# Miller v. Patterson

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · July 13, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10435464

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** July 13, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10435464

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding confinement in administrative segregation “three years and running” failed to state Eighth Amendment claim
- holding sixty-one days in segregation is not atypical and significant

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT GREENEVILLE

CODY MILLER, )
) Case No. 2:23-cv-79
Plaintiff, )
) Judge Travis R. McDonough
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Cynthia R. Wyrick
MATT PATTERSON )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Court is in receipt of a pro se prisoner’s civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (Doc. 2) and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1). For the reasons set
forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.
1) and DISMISSES the complaint (Doc. 2) for failure to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief
may be granted.
I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
A review of Plaintiff’s certified-inmate-trust-account record demonstrates that Plaintiff
lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the filing fee in a lump sum. Accordingly, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915, this motion (Doc. 1) will be GRANTED.
Plaintiff will be ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s
inmate trust account will be DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 220 West
Depot Street, Suite 200, Greeneville, Tennessee, 37743 as an initial partial payment, the greater
of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s inmate trust account;
or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in his inmate trust account for the
six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A), (B).
Thereafter, the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account shall submit twenty percent (20%) of
Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account for the
preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the
full filing fee of three-hundred-fifty dollars ($350.00) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. §§

1914(a), 1915(b)(2).
To ensure compliance with this fee-collection procedure, the Clerk will be DIRECTED
to mail a copy of this memorandum opinion to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution
where Plaintiff is now confined and the Court’s financial deputy. This memorandum opinion
shall be placed in Plaintiff’s prison file and follow him if he is transferred to another correctional
institution.
II. COMPLAINT SCREENING
A. Screening Standard
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen prisoner

complaints and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Benson v.
O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme
Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff might later establish
undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not state a plausible claim.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of

a claim which are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible claim for
relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. However, courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings filed
in civil-rights cases and hold them to a less stringent standard than “formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
B. Allegations of Complaint
Carter County Jail Captain Matt Patterson placed Plaintiff on administrative protective
custody/segregation (hereinafter “administrative segregation”), despite Plaintiff never requesting
such a status. (Doc. 2, at 3–4.) In administrative segregation, Plaintiff is housed in a medical
cell where he is constantly on camera, behind two doors where he cannot hear or see the

television, “denied religion program,” denied inmate outreach programs, denied full access to
law books, and made to take recreation time last and alone. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff contends that on
April 24 and 25, 2023, Captain Patterson gave Plaintiff recreation time with other inmates, but
that beginning April 26, 2023, Plaintiff was back to having recreation time alone. (Id.) Plaintiff
contends that Captain Patterson’s conduct violates his Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment, it is “crude an[d] libelous[,]” and it is a “defamation of [his]
character.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that he has had to seek mental-health services due to the
isolation and unfair treatment. (Id. at 4–5.)
Aggrieved, Plaintiff filed this action seeking $1 million in damages for pain and
suffering. (Id. at 5.)
C. Analysis
i. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Plaintiff’s claim that his placement in administrative segregation violates the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments contains both objective and
subjective elements. Richmond v. Settles, 450 F. App’x 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
As to the objective element, “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.”
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Accordingly, “[n]ot every unpleasant
experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir.
1987). Instead, only conditions of confinement that involve “the wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain,” that are “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime,” or that result

in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” will violate the Eighth
Amendment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346–47. Therefore, in examining claims alleging that the
conditions of a plaintiff’s confinement violate the Eighth Amendment, courts must determine
whether the risk of which the plaintiff complains is “so grave that it violates contemporary
standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner
must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today’s society chooses to
tolerate.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993); see also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
As to the subjective element, a plaintiff must establish that the prison official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind—that of deliberate indifference to a substantial risk that the
prisoner would suffer serious harm. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994); see also Richmond, 450 F. App’x at 455 (“The subjective component requires
the plaintiff to demonstrate that the prison officials acted wantonly, with deliberate indifference
to the plaintiff’s serious needs.”).
Mere “placement in segregation” will not sustain an Eighth Amendment claim, because it

is “a routine discomfort that is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society.” Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Murray v.
Unknown Evert, 84 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003)). Instead, Plaintiff may support an Eighth
Amendment claim based on his segregated status only by alleging that the segregation deprived
him of some basic human need. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347-48; see also Harden-Bey, 524 F.3d
at 795 (finding confinement in administrative segregation “three years and running” failed to
state Eighth Amendment claim). Plaintiff alleges that he receives fewer privileges than inmates
in general population, but he does not maintain that he has been denied food, shelter, clothing,
medical attention, or other basic human needs. In fact, Plaintiff confirms that he receives

recreation time and has access to mental-health care despite his placement in administrative
segregation. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.
ii. Due Process
Liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court otherwise considers whether
Plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation states a cognizable due process claim. To do
so, Plaintiff must demonstrate a liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause. See
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to
invoke its procedural protection must establish one of these interests at stake.”). This requires
Plaintiff to show that being deprived of a right or interest imposes on him an “atypical and
significant hardship” relative to the ordinary circumstances of prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Plaintiff has no liberty interest in either his housing placement or in his security
classification. See, e.g., Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). And the Sixth Circuit

has stated under various circumstances that “administrative segregations have repeatedly been
held not to involve an ‘atypical and significant’ hardship implicating a protected liberty interest
without regard to duration.” Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that an inmate “could not
after Sandin, argue that placement in administrative segregation is an ‘atypical and significant
hardship’”); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that mere
“placement in administrative segregation was not an atypical and significant hardship, as
intended by Sandin”).
Rather, administrative segregation is considered atypical and significant only in “extreme

circumstances,” Joseph v. Curtin, 410 F. App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010), such as a “prolonged or
indefinite” period in restrictive conditions, Bishawi v. Ne. Ohio Corr. Ctr., 628 F. App’x 339,
344 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224). Plaintiff does not advise how long he
has been held in administrative segregation and forced to take recreation time alone, and
therefore, he has failed to allege a prolonged period of extreme deprivation sufficient to establish
a cognizable due process claim.1 See, e.g., Bishawi, 628 F. App’x at 344 (holding sixty-nine

1 Plaintiff has not raised a First Amendment claim that his association rights have been infringed,
but the Court nonetheless notes that the Supreme Court has found freedom of association
“among the rights least compatible with incarceration” and thus, “[s]ome curtailment of that
freedom must be expected in the prison context.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003).
Limiting an administratively segregated inmate’s contact with other prisoners bears a legitimate
days in administrative segregation did not constitute due process violation); Joseph, 410 F.
App’x at 868 (holding sixty-one days in segregation is not atypical and significant). Because
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his confinement in administrative segregation is atypical and
significant relevant to the ordinary incidents of prison life, the Court DISMISSES this due
process claim.

iii. Privileges
Plaintiff also contends that he has been denied access to various privileges, including
access to the television and outreach programs, while in administrative segregation. (Doc. 2, at
4.) However, Plaintiff possesses no constitutional right to such programs or amenities. See, e.g.,
Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 429 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Prisoners have no constitutional right
to rehabilitation, education, or jobs.”); Vick v. Core Civic, 329 F. Supp. 3d 426, 451 (M.D. Tenn.
2018) (“Simply stated, there is no constitutional right to television while incarcerated.”) (citing
Rawls v. Sundquist, 929 F. Supp. 284, 288–89 (M.D. Tenn. 1996)). Thus, the Court
DISMISSES this claim.

iv. Religion Programs
Plaintiff maintains that he has been “denied religion program[]s” as a result of his
placement in administrative segregation. (Doc. 2, at 4.) Prisoners retain a First Amendment
right to freely exercise their religion, but that right may be restricted in a means reasonably
related to a legitimate penological interest. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348–49
(1987); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). In
ensuring that this right is protected, prisons do not have to respond to every religious request of

penological interest of ensuring institutional security as well as the individual inmate’s safety.
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (requiring challenged regulation to bear rational
relation to a legitimate penological interest).
an inmate; they only must allow prisoners a reasonable opportunity to exercise their faith. Cruz,
405 U.S. at 322 n.2.
Here, Plaintiff has presented only a conclusory allegation that he was denied religious
programs, and his complaint is devoid of any facts that would allow the Court to plausibly infer
that his constitutional right to exercise his faith has been impermissibly infringed. As such, the

Court DISMISSES this claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570 (holding plaintiff must plead
enough facts to state a facially plausible claim).
v. Access to Courts
Plaintiff alleges next that he is denied full access to law books while in administrative
segregation. (Doc. 2, at 4.) However, detention facilities may “reasonably limit the times,
places, and manner in which inmates may engage in legal research and preparation of leg[al]
papers so long as the regulations do not frustrate access to the courts.” Walker v. Mintzes, 771
F.2d 920, 931–32 (6th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff has not alleged that he has suffered some legal harm
because of the allegedly restricted access, and, therefore, this allegation fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996) (holding
inmate claiming lack of access must demonstrate his prison officials impeded non-frivolous civil
rights or criminal action); Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (“An inmate who
claims his access to the courts was denied fails to state a claim without any showing of prejudice
to his litigation.”). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this claim.
vi. Equal Protection
To the extent Plaintiff’s complaint may be liberally construed to allege that Plaintiff has
been denied privileges accessible to other inmates, the Court considers whether the alleged
disparity in treatment violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, which
provides that “[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. “To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must
adequately plead that the government treated the plaintiff ‘disparately as compared to similarly
situated persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a fundamental right, targets a
suspect class, or has no rational basis.’” Ctr. For Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648

F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of
Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 299 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint does not provide a factual basis for his claim that he is treated
differently from other similarly situated prisoners, and such “conclusory allegations of
unconstitutional conduct” are insufficient to state an equal protection claim. See Mosley v. Batts,
No. 19-5355, 2019 WL 8399882, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 2019) (quoting Chapman v. City of
Detroit, 808 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this claim.
vii. Libel and Defamation
Plaintiff contends that Captain Patterson’s decision to place him in administrative

segregation despite any absence of wrongdoing is libelous and defamatory. (Doc. 2, at 4.)
However, claims filed under § 1983 are comprised of two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights
“secured by the ‘Constitution and laws’ of the United States” (2) committed by a defendant
acting “under color of [state] law.” Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)
(citations omitted). Defamation and libel do not state a § 1983 claim, because harm to one’s
reputation does not implicate a protected “liberty” or “property” interest under due process
principles. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (holding “interest in reputation . . . is neither
‘liberty’ nor ‘property’ guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of law”);
Voyticky v. Vill. of Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Absent a further injury, such
as loss of a government job or loss of a legal right or status, defamation, by itself, does not
constitute a remediable constitutional claim.”).
Further, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim under state law. Libel is
written defamation. Quality Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Bluff City Buick Co., Inc., 876 S.W.2d 818,
820 (Tenn. 1994). To establish a case of defamation, a plaintiff must prove that a party: (1)

published a statement; (2) with knowledge that the statement was false and defaming to the
other; or (3) with reckless regard for the truth of the statement or with negligence in failing to
ascertain the truth of the statement. Sullivan v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 571
(Tenn. 1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[I]t is injury to one’s reputation for good
character with the public which is necessary for an actionable claim of defamation.” Davis v.
The Tennessean, 83 S.W.3d 125, 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Plaintiff suffered no such injury by
his mere placement in administrative segregation. See Ali v. Moore, 984 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1998) (finding that libel claims based on depictions that do not subject plaintiff to
“‘public hatred, contempt or ridicule’ and, thus, do not constitute a ‘serious threat to [his]

reputation’” are frivolous) (citation omitted). Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s
claims for defamation and libel both under § 1983 and under state law.
viii. Privacy
Plaintiff alleges that he is under constant video surveillance in administrative segregation.
(Doc. 2, at 4.) Liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court construes this as an
allegation that the constant surveillance is an unreasonable “search” in violation of Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment rights as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kent v. Johnson,
821 F.2d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1987). Typically, prisoners maintain no right to privacy in their
cells. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527–28 (1984) (“A right of privacy in traditional
Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual
surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order.
We are satisfied that society would insist that the prisoner’s expectation of privacy always yield
to what must be considered the paramount interest in institutional security.”). However, the
Sixth Circuit has recognized an inmate’s limited right to bodily privacy under the Fourth

Amendment in circumstances whether the prisoner is forced to expose himself to a member of
the opposite sex. See, e.g., Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir. 1992) (observing
right to privacy claim under Fourth Amendment where male inmate forced to endure outdoor
strip search in presence of female correctional officers); Mills v. City of Barbourville, 389 F.3d
568, 579 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that “a prison policy forcing prisoners . . . to be exposed to
regular surveillance by officers of the opposite sex while naked—for example while in the
shower or using a toilet in a cell—would provide the basis of a claim on which relief could be
granted”). Plaintiff has not alleged similar facts to allow a plausible inference that his right to
privacy has been violated. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES this claim.

ix. Absence of Physical Injury
Finally, the Court notes that under the PLRA, a lawsuit brought by an institutionalized
person requires a “physical” injury to permit recovery for mental or emotional injury. See 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury. . . .”). Plaintiff has not alleged any physical injury
because of the constitutional violations alleged in his complaint, and, therefore, recovery for
“pain and suffering” is not permitted under the PLRA.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00;
3. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit the filing

fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;
4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this memorandum opinion to the
custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined and the
Court’s financial deputy;
5. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983,
and this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A;
and
6. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good
faith and would be totally frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 24.

AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT SHALL ENTER.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10435464. Public record. Not legal advice.