# Jones v. Stryker (TV1)

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · February 2, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10434268

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** February 2, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

ROBERT D. JONES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No.: 3:19-CV-398-TAV-DCP
)
BRANDON STRYKER and )
PHILIP M. JINKS, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This civil matter is before the Court on defendants Brandon Stryker and Philip M.
Jinks’s motion for summary judgment, in which they assert qualified immunity [Doc. 36].
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, responded in opposition [Doc. 42], and the defendants replied
[Doc. 46]. Long after the deadline for responding to the instant motion, plaintiff filed a
“Motion to Add Evidence that My Rights Were Violated” [Doc. 54], which the Court
interprets as a motion to submit additional evidence and arguments in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment. The matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons
set forth below, the defendants’ motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
Herein follows a summary of the facts as presented in plaintiff’s complaint. On
November 1, 20181, plaintiff Robert Dennis Jones (“Jones”) was in a building located at

1 The complaint sets the date as November 15, 2018 [Doc. 1 at p. 4], but it is clear from
the rest of the evidence in the record that the actual date was November 1, 2018. As the date is
not material to the Court’s decision, the Court will use the actual date to avoid confusion.
1612 Grainger Ave, Knoxville, Tennessee (the “Building”) [Doc. 1 at p. 4]. At around
4:40 P.M., officers from the City of Knoxville Police Department served a no-knock
warrant on the Building [Id.]. Jones was standing in a hall inside the Building at the time,

and upon seeing the officers, at least one of whom was holding an assault rifle2, Jones
stepped into the kitchen [Id.]. Once in the kitchen, Jones clapped his hands, activating an
“Eyespy” video camera3 which had been installed recently [Id.].
A police officer (the “Arresting Officer”)4 entered the kitchen and pointed his gun
at Jones [Id.]. The Arresting Officer told Jones to lay down on his stomach [Id. at p. 5].

Jones lay down on his stomach, face down [Id. at p. 4]. The Arresting Officer told Jones
to put his hands behind his back, which Jones did [Id. at p. 5]. The Arresting Officer
handcuffed Jones and emptied Jones’s pockets [Id.]. After handcuffing Jones, the
Arresting Officer used his “steel toed boots” to stomp on Jones’s head multiple times,
forcing Jones’ face and head into the floor [Id.]. Jones screamed in pain and thought his

“skull was cracked” [Id.]. After the Arresting Officer stopped, Jones told the Arresting
Officer that he was being filmed [Id. at p. 4].

2 The weapon is referred to as an AR-15 at one point [Doc. 1 at p. 4], and an AK-47 at
another [Doc. 1 at p. 5]. The discrepancy is not material to the Court’s ruling.
3 Although Jones alleges he has video footage of the events inside the Building, he has not
presented that evidence to the Court. Instead, Jones has stated that he will post the video footage
on social media if the case is not resolved to his satisfaction [Doc. 1 at p. 4].
4 In the complaint, Jones alleges that Brandon Stryker was the Arresting Officer. Jones
later learned that it was Officer Shane Watson who performed the arrest [Doc. 22]. For the sake
of clarity, the Court will refer to the officer who performed the arrest as the “Arresting Officer.”
The Court addresses the legal ramifications of this case of mistaken identity in more detail below.
2
Either the Arresting Officer [Id. at p. 5] or Officer Philip Jinks (“Jinks”) [Id. at p. 4]
then picked Jones up from the floor. Jones contends that his head was “swollen up” by that
time, and that he was about to pass out [Id. at p. 4]. Jinks grabbed Jones and Jones asked

Jinks for medical treatment [Id. at 4-5]. Jinks refused [Id.]. As a result of the alleged
assault by the Arresting Officer, Jones claims that he has suffered a loss of hearing, severe,
constant headaches, blurry vision, and nightmares [Id. at p. 6].
The complaint named several other officers as parties, but the Court ruled that the
complaint only stated two claims: a claim of excessive force against the Arresting Officer

and a claim against Jinks of deliberate indifference to Jones’s need for serious medical care
[Doc. 5]. Any claims against the remaining named officers were dismissed [Id.].
II. Summary Judgment
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where there is “no genuine issue as to any material

fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
The Court may consider the pleadings, discovery, affidavits, and other evidence on the
record in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Id. In the Sixth Circuit, there is a
genuine issue of fact “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-moving party.” Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir.

2004). “A fact is material only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit.” Id.
at 451–52. The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
movant, as well as draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. See
3
Sutherland v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 613 (6th Cir. 2003). Thus, “the
moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 451 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).

On a motion for summary judgment by a defendant asserting a sovereign immunity
defense, the Court must adopt the plaintiff’s version of the facts. Campbell v. City of
Springboro, 700 F.3d 779, 786 (6th Cir. 2012).
Government officials are shielded from liability under the doctrine of qualified
immunity “unless the facts alleged and the evidence produced, when viewed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to find that: (1) the
defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established.”
Morrison v. Board of Trustees of Green Township, 583 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). “A right is ‘clearly established’ if ‘the contours of the right are
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates

that right.” Id. (citation omitted).
B. Excessive Force
When considering a claim of qualified immunity, the Court must first define the
right and determine whether that right was clearly established. A claim that a police officer
used excessive force during an arrest falls under the Fourth Amendment. Id. “Whether an

officer has exerted excessive force during the course of seizure is determined under an
‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Id. at 401 (citation omitted). “This entails ‘balancing

4
the consequences to the individual against the government’s interests in effecting the
seizure.” Id. (citations omitted). “The assessment involves a fact-specific inquiry based
on the totality of the circumstances that ‘pays particular attention to the severity of the

crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”
Id. (citations omitted). A reviewing court analyzes the subject event in segments when
assessing the reasonableness of a police officer’s actions. Id. (citation omitted). In this
instance, there are two distinct segments: (1) the events leading up to and including the

handcuffing of Jones; and (2) the alleged use of force on Jones after he was handcuffed
and under the control of the officers.
Based on the facts as presented in the complaint, Jones immediately complied with
the Arresting Officer, laying down on his stomach and putting his hands behind his back
[Doc. 1 at p. 4-5]. Jones does not allege that excessive force was used until after he was

handcuffed, nor does he allege that he sustained any of the injuries at issue until after he
was handcuffed [Id.]. The Arresting Officer disagrees. In his affidavit, the Arresting
Officer describes the events as follows:
Upon entering the residence, I observed the plaintiff flee towards the back of
the residence and I followed in pursuit. The plaintiff ultimately ran into the
kitchen where I saw him thrown an item that landed on the stove. I gave
multiple verbal commands to the plaintiff to produce his hands. When the
plaintiff did not comply with these commands, I forced the Plaintiff to the
ground so that handcuffs could be applied to him. The plaintiff continued to
resist on the kitchen floor, forcefully pulling his hands away from me and
tucking them under his body. The plaintiff’s continued resistance required
the use of force to get the plaintiff’s hands behind his back whereupon his
5
hands were placed in handcuffs. I did not use any further force on the
plaintiff after he was placed in handcuffs.

[Doc. 36-3 at ¶ 5].
Normally, at summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. However, for the sequence of events leading up to the moment
when Jones was actually in handcuffs and under the control of the police, there is an
exception: namely, the fact that Jones has pled guilty to, and was convicted of, resisting
arrest [Doc. 29-1 at p. 3].5 The Sixth Circuit has held that “[u]nder Tennessee law, an
officer’s excessive use of force is a defense to a charge of resisting or evading arrest; thus,
a guilty plea and resultant conviction of such a charge necessarily includes a finding that
the officer did not use excessive force.” Parvin v. Campbell, 641 F. App’x 446, 449 (6th

Cir. 2016). Claiming the use of excessive force in such a case would challenge the validity
of the underlying conviction of resisting arrest, which is barred by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). However, claims of excessive force
are only barred as to the use of force before the subject was handcuffed and in the control
of the police. Parvin, 641 F. App’x at 450. “In such a case, the force would not be

‘inextricably intertwined’ with the suspect’s resistance to arrest,” and a section 1983 action
as to the post-arrest use of excessive force would not be barred. Id.

5 Jones argues that he was “forced” to enter a guilty plea to resisting arrest after he filed
this 1983 action [Doc. 42 at ¶ 5]. That is an issue Jones would need to address in a challenge to
the underlying state court conviction, not in this civil suit.
6
In this instance, defendants have submitted pictures of Jones laying on the kitchen
floor, in restraints [Doc. 36-2, Ex. A]. There appears to be a minor cut or abrasion on
Jones’s elbow, and what may be a bruise on his lower back [Id.]. One of the photos

also shows redness on Jones’s face and neck, near his left ear [Doc. 36-7].6 One of the
booking photos of Jones shows what may be bruising on Jones’s face, around his left ear
[Doc. 44 at p. 7]. Jones contends that one of the pictures shows evidence of injuries,
including marks on his face, elbows, ear, side of his head, and mouth [Doc. 42 at ¶ 11].
Regardless, some level of injury is shown, but there is no way for the Court to determine

when those injuries were sustained, whether pre-arrest (meaning before Jones was in
restraints and no longer resisting arrest) or post-arrest (when Jones was in restrains and
when the Arresting Officer allegedly stomped on Jones’s head multiple times). This
presents a question of material fact which the Court cannot resolve at summary judgment.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that any “use of force after a suspect has

been incapacitated or neutralized is excessive as a matter of law.” Morrison, 583 F.3d at
404 (citations omitted). In clarifying this position, the Sixth Circuit explained:
A police officer’s use of force against a suspect is justified by the threat posed
by the suspect to the safety of the office or others. By contrast, when a
suspect has already been restrained, the officer’s constitutional authority to
use force is significantly more circumscribed. This constitutional line serves
to ensure that a police officer’s authority to use legitimate force to detain
does not cross into physical abuse of an incapacitated suspect.

6 The Court notes that the redness does not appear to be visible in the video footage
submitted by defendants [Doc. 36-5]. Specifically, on Disc 1, at timestamp 17:14:32, on the
camera showing the rear exterior of the vehicle, Jones is seen entering the back of the vehicle, and
there is no apparent redness near Jones’s left ear.
7
Id. at 405 (citation omitted). There is no de minimis injury requirement for excessive force
claims in such a circumstance. “Rather, we have held that a plaintiff may ‘allege use of
excessive force even where the physical contact between the parties did not leave excessive

marks or cause excessive physical damage.’” Id. at 407 (citation omitted). “‘Gratuitous
violence’ inflicted upon an incapacitated detainee constitutes an excessive use of force,
even when the injuries suffered are not substantial.” Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore,
the Sixth Circuit has held that “‘In this Circuit, the law is clearly established that an officer
may not use additional gratuitous force once a suspect has been neutralized.’” Id. at 408

(citations omitted).
The Morrison decision is of special interest in this case, because it involved a 1983
action which included an allegation that a police officer repeatedly pushed a subject’s face
into the dirt after that subject had been handcuffed and placed on the ground, though the
officer’s actions caused no significant physical injury to the subject. The court held that

“it was ‘obvious’ that [the officer] could not push a handcuffed detainee’s face into the
ground when there lacked a genuine threat to the safety of the officers or others.” Id.
(citation omitted). In this case, Jones alleges that, after Jones was restrained, the Arresting
Officer stomped on Jones’s head repeatedly. It goes without saying that stomping on a
restrained subject’s head would constitute an unconstitutional use of gratuitous force. It is

equally “obvious,” under Morrison that a reasonable officer would know that such an act
was unconstitutional, meaning the right at issue was clearly established. Accordingly, the
Arresting Officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of excessive force.
8
Defendants argue that under Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) and its progeny,
the Court is not required to defer to the plaintiff’s version of events if that version is
“blatantly contradicted by the record.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. However, in addressing a

similar case, Amerson v. Waterford Township, 562 Fed. App’x 484 (6th Cir. 2014), the
Sixth Circuit ruled that Scott did not apply. Amerson involved a 1983 action in which
plaintiff alleged that a police officer punched and kicked plaintiff in the head while plaintiff
was lying on his stomach, with his hands cuffed behind his back, and offering no resistance.
Id. at 486. There was no video footage of the incident, but the defendants relied on booking

photographs and the interrogation video and argued that there were “no visible signs of
injury – no swelling or bruising.” Id. at 488. The Amerson court refused to apply Scott,
finding that “the booking photographs and interrogation video only make Amerson’s
version of events less probable” rather than blatantly contradicting them. Id.
The Court notes that defendants have also submitted prison records showing that

Jones was seen by a medical practitioner the day after the events in question, and the
records show no indication of injury [Doc. 44, Ex. C]. However, the Sixth Circuit,
interpreting Scott, noted that Scott involved a circumstance where the video evidence could
“‘speak for itself.’” Oliver v. Greene, 613 Fed. App'x 455, 457 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Scott, 550 U.S. at 378, n. 5). The Sixth Circuit went on to hold that “deposition testimony,

affidavits, and prison records” do not qualify as evidence which rises to the level of
speaking for itself. Oliver, 613 Fed. App’x at 457.

9
In this instance, no party has submitted video footage of the actual moment of arrest
and the subsequent alleged use of excessive force. Had defendants presented video footage
conclusively establishing that the Arresting Officer did not stomp on Jones’s head, then

Scott would apply. In the absence of such irrefutable evidence, the Court is required to
view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, defendants’ motion for summary
judgment will be denied as to the use of excessive force claim against the Arresting Officer.
The Court turns next to the deliberate indifference claim against Jinks.

C. Deliberate Indifference to Need for Serious Medical Care
A claim of deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee’s need for serious medical
care falls under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, providing the same
protection for people in police custody pre-conviction as the Eighth Amendment provides
for prisoners post-conviction. Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 476 (6th Cir. 2013). The

Sixth Circuit has established “a two-prong test with objective and subjective components
to assess” claims that government officials were deliberately indifferent to a pretrial
detainee’s serious medical needs. Id. (citation omitted). The first prong requires
determining whether the plaintiff had a “sufficiently serious medical need” under the
objective prong. Id. (citation omitted). “A medical need is sufficiently serious if it has

been diagnosed by a physician that has mandated treatment or it is so obvious that even a
lay person would easily recognize the need for medical treatment. Blackmore v.
Kalamazoo City, 390 F.3d 890, 897 (6th Cir. 2004). Superficial physical conditions, such
10
as minor “cuts, bruising, and swelling” are not “serious medical needs” requiring
constitutionally guaranteed medical treatment. Burgess, 735 F.3d at 476 (citation omitted).
The second prong requires determining whether “the defendant had a sufficiently

culpable state of mind in denying medical care under the subjective prong.” Id. at 462
(citation omitted). “There must be a showing of more than mere negligence, but something
less than specific intent to harm or knowledge that harm will result is required.” Id.
(citation omitted).
In this instance, Jones alleges that he asked for medical treatment, but the mere fact

that he asked for medical treatment is insufficient to support a 1983 action alleging
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. After reviewing all of the evidence in the
record, the Court finds that Jones’s alleged injuries were not “so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the need for medical treatment.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at
897. Rather, the Court finds that the only visible injuries were minor cuts, such as the

apparent abrasion on Jones’s elbow and possible bruising on his lower back [Doc.36-2]
and near his left ear [Doc. 44 at p. 7]. The video footage provided by defendants also
supports this finding [Doc. 36-5]. During the approximately two hours of footage, Jones
displays no obvious signs of serious injury such that a lay person would recognize the need
for medical aid. Jones has no apparent trouble speaking, there is no obvious slurring of his

speech, there is no obvious facial or head trauma, and no obvious signs of bleeding.

11
In the complaint, Jones alleges loss of hearing, severe headaches, blurry vision, and
nightmares [Doc. 1 at p. 6]. None of these injuries would seem to be the type that would
be obvious to a lay person, and the Court found no apparent signs of such injuries in

reviewing the video footage available. See Hammock v. Rogers, Case No. 1:17-CV-1939,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211022, at *49 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2019) (holding that “minor
cuts to [plaintiff’s] lips and nose, and a loose tooth” were not the type that a lay person
would recognize as needing medical attention).
Jones also argues that he has lost teeth as a result of the alleged excessive use of

force, though at least two of the three teeth he lost were removed while he was in jail, and
not lost at the scene [Doc. 42]. It is unclear when the third tooth was lost. Certainly, the
video footage shows no bleeding from the mouth that would be expected from lost teeth
[Doc. 36-5]. Assuming, arguendo, that Jones’s teeth were damaged, but not lost, during
the alleged use of excessive force, the damage was not so obvious as to alert the average

lay person to the need for medical attention. The Court also notes that Jones has not
amended his complaint to include allegations related to the loss of teeth, and to the extent
that he intends to proceed with such claims, they will need to be included in an amended
complaint, which the Court discusses in more detail below.
As to the second prong, the Court finds that there is no evidence that Jinks acted

with the necessary intent to deny Jones of obviously needed medical care. Rather, as the
Court found above, there were no obvious signs that Jones needed serious medical
attention. The minor injuries visible in the photographs taken at the scene are not the type
12
that would require medical attention, and in the absence of some obvious sign that Jones
was suffering from a serious medical condition, Jinks was not required to provide Jones
with immediate medical attention.

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Jinks is entitled to qualified immunity
as to Jones’s claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Accordingly,
the motion for summary judgment will be granted as to the claim against Jinks.
III. Amendment of Plaintiff’s Complaint
Having resolved the motion for summary judgment, the Court turns now to the issue

of plaintiff’s failure to amend his complaint to name the proper party as the Arresting
Officer. In his complaint, Jones named Brandon Stryker as the Arresting Officer [Doc. 1].
Jones later moved to amend his complaint, indicating that Shane Watson, not Brandon
Stryker, was the Arresting Officer [Doc. 22]. Jones’s motion to amend was denied because
it failed to comply with the Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Doc.

23]. Specifically, Jones failed to attach a copy of his proposed amended complaint to the
motion, as required by Local Rule 15.1, and he failed to comply with Rule 7(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that motions must state with particularity
the grounds for seeking an order and state the specific relief sought [Doc. 23].
Jones moved to amend his complaint a second time, asking to remove Brandon

Stryker as a party and replace him with Shane Watson, but he again failed to submit a
proposed copy of the amended complaint [Doc. 26]. Because of his failure to submit the
proposed amended complaint, the motion was again denied with leave to refile [Doc. 34].
13
More recently, Jones filed a “Motion for Shane Watson to be Accountable,” which the
Court interprets as a motion to amend [Doc. 56]. However, Jones again failed to submit a
copy of his proposed amended complaint. The Court will deny this motion with leave to

refile, but the Court will only grant Jones one more chance to correctly amend his
complaint.
If Jones wishes to amend his complaint to replace Brandon Stryker with Shane
Watson, and to assert any additional claims, then Jones should submit a motion which
clearly states why and how he wishes to amend his complaint, and he must also submit a

new complaint which includes all of the facts and claims he wishes to assert in this
lawsuit. The Court will direct the Clerk of the Court to send Jones a blank Section 1983
complaint form to use for this purpose. Jones shall have forty-five (45) days to submit a
proper motion to amend and the proposed amended complaint. If Jones fails to do so, the
Court will find that Jones has failed to prosecute this case and the Court will dismiss with

prejudice all remaining claims pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
IV. Motion to Add Evidence
Long after the deadline for responding to the instant motion, plaintiff filed a
“Motion to Add Evidence that My Rights Were Violated” [Doc. 54], which the Court

interprets as a motion to submit additional evidence and arguments in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment. Local Rule 7.1(d) provides that no supplemental briefs
shall be filed “without prior approval of the Court, except that a party may file a
14
supplemental brief of no more than 5 pages to call to the Court’s attention developments
occurring after a party’s final brief is filed.” E.D. Tenn. L.C. 7.1(d).
While plaintiff does not cite the relevant Local Rule, he does ask permission to

submit additional information to the Court. The motion does not explain why plaintiff
could not have presented this evidence and arguments with his original arguments. In an
abundance of caution, the Court has reviewed the arguments presented in plaintiff’s
motion, and they do not alter the Court’s decisions, set forth above. The Court has already
denied summary judgment as to the claim of excessive force, and nothing in plaintiff’s

motion establishes that Jones’s injuries were so severe that a lay person would recognize
that he needed medical attention. In the absence of such a showing, Jinks remains entitled
to qualified immunity. Accordingly, to the extent that the Court has considered plaintiff’s
arguments, his motion to add evidence [Doc. 54] will be GRANTED.
V. Motion to Put Into Evidence of Rights Being Violated

Plaintiff has also filed a motion alleging that his right to a fair trial has been violated
in this case [Doc. 52]. The Court notes that discovery was stayed pending resolution of the
issue of qualified immunity [Doc. 45]. This opinion resolves that issue, allowing the case
to proceed as to plaintiff’s excessive force claim, and lifts the stay on discovery. To the
extent that plaintiff complains because he has filed discovery related motions which have

not been ruled on during the stay of discovery, and which now will be ruled on in due
course, plaintiff’s motion [Doc. 52] will be DENIED as moot.

15
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT defendants’ Motion [Doc. 36]
for summary judgment as to defendant Jinks and will DENY defendants’ Motion [Doc. 36]

as to defendant Stryker. Plaintiff’s Motion to Add Evidence [Doc. 54] is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s motion alleging a violation of his right to a fair trial [Doc. 52] is DENIED as
moot. Plaintiff’s Motion for Shane Watson to be Accountable [Doc. 56] is hereby
DENIED WITH LEAVE TO REFILE as a Motion to Amend. Plaintiff shall have forty-
five (45) days to submit a proper motion to amend and the proposed amended complaint.

Failure to do so will result in the dismissal, with prejudice, of all remaining claims pursuant
to Rule 41(b). The stay of discovery [Doc. 45] in this matter is hereby LIFTED. The
Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to send plaintiff a blank Section 1983 complaint form
with a copy of this opinion.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.

s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10434268. Public record. Not legal advice.