# Gehling v. Sliager

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · April 20, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10434883

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** April 20, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10434883

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding inmate was not a state actor where he was not acting under color of state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage”
- finding inmate was not a state actor where he was not acting under color of state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

SETH GEHLING, )
) Case No. 3:21-cv-400
Plaintiff, )
) Judge Travis R. McDonough
v. )
)
BILLY SLIAGER, RICKY OAKS, and )
JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S )
DEPARTMENT, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This is a prisoner’s pro se complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Billy Sliager, another inmate, masturbated in his presence and
later engaged in unwanted sexual behavior with him while he was asleep. Plaintiff also alleges
that Sliager took these actions after he had filed a Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”)
complaint and had spoken to Defendant Chief Ricky Oaks about Sliager’s prior behavior [Doc.
1]. For the reasons set forth below, this action will proceed only as to Plaintiff’s claim that
Defendant Ricky Oaks failed to protect Plaintiff from Defendant Inmate Sliager, and all other
claims and Defendants will be DISMISSED.
I. SCREENING STANDARD
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen prisoner
complaints and shall, at any time, sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious,
fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal
standard that the Supreme Court set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a claim
under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the
language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to
survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim are insufficient to state a
plausible claim for relief. Id. at 681. Likewise, an allegation that does not raise a plaintiff’s right
to relief “above a speculative level” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. However, courts liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to
a less stringent standard than lawyer-drafted pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972).
II. ALLEGATIONS

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, in the months after he began to share a cell with
Sliager, who has been charged with rape of a child and has faced multiple charges for sexual
assault and battery, Sliager would masturbate in front of Plaintiff while they were talking “about
something unrelated” [Doc. 1 at 3–4, 6]. Plaintiff also alleges that Sliager would “act
childish[ly]” with Plaintiff in the cell but act differently at recreation time, and that Defendant
Inmate Sliager would offer to give Plaintiff money to order commissary [Id. at 6].
On an unspecified date that Plaintiff cannot remember, Plaintiff filed a PREA complaint
regarding Sliager and told Defendant Chief Ricky Oaks that Sliager would masturbate in front of
Plaintiff while staring at him [Id.]. But, later that week, Sliager engaged in sexual activity with
Plaintiff while he was asleep [Id. at 4, 6]. During this sexual activity, Sliager held Plaintiff down
and told Plaintiff he loved him while Plaintiff was “in complete shock [and] feared for [his] life
as [Sliager] victimized [him]” [Id. at 4, 6]. Sliager then told Plaintiff that he would take all of
Plaintiff’s trays if Plaintiff did not allow him to engage in sexual activity with Plaintiff again,
and that “there would be no one that would love [Plaintiff] like he did” [Id.].

Plaintiff has sued Sliager, whose position he lists as “Jefferson County Jail,” and
Defendant Chief Ricky Oaks, whose name he follows with “Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office”
[Id. at 3].
III. ANALYSIS
A claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that a person
acting under color of state law deprived him a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While Plaintiff
has named Sliager as a Defendant in this action, nothing in the complaint suggests that any of
Sliager’s actions constitute state action, as required for him to be liable for those actions under
§ 1983. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590–91 (6th Cir. 2003) (setting forth the relevant tests

for whether a private party may be considered a state actor for purposes of §1983); Wolotsky v.
Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992) (providing that “[t]he principal inquiry in
determining whether a private party’s actions constitute ‘state action’ under the Fourteenth
Amendment is whether the party’s actions may be ‘fairly attributable to the state.’”
(quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)); Nobles v. Brown, 985 F.2d
235, 238 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding inmate was not a state actor where he was not acting under
color of state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage”). Accordingly, the complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 as to Sliager, and he will be
DISMISSED.
Additionally, it is unclear if Plaintiff intended to name the Jefferson County Jail and/or
the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office as Defendants. But to the extent that he did, they are not
suable entities under § 1983. See Anciani v. Davidson Cty. Sheriff Office, No. 3:19-cv-169, 2019
WL 1002503, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28, 2019) (“It is well established that in Tennessee federal
courts, a sheriff’s office or police department is not a ‘person’ subject to suit under 42 U.S.C.

§1983”) (citing Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994)); Marbry v. Corr. Med.
Serv., No. 99-6706, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (holding that “the Shelby
County Jail is not an entity subject to suit under §1983”). Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege
that any act alleged in the complaint resulted from a custom or policy of Jefferson County, such
that the Court could liberally construe the complaint to state a claim against this municipality.
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). However, as Plaintiff adequately
alleges that Defendant Chief Oaks failed to protect Plaintiff from a risk of harm from his
cellmate, this claim will proceed.
IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above:
1. Even liberally construing the complaint in favor of Plaintiff, it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted under § 1983, except as to Plaintiff’s claim that
Defendant Chief Oaks failed to protect him from his cellmate;

2. All other claims and Defendants are DISMISSED;

3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a service packet (a blank summons and
USM 285 form) for Defendant Chief Oaks;

4. Plaintiff is ORDERED to complete the service packet and return it to the Clerk’s
Office within twenty (20) days of entry of this order;

5. At that time, the summons will be signed and sealed by the Clerk and forwarded to
the U.S. Marshal for service, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4;
6. Service on Defendant Chief Oaks shall be made pursuant to Rule 4(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4.04(1) and (10) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure, either by mail or personally if mail service is not effective;

7. Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that if he fails to timely return the completed service packet,
this action may be dismissed;

8. Defendant Chief Oaks shall answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within
twenty-one (21) days from the date of service. If this Defendant fails to timely
respond to the complaint, it may result in entry of judgment by default; and

9. Plaintiff is ORDERED to immediately inform the Court and Defendant Chief Oaks
or his counsel of record of any address changes in writing. Pursuant to Local Rule
83.13, it is the duty of a pro se party to promptly notify the Clerk and the other parties
to the proceedings of any change in his or her address, to monitor the progress of the
case, and to prosecute or defend the action diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13. Failure
to provide a correct address to this Court within fourteen days of any change in
address may result in the dismissal of this action.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10434883. Public record. Not legal advice.