# Stephens v. Knox County (PSLC1)

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · September 17, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10434031

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** September 17, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10434031

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a governmental entity may be liable under § 1983 only where its official custom or policy causes a constitutional rights violation
- holding that “unadorned, 6 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief
- characterizing such an amendment as “a change in parties, not a mere substitution of parties,” and concluding that Rule 15(c
- holding that once qualified immunity has been invoked, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing it is inappropriate

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

JARED STEPHENS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No.: 3:18-CV-157-TAV-HBG
)
ANTHONY MCGAHA, )
RICHARD DACUS, )
LIEUTENANT MILLER, )
KNOX COUNTY, )
JANE DOE #1, and )
JANE DOE #2, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a pro se prisoner’s complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Now before
the Court are Defendants McGaha, Miller, Dacus, and Knox County’s motions to dismiss
[Docs. 31, 32, 33]. Plaintiff did not respond to these motions, and his time for doing so
has passed [Doc. 34]. Thus, Plaintiff waived any opposition thereto. Elmore v. Evans, 449
F. Supp. 2, 3 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), aff’d mem. 577 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1978); E.D. Tenn. LR
7.2. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s claims against the Jane Doe Defendants
will be DISMISSED, Defendants’ motions to dismiss [Docs. 31, 32, 33] will be
GRANTED, and this action will be DISMISSED.
I. ALLEGATIONS
On February 17, 2018, while escorting Plaintiff to a paddy wagon, Defendant
McGaha accused Plaintiff of trying “to jerk away” [Doc. 2 p. 4]. In response, defendant
McGaha twisted Plaintiff’s arm, hurting Plaintiff’s shoulder, elbow, and wrist [Id.].
Defendant McGaha then “ran with” Plaintiff to the bottom platform, slammed Plaintiff’s
face into the ground, and applied pressure to Plaintiff’s face [Id.]. Defendant McGaha
continued to use excessive force while taking Plaintiff to the paddy wagon [Id.].

When Plaintiff arrived at the Knox County Detention Facility, he asked one of the
Jane Doe Defendants if he could be seen by the medical staff and showed her the inside of
his mouth [Id. at 4–5]. She stated that he would be taken to be processed and evaluated
right after that, but he was not [Id.].
Subsequently, at some point between February 20 and February 25, 2018, Plaintiff

spoke with Defendant Miller1 about seeing a nurse for his facial injury and told him about
the incident that caused it [Id. at 5]. Defendant Miller told Plaintiff that he would make
sure Plaintiff saw medical staff without a copay as the injury occurred while Plaintiff was
detained, but Plaintiff was not seen by medical staff until sometime between March 1 and
March 5, and that was for his intake physical [Id.]. When Plaintiff received his intake

physical, he told one of the Jane Doe Defendants about his facial injuries, but she only put
in his file that he complained about his face and did not examine his face or put anything
in his file about bruising or swelling [Id.].
On March 21, 2018, while in the Knox County Jail, Plaintiff told Defendant Dacus
that his face might be fractured and that it had bothered him for a month [Id. at 4]. But

Defendant Dacus would not send him for an x-ray [Id.].

1 After Plaintiff’s complaint was filed, defendant Miller was identified as the individual
referred to as “Defendant John Doe” in the complaint [Doc. 9 p. 7].
2
II. DOE DEFENDANTS

First, Plaintiff seeks to hold the Jane Doe Defendants liable for the incidents in his
complaint that occurred February and March 2018. However, the claims against the Doe
Defendants arising out of these incidents are barred by the applicable one-year statute of
limitations.2 While Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that under
certain circumstances a plaintiff may change the name of a defendant in a manner that
relates the amendment back to the date of the plaintiff’s original pleading, well-established
Sixth Circuit case law provides that this Rule does not apply to the addition of new,
previously unknown Defendants in the place of Doe defendants. Smith v. City of Akron,

476 F. App’x 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012) (characterizing such an amendment as “a change in
parties, not a mere substitution of parties,” and concluding that Rule 15(c) offers no remedy
to a plaintiff seeking to add parties after the statute of limitations has passed (quoting Cox
v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996))). Here, although Plaintiff filed his
complaint in April 2018, he did not amend his complaint to name the Jane Doe Defendants

prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations for his claims against them. For this
reason, the claims are time barred. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the Jane Doe
Defendants will be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under § 1983.

2 District courts apply state statutes of limitations § 1983 claims. Harris v. United States,
422 F.3d 322, 331 (6th Cir. 2005). Tennessee applies a one-year statute of limitations to § 1983
actions. Zundel v. Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 281 (6th Cir. 2012); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3).
3
III. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
A. Standard of Review
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is implausible when “the

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct.” Id. at 679. In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must take all factual
allegations in the complaint as true. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94
(2007). However, the Supreme Court has cautioned:
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . .
be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted).
B. Qualified Immunity
All remaining individual Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them
based on the doctrine of qualified immunity [Docs. 31, 32]. Qualified immunity protects
governmental employees from individual, civil liability where their conduct does not
violate clearly established “constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). An evaluation of qualified
immunity requires the Court to conduct a three-pronged inquiry: (1) whether there was a
constitutional violation; (2) whether the violated right was “clearly-established;” and
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(3) whether the official’s actions were objectively unreasonable. Williams v. Mehra, 186
F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999).
Once qualified immunity has been pled by a defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden
of rebutting the defense by showing “that the challenged conduct violated a constitutional
or statutory right, and that the right was so clearly established at the time of the conduct

‘that every reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d]
that right.’” T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632, 635 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at
741). In short, this defense that protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
C. Analysis

1. Defendant McGaha3

As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges that while escorting Plaintiff to a paddy wagon,
Defendant McGaha accused Plaintiff of trying “to jerk away” and then twisted Plaintiff’s
arm, hurting Plaintiff’s shoulder, elbow, and wrist [Doc. 2 p. 4]. Plaintiff alleges Defendant
McGaha then “ran with” Plaintiff to the bottom platform, slammed Plaintiff’s face into the
ground, and applied pressure to Plaintiff’s face [Id.], and that Defendant McGaha continued
to use excessive force while taking Plaintiff to the paddy wagon [Id.].

3 Defendant McGaha seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against him by asserting that
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and based on the doctrine
of qualified immunity [Doc. 31]. Because the Court finds that Defendant McGaha has established
that he is shielded by qualified immunity, it will decline to address his argument that Heck bars
Plaintiff’s claims against him.
5
The Supreme Court “has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or
investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical
coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–27 (1968)). But any such use of force must be reasonable

and must not be excessive. See Malory v. Whiting, 489 F. App’x 78, 85 (6th Cir. 2012);
Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir. 2006). Specifically, to be constitutional, an
officer’s use of force during an arrest must be “‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts
and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.

Thus, in evaluating an officer’s use of force during an arrest, a court must balance
“the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Martin v. City of Broadview
Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 958 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). It must
consider the relevant facts and circumstances of the specific case, “including the severity

of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
by flight.” Id.
First, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant McGaha continued to use excessive force
while taking Plaintiff to the paddy wagon after Plaintiff got up off the ground is conclusory

and does not support a plausible inference that Defendant McGaha violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights during this time. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (holding that “unadorned,
6
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” are insufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief).
Next, as Defendant McGaha correctly points out in his motion, Plaintiff does not
contend that he did not jerk away from Defendant McGaha before the initial “twisting” of

Plaintiff’s arm despite acknowledging that Defendant McGaha first stated that Plaintiff had
jerked away. Nor does Plaintiff explain his allegation that Defendant McGaha “ran with”
him to the bottom platform, despite these allegations suggesting that Plaintiff was resisting
or attempting to flee right before Defendant McGaha slammed him to the ground. Also,
Plaintiff does not set forth any facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that he was

not resisting while Defendant McGaha applied pressure to Plaintiff’s face after Plaintiff
was on the ground. Most notably, Plaintiff has failed to come forward with any facts to
support a finding that he was not resisting and/or attempting to flee during this incident in
response to Defendant McGaha’s motion to dismiss. See Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707
F.3d 675, 681 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that once qualified immunity has been invoked, the

plaintiff bears the burden of showing it is inappropriate).
Taking together Plaintiff’s failure to assert that he was not resisting and/or
attempting to flee during his arrest and the violent nature of many of the crimes for which
Defendant McGaha was arresting Plaintiff, including attempted aggravated arson,
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and domestic violence [Doc. 30-1], the Court

cannot find that Defendant McGaha’s acts as alleged in the complaint were objectively
unreasonable such that every reasonable officer would have understood that those acts
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violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (providing that a
complaint must contain more than a statement of facts that merely creates speculation or
suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action to state a claim for relief).
Accordingly, Defendant McGaha’s motion to dismiss [Doc. 31] will be

GRANTED.
2. Defendants Dacus and Miller

Defendants Dacus and Miller also seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them by
asserting that they are entitled to qualified immunity [Doc. 32]. As set forth above, Plaintiff
states that he spoke with Defendant Miller about seeing a nurse for his facial injury and
about the incident that caused it, and Defendant Miller told Plaintiff that he would make
sure that Plaintiff saw medical staff without a copay as the injury occurred while Plaintiff
was detained, but Plaintiff was not seen by medical until up to fifteen (15) days later, and
that was for his intake physical [Doc. 2 p. 5]. Regarding Defendant Dacus, Plaintiff alleges
that he told Defendant Dacus that his face might be fractured and that it had bothered him

for a month but that Defendant Dacus would not send Plaintiff to get an x-ray [Id.].
A prison official’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs
violates the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Prison
medical personnel or officials may be deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious
medical needs “in their response to a prisoner’s needs” or by “interfer[ing] with treatment

once prescribed.” Id. at 104–05. Establishing the deprivation of a federal right in the
Eighth Amendment medical context requires evidence that that acts or omissions of an
8
individual operating under the color of state law were “sufficiently harmful to evidence
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Id. at 106. Thus, “[a] constitutional
claim for denial of medical care has [both] objective and subjective components.”
Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004).

The objective component requires proof that the inmate is suffering from a
sufficiently serious medical need, such that “he [was] incarcerated under conditions posing
a substantial risk of serious harm.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). To be sufficiently serious, the
medical need must be either (1) obvious to a layperson or (2) a condition diagnosed by a

physician. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297–98 (1991).
The subjective component requires proof that the prison official acted with
deliberate indifference. Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 2005),
abrogated on other grounds in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). Deliberate
indifference is more than mere negligence and requires a mental state amounting to

criminal recklessness. Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 839–40). To meet this subjective standard, the defendant must
have: (1) “perceived the facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner,” (2)
“draw[n] the inference;” and (3) “then disregarded that risk.” Id. at 591 (quoting Comstock
v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001)).

9
Also, “[a] patient’s disagreement with his physicians over the proper course of
treatment alleges, at most, a medical-malpractice claim, which is not cognizable under
§ 1983.” Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S.
at 107). Moreover, “a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition” is insufficient to support claim for deliberate indifference
to a prisoner’s serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment, as “medical
malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a
prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107.
Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he had a serious

medical need, Plaintiff has not set forth facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that
Defendants Dacus or Miller were deliberately indifferent to that need. Specifically,
Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Dacus did not send him for an x-ray even though his
face had bothered him for a month does not assert a constitutional violation, as it
demonstrates only that Plaintiff disagrees with how Defendant Dacus decided to treat him.

Darrah, 865 F.3d at 372. Further, Plaintiff does not state what he told Defendant Miller
about his face injury or set forth any facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that
Defendant Miller perceived any substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff based on this
injury. Rather, Plaintiff states only that Defendant Miller stated that he would make sure
Plaintiff was seen without a copay due to the way in which Plaintiff sustained his injuries.

This statement does not suggest that Defendant Miller perceived any substantial risk to
Plaintiff or believed that Plaintiff had any urgent need for medical care. Moreover, Plaintiff
10
again has not opposed Defendants Miller and Dacus’s assertion that they are entitled to
qualified immunity for these acts. See Quigley, 707 F.3d at 681 (holding that once qualified
immunity has been invoked, plaintiff bears the burden of showing it is inappropriate).
Thus, Defendants Dacus and Miller have established that they are entitled to

qualified immunity for Plaintiff’s claims against them and their motion to dismiss
[Doc. 32] will be GRANTED.
3. Defendant Knox County

As Defendant Knox County correctly points out in its motion to dismiss, it cannot
be liable for Plaintiff’s claims for violation of § 1983 unless its custom or policy was a
moving force behind the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (holding that a governmental entity may be
liable under § 1983 only where its official custom or policy causes a constitutional rights
violation). Moreover, “there can be no Monell liability under § 1983 unless there is an
underlying unconstitutional act.” Thurmond v. Cty. of Wayne, 447 F. App’x 643, 651 (6th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 340 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Thus, as the Court is dismissing the Jane Doe Defendants and granting Defendants
McGaha, Miller, and Dacus’s motions to dismiss, no claim will remain for which
Defendant Knox County may be liable, and its motion to dismiss [Doc. 33] will be
GRANTED.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:
1. The Jane Doe Defendants will be DISMISSED;

2. Defendants McGaha, Dacus, Miller, and Knox County’s motions to dismiss
[Docs. 31, 32, 33] will be GRANTED;

3. This action will be DISMISSED; and

4. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this decision would not be
taken in good faith, and that Plaintiff will be DENIED leave to proceed in
forma pauperis on any subsequent appeal.

AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER.
ENTER:

s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10434031. Public record. Not legal advice.