# Prince v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · March 23, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10434367

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** March 23, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA

MIRIAM PRINCE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No: 1:19-cv-317
v. )
) Judge Christopher H. Steger
ANDREW SAUL, )
Commissioner of Social Security )
Administration, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Miriam Prince seeks judicial review under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act
("Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), from her denial by the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration regarding her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income under Titles II and XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34, 1381-83f. [See Doc. 1].
The parties consented to the entry of final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge, according to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), with an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
[Doc. 9].
For reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. 13] will be
DENIED; the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 15 ] will be GRANTED;
and judgment will be entered AFFIRMING the Commissioner's decision.
I. Procedural History

In March 2017, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, alleging disability of January 21, 2017.
(Tr. 15). Plaintiff's claims were denied initially as well as on reconsideration. (Id.). As a result,
Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. (Id.).
In July 2018, ALJ Lauren Logan Benedict heard testimony from Plaintiff, Plaintiff's
attorney representative, and a vocational expert. (Id.). The ALJ then rendered her decision, finding
that Plaintiff was not under a “disability" as defined by the Act. (Tr. 25). Following the ALJ's

decision, Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the denial of benefits; however, that
request was denied. (Tr. 1). Exhausting her administrative remedies, Plaintiff then filed her
Complaint in November 2019, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision under
§ 405(g) [Doc. 1]. The parties filed competing dispositive motions, and this matter is ripe for
adjudication.
II. Findings by the ALJ

The ALJ made the following findings concerning the decision on Plaintiff's application for
benefits:
1. Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through December 31, 2021.

2. Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 21,
2017, the alleged onset date. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 et seq.).

3. Plaintiff had the following medically-determinable impairments: depression
and anxiety (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 et. seq.).

4. Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
404.1525, and 404.1526).

5. Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work.

6. Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as a warehouse worker,
quality control inspector, and assembly line worker. This work does not
require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the
Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (20 C.F.R. § 404.1565).
7. Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, from January 21, 2017, through the date of the ALJ's decision (20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)).

(Tr. at 15-25).

III. Standard of Review

This case involves an application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). An individual
qualifies for DIB if they: (1) are insured for DIB; (2) have not reached the age of retirement; (3)
have filed an application for DIB; and (4) are disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1).
The determination of disability under the Act is an administrative decision. To establish
disability under the Social Security Act, plaintiffs must show that they are unable to engage in any
substantial gainful activity due to the existence of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Abbot v. Sullivan,
905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). The Commissioner employs a five-step sequential evaluation
to determine whether an adult claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; 416.920. The following
five issues are addressed in order: (1) if a claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity, she
is not disabled; (2) if a claimant does not have a severe impairment, she is not disabled; (3) if the
claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, she is disabled; (4) if the claimant is
capable of returning to work she has done in the past, she is not disabled; (5) if the claimant can
do other work that exists in significant numbers in the regional or the national economy, she is not
disabled. Id. If the ALJ makes a dispositive finding at any step, the inquiry ends without proceeding
to the next step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; 416.920; Skinner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 902
F.2d 447, 449-50 (6th Cir. 1990). Once, however, the claimant makes a prima facie case that she
cannot return to her former occupation, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there
is work in the national economy that the claimant can perform considering her age, education, and
work experience. Richardson v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 735 F.2d 962, 964 (6th Cir.
1984); Noe v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 588, 595 (6th Cir. 1975).
The standard of judicial review is whether substantial evidence supports the findings of the

Commissioner and whether the Commissioner made any legal errors in the process of reaching his
decision. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (adopting and defining substantial
evidence standard in the context of Social Security cases); Landsaw v. Sec'y of Health and Human
Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). Even if there is evidence on the other side, if there is
evidence to support the Commissioner's findings, he must be affirmed. Ross v. Richardson, 440
F.2d 690, 691 (6th Cir. 1971). Courts may not reweigh the evidence and substitute their judgment
for that of the Commissioner merely because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a
different conclusion. The substantial-evidence standard allows considerable latitude to
administrative decision-makers. It presupposes a zone of choice within which the decision-makers
can go either way, without interference by the courts. Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027 (6th Cir.

1994) (citing Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 548 (6th Cir. 1986)); Crisp v. Sec'y, Health and
Human Servs., 790 F.2d 450 n.4 (6th Cir. 1986).
Courts may consider any evidence in the record, regardless of whether the ALJ cited it. See
Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). But courts may not consider
any evidence that was not before the ALJ. Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir. 2001).
Also, courts are not obligated to scour the record for errors not identified by the claimant.
Howington v. Astrue, No. 2:08-cv-189, 2009 WL 2579620, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 18, 2009)
(stating that assignments of error not made by claimant were waived). Further, “issues [that] are
‘adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,
are deemed waived[.]'" Kennedy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 87 F. App'x 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996)).
IV. Analysis

Plaintiff contends that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's decision since
Plaintiff has severe back problems. [Doc. 14 at PageID #: 419-22]. Plaintiff also asserts that the
ALJ committed legal error by failing to consider the medical opinions properly. [Id. at PageID #:
422-25]. The Court will address each issue in turn.
A. Severe Impairment
Plaintiff's initial complaint is that the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff did not suffer a
severe impairment as to Plaintiff's back. [Doc. 14 at PageID #: 419 ("The outcome of the entire
case depends upon whether Plaintiff's back/spine problems are ‘severe[.]'")]. A “severe
impairment" is an impairment or combination of impairments, “which significantly limits your
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). An impairment or
combination of impairments is not “severe" if it has no more than a minimal impact on an

individual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522; Social
Security Ruling (SSR) 85-28, 96-3p. Thus, to establish that her impairments were “severe,"
Plaintiff must show that her impairments more than minimally impact her ability to perform basic
work activities for the twelve-month durational requirements under the Act. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1522. As explained in S.S.R. 85-28,"[t]he severity requirement cannot be satisfied when
medical evidence shows that the person has the ability to perform basic work activities, as required
in most jobs." S.S.R. 85-28; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1522(b)(1)-(2) (defining “basic work activities"
concerning physical capacities); 404.1522(b)(3)-(6) (defining “basic work activities" for mental
capacities). The evidence that Plaintiff had a medically determinable impairment must come from
acceptable medical sources; while evidence from other medical sources may be used to show the
severity of the impairment and how it affects her ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a),
(d)(1). Yet, the existence of a medically-determinable impairment alone is insufficient to overcome
the minimal-impact hurdle. See Despins v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 257 F. App'x 923, 930 (6th Cir.

2007); Foster v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 1988). That is, even if Plaintiff has been
diagnosed or treated for a condition, this diagnosis or treatment does not establish that the
impairment was "severe."
Here, the ALJ reviewed the evidence from Plaintiff's alleged onset date and found that
Plaintiff's back pain was not severe. (Tr. 19-24). Plaintiff's objections were based upon her
subjective complaints; but the ALJ was not required to take Plaintiff at her word. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(a). An ALJ's findings on credibility "are to be accorded great weight and deference,
particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a witness's demeanor and
credibility." Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). But those findings
must be supported by substantial evidence. Id. And "discounting credibility to a certain degree is

appropriate where an ALJ finds contradictions among the medical reports, claimant's testimony,
and other evidence." Id.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of her symptoms were inconsistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the
record. (Tr. 18-23). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 ("In determining whether you are disabled, we
consider all of your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your symptoms can
reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.").
As a basis for this finding, the ALJ found the lack of objective evidence to support Plaintiff's
complaints, her daily-living activities, discrepancies within the record, and the medical opinions
not being supportive of the alleged disability. (Tr. at 18-23). An ALJ may find a claimant's
statements "less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of
complaints, or if the medical reports or records show that the individual is not following the
treatment as prescribed and there are no good reasons for this failure." See S.S.R. 96–7p, 1996 WL

374186, at *7.
Plaintiff's medical file as to back pain mostly includes only consultative examination
reports, and even those do not show significant physical impairments. (Tr. 324-45). Dr. Woodrow
Wilson, a consultative examiner, noted that Plaintiff received"[n]o treatment for her back at all[.]"
(Tr. 325). Plaintiff did not have any x-rays or magnetic resonance imaging of her back, and she
had not undergone physical therapy, injections, or surgery. (Tr. 325). After conducting a
consultative exam, Dr. Wilson observed that Plaintiff could get out of a chair without difficulty
and that her gait was normal with a good cadence. (Tr. 326). Plaintiff could, observed Dr. Wilson,
tandem walk six steps without much difficulty, go up on her toes, back on her heels, and balance
weight on each foot independently. (Tr. 326).

Barbara James, Ph.D., also performed a psychological consultative exam on Plaintiff. (Tr.
329) Dr. James observed that Plaintiff was overweight, had normal posture, and displayed a normal
gait. (Id.).
During the ALJ's hearing, Plaintiff stated that she had not received any treatment for her
back because she did not have health insurance. (Tr. 36). But, it is plaintiffs who bear the burden
of showing that they are disabled. If plaintiffs are denied treatment for financial reasons, they must
present evidence that they sought (and were denied) treatment due to financial reasons. There is
no indication that Plaintiff ever was denied medical treatment due to her financial circumstances.
Plaintiff did not seek free medical treatment from a hospital or emergency room, or any rural health
clinic or health department with care for patients with no health insurance. See Moore v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., No. 14-1123-T, 2015 WL 1931425, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 28, 2015) (citing Goff v.
Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2005) ("However, there is no evidence Goff was ever denied
medical treatment due to financial reasons.")); Tollison v. Colvin, Case No. 2:12-CV-00004, 2014

WL 2864204, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. June 24, 2014) ("Because the burden is on the claimant to show
that she is disabled, here, Plaintiff was required to present evidence of the efforts she made to
obtain funding for a surgical repair . . . .").
Finally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's functional capabilities were also supported by the
medical opinion of state-agency physician, Martin Rubinowitz, M.D. (Tr. 22). Dr. Rubinowitz
found that Plaintiff's back impairments were not severe because she could stand and walk without
assistance. (Tr. 83, 105). The ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Rubinowitz's opinion because the
record as a whole supported it. (Tr. 22) See Reeves v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App'x 267, 275
(6th Cir. 2015) ("ALJ gave appropriate weight to Dr. Caldwell's and Dr. Torello's opinions because
both were supported by the record as a whole.").

The evidence regarding the severity of Plaintiff's impairments is inconsistent and can
support more than one reasonable conclusion. Therefore, the Court will not second-guess the ALJ's
finding since the ALJ gave numerous reasons, supported by the record, for determining that
Plaintiff's subjective allegations were not entirely credible. See Ulman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 693
F.3d 709, 713–14 (6th Cir. 2012) ("As long as the ALJ cite[s] substantial, legitimate evidence to
support his factual conclusions, we are not to second-guess.").
B. The ALJ's consideration of the medical opinions
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly weighed the opinions of Plaintiff's physicians:
Woodrow Wilson, M.D., Frank Pennington, M.D., and Jan Crean, M.D. [Doc. 14 at PageID#: 422-
25]. According to Plaintiff,"[a]ll three of these physicians found more than 'minimal' or 'slight'
limitations with regard to Plaintiff's ability to stand, walk, lift and sit in a competitive work
environment." [Id. at PageID #: 421]. And,"[s]urely with three out of four physicians assigning
limitations significant enough to preclude Plaintiff's past work, the evidence of record sufficiently

detracts from the Secretary's decision and establishes that substantial evidence does not support
finding Plaintiff's back problems as 'non-severe.'" [Id. at PageID #: 422].
In response, the undersigned would first note that Plaintiff is correct in saying that each of
these three physicians assigned more significant restrictions to Plaintiff than the ALJ ultimately
found to be applicable. However, such discrepancy does not mean that the ALJ committed legal
error. The Sixth Circuit, in Shepard v. Commissioner of Social Security, rejected a similar
argument. 705 F. App'x 435, 442–43 (6th Cir. 2017). In that case, "Shepard argue[d] that the ALJ's
[residual functional capacity (“R.F.C.”)] lacks substantial evidence because no physician opined
that Shepard was capable of light work." Id. at 442. Rejecting that argument, our appellate court
noted that the ALJ has the "responsibility of determining the R.F.C. based on her evaluation of the

medical and non-medical evidence." Id. (quoting Rudd v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 531 Fed.Appx. 719,
728 (6th Cir. 2013)). The fact that medical sources assigned greater limitations does not invalidate
the ALJ's determination of residual functional capacity because it is the ALJ's responsibility to
formulate the R.F.C. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) ("Although we consider opinions from
medical sources on issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity . . . the final responsibility
for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner."). In other words, an R.F.C. assessment
is based upon the evaluation of the evidence as a whole, not just medical opinions. See Brown v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 602 F. App'x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2015) ("The district judge correctly decided
that 'neither the applicable regulations nor Sixth Circuit law limit[s] the ALJ to consideration of
direct medical opinions on the issue of RFC.'") (remanded on other grounds).
Second, substantial evidence supports the finding that the ALJ properly evaluated each
physician's opinion. ALJs are not required to explain the reasons for rejecting a consulting
physician's opinion like they are for treating-physician opinions. See Norris v. Comm'r. of Soc.

Sec., 461 F. App'x 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[A]n ALJ need only explain its reasons for rejecting
a treating source statement because such an opinion carries 'controlling weight' under the SSA.")
(citing Smith v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he S.S.A. requires
ALJs to give reasons for only treating sources."). But ALJs are not required to give controlling
weight to a treating physician if the treating physician's opinion is inconsistent with other
substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). That is, when
an ALJ does not give a treating physician's opinion controlling weight, the ALJ must give "good
reasons" for the weight given. § 404.1527(c)(2). A decision denying benefits "must contain
specific reasons for the weight given to the treating source's medical opinion, supported by
evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent

reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons
for the weight." Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 at *5 (July 2, 1996). "The requirement of
reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants understand the disposition of their cases," particularly
in situations where a claimant knows that their physician has deemed them disabled and thus
"might be especially bewildered when told by an administrative bureaucracy that [they] [are] not,
unless some reason for the agency's decision is supplied." Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d
Cir. 1999). The requirement also ensures that the ALJ will apply the treating physician rule and
permits a meaningful review of its application. See Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32–33 (2d
Cir. 2004).
Unlike treating-source opinions, however, opinions from examining and non-examining
sources are never entitled to controlling weight, and the ALJ is not required to give "good reasons"
for the weight given to non-treating source opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Smith v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir. 2007) ("S.S.A. requires ALJs to give reasons for

only treating sources"). The ALJ is merely to consider their opinions under the relevant regulatory
factors and is not bound by any findings made by these sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Under this
deferential standard, ALJs are required only to (1) consider the opinions and (2) explain in the
decision the weight given to the opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
Turning to Dr. Wilson's opinion, the ALJ explained how Dr. Wilson's opinion was
inconsistent with the record. Consequently, he appropriately assigned such opinion little weight.
(Tr. 22). Dr. Wilson's opinion was internally inconsistent in that he observed that Plaintiff seemed
to be "functioning okay." (Tr. 326). Beyond that, Dr. Wilson's opinion was inconsistent with other
clinical observations and with Plaintiff's activities of daily living. It further appeared that Dr.
Wilson relied heavily on Plaintiff's subjective complaints in reaching his opinion because he noted

that her chronic back pain had "not been evaluated well," she had an "apparent" history of diabetes
mellitus, and "she thinks" she could lift up to 20 pounds occasionally. (Tr. 327). The ALJ is not
required to accept wholesale Dr. Wilson's opinion. Indeed, here it appeared that Dr. Wilson
rendered his opinion based upon Plaintiff's self-assessment. The ALJ is charged with the
responsibility of interpreting Dr. Wilson's medical opinion in light of the totality of the evidence.
Griffith v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F. App'x 555, 564 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(b)); Bell v. Barnhart, 148 F. App'x 277, 285 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 2014) (declining to give
weight to a doctor's opinion that was only supported by the claimant's reported symptoms).
Substantial evidence, thus, supports the ALJ's decision to give Dr. Wilson's opinion little weight.
Next, Dr. Pennington was a state-agency physician. While the ALJ may consider the non-
examining doctor's opinions, the ALJ is not bound by them. See Justice v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
515 F. App'x 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2013) ("Instead, the ALJ is charged with evaluating these experts'
findings and reaching a reasoned determination as to the applicant's disability status.").

Finally, with respect to Dr. Crean's reasonable-accommodation request, such request was
issued on May 9, 2016, outside the relevant period. In determining whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ's determination, the emphasis is on the relevant period. See, e.g., Seeley v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 600 F. App'x 387, 390–91 (6th Cir. 2015). That is not to say that evidence
beyond that period is irrelevant. See Ellis v. Schweicker, 739 F.2d 245, 248–49 (6th Cir. 1984).
But that evidence is generally of little probative value as to whether the claimant is disabled
"during the insured time period . . . ." Strong v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 88 F. App'x 841, 845 (6th Cir.
2004). Similarly, evidence that "predate[s] the alleged onset of disability [is] of limited relevance."
Carmickle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885
F.2d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1989)). So, given the "limited relevance" of Dr. Crean's reasonable-

accommodation request, the Court sees no reason to disturb the ALJ's assessment of her opinion.
See id.
The discrepancies amongst Drs. Wilson, Pennington, and Crean were properly found by
the ALJ to render their opinions less persuasive. See Martin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 658 F. App'x
255, 258 (6th Cir. 2016), reh'g denied (Sept. 20, 2016) ("An ALJ must also consider the opinion's
supportability and consistency in discerning the amount of weight due. . . . The ALJ here found
that the [ ] report lacked support in objective medical evidence and was internally inconsistent.
Thus, the ALJ applied the proper analysis to the [ ] report."); Vorholt v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 409
F. App'x 883, 889 (6th Cir. 2011) ("Further, the ALJ also determined that Deters's opinion was
internally inconsistent, which is an independent reason for granting it little weight."). The ALJ
recognized that the medical sources offered greater limitations, properly evaluated them under the
appropriate regulatory factors, and found them to be unpersuasive. An ALJ must consider all
medical opinions in conjunction with any other relevant evidence received to determine a

claimant's R.F.C. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(b) ("In determining whether you are disabled, we will
always consider the medical opinions in your case record together with the rest of the relevant
evidence we receive."); 404.1527(c) ("Regardless of its source, we will evaluate every medical
opinion we receive."). The ALJ did that here, and the Court discerns no legal error.
V. Conclusion
Having reviewed the administrative record and the parties' briefs, Plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. 13] will be DENIED; the Commissioner's Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 15] will be GRANTED; and the decision of the ALJ will be
AFFIRMED. Judgment will be entered in favor of the Commissioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Christopher H. Steger
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10434367. Public record. Not legal advice.