# Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Triple-S Vida, Inc.

> District Court, D. Puerto Rico · February 17, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10420795

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Puerto Rico
- **Decided:** February 17, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.
CIV. NO. 21-1463 (FAB/MDM)

TRIPLE-S VIDA, INC, ET AL.

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) filed the

above-captioned suit against Triple-S Vida, Inc., (“TSV”) alleging discrimination

under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (“ADA”),
as amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A), and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991) (“ADAAA”). (Docket
No. 1). The EEOC moved to amend its complaint to add Triple-S Management
(“TSM”) as a second defendant to the suit. (Docket No. 38). The Court granted the
EEOC’s request. (Docket No. 39). Five days later, the EEOC filed an amended
complaint (the “Amended Complaint”), which sought to correct allegedly unlawful
employment practices on the basis of disability and to provide appropriate relief to
the charging party, Ivelisse González (the “claimant” or “Ms. González”). (Docket
No. 40). In the Amended Complaint, the EEOC claims that TSV and TSM failed to
provide a reasonable accommodation to Ms. González in violation of the ADA. Id.
With this action, the EEOC hopes to obtain a permanent injunction against the
defendants enjoining them from engaging in discriminatory conduct based on
disabilities, an Order instructing the defendants to implement and execute policies,
practices, and programs that provide equal employment opportunities for employees
with disabilities, like the claimant, and to recover monetary compensation for the
claimant’s damages. Id.
TSM has filed a Motion to Dismiss the EEOC’s Amended Complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); or in
the alternative, a Motion to Strike all references to TSM in the Complaint, under
Rule 12(f), because “[o]n motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just
terms . . . drop a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Although contained within the same
document, the motion to dismiss portion will be referred to as the “Motion to Dismiss,”
and the motion to strike portion will be referred to as the “Motion to Strike.” (Docket
No. 44). The EEOC opposed TSM’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike, arguing
that it has pleaded sufficient facts at this stage of the proceedings to survive a motion
to dismiss and that striking TSM as a party is not appropriate. (Docket No. 50). TSM
subsequently filed a Reply. (Docket No. 58). After reviewing the parties’ submissions
and the pertinent law, the Court recommends DENYING both the Motion to Dismiss
and the Motion to Strike at Docket No. 40.
I. Background and Operative Facts
This case arises from the alleged failure by both TSV and TSM to provide a
reasonable accommodation to Ms. González. TSM is a parent company with at least
three affiliate entities: TSV, Triple S Salud, and Triple S Propiedad, which offer life,
health, and property insurance respectively. (Docket No. 40 ¶17). Per the Complaint,
the EEOC claims that TSV and TSM discriminated against Ms. González in violation
of Section 102(a) and (b)(5)(A) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) and (b)(5)(A), by not
providing her a reasonable accommodation. The EEOC argues that TSM and TSV’s
conduct, namely, their failure to provide Ms. González with a reasonable
accommodation, caused her to suffer damages, including emotional pain, mental
anguish, suffering, humiliation, inconvenience, and loss of enjoyment of life. (Id. at
¶55). The EEOC further claims that the effect of the practices employed by TSM and
TSV has been to deprive Ms. González of equal employment opportunities because of
her disability and otherwise adversely affect her status as an employee.
Pursuant to the standard governing dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
the following facts derived from the nonconclusory allegations in the Amended
Complaint (Docket No. 40) are taken as true for purposes of this decision:1
TSV is an insurance company registered to do business in Puerto Rico and has
continuously done business in Puerto Rico with its principal place of business in San
Juan. (Docket No. 40 at ¶4). TSM is an insurance company registered to do business
in Puerto Rico and has continuously done business in Puerto Rico with its principal
place of business in San Juan. (Id. at ¶5). At all relevant times, TSV and TSM have
continuously had at least fifteen employees. (Id. at ¶6, 7). At all relevant times, TSM
has continuously been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within
the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g), and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e(b), (g), and
(h). (Id. at ¶8). At all relevant times, TSV has continuously been an employer engaged
in an industry affecting commerce under Sections 101(5) and 101(7) of the ADA,
42 U.S.C.§§ 12111(5), (7). (Id. at ¶9).
More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, the claimant, Ms.
González filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission alleging violations of
the ADA against TSV. (Id. at ¶9).
TSM is a parent company with at least three affiliate entities: TSV, Triple-S
Salud, and Triple-S Propiedad, which offer life, health, and property insurance
respectively. (Id. at ¶17). TSM handles employee relations issues for TSV. (Id. at ¶18).
TSM was aware that Ms. González filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination. (Id. at
¶19). TSM human resources official, Iliana S. Rodríguez Torres, received notice of
Ms. Rodríguez’ EEOC Charge of Discrimination. (Id. at ¶20). The TSM reasonable
accommodation policy controls employee relations for TSM affiliates, including TSV.
(Id. at ¶21). The TSM reasonable accommodation policy applied to Ms. González
throughout her employment at TSV. (Id. at ¶22). The name “Triple-S Management”
appears on the heading of the documents for Human Resources that applied to

1 The Court focuses on the factual allegations lodged against TSM as it is the moving party of the
motion pending before the Court.
Ms. González. (Docket No. 40 at ¶23). The TSM human resources policy on reasonable
accommodation applies to Ms. González. (Id. at ¶24). The TSM reasonable
accommodation policy defines TSM as including “direct or indirect affiliates,” which
includes TSV. (Id. at ¶25). TSM makes hiring and re-assignment decisions for TSV
and other affiliates such as Triple-S Salud, Triple-S Propiedad, and others. (Id. at
¶26).
TSV is an insurance company doing business in Puerto Rico. (Id. at ¶27). TSV
employs hundreds of people in Puerto Rico. (Id. at ¶28). TSM is an insurance company
doing business in Puerto Rico. (Id. at ¶29). Defendants TSV and TSM operate as a
single or integrated enterprise, and/or joint employer by virtue of the interrelations
of their operations and the centralized control over their labor relations. (Id. at ¶30).
TSV and TSM share personnel practices for their employees. (Id. at ¶31). TSV and
TSM offer similar services. (Id. at ¶32).
Ms. González has a disability, namely, fibromyalgia. (Id. at ¶33). Fibromyalgia
substantially limits one or more major life activities of Ms. González in that it affects
her ability to walk, bend, lift, drive, and care for herself, among others. (Id. at ¶34).
Ms. González started working for TSV in October 2015 as an Authorized Sales
Representative. (Id. at ¶35). Her job as an Authorized Sales Representative requires
her to drive along planned routes, visit several clients a day, sell insurance policies
and/or do collections. (Id. at ¶36).
In 2018, Ms. González was diagnosed with fibromyalgia by her physician. (Id.
at ¶37). In 2018, Ms. González provided a physician’s note to her district director and
to human resources. The physician’s note explained that Ms. González needed
reassignment to a position in an office, not one that required driving all day. (Id. at
¶38). In or about October 2018, a human resources representative, Kayra Dávila
Torres (“Ms. Dávila”), notified Ms. González, first by letter, and then verbally, that
she could not be accommodated in her current position. (Id. at ¶39).
Ms. Dávila met with Ms. González in person and told her she should apply to
vacant positions for which she was qualified and could be re-assigned as a reasonable
accommodation. Ms. Dávila also told Ms. González to search for such vacant positions
on the TSM website which includes jobs for TSM and its affiliates. (Docket No. 40 at
¶40). TSM’s reasonable accommodation policy, which applies to TSV and its affiliates,
includes re-assignment as a reasonable accommodation. (Id. at ¶41). Ms. González
has an associate degree in secretarial work, a bachelor’s degree in criminology, which
she earned in 2020, over ten years of experience in customer service, and has
experience performing administrative work in an office setting. (Id. at ¶42).
Between November 2018 and November 2020, Ms. González applied for at
least nine (9) vacant positions for which she was qualified at TSM and various TSM
affiliates, including, for example, Enrollment Representative for Triple-S Salud,
General Office Clerk for Triple S Management, and administrative support clerk for
Triple-S Vida, among others. (Id. at ¶43). Ms. González was more than qualified for
the administrative and customer service positions to which she applied. (Id. at ¶44).
Ms. González was not re-assigned into any of the vacant positions to which she
applied and for which she was qualified. (Id. at ¶45). TSM officials selected
candidates to fill various vacant positions for which Ms. González applied. (Id. at
¶46). In July 2020, Ms. González notified the TSM hiring officials during an interview
for a customer service representative position that she was seeking re-assignment as
a reasonable accommodation but was still rejected for the position. (Id. at ¶47).
By the time Ms. González filed her charge of discrimination with the EEOC in
September 2020, no one at TSM or TSV had ever engaged in discussions with her to
re-assign her to vacant positions for which she was qualified or to present her with
potential re-assignment options. (Id. at ¶48). As of June 2021, no one at TSM or TSV
had ever engaged in discussions with Ms. González to re-assign her to vacant
positions or to present her with potential re-assignment options. (Id. at ¶49).
In early July 2021, only weeks after the EEOC issued its Letter of
Determination finding reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the ADA had
occurred, TSM and/or TSV re-assigned Ms. González to an office position at TSV. (Id.
at ¶50). In early July 2021, Ms. González was re-assigned to a customer service
representative position at TSV, a position similar to the one she had applied for in
July 2020 when she sought re-assignment as a reasonable accommodation but was
denied. (Docket No. 40 at ¶51). Between August 2018 and July 2021, TSV and TSM
failed to provide Ms. González a reasonable accommodation by re-assigning her to an
office job that did not require driving, as requested in the doctor’s note that she had
provided to the defendants in 2018. (Id. at ¶52).
Between August 2018 and July 2021, TSM and TSV failed to engage with
Ms. González in a good faith interactive process to re-assign her to an office job that
did not require driving. (Id. at ¶53). As a result of TSM and TSV’s failure to
accommodate Ms. González, she was forced to remain in her job as an Authorized
Sales Representative, causing her health to decline and causing her pain and
suffering. (Id. at ¶54).
I. Legal Standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
A complaint survives a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss where it
alleges “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In evaluating whether a plaintiff is
entitled to relief, the court must accept as true all “well pleaded facts [and indulge]
all reasonable inferences” in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 556.
When considering 12(b)(6) motions, the Court analyzes the complaint in a two-
step process under the current context-based “plausibility” standard established by
the Supreme Court. See Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50,
55 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12
(1st Cir. 2011) which discusses Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Twombly,
550 U.S. at 544. The plaintiff must plead enough facts to state a “plausible”
entitlement to relief, and the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level, [...] on the assumption that all the allegations in
the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact),” Twombly, id. at 555, excepting those
allegations “that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-
action elements.” Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. If the complaint’s “factual content, so taken,
‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged,’ the claim has facial plausibility.” Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at
12 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Plausibility is a context-specific determination
that requires the Court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
The Supreme Court has explained that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of [her] ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 545 (quotation omitted). Thus, a complaint will not stand if it offers only
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” Iqbal, id. at 678–79. To determine whether a complaint has stated a
plausible, non-speculative claim for relief, courts may also consider: “documents
incorporated by reference into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts
susceptible to judicial notice.” Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011)
(citing In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2003).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper when “it clearly appears, according to
the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory.” Gonzáles-
Morales v. Hernández-Arencibia, 221 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Correa-
Martínez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 1990)). Moreover, the First
Circuit has held that “dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the
complaint fails to set forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting
each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal
theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008).
“The aforementioned requirements complement a bedrock principle of the
federal judicial system: a complaint must contain enough detail to give “a defendant
fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests.” Meléndez-Fernández v.
Special Care Pharmacy Servs., Inc., 2012 WL 4813528 at 3 (D.P.R. Oct. 10, 2012)
citing Ocasio–Hernández, 640 F.3d at 8 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Accordingly,
“[w]hile a plaintiff’s claim to relief must be supported by sufficient factual allegations
to be plausible under Twombly [and Iqbal], nothing requires a plaintiff to prove her
case in the pleadings.” Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177 (D. Mass. 2009).
Differently stated, even after Twombly and Iqbal, “[d]ismissal of a complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6) is inappropriate if the complaint satisfies Rule 8(a)(2)’s
requirement of a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ocasio–Hernández, 640 F.3d at 11.
II. The Motion to Dismiss
In short, TSM moves for dismissal of the case against it, arguing that it should
not be a party to the present litigation because it “has absolutely nothing to do with
this lawsuit.” (Docket No. 44). More specifically, TSM claims that the Amended
Complaint should be dismissed against it pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(f) for
various reasons, namely: that TSV and TSM are separate entities and, as such, TSM
is not liable for TSV’s actions; that the EEOC failed to advance specific allegations in
the Complaint sufficient to pursue viable ADA and ADAAA claims against TSM; and,
that the EEOC failed to state a claim against TSM upon which relief can be granted
because TSM is not the claimant’s employer. Id. In its response in opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss, the EEOC argues that it has pleaded sufficient facts at this stage
for the Court to deny TSM’s request for dismissal. The EEOC further claims that
TSM completely ignores the well-pleaded facts included in the Amended Complaint,
which satisfy the elements of a joint employer or an integrated enterprise (between
TSM and TSV) and, therefore, dismissal of the action against TSM would be
unwarranted.
The First Circuit has explained that, under the “single employer” or
“integrated employer” doctrine, two nominally separate companies may be so
interrelated that they constitute a single employer subject to liability under Title VII
and, by analogy, the ADA. See Meléndez-Fernández, 2012 WL 4813528 at 3; Torres–
Negrón v. Merck & Co., Inc., 488 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2007) (relying on NLRB v.
Browning–Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1114, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982)). This doctrine may
apply in cases where “liability is sought to be imposed on the legal employer by
arguing that another entity is sufficiently related such that its actions . . . can be
attributable to the legal employer.” Engelhardt v. S.P. Richards Co., 472 F.3d 1, 4 n.2
(1st Cir. 2006).
There are three recognized methods for determining whether a single employer
exists in these types of cases and, although the First Circuit has not decided which
test is appropriate, it has recognized that the “integrated-enterprise test” is the
standard adopted by most circuits. Meléndez-Fernández, supra; Torres–Negrón, 233
F.3d at 42; Romano v. U–Haul International, 233 F.3d 655 (1st Cir. 2000). The factors
that must be considered under the “integrated-enterprise test” are: (1) common
management; (2) interrelation between operations; (3) centralized control over labor
relations; and (4) common ownership. Torres–Negrón, 488 F.3d at 42 (citing Romano,
233 F.3d at 662). Courts have stated that all four factors are not necessary for single-
employer status, and that the test should be applied flexibly, placing special emphasis
on the control of employment decisions. Id. As applied to the single employer or
integrated enterprise test, the First Circuit has required only that the “complaint
contains well-pleaded allegations that, taken as true, established an employment
relationship between plaintiffs and defendants.” Meléndez–Fernández, 2012 WL
4813528, at *5 (citing Cavallaro v. UMass Mem’l Healthcare, Inc., 678 F.3d 1, 9–10
(1st Cir. 2012).
In the motion currently pending before the Court, TSM claims that it is not
Ms. González’ employer—rather, TSV is—and that TSM is merely the parent
company of TSV and is thus detached from any involvement in Ms. González’
employment. TSM also avers that even though TSV is a subsidiary of TSM, it is still
a separate and independent corporation from TSM, with its own separate and distinct
legal personality. To prove its theory that TSM “has absolutely nothing to do with
this lawsuit,” and thus dismissal should follow, TSM relies on the Certificates of
Existence and Federal Employment Identification Numbers (FEIN) of both TSM and
TSV, respectively.2
The parties dispute whether the Certificates of Existence can be properly
considered by the Court in its 12(b)(6) analysis because they are being proposed by
TSM in its Motion to Dismiss and are not “attached to or fairly ‘incorporated into the
complaint.’” See Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 20-1393,
2021 WL 3293622, at *2 (D.P.R. Aug. 2, 2021) (citing Nieto-Vicenty v. Valledor, 984
F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D.P.R. 2013)). Assuming, without deciding, that these documents
can be considered, the Court finds that they do little to advance TSM’s cause.
The Court agrees with the EEOC that a Certificate of Existence constitutes a
typical, run-of-the-mill, incorporation document, which is expected and required for
corporations, and is issued by the State Department to record the formation of a
business entity. That TSM and TSV have separate Certificates of Existence is also
typical of corporations having parent/subsidiary relationships. While the documents
may show, on their face, that TSM and TSV are distinct legal entities, they do not
prove the assertion that TSM ultimately proposes—that TSM cannot be liable for
TSV’s actions because it is not the claimant’s employer or joint employer, ergo, the
Court should dismiss the lawsuit against it. Even considering the Certificates of
Existence as part of the Court’s analysis, they are not in the least the smoking gun
that TSM portends them to be. Indeed, the Certificates of Existence, alone, are
insufficient to support the dismissal of the claims against TSM.
To be sure, the Certificates of Existence do not offer a shred of evidence with
respect to the well-established factors of the “integrated-enterprise test,” which is
required to determine the level of interrelatedness of operations between TSM and
TSV. For example, the Certificates of Existence do not shed light on any of the
relevant questions at hand, such as, common management between TSM and TSV,

2 It is worth noting, though certainly not dispositive, that TSM’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion to
Strike is only seven (7) pages long and, for the most part, is comprised of “matter-of-fact” conclusory
statements but omits necessary well-developed argumentation and enough factual matter to support
the type of dispositive relief it has requested.
common ownership, how TSM and TSV operate as a matter of practice with respect
to their policies and personnel; what degree of control, if any, TSM has over
employment decisions of the employees of its subsidiaries; whether there are
integrated operations in terms of how TSM and TSV manage their human resources
and employee relations; what, if any, is the relationship between TSM and the
claimant; and what, if any, is TSM’s level of control over the claimant’s employment
with TSV and any other TSM affiliate, among other relevant inquiries.
Courts have explained that one can show interrelation of operations with
evidence of, among others, “shared employees, services, records, office space, and
equipment, commingled finances, and handling by the parent of subsidiary tasks such
as payroll, books, and tax returns.” See e.g., Romano v. U-Haul Int’l, 233 F.3d 655,
667, n.7 (1st Cir. 2000); Magee v. BEA Const., Corp., No. 12-1738, 2013 WL 1429679,
at *1 (D.P.R. Apr. 5, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss and rejecting defendant’s
arguments that it had presented “overwhelming documentation . . . presented to
establish the separation of the corporation and its employees and incorporators.”).3
Here, aside from offering conclusory statements to the effect that it should not be a
party to this lawsuit, and submitting the Certificates of Existence of TSM and TSV,
respectively, TSM has not even attempted to answer any of the relevant questions at
hand, which are required to show that TSM does not operate as a joint employer with
TSV nor are they integrated enterprises. TSM misses the mark.
The Court now moves on to its analysis of the sufficiency of the Amended
Complaint. In its opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, the EEOC argues that the
Amended Complaint adequately pleads that TSM and TSV operate as single
employers or an integrated enterprise and joint employers. According to the Amended
Complaint: (1) TSM is the parent company of TSV (Docket No. 40 ¶17); (2) TSM

3 At best, the Certificates of Existence that TSM has offered raise a question of fact concerning the
alleged interrelated operations between TSM and TSV. It is well-known, however, that the Court is
precluded from deciding issues of fact, which are reserved for the trier of fact. See Puerto Rico Elec.
Power Auth. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 20-1393, 2021 WL 3293622, at *2 (D.P.R. Aug. 2, 2021) (issues
of fact are not decided by the court on motion to dismiss or on summary judgment).
handles employee relations issues for TSV, including the matters at question here for
the claimant; (Docket No. 40 ¶18); (3) TSM was aware that claimant filed an EEOC
Charge of Discrimination (Id. at ¶19); (4) TSM and its human resources official, Iliana
S. Rodríguez Torres, received notice of the claimant’s EEOC Charge of
Discrimination; (Id. at ¶20); (5) the TSM reasonable accommodation policy controls
employee relations for TSM affiliates, including TSV (Id. at ¶21); (6) the TSM
reasonable accommodation policy applied to the claimant throughout her
employment at TSV (Id. at ¶22); (7) the name “Triple-S Management,” namely, TSM,
appears on the heading of the documents for Human Resources that applied to the
claimant (Id. at ¶23); (8) the TSM human resources policy on reasonable
accommodations applies to the claimant (Id. at ¶24); (9) the TSM reasonable
accommodation policy defines TSM as including “direct or indirect affiliates,” which
includes TSV (Id. at ¶25); (10) TSM makes hiring and re-assignment decisions for
TSV and other affiliates such as Triple-S Salud, Triple-S Propiedad, and others (Id.
at ¶26); (11) TSV and TSM operate as a single or integrated enterprise, and/or joint
employer by virtue of the interrelations of their operations and the centralized control
over their labor relations (Id. at ¶30); and, (12) TSV and TSM share personnel
practices for their employees. (Id. at ¶31).
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court must accept as true the factual
allegations in the Amended Complaint and determine whether it is plausible that the
EEOC will be able to satisfy the single employer or integrated enterprise and/or joint
employer test. See Villafañe-Colon v. B Open Enterprises, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 2d 274,
279 (D.P.R. 2013); Polo-Echevarría v. Centro Médico Del Turabo, Inc., 949 F. Supp.
2d 332, 337 (D.P.R. 2013). Notwithstanding the correct legal standard of review, TSM
unavailingly seeks to impose a higher burden on the EEOC than that which is
required of a plaintiff at this juncture. Contrary to TSM’s theory,
under Twombly and Iqbal, nothing requires a plaintiff to prove her case in the
pleadings. See Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177 (D. Mass. 2009).
After a careful analysis of the Amended Complaint, the Court finds that the
well-pled allegations contained therein, taken as true and indulging in all inferences
in the EEOC’s favor, contain enough factual matter to show that TSM satisfies at
least one of the tests for either single employer or integrated enterprise or joint
employer pursuant to the ADA. See Torres–Negrón, 488 F.3d at 42 (citing Romano,
233 F.3d at 662); Meléndez-Fernández, supra. Contrary to TSM’s threadbare
arguments, the allegations in the Amended Complaint go beyond simply stating that
TSM operates as the claimant’s employer, or similarly worded conclusory statements.
The Amended Complaint contains specific factual matter to demonstrate at the initial
pleading stage a potential interrelation between TSM and TSV’s operations, common
management between these two entities, and centralized control over the claimant’s
labor relations. More precisely, the Amended Complaint sufficiently pleads that TSM
had control over the policies involving reasonable accommodation for employees like
the claimant, that TSM may have participated in, or had a certain level of control
over, the claimant’s employment, including her reasonable accommodation requests
and denials thereof, the claimant’s applications for new positions because of her
disability, reassignment applications, and denials of reassignment requests. The
Court therefore finds that the Amended Complaint contains enough non-speculative
allegations to show that TSM and the claimant are sufficiently related such that
TSM’s “actions . . . can be attributable to the legal employer.” Engelhardt v. S.P.
Richards Co., 472 F.3d 1, 4 n.2 (1st Cir. 2006).
To summarize, the Court finds that the EEOC’s Amended Complaint
sufficiently states a plausible claim of entitlement to relief, which is what is required
to withstand TSM’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, dismissal of the case
against TSM is not warranted at this time. See Bonilla v. Liquilux Gas Corp., 812 F.
Supp. 286, 289 (D.P.R. 1993) (denying a motion to dismiss even though a defendant
is not the immediate employer of the plaintiff employee because “entities which
exercise significant control over an employment situation may be proper defendants
in a Title VII action”) (citations omitted); Correa-Martínez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903
F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 1990) (dismissal is proper when “it clearly appears, according to
the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory.”)4
III. The Motion to Strike
TSM has also brought, in the alternative, a Motion to Strike as “immaterial”
all references to TSM in the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). As
the moving party, TSM bears the burden to show that the allegations should be
stricken under Rule 12(f). Under said rule, a party may move to have the court “strike
from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Rule 12(f) “motions are narrow in scope, disfavored in practice,
and not calculated readily to invoke the court’s discretion.” Manning v. Bos. Med. Ctr.
Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Boreri v. Fiat S.p.A., 763 F.2d 17, 23
(1st Cir. 1985)). Courts disfavor motions to strike “because ‘striking a portion of a
pleading is a drastic remedy and . . . it is often sought by the movant simply as a
dilatory or harassing tactic.’” Manning v. Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 59 (1st
Cir. 2013) (citing 5C Charles Alan Wright, et. al., Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 1380 (3d ed. 2011)).
Moreover, “when a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not be
dismissed based on a district court’s assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find
evidentiary support for his allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of the
factfinder.” Manning, 725 F.3d at 60 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 563 n.8). Although
striking portions of a pleading is disfavored by the courts, they have “considerable
discretion” to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); Alvarado–
Morales v. Digital Equip. Corp., 843 F.2d 613, 618 (1st Cir. 1988); and Boreri v. Fiat
S.P.A., 763 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1985).

4 On a final note, TSM did not place the Court in a position to award it the type of relief it requested.
TSM is free to renew its request in due course through another dispositive motion once discovery has
been completed and it is in a position to prove its argument through proper evidentiary support.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Triple-S Vida, Inc., Page | 15
21-1463 (FAB/MDM)
Again, TSM argues that the allegations made against it in the Amended
Complaint “provide an erroneous perception of’ it because TSM is not part of the
contractual relationship between TSV and the claimant. Aside from that conclusory
and broad claim, TSM fails to point to any specific paragraph or precise matter within
the four corners of the Amended Complaint that should be stricken for being
“redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Merely
arguing in a conclusory manner, without any specificity or well-developed form of
argumentation, that the EEOC’s allegations are “incorrect” as it pertains to TSM does
not come close to meeting the requirements of Rule 12(f). TSM also fails to argue how,
if at all, including it as a defendant in this case would prejudice it or confuse the
issues before the Court’s consideration. To the contrary, the Court previously found
that the Amended Complaint adequately states a plausible claim of entitlement to
relief as it pertains to TSM. Simply stated, TSM did not meet its burden to cause the
Court to strike any mention of TSM in the Amended Complaint. For the foregoing
reasons, the Motion to Strike does not pass muster.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court RECOMMENDS that TSM’s
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike (Docket No. 44) be DENIED.
The parties have fourteen days to file any objections to this Report and
Recommendation. Failure to file the same within the specified time waives the right
to appeal this Report and Recommendation. Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d
1438, 150-51 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Valencia Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir.
1986).
IT ISSO RECOMMENDED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 17th day of February 2023.

—_ | eige .
MARSHAL DAM ORGANS
United StatesMagistrate

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10420795. Public record. Not legal advice.