# GUIDAS v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · May 28, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10419806

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 28, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10419806

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “§ 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law”
- explaining that “the general presumption [is] that the FLSA is a parallel regime of wage-and-hour protections that works in cooperation with, not to the exclusion of, other laws protecting workers”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONALD GUIDAS,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-305
v. Hon. William S. Stickman IV
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Ronald Guidas (“Guidas’”) filed this putative class action under the Pennsylvania
Minimum Wage Act (““PMWA”), 43 P.S. §§ 333.101 ef seg., against United States Steel
Corporation (“U.S. Steel”) in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
In the single-count complaint (“Complaint”), Guidas asserts, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, that U.S. Steel violated the PMWA by failing to pay overtime wages to hourly
employees for activities they performed before their scheduled start time and after their
scheduled end time. (ECF No. 1-2, p. 12). U.S. Steel removed the case to this Court on the basis
of preemption under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”),
29 U.S.C. § 185. (ECF No. 1). Guidas filed a Motion to Remand to State Court, asserting that
U.S. Steel did not satisfy its burden of proving that his claim is preempted. (ECF No. 7). U.S.
Steel then filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
arguing that Guidas’s PMWA claim is preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. (ECF No. 10).
For the reasons discussed below, the Court holds that Guidas’s PMWA claim is not preempted.

Guidas’s motion will be granted, and the case will be remanded to state court. U.S. Steel’s
motion to dismiss will be denied as moot.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
U.S. Steel owns and operates Mon Valley Works, “an integrated steelmaking operation”
comprised of four facilities: the Clairton Plant, the Edgar Thomson Plant, the Irvin Plant, and the
Fairless Plant. (ECF No. 1-2, p. 8). Guidas is an hourly employee at the Clairton Plant (the
“Plant”), where he has worked as a “Mechanical Repairman” for the last twenty-two years. (/d.).
In addition to Guidas, U.S. Steel employs other “individuals who have been paid an hourly wage
to perform work at the Clairton Plant” (“Hourly Employees”). (/d.).
Guidas and the Hourly Employees’ work at the Plant is governed by a Basic Labor
Agreement (“BLA”), which is a collective bargaining agreement to which U.S. Steel and the
labor union, United Steel, Paper, and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial
and Service Workers International Union, are parties. (ECF No. 1-3, pp. 2, 11).! The BLA
“addresses, among other things, union members’ hours of work, work time, job duties, and rates
of pay,” as well as defining “a predetermined amount of compensation to coke plant employees
for time spent performing preparatory or closing activities which occur outside of their scheduled
shift or away from their worksite.” (Ud. at 23).
The BLA lists the following positions and their corresponding duties and responsibilities:
APPENDIX A-2: JOB DESCRIPTIONS
Position Title: Senior Operating Technician
Labor Grade 5
Operates and is responsible for a major producing unit (such as Hot Strip Mill) as
a member of the operating team. Directs other operating and support crew
members, performs administrative duties, and communicates with maintenance,

' A copy of the BLA is attached as Exhibit 1 to U.S. Steel’s Exhibit B, Declaration of Rebecca S.
Bloom. (ECF No. 1-3).

as required, to maximize production. Performs and assists in production and
maintenance tasks and functions necessary to assure maximum production,
quality, and inspection. Performs or leads maintenance activities as required with
operating crew members and coordinates and works in conjunction with
Maintenance Technicians.
Position Title: Maintenance Technician (Mechanical or Electrical)
Labor Grade 4
Performs all maintenance functions (mechanical or electrical/electronic)
necessary to maintain all operating and service equipment using standard and
specialized tools and equipment including mobile equipment as required.
Operates equipment in conjunction with repairs and provides assistance in
operating functions as necessary to maintain continuity of operations. May work
alone, with minimal supervision or with other Maintenance Technicians and
coordinates and works in conjunction with operating team members in the
performance of maintenance tasks.
Position Title: Operating Technician IT
Labor Grade 4 .
Operates and is responsible for a significant producing unit (such as Galvanizing
Line) or operates and assists Senior Operating Technician on a major producing
unit as a member of the operating team. Directs other operating and support crew
members, performs administrative duties, and communicates with maintenance,
as required to maximize production. Performs and assists in production and
maintenance tasks and functions necessary to assure maximum production,
quality and inspection. Performs or leads maintenance activities as required with
operating crew members and coordinates and works in conjunction with
Maintenance Technicians. Includes hybrid operating/maintenance jobs, such as
former Equipment Tender.
Position Title: Operating Technician I
Labor Grade 3
Operates and is responsible for producing and support units other than those
described above or operates key sections of a producing unit and assists Operating
Technician II or Senior Operating Technician as a member of the operating team.
Directs support crew members, performs administrative duties, and communicates
with maintenance, as required to maximize production. Performs and assists in
production and maintenance tasks and functions necessary to assure maximum
production, quality, and inspection. Performs or leads maintenance activities as
required and coordinates and works in conjunction with Maintenance
Technicians.
Position Title: Utility Technician
Labor Grade 2
Operates equipment and performs tasks that support operations of the various
producing units and works with materials and equipment to handle, transport and

process product and materials. Directs the flow of material to and from producing □
units and material. Operates equipment associated with producing units such as
roll grinders, etc. and operates material handling equipment such as overhead
electric cranes, feeders, etc. and mobile equipment such as tractors, trucks, heavy
equipment, dozers, loaders, boom trucks, mobile cranes (various sizes and types),
etc. Inspects and performs maintenance on all associated equipment.
Position Title: Utility Person
Labor Grade 1
Operates equipment and performs tasks such as operating labor, general labor and
light mobile equipment operation required to support and maintain Plant
operations. Supports and assists in maintenance activities.

APPENDIX N—FLSA MATTERS

The Parties agreed that starting in 1947, every national collective bargaining
agreement or BLA negotiated by the Parties has included an agreement that the
Company is not obligated to pay Employees for preparatory or closing activities
which occur outside of their scheduled shift or away from their worksite (1.¢e., so-
called “portal-to-portal activities”). Such activities include such things as
donning and doffing of protective clothing (including such items as flame-
retardant jacket and pants, metatarsal boots, hard hat, safety glasses, ear plugs,
and a snood or hood), and washing up. Nevertheless, the Parties have agreed to
the following, effective with the September 1, 2008 BLA.
1. Coke plant Employees who work in OSHA regulated areas and who are
required to shower at the end of their shift will be provided with twenty (20)
minutes washup time prior to the end of the Employee’s shift, or a daily additive
in an amount calculated at four-tenths (0.4) of an hour at the Employee’s Base
Rate of Pay, at the Company’s choice. Existing local practices which may permit
more than twenty (20) minutes of such wash-up time shall not be affected by this
agreement.
2. The Parties’ long-standing agreement described above which makes such
portal-to-portal activities non-compensable shall otherwise remain in effect.

(ECF No. 1-3, pp. 279-281, 301-02).

Guidas alleges that he and the Hourly Employees often worked forty or more hours per
workweek and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as required by the PMWA.
(ECF No. 1-2, p. 8). He claims that U.S. Steel failed to pay him and the Hourly Employees for
activities performed prior to and after the completion of their scheduled shifts. Pre-start time
activities include “walking to locker room/changing area from the Plant entrance area; waiting
for, gathering, and donning personal protective equipment (“PPE”); [and] walking to assigned
work locations.” (/d. at 8-9). Post-end time activities are the same, but in reverse—ie.,
“walking from assigned work locations to the locker room/changing area; doffing and returning
PPE; showering; and walking from the locker room/changing area to the Plant exit area.” (ECF
No. 1-2, pp. 8-9). Guidas alleges that showering is another post-scheduled shift activity for
which he and the Hourly Employees did not receive compensation. (/d. at 9).
In the BLA, the only pre- or post-shift activity that is stated as a requirement is showering
at the end of certain employees’ shifts. (ECF No. 1-3, p. 301). This provision states that these
particular employees, those “who work in OSHA regulated areas” in the Plant, will be
compensated for the time spent showering because these individuals are “required to shower at
the end of their shift.” (/d.).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A civil action brought in state court can be removed by a defendant to federal district
court under the general removal statute: 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Since federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction, such removal is proper only if a district court would have original subject-
matter jurisdiction over the action, either through diversity of citizenship or federal question
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Emps. Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 905

F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). A lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is a
mandatory basis for remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
The presumption at every stage of litigation is that a district court lacks federal
jurisdiction unless proven otherwise. Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 337 (1895)
(internal citation omitted). A defendant retains the overall burden to show by the preponderance
of the evidence that subject-matter jurisdiction exists and removal is proper. Boyer v. Snap-on
Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (Gd Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); McNutt v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936). Doubts as to jurisdiction must be resolved
in favor of remand. See Samuel-Bassett vy. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 403 (Gd Cir.
2004).
Whether a district court has federal question jurisdiction is governed by the “well-pleaded
complaint rule,” which sets forth that federal jurisdiction “exists only when a federal question is
presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,
482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A federal defense, including the defense of preemption, is not a basis
for removal. Jd. at 393. However, there is an “independent corollary” to the well-pleaded
complaint rule known as the “complete pre-emption” doctrine. Jd In these limited
circumstances, the preemptive force of a statute is found to be so “extraordinary” that it
“converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes
of the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Jd. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65
(1987)). The complete preemption corollary “is applied primarily in cases raising claims
preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.” Id.
The requirements for filing a motion to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) parallels the
defense requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales

Co., Inc., 842 F.3d 805, 811 (Gd Cir. 2016) (citing Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121-22
(9th Cir. 2014)). A challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may entail either
a facial or factual attack. Jd. (quoting Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016)).
In reviewing a facial attack, a court assumes all factual allegations are true. Jd. (citation
omitted). In reviewing a factual attack, a court construes all factual allegations in a light most
favorable to the movant as it would otherwise do under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Id. (quoting In re Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Def.
Ass’n, 790 F.3d 457, 466 (3d Cir. 2015)); Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121 (citing Pride v. Correa, 719
F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013)). In either case, a defendant retains the overall burden of
demonstrating that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111; McNutt, 298 U.S.
at 189.
IW. ANALYSIS
Guidas moves to remand this action to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
arguing that U.S. Steel has not demonstrated that his PMWA claim is preempted by the LMRA.
(ECF No. 7, p. 1). Guidas contends that his Complaint does not reference the BLA nor imply
that U.S. Steel violated the agreement, and thus his claim does not require interpretation of any
specific provision contained therein. (ECF No. 8, pp. 11-13); (ECF No. 15, p. 3). He highlights
his claim’s independence from the LMRA. (ECF No. 15, p. 3). Additionally, he asserts that this
suit will be resolved by applying the facts of his employment to the PMWA’s statutory language,
not the BLA, and that no provision of the BLA needs to be interpreted. Ud. at 3-8).
U.S. Steel counters that Guidas’s Complaint alleges a violation of the BLA, or stated
differently, a claim for breach of the BLA’s terms. (ECF No. 13, p. 13). In the alternative, it
asserts that to determine whether Guidas is entitled to the alleged compensation, the Court must

analyze and interpret the BLA provisions governing Guidas’s employment, such as his work
schedule, wages, and job description. (Ud. at 14). U.S. Steel notes that the Court will need to
undertake interpretation “to determine whether the activities fit the definition of “hours worked’
under the PMWA.” (/d. at 17). U.S. Steel also contends that the Court will need to interpret
BLA provisions because the agreement is “nor silent as to the compensation provided for the
very activities [Guidas] points to in his Complaint.” (Jd. at 21) (emphasis in original). Based on
this, U.S. Steel asserts that Guidas’s PMWA claim is preempted by the LMRA, and removal was
proper.
As explained below, the Court holds that Guidas’s PMWA claim is not preempted by. the
LMRA.
A. Relevant Federal and State Law.
1. Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act
The wages of employees in the United States are governed by both federal and state law.
The federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, establishes “a
national floor under which wage protections cannot drop.” Chevalier v. Gen. Nutrition Ctrs.,
Inc., 220 A.3d 1038, 1055 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Com. of Pa., Dep’t of Lab.
& Indus., 8 A.3d 866, 883 (Pa. 2010)). But the FLSA does not preclude states from “enact[ing]
more beneficial wage and hour laws.” Jd; see also 29 U.S.C. § 218 (providing that the FLSA
does not “excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance
establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under [the FLSA]”);
Verma v. 3001 Castor, Inc., 937 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that “the general
presumption [is] that the FLSA is a parallel regime of wage-and-hour protections that works in
cooperation with, not to the exclusion of, other laws protecting workers”).

The Pennsylvania General Assembly endeavored to provide “more generous protections”
to employees through enactment of the PMWA. Chevalier, 220 A.3d at 1055 (citation omitted).
The PMWA “manifests th{e] Commonwealth’s strong public policy protecting an employee’s
right to be adequately compensated for all hours for which they work.” Jn re Amazon.com, Inc.,
255 A.3d 191, 200 (Pa. 2021); see also 43 P.S. § 333.101 (“The evils of unreasonable and unfair
wages as they affect some employe[e]s employed in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are
such as to render imperative the exercise of the police power of the Commonwealth for the
protection of industry and of the employe[e]s employed therein and of the public interest of the
community at large.”). The PMWA provides that “[e]very employer shall pay to each of his or
her employe[e]s wages for all hours worked ....” 43 P.S. § 333.104(a). It further provides that
employees “shall be paid for overtime not less than one and one-half times the employe[e]’s
regular rate . . . for hours in excess of forty hours in a workweek.” Jd. § 333.104(c). The statute
does not itself define “hours worked.” Jn re Amazon.com, 255 A.3d at 203. But the term has
been defined by regulation:
Hours worked-—The term includes [1] time during which an employee is required
by the employer to be on the premises of the employer, [2] to be on duty or to be
at the prescribed work place, [3] time spent in traveling as part of the duties of the
employee during normal working hours and [4] time during which an employee is
employed or permitted to work; provided, however, that time allowed for meals
shall be excluded unless the employee is required or permitted to work during that
time, and provided further, that time spent on the premises of the employer for the
convenience of the employee shall be excluded.
34 Pa. Code § 231.1(b). According to the plain language of the regulation, “all time which an
employee spends performing any one of these four types of activity constitutes hours worked.”
Inre Amazon.com, 255 A.3d at 203—04.
2. LMRA Preemption
Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a). As interpreted by the Supreme Court, this provision of the LMRA has both
a jurisdictional and substantive effect. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala.,
353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957); see also Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
642-43 (1981). First, it vests federal district courts with jurisdiction over certain labor-
management disputes. Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 451-52; see also Textron Lycoming
Reciprocating Engine Div., Avco Corp. v. United Auto., Aerospace, Agric. Implement Workers of
Am., Int’l Union, 523 U.S. 653, 656-57 (1998) (“By its terms, this provision confers federal
subject-matter jurisdiction only over ‘[sJuits for violation of contracts.””). And second, it
“authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of [] collective
bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law specific performance of promises to
arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining agreements.” Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 451;
see also id. at 456 (“[T]he substantive law to apply in suits under s [sic] 301(a) is federal law,
which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.”).
The need for uniformity gave rise to the doctrine of complete preemption under the
LMRA. See Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. vy. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962) (citation omitted). In defining this doctrine, the Supreme Court
explained that “the preemptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state
cause of action ‘for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.’”
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for. S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)
(citation omitted). Accordingly, a suit “alleging a violation of a provision of a labor contract
must be brought under § 301 and [] resolved by reference to federal law.” Allis-Chalmers Corp.
10

v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985). And if a “state rule [] purports to define the meaning or
scope of a term in a [labor] contract suit,” it is “pre-empted by federal labor law.” Id.
Significantly, LMRA preemption “extend[s] beyond suits alleging contract violations.”
Id. It also applies to state law claims that are “substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms
of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract.” Jd. at 220; see also Caterpillar,
482 US. at 394 (“Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective-
bargaining agreements, and also claims ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-
bargaining agreement.’” (citation omitted)). But such an extension of LMRA preemption is
“narrow.” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220. “[N]ot every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially
involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301.” Jd. at 211.
Rather, “it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under that section to pre-empt state
rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.”
Id. at 212; see also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994) (stating that Ҥ 301 cannot be
read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of
state law”).

The question thus becomes—as assessed “on a case-by-case basis”—whether the state-
law claim “confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or employees independent of
any right established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the [state law] claim is
inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.” Lueck, 471 U.S.
at 213, 220. In determining whether a state-law claim is “independent” of a collective
bargaining agreement, a court must consider the “legal character of [the] claim” as opposed to its
factual underpinnings. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123 (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213). In other words,
“even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and

11

state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the
state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is
‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1988).
Moreover, mere consultation of a collective bargaining agreement does not trigger
LMRA preemption. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124 (“[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not
the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in
the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.”). “[A]n
application of state law is preempted by § 301 of the [LMRA] only if such application requires
the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 (emphasis
added). Under those circumstances, the state-law claim “must either be treated as a § 301 claim
or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220 (internal
citation omitted).
B. Guidas’s PMWA claim is not preempted by the LMRA.
Guidas, on behalf of himself and the Hourly Employees, brings a single claim for unpaid
wages under the PMWA for U.S. Steel’s alleged failure to compensate for all time associated
with activities performed before and after their scheduled shifts. These activities include
walking between the locker room/changing area, the Plant entrance or exit area, and the assigned
work location; waiting for, gathering, donning, doffing, and returning PPE; and showering.
(ECF No. 1-2, pp. 8-9).
To determine whether LMRA preemption applies in this case, the Court first considers
whether the PMWA “confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or employees.”
Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213. As discussed above, the PMWA was intended to “protect[] an

12

employee’s right to be adequately compensated for all hours for which they work.” Jn re
Amazon.com, 255 A.3d at 200; see also Chevalier, 220 A.3d at 1055; 43 P.S. § 333.101. To give
effect to that right, the PMWA affords an employee a civil cause of action to recover minimum
wages. See 43 P.S. § 333.113. The PMWA provides supplemental protections in a number of
areas where federal law does not extend, such as donning, doffing, sanitizing protective gear, and
taking shuttled transportation to and from a work site. See Larue v. Great Arrow Builders LLC,
No. 2:19¢v932, 2020 WL 5747818, at *12 (W.D Pa. Sept. 25, 2020) (colleting cases).
The PMWA further provides that “any agreement between the employer and the worker
to work for less than such minimum wage shall be no defense to such action.” 43 □□□
§ 333.113. In other words, the PMWA expressly states that its protections cannot be waived by
contract. See Verma, 937 F.3d at 229 (“The whole point of . . . the PMWA is to protect workers
by overriding contractual relations through statute.’”’); Larue, 2020 WL 5747818, at *11 (“The
rights afforded to employees under the PMWA are independent of any contract rights arising
under the CBA.”). Therefore, the PMWA confers nonnegotiable rights—as explicitly detailed
by the text and purpose of the PMWA—that employees are due the minimum amount of wages
owed to them for their work. Guidas’s claim is grounded-entirely upon U.S. Steel’s alleged
failure to pay wages owed to him and the Hourly Employees for all hours worked and thus
triggers these nonnegotiable rights.
But the fact that a state law “grant[s] nonnegotiable rights” does not, by itself, “ensure[ ]
nonpre-emption.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407 n.7. Rather, such rights must also be “independent of
any right established by contract,” Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213, meaning adjudication of the state-law
claim will not require “interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement,” Lingle, 486 U.S. at
413; Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original) (citation

13

omitted) (“[T]he essential question is not whether [a plaintiffs] claims relate to a subject...
contemplated by the CBA. ... Rather, the dispositive question [] is whether [the] state claims
require any interpretation of a provision of the CBA.”). Interpretation is warranted when the
parties have a specific dispute over the meaning of the agreement’s terms or provisions. Malone
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 21-3643, 2023 WL 3362588, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2023)
(citations omitted); Mack v. Six Flags Great Adventure, LLC, No. 23-3813, 2024 WL 69879, at
*5 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2024) (citation omitted).
Mere consultation of an agreement does not necessitate interpretation of the applicable
employment contract or collective bargaining agreement in every case. A court may have to
look to the agreement to determine an employee’s required activities and duties. See Pa. Fed’n
of Brotherhood of Maint. of Way Emps. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK), 989 F.2d 112,
115 (3d Cir. 1993); Smith v. Allegheny Techs., Inc., 754 F. App’x 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2018).
Additionally, a court may need to consider the fact and circumstances beyond the four corners of
a written contract to determine an employer’s requirements. This especially is the case when an
employment agreement is silent (rather than ambiguous) as to certain job requirements. See
Kline, 386 F.3d at 256. A court cannot be said to “interpret” an agreement by making a
determination of silence and then looking to external, non-contractual sources of those alleged
requirements. Jd. (“[T]he mere fact that we must look at the CBA in order to determine that it is
silent on any issue relevant to [a plaintiff's] state claims does not mean that we have ‘interpreted’
the CBA.”).
To prevail on a PMWA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he and the Hourly
Employees were “employees,” (2) U.S. Steel was their “employer,” and (3) U.S. Steel failed to
pay them the wages required by the PMWA. See 43 P.S. §§ 333.103, 333.104. Resolution of the

14

first two elements (which are inherently related) will not require any interpretation of the BLA.
See Soles v. Zartman Constr., Inc., No. 4:13-cv-29, 2014 WL 3557197, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 18,
2014) (“Whether a worker is an ‘employee’ subject to the protections of the PMWA is a fact-
based inquiry regardless of what a contract says and even whether a contract exists at all.”). To
determine employee-employer status, courts must consider the “totality of the circumstances”
and apply a six-factor “economic reality” test. Pa. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., Bureau of Lab. L
Compliance v. Stuber, 822 A.2d 870, 873-74 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003); see also Verma, 937 F.3d
at 229. Notably, “none of [the six] factors asks whether the worker signed an agreement stating
that she is an ‘independent contractor’” or an employee. Verma, 937 F.3d at 229. As such, the
Court finds that application of the “economic reality” test to determine whether Guidas and the
Hourly Employees were U.S. Steel’s employees will not require interpretation of any provision
of the BLA. Indeed, the BLA is largely—if not entirely—irrelevant to this inquiry.
The parties’ arguments are focused on the resolution of the third element. Under the
PMWA, employers must pay every employee “wages for all hours worked.” 43 P.S. §
333.104(a). As defined by regulation, “hours worked” includes (1) time during which an
employee is required by the employer to be on the employer’s premises, (2) to be on duty or to
be at the assigned workplace, (3) time spent traveling as part of the employee’s duties during
normal working hours, and (4) time during which an employee is employed or permitted to
work. 34 Pa. Code § 231.1(b).
U.S. Steel first contends that Guidas “‘is trying to disguise his LMRA claim as a PMWA
claim” because he alleges violations of specific terms of the BLA. (ECF No. 13, pp. 12-13). It
notes that the BLA provides compensation for time that Plant employees spend on post-liminary
activities outside of their normally scheduled shifts. (Ud. at 13). Since the contract explicitly

15

details this compensation metric, U.S. Steel argues that Guidas’s allegations that he and the
Hourly Employees are not paid for “all time” associated with activities performed before and
after their scheduled shifts is a claim for breach of a term of the BLA. (Ud.). Therefore, U.S.
Steel asserts that § 301 preemption applies, and removal is proper. (/d.).
If not a breach of a BLA term, U.S. Steel alternatively asserts that determining whether
Guidas and the Hourly Employees are entitled to compensation for the pre- and post-shift
activities allegedly performed “requires the Court to determine whether [U.S. Steel] required
[Guidas] to perform those activities at the workplace or while on duty,” necessitating it to
analyze and interpret the applicable BLA provisions. (/d. at 14). Specifically, U.S. Steel
contends that the BLA outlines what constitutes hours worked and the job duties of hourly
employees. (/d. at 16). It argues that Guidas’s claim is inextricably linked to BLA provisions,
and the Court will need to interpret sections “to determine whether the activities fit the definition
of ‘hours worked’ under the PMWA.” (d. at 17-18).
In response, Guidas asserts that his Complaint does not mention, reference, or allege any
violation of a BLA term. (ECF No. 8, p. 11); (ECF No. 15, p. 9). Instead, Guidas argues this his
PMWA claim “exists independently of the contractual provisions within the BLA.” (ECF No.
15, p. 9). Additionally, he contends that “while the parties may potentially need to consult the
BLA, [his] PMWA claim will not require an interpretation of the provisions cited by [U.S.
Steel] to resolve its merits.” (Ud. at 5) (emphasis in original). This, Guidas contends, is because
the BLA is “‘silent’? as to whether any of the challenged pre and post-shift activities were
required to be performed on the premises of the Plant.” (d.). Guidas also asserts that even
though the BLA states that U.S. Steel is not obligated to pay employees for preparatory or
closing activities that occur outside of their scheduled shift or away from their worksite, the BLA

16

is effectively silent as to whether these activities would qualify as compensable hours worked
under the PMWA. (Jd. at 6).
Upon careful review of the BLA, the Court concludes that Guidas does not allege a claim
for breach of any BLA term. Nor does it find Guidas alleges that any relevant provisions of the
agreement require interpretation. The Court holds that Guidas’s claim is “independent” of the
BLA. Resolution will require a factual determination of the amount of time the employees
worked at the beginning and end of the workday and a legal determination of whether such time
is compensable under the PMWA. See Bell v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 733 F.3d 490, 495 (3d Cir.
2013). Therefore, his claim is not preempted by the LMRA.
The Court does not find that Guidas’s claim is one for breach of a BLA term, as U.S.
Steel argues. Guidas does not seek to recover based on any right included within the four
corners of the BLA. See Larue, 2020 WL 5747818, at *15 (“[I]t would be disingenuous to
ignore the fact that plaintiff does not seek to recover based on a right or form of entitlement
under the CBAs.”). Rather, his PMWA claim is grounded entirely on U.S. Steel’s alleged
violation of his statutory rights. It is not enough for there to exist a potential claim for breach of
an applicable collective bargaining agreement from the same set of facts. Jd (emphasis added)
(citing Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409-10). Therefore, that the BLA contains provisions that provide
compensation for certain Plant employees—those that are required to shower at the end of their
scheduled shifts—does not automatically preempt Guidas’s state law claim for unpaid wages.
Id.; (ECF No. 1-2, p. 9).
Guidas’s claim will require applying certain facts in conjunction with the PMWA’s
“hours worked” provision. No interpretation of the BLA will be necessary. A court may,
however, need to consult the BLA’s provisions “to consider whether the activities at issue are

17

clearly excluded from the [employees’] workday.” Ballard v. BHI Energy, Inc., No. 22-115,
2022 WL 4464959, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2022). But this alone “does not equate with
‘interpreting’ the CBA to determine whether such activities constitute compensable time under
the PMWA.” Id.
Specifically, a court may need to consult Appendix N—FLSA Matters, which sets forth
the agreement reached related to certain “‘portal-to-portal activities.” (ECF No. 1-3, pp. 139-40).
The provision explicitly states that U.S. Steel is “not obligated to pay [e]mployees for
preparatory or closing activities which occur outside of their scheduled shift or away from their
worksite,” listing donning and doffing of protective clothing and washing up as examples. (/d. at
140). It then specifies the one exception to this—Plant employees “who work in OSHA
regulated areas” are required to shower and will be compensated for doing so. (Ud). Guidas
alleges that showering after scheduled shifts is an activity for which he and the Hourly
Employees did not receive compensation. (ECF No. 1-2, p. 9). Because the BLA explicitly
provides compensation for post-shift showering, U.S. Steel asserts that Guidas’s corresponding
claim would require interpretation of the BLA. (ECF No. 13, p. 19). The Court disagrees.
Resolution of Guidas’s claim related to post-shift showering would require mere consultation of
the BLA, not interpretation. The parties do not dispute the meaning of the provision. See
Malone, 2023 WL 3362588, at *6 (citations omitted); Mack, 2024 WL 69879, at *5 (citation
omitted). A court will have to make a factual determination as to whether U.S. Steel paid Guidas
and the Hourly Employees for their required post-shift showers based on the unambiguous terms
stated on the face of the BLA.
Related to the other activities Guidas alleges went uncompensated—walking within the
Plant as well as donning and doffing PPE—the BLA is silent. There are no terms or provisions

18

contained therein which set forth whether any of the challenged pre- or post-shift activities are
required, and thus are compensable “hours worked.” In other words, with respect to the third
element of Guidas’s PMWA claim, there is nothing in the BLA for a court to interpret.
Resolution of this element will ultimately require a court to look beyond the BLA. That task, as
explained above, will not involve contractual interpretation because the determination will be
made by looking at the facts and circumstances of the employment.
In the absence of any required interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the
doctrine of complete preemption under the LMRA is inapplicable. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413
(“[A]n application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of the [LMRA] only if such application
requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.”); Kline, 386 F.3d at 257 (“The
fact that a collective bargaining agreement [is] part of the context in which an employee’s claim
must be addressed [does] not trigger complete preemption in the absence of some substantial
dispute over the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement.”). The Court, therefore,
concludes that Guidas’s PMWA claim is not preempted by the LMRA, and the case will be
remanded.

19

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Guidas’s Motion to Remand to State
Court (ECF No. 7). U.S. Steel’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) will be denied as moot. An
Order of Court will follow.
BY THE COURT:
NEL f CO Qe
4 é — 7 = wee □□
2 AA BG SE!
WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated:
1.
Siz jay

20

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10419806. Public record. Not legal advice.