# ACHILLE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · April 26, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10419763

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 26, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10419763

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating “no incantations are required at steps four and five simply because a particular finding has been made at steps two and three.”
- holding that an ALJ’s decision must be “read as a whole”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHERYL ACHILLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-147-E
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
)
Defendant. )
)

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-
motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under
Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the
Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.
Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.
Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s
decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,
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merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642
F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in determining
her residual functional capacity (“RFC”). (Doc No. 10). Specifically, Plaintiff contends
that the ALJ failed to incorporate her mild limitations regarding her ability to understand,
remember, or apply information; interact with others; concentrate, persist, or maintain
pace; and adapt or manage herself (collectively the “Paragraph B Criteria”). (Id. at 7-10).
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred in failing to account for Plaintiff’s hand problems
in the RFC despite finding that Plaintiff’s osteoarthritis was a severe impairment at Step
Two. (Id. at 10-16). For the following reasons, the Court disagrees and affirms the
ALJ’s finding of non-disability.

This Court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether it is supported by
substantial evidence. See Schaudeck v. Comm’r, 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir.
2005) (quotation omitted). This Court may not reweigh the evidence nor substitute its
own findings for the ALJ’s findings even when there is evidence in the record to support a
“contrary conclusion.” Malloy v. Comm’r, 306 Fed. Appx. 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009).

The ALJ uses a five-step evaluation process to determine disability. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a). At Step One, the ALJ “consider[s] [the claimant’s] work activity” to
ensure he or she is not doing “substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At
Step Two, the ALJ “consider[s] the medical severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s),”
and for the inquiry to continue, the ALJ must find that the claimant has at least one “severe
medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . or a combination of
impairments[,]” that has lasted or is “expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12
months.” Id. § 404.1509; 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A claimant’s satisfaction of his or her
burden of proof at Step Two leads to Step Three where the ALJ asks whether the claimant’s
impairments meet or equal the criteria for one of the presumptively disabling impairments
listed in the regulations. See Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant does not satisfy
Step Three, the inquiry continues to Steps Four and Five, which requires an assessment of
the claimant’s RFC and a determination as to whether claimant can return to past relevant
work or perform other substantial work. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)-(v).

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s first argument that the ALJ erred by failing to include
non-exertional limitations in her RFC accommodating her mild limitations in the Paragraph
B Criteria. (Doc. No. 10 at 7-10). In this case, the ALJ made the following RFC
determination:

2
[C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work
as defined in 20 CFR. 404.1567(a) except she can only occasionally climb
ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally
stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; and must avoid concentrated exposure to
temperature extremes, wetness, humidity, respiratory irritants, and hazards
(e.g. open dangerous machinery and unprotected heights).

(R. 17). Plaintiff argues the ALJ incorporated only physical limitations in this RFC and
did not account for her mild limitations in the Paragraph B Criteria. The Court disagrees.

The Court first notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has made clear that the ALJ’s finding of a mild limitation in a claimant’s Paragraph B
Criteria demands no specific formulation of the RFC. See Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
931 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2019) (stating “no incantations are required at steps four and
five simply because a particular finding has been made at steps two and three.”). The
Court requires only that the ALJ have a “valid explanation” for the limitations included in
the RFC. Id. at 211.

In this case, the ALJ offered a valid explanation for the RFC determination. In
determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s mental health issues were
“addressed above in Finding 2[,]” referring to the analysis at Step Two. (R. 18). At Step
Two, the ALJ explained when assessing Plaintiff’s severe impairments that Plaintiff had
“no more than ‘mild’ limitation” in the Paragraph B Criteria because Plaintiff’s record
contained scant evidence of mental health treatment during the relevant time period, notes
from the few mental health treatment sessions did not suggest more than minimal limits in
Plaintiff’s ability to work, and Plaintiff’s mental status examinations were typically
negative for any significant psychiatric symptoms or mental status abnormalities. (R. 16;
Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that an ALJ’s decision must
be “read as a whole”)). Additionally, Plaintiff herself admitted that the limitations in her
day-to-day life were more due to physical impairments than to mental health issues. (R.
16; (citing Ex. 5E)). Further, Douglas Schiller, Ph.D., assessed mild limitations in the
Paragraph B Criteria, and the ALJ found this opinion to be persuasive because it was
consistent with Plaintiff’s treatment records and objective findings. (R. 16 (citing Ex.
3A)). Indeed, the ALJ expressly noted that “the following residual functional capacity
assessment reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has found in the ‘paragraph B’
mental function analysis.” (R. 16). Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ’s RFC finding
is supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff’s argument that Hrnjic v. Berryhill, No. 1:16-302, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11607, at *12-14 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2018) demands a remand of her case is unconvincing.
Hrnjic involved an ALJ’s decision where the RFC determination was silent as to limitations
caused by Plaintiff’s non-severe mental impairments, whereas the ALJ here specifically
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analyzed Plaintiff’s mental health and its impact on her ability to work, stating, “[Plaintiff’s
m]ental health treatment has also been limited and conservative, with a focus on improving
communication in her family, and mental status examinations have typically been entirely
normal, with no indication that a mental impairment more than minimally limits her ability
to work.” (R. 23). Moreover, as noted above, the ALJ specifically explained that the RFC
assessment “reflects the degree of limitation the undersigned has found in the ‘paragraph B’
mental function analysis.” (R. 16). This sufficiently addressed Plaintiff’s non-exertional
mental limitations. The ALJ’s RFC determination makes sense considering this analysis
and the fact that the RFC determination is the most a claimant can do despite his or her
limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). For these reasons, the ALJ provided a
sufficient explanation and incorporated limitations into the RFC to account for all of
Plaintiff’s “credibly established” limitations. See Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 n.8.

The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s next argument that the ALJ committed reversible
error by failing to account for Plaintiff’s bilateral hand problems in the RFC, especially
after concluding that Plaintiff’s osteoarthritis was a severe impairment at Step Two.
(Doc. No. 10 at 10-16). Plaintiff contends that her RFC should have contained handling,
fingering, and feeling limitations to account for her hand problems and that these
limitations would have precluded her from performing past relevant work as a 411
operator. (Id. at 10-11). Plaintiff states that these limitations were supported by her
multiple diagnostic x-rays throughout the years that showed her bilateral polyarticular
arthritis, her surgery for right-hand numbness, and reports of bilateral thumb pain. (Id.).
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ used “minimizing prefixes and lead-ins” in the analysis
of Plaintiff’s medical record. (Id. at 12 (citing R. 19)). All told, Plaintiff posits that her
RFC limitation to sedentary work does not account for her severe osteoarthritis. (Id. at
14-16).

The Court disagrees with Plaintiff for the following reasons. First, Plaintiff’s
argument is based on a flawed premise – it assumes that each severe impairment at Step
Two must correlate with a specific restriction(s) in the RFC. This is not the case. When
a claimant has multiple severe impairments, the restrictions created by these impairments
are considered in combination. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. Second, the ALJ sufficiently
addressed Plaintiff’s hand problems in determining the RFC. Specifically, the ALJ
rejected Plaintiff’s testimony regarding pain in her hands and difficulty opening and
closing her hands on “bad days” because her statements were not entirely consistent with
the evidence of record. (R. 18-19). The medical record showed that Plaintiff
experienced osteoarthritis in her foot and conservative measures were recommended to
address this. (R. 20). Additionally, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s subsequent x-rays
showing arthritis in her hands and mentioned that Plaintiff nonetheless denied any hand
pain during her consultative examination with Mary Donikowski, N.P., and that the
examination revealed that Plaintiff’s joints were stable and non-tender. (R. 21-22). Ms.
Donikowski’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s x-rays also revealed that Plaintiff had “mild”
4
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 9) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

osteoarthritis at the base of her bilateral thumbs. (R. 22 (citing Ex. 5F/4, 17)). Further,
no state medical consultants or consultative examiners opined that Plaintiff required
manipulative limitations. (R. 23-24) (citing Exs. 1A, 3A, 5F)). The ALJ also analyzed
the records of Dr. Mary Bertha Russo-Colt, D.O., who addressed Plaintiff’s foot pain. (R.
20). This analysis shows that the ALJ sufficiently considered all of the evidence in
determining Plaintiff’s RFC.

The Court further rejects Plaintiff’s arguments that the RFC did not account for Dr.
Russo-Colt’s recommendation that she avoid “overuse using phone/games/etc.” and that
Plaintiff’s x-ray showed Plaintiff suffers osteoarthritis in seven joints between her two
hands. (Doc. No. 10 at 10-12 (citing R. 1108, 1430)). First, this recommendation
provided the ALJ with little value in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC as the recommendation does
not appear to have constituted a work-related limitation, and, in any event, referred only to
an undefined level of “overuse.” See SSR 96-8P, at *4 (explaining that the RFC “must
be expressed in terms of work- related functions”). Second, as noted above, the ALJ
analyzed the records of Dr. Russo-Colt, and while the specific recommendation that
Plaintiff avoid “overuse using phone/games/etc” was not mentioned in the ALJ’s decision,
this is not cause for remand as the ALJ “need not mention every piece of evidence in the
record[.]” Beety-Monticelli v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 343 Fed. Appx. 743, 747 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). The ALJ analyzed many of Plaintiff’s x-rays, including the x-
ray Plaintiff points to in support of her argument. (R. 19 (citing Ex. 9F/58)). The ALJ
specifically stated that x-rays of Plaintiff’s hands showed mild or moderate osteoarthritis
in a few of her hand joints, which aligns with the impression reported from the x-ray
Plaintiff relies upon. (Ex. 9F/58 (stating Plaintiff’s x-ray of her left hand showed “[m]ild
first CMC joint osteoarthritis[,] [m]ild second and third MCP joint osteoarthritis[,]
[m]oderate osteoarthritis at the index and middle finger DIP joints[]” and in her right hand
“[m]ild first CMC joint osteoarthritis[,] [m]oderate second and mild third DIP joint
osteoarthritis.”). All of this constitutes substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s
findings.

For all these reasons, the Court affirms the decision of the ALJ.
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10419763. Public record. Not legal advice.