (finding objective seriousness of deprivation sufficiently alleged based on 15-day
van trip during which prisoners endured purposefully reckless driving which resulted in specific
physical injuries; necessity of eliminating bodily waste in van due to insufficient hygiene stops;

extreme temperatures due to van lacking ventilation and air conditioning; riding in complete
darkness and in restraints; and forced sleep deprivation); see also King v. Berghuis, No. 1:10-cv-
57, 2010 WL 565373, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2010) (“[A]bsent such extreme conditions raising
serious risks to prisoner health, the courts routinely have determined that claims concerning [cell]
ventilation were insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim.”) (collecting cases).
2. Eighth Amendment Claim––Subjective Component
Even if the complaint could be found to adequately allege a deprivation of the “minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities,” a conditions-of-confinement claim also requires plausible
allegations that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the health or safety of the prisoner.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302–03 (1991) (applying standard articulated in Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 102, 104–05 (1976)). Although the prisoner need not allege that a prison official acted
maliciously or sadistically, mere negligence is not enough to establish the level of subjective
culpability this standard requires. Id. at 305. Rather, a claim based on inhumane conditions of

confinement must be supported by allegations that a prison official knew of and disregarded an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; “the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Accordingly, “the Supreme Court has
noted that ‘an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did
not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as [deliberate
indifference].’” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 838).
In this case, the van drivers are alleged to have responded to the prisoners’ initial complaint
by attempting to repair the ventilation system and contacting dispatch to see if another van was

available, which it was not. At their first scheduled stop, the prisoners were allowed to exit the van
(Doc. No. 1 at 3) and were apparently provided the opportunity to hydrate. (See id. at 4 (“At no
time was any other hydration made available to me . . . except the stop made at an unknown county
jail . . . about 4-5 hours into the trip.”).) It was at their second stop, some ten hours into the trip,
when Plaintiff first advised the drivers that he was experiencing symptoms of “severe heat
exhaustion.” (Id. at 3.) The drivers responded by providing Plaintiff with a bottle of Gatorade and
telling him that they would not call 911 over such complaints, but would only do so if he “appeared
to stop breathing.” (Id.) They then proceeded to finish the remaining three hours of the trip. Based
on these allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that the drivers knew of
and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. At best, he has alleged that the drivers
should have known that he faced a more significant medical risk than dehydration and should have
responded by seeking emergency medical treatment once he reported his heat exhaustion
symptoms to them, rather than finishing the trip. (Id. at 4.) These allegations are more consistent

with a negligence theory than deliberate indifference.
3. Corporate Liability
Finally, to hold the corporate Defendants liable, Plaintiff cannot rely on a theory of
respondeat superior or vicarious liability, Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 817–18 (6th
Cir. 1996), but must allege an injury caused by the execution of some corporate policy or custom.
Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App’x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001). Even if Plaintiff has properly
alleged that the drivers’ decisions were guided by corporate policy,1 he has failed to adequately
allege that those decisions or policies caused more than the “uncomfortable and even harsh living
conditions [that] are part of the penalty of incarceration.” Bain, 2009 WL 4348598, at *4.
In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to support the Eighth Amendment violation

he claims. The complaint is therefore subject to dismissal.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP (Doc. No. 2) is
GRANTED; his Motion for PLRA screening (Doc. No. 6) is GRANTED; and the complaint is
DISMISSED for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

1 Plaintiff alleges that “dispatch” directed the initial decision to continue the trip after the van’s
ventilation system malfunctioned because no other vehicles were available. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) He further
alleges that “the transport company” would only approve payment for medical treatment in an emergency.
(Id. at 4.)
This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(1).
It is so ORDERED.

WILLIAM L. CAMPBEI J
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10435982. Public record. Not legal advice.