# HUMPHREY v. PA. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · October 24, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10419252

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 24, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DOUGLAS E. HUMPHREY, )
)
Plaintiff, ) 3:23-cv-00109-MRH-MPK
)
v. )
)
PA. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
)

OPINION

Mark R. Hornak, Chief United States District Judge

Plaintiff Douglas E. Humphrey (“Humphrey”) filed this action, asserting fifteen (15)
different causes of action (ECF No. 20) and alleging that Defendants Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (“PDC”), PDC Unit Manager Rebecca Witt (“Witt”), and Registered Nurse Supervisor
Crevling (“Crevling”) deprived him of access to gym, library, and religious services in violation
of the United States Constitution and federal law. Humphrey filed a Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in an effort to immediately remedy these alleged
deprivations. (ECF No. 4). The Motion for Preliminary Injunction has now been fully briefed and
is ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED.1

1 This matter is also referred to Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly. In order to further judicial efficiency, the
undersigned will address the request for a preliminary injunction, but all other pretrial matters will proceed with
Judge Kelly.
I. Background

Humphrey is an inmate housed on a skilled care medical unit at the PDC’s facility at SCI
Laurel Highlands. (ECF No. 20). Since his arrival, Humphrey has, at all times, been using a
wheelchair. (ECF No. 19-1, ¶ 12). In 2018, Humphrey had a “fem to fem” bypass to remedy poor
circulation in his legs. (ECF No. 20, ¶ 1). At that time, Plaintiff was housed in E Block of the
facility and had access to the in-unit exercise equipment located on that block. (Id.). On April 12,
2022, Humphrey was injured when his wheelchair flipped over. He was diagnosed with a herniated
disc in his neck. (Id. ¶ 9). After a period of rehabilitation and surgery to correct the herniated disc,
Humphrey was moved from E Block to A Block. (Id. ¶ 15). Both blocks are medical units, but A
Block inmates need more intensive care than E Block inmates. (Id.). Though inmates housed on
both A Block and E Block have religious, law library, and gym services brought to/provided for

them on the Unit, (ECF No. 19-1, ¶ 6–7), Humphrey alleges that the move to A Block reduced his
access to these services. It is this alleged reduction in the provision of services that Humphrey
seeks to challenge and, for these purposes, seeks a preliminary injunction.
Though all intensive care inmates—on both A Block and E Block—can, only as of late
August 2023, access the general religious and library services like the rest of the inmate population,
(id. ¶ 8) Humphrey and other skilled care inmates still cannot access the main gym to use the

exercise equipment located there. (Id. ¶ 9). This policy is still in place “because of safety concerns
and the availability of [gym] equipment on the housing units.” (Id.).2 Dissatisfied with the formerly

2 Defendants note in a supplemental brief that, as of late September 2023, skilled care inmates now have permission
to access services in the main gym, but Defendants qualify this alleged increase in access as being limited to
meetings and speaker events. (ECF No. 21, ¶ 5). Given that Humphrey’s main complaint is that he does not have
“full” access to the exercise equipment in the main gym, the expansion of access to the main gym for meetings and
speaker events does not address Humphrey’s alleged grievances or moot his arguments on this topic.
limited religious and law library services and the still limited gym services for intensive care
inmates, Humphrey went through the inmate grievance procedures to seek fuller access to these
services, but at each level, his grievance was denied. (ECF Nos. 4-4, 4-5, 4-6). Now, Humphrey
seeks a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to provide him with “full” access
to these services.3

II. Discussion
A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” that is within the discretion of the
trial court. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008); Washington v. Gilmore, No.

18-cv-1558, 2019 WL 2610765, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 26, 2019). It is the movant’s burden to show
that the “preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the [movant] from harm.”
Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992); Washington, 2019 WL
2610765, at *6. In assessing whether a movant has met this burden, “[f]our factors are considered:
(1) whether the movant has a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the
movant will be irreparably harmed by denying the injunction; (3) whether there will be greater
harm to the nonmoving party if the injunction is granted; and (4) whether granting the injunction
is in the public interest.” Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 170–71 (3d
Cir. 2001). Great weight is placed on these first two prongs, as “preliminary injunctive relief cannot

3 Whether Humphrey ever had “full access” is a point of contention between the parties. Humphrey contends that,
after the filing of his original Complaint (ECF No. 2), Defendants, particularly Witt, enforced the “in-Unit services
only” policy more rigidly. (See generally ECF No. 4; ECF No. 22). Defendants dispute this, stating that Humphrey
has been a skilled care inmate for whom the availability of select services has been restricted since he arrived at the
facility in 2016. (ECF No. 19-1, ¶¶ 5–6). Defendants further state that Humphrey never had PDC clearance to access
the main gym, that they did not know he was attending activities in the main gym, and that when it was discovered
that Humphrey was attending activities in the main gym, Humphrey was informed that he was not permitted to go to
the main gym. (ECF No. 24-1, ¶ 7). It therefore appears from what is in the record that Humphrey was
impermissibly going to the main gym to exercise for an unknown period of time, and when this was discovered, he
was informed that he was not medically cleared to do so, per generally applicable prison policy applicable to those
on the skilled care Units.
be granted” without a showing of both a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable injury.
Pettaway v. Overton, No. CA 13-213, 2014 WL 3747672, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 29, 2014) (citing
Marxe v. Jackson, 833 F.2d 1121 (3d Cir. 1987)).

Even inmate pro se motions for injunctive relief “are judged against exacting legal
standards.” Artis v. Byunghak Jin, No. 13-cv-1226, 2013 WL 5936434, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5,
2013). The Artis court noted that:
In the past, inmates have frequently sought preliminary injunctive relief compelling
prison officials to take certain actions with respect to them during the pendency of
a lawsuit. Yet, such requests, while often made, are rarely embraced by the courts.
Instead, applying Rule 65's exacting standards courts have frequently held that
prisoner-plaintiffs have not shown that they are entitled to use a motion for
preliminary injunction as a vehicle to compel prison officials to provide them with
some specific relief and services pending completion of their lawsuits.
Id. at *4 (citations omitted). 18 U.S.C. § 3626 further limits the authority of federal courts to
provide injunctive relief in the prison context. This statute states that:
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than
necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the
least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial
weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice
system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity .
. . in tailoring any preliminary relief.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). To put it more neatly, “in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief
must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in
dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.’” Goff v. Harper, 60
F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)).
In light of the exacting standards that apply to requests for preliminary injunctions in the
prison context, the Court will first examine the likelihood of success on the merits of Humphrey’s
various arguments before turning to likelihood of irreparable harm to him, the potential harm to
the Defendants as the non-moving parties, and the interest of the public relative to a grant of
Humphrey’s requested injunction.

a. Success on the Merits: Law Library and Religious Services
At the outset, Humphrey’s arguments regarding his access to the law library and religious
services are moot. “When the questions or issues presented are no longer ‘live,’ the case is moot.
That is, an issue is moot if changes in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of the litigation
have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.” Ordonez-Tevalan v. Att'y Gen., 837 F.3d 331,
339–40 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Humphrey obtained access to the external law library

and religious services in late September 2023. (ECF No. 19-1, ¶ 8). So even if these claims once
had merit, they no longer present a “live” controversy for the purposes of a motion for preliminary
injunction and TRO, and the record does not reflect a likelihood of repetition such that the Court
should nonetheless proceed further on the merits of these claims at this point. N.J. Tpk. Auth. v.
Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d 25, 31 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[I]f the underlying dispute between
the parties is one capable [of] repetition, yet evading review, it remains a justiciable controversy
within the meaning of Article III.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Therefore,
arguments regarding access to these services are moot, leaving only Humphrey’s argument about
his access to external gym services for consideration.

Even if the action were not moot as to this relief, the merits of Humphrey’s law library and
religious services arguments are thin. As for the law library, prisons only have a duty to provide
materials or persons trained in the law such that prisoners are able to “challeng[e] their sentence
or the conditions of [their] confinement.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996). The Supreme
Court has not since addressed the question of what an “adequate” prison law library is. Kelsey
Brown, Comment, How Twenty-First Century Technology Affects Inmates' Access to Prison Law
Libraries in the United States Prison System, 21 Marq. Benefits & Soc. Welfare L. Rev. 83, 94
(2020). Given that Humphrey has had access to such services on the Unit and, as the record here
demonstrates, has had no issue submitting filings and making legal arguments pro se in this very
matter, Humphrey is not likely to succeed on the merits of this claim.

As for Humphrey’s religious services argument, within the Third Circuit, there appears to
be some conflict as to the relevant standard for answering this inquiry. In 1987, the Supreme Court
held that an alleged restriction on an inmate's right to free exercise of religion will be upheld “if it
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342, 349 (1987) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). The O’Lone “reasonable
relation” test was replaced with a more stringent “compelling interest” standard in the mid-1990s
when Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). But in 1997, the

Supreme Court held that RFRA was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s enforcement
powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
Congress, in 2000, then passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. The portions of RLUIPA that apply to institutionalized
persons “mirror[] RFRA and provide[] that ‘[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on

the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of
the burden on that person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.’” Holt v. Hobbs,
574 U.S. 352, 357–58 (2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-(1)(a)). This provision applies where the
substantial burden on Free Exercise is imposed in a program that receives federal financial
assistance or where the burden affects interstate commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b). Pennsylvania
has accepted federal funds for the PDC, and therefore, this statute applies. See Koslow v.
Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).

But in a 2008 decision—issued more than eight years after RLUIPA was enacted—the
Third Circuit relied on O’Lone in holding that inmates enjoy their Free Exercise rights “under a
more limited framework than the average citizen.” Smith v. Kyler, 295 F. App'x 479, 481 (3d Cir.
2008) (citing O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348). In Smith, the Third Circuit confronted, among other claims,
a freestanding Free Exercise Claim akin to the one at issue here. There, the prisoner-appellant
alleged that the PDC violated his Free Exercise rights by refusing to provide free Rastafarian
religious services. Id. at 480. In evaluating the reasonableness of this policy in the Free Exercise
context, the Third Circuit stated that courts are to consider four factors: (1) whether there is a

“valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest
put forward to justify it”; (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that
remain open to prison inmates”; (3) “the impact accommodation . . . will have on guards and other
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) whether there are “ready
alternatives that could fully accommodate[] the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid
penological interests.” Id. at 481 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91). The Smith court did not
address RLUIPA in assessing the freestanding Free Exercise claim but did rely on RLUIPA’s
compelling interest test in assessing the claims made directly under that statute. Id. at 481–83. The
Court is thus confronted with two standards that have been considered and applied in parallel

contexts. But under either of these approaches, Humphrey’s arguments fail to demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits.
Under RLUIPA and the precedential cases in this area, a plaintiff’s grievance or request
for an accommodation based on the right to Free Exercise “must be sincerely based on a religious
belief and not some other motivation.” Holt, 574 U.S. at 360–61 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 717 n.28 (2014)). In his Motion, Humphrey focuses mainly on the

restriction of gym access, only referencing the denial of religious services as a passing, catch-all
allegation to indicate the alleged breadth of the PDC’s deprivation of services under the governing
policy. (See generally ECF No. 4).
Humphrey does not state how his religious beliefs or practices have been impacted, and he
does not address Defendants’ assertion that he has had access to in-Unit religious services at all
times. Further, Defendant Witt states that Humphrey has never participated in religious services
and that Humphrey has never expressed to her any concerns about the PDC’s religious policies for

A Block and E Block residents. (ECF No. 19-1, ¶ 11). The lack of focus on religious services in
Humphrey’s Motion for extraordinary relief and Defendants’ assertions that Humphrey does not
attend and has not expressed interest in religious services undercut any argument that Humphrey
makes under RLUIPA, at least as to his request for injunctive relief. To the extent that Humphrey
does hold a sincere religious belief that was being substantially burdened by the PDC’s former
policy, Defendants’ compelling interest in ensuring the health and safety of all inmates, especially
skilled care inmates in Humphrey’s Unit, and the availability of in-Unit religious services satisfy
RLUIPA’s two prong test, at least in the context of Humphrey’s Motion and his obligation to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.

Humphrey’s arguments fare no better under Smith. First, Defendants set forth a legitimate
government interest in ensuring the health and welfare of skilled care inmates. Because Humphrey
uses a wheelchair to navigate the prison facility and has fallen and injured himself in doing so in
the past, there is a valid connection between this penological interest and the underlying legitimacy
of the policy. Further, nurses and other medical personnel are available in the medical Units, but
not in other Units where the sought-after external services were located. Thus, if Humphrey were
to injure himself again outside of the Unit, he may not have had ready access to the same level of

care as if he had injured himself inside the Unit. Second, there were alternative means of religious
worship available in the form of in-Unit religious services.4 The impact on prison
administration/allocation of resources element was not addressed by the parties in their filings but
given the deference courts are directed to give prison officials in this context under the Third
Circuit’s approach, Smith, 295 F. App’x at 481, the Court is hesitant to issue an injunction that
would drastically alter the way the PDC interacts with all of its skilled care inmates absent
supporting proof of likely success advanced by Humphrey in support of such relief. Fourth, there
were alternatives that accommodated Humphrey—the in-Unit services. In sum, the in-unit
religious services constituted both a reasonable means of providing such services and a reasonable
restriction on Humphrey’s movement. Humphrey is therefore not likely to succeed on the merits

of his religious services claim.
b. Success on the Merits: Gym Services
Humphrey’s claim of an alleged denial of gym services, for the purposes of this Motion, is
best treated as an Eighth Amendment violation or an ADA violation. See Defreitas v. Montgomery
Cnty. Corr. Facility, 525 F. App'x 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2013) (examining the post-conviction denial
of access to yard and gym services under the Eighth Amendment and the ADA).5

4 The frequency of religious services via the “in-Unit” services is unclear. (ECF No. 19-2. ¶ 9 (stating that Plaintiff
had access to religious services “as chaplaincy services visit[ed] the unit”)).

5 “Only [where] the movant produces evidence sufficient to convince the trial judge that all four factors favor
preliminary relief should [an] injunction issue.” Opticians Ass'n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187,
192 (3d Cir. 1990). In assessing whether Humphrey has met this burden, the Court “must exercise [its] discretion in
i. Eighth Amendment

Under the Eighth Amendment, Humphrey may advance two different theories of liability.
First, pursuant to the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner “must
demonstrate that prison conditions deprived him of life's minimum necessities, that the deprivation
was sufficiently serious, and that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference in subjecting
him to that deprivation.” Id. at 177 (citing Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 338 (3d Cir.
2010)). In Defreitas, the court concluded that the deprivation of the ability to use “the yard, gym,
and weight room as used by the general population—fails as a matter of law.” Id. at 178. Thus,
Humphrey’s acknowledged access to a more limited set of gym services does not support a
cognizable theory under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.

Humphrey may also advance a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment
insofar as he would assert that he needs access to the external gym to remedy his medical
conditions:
“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (internal quotation omitted). To establish
a violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical care, a plaintiff must
allege facts that demonstrate: (1) he had a serious medical need, and (2) acts or
omissions by prison officials that reflect deliberate indifference to that need. See
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A serious medical need exists
when a “failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary
suffering.” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991).
Deliberate indifference is manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care,
delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical
treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or
risk of injury, Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or “persistent
conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” White v.
Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).

weighing all the attendant factors, including the need for expedition, to assess whether, and to what extent, affidavits
or other hearsay materials are appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding.” Kos
Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 719 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Trainor v. Wellpath, No. 20-CV-00225, 2023 WL 2603196, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2023)
(analyzing a prisoner’s complaint that he could not attend prescribed gym sessions to treat spinal
and leg injuries). The Trainor court ultimately rejected plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim,
concluding that “Trainor's disagreements with his medical providers, available gym equipment,

and prison policies setting times for the med-line and accessing the gym and prohibiting inmates
in the RHU from receiving a stationary bike in an RHU cell do not support a finding of deliberate
indifference.” Id. at *19.
Unlike the situation in Trainor, the record advanced by Humphrey does not demonstrate
that he has been prescribed a treatment plan as a matter of medical care via gym usage. (ECF No.
19-1, ¶ 10 (stating that Humphrey does not have a medical recommendation for use of particular
exercise equipment)). Additionally, part of Humphrey’s argument is that he is healthy enough to

access the external gym. Contending that his denial of external gym services is harming his ability
to exercise his legs, for medical reasons, is thus paradoxical. And if Humphrey were to focus on
medical treatment rather than gym access under this theory, the record does not reveal that he was
ever restricted from going to the main gym for medical treatment sessions. (Id. ¶ 11). As a result,
Humphrey is not likely to succeed on the merits as to his gym access claim under a deliberate
indifference theory.

ii. ADA
Humphrey also appears to contend that his deprivation of access to the services in the main
gym6 violates Title II of the ADA. Under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish that “(1) he is a
qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) he was excluded from participation in or denied the

6 As in use of the “main” gym external to the equipment available on the medical Units.
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination
by any such entity; (4) by reason of his disability.” Defreitas, 515 F. App’x at 178 (quoting Bowers
v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 475 F.3d 524, 553 n. 32 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Insofar as Humphrey argues that he was denied access to the external gym because of his
disability, this argument fails. While Humphrey does have a disability because of his leg injuries
that require the use of a wheelchair, he was not “denied” a service because he had substitute gym
access in the form of in-Unit exercise equipment. (ECF No. 19-1, ¶ 6).
But even assuming that Humphrey was denied a service or benefit, Humphrey fails to show

that this denial was “because” of his disability. In Defreitas, the Third Circuit rejected a similar
argument centered on the denial of gym services, concluding that the appellant’s amputee status
alone did not constitute discrimination.7 Defreitas, 515 F. App’x at 179. In reaching this
conclusion, the DeFreitas court noted that this denial was entitled to deference because it was
connected to prison policies related to safety and security, which “are peculiarly within the
province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial
evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these
considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment.” Id. (quoting Turner, 482
U.S. at 86). Similarly, here, Humphrey has been denied access to the main gym because prison

officials are concerned for his safety given his underlying medical conditions, the medical Units
in which Humphrey can use exercise equipment are staffed by medical professionals, and if injury
were to occur, Humphrey is better positioned to receive immediate treatment and care in these

7 Unlike in the instant matter, Defreitas did not receive access to any gym services whatsoever. And here, the record
before the Court also shows that the inability to use the “main gym” for those on Humphrey’s Unit is applicable to
all inmates on that Unit, not just Humphrey, which undercuts his contention that he was personally denied a service
due to a handicap personal to him.
Units. “Thus, although [Plaintiff] may not have gotten the [type of access to services] he wished,”
what he received instead was reasonable. Id. Humphrey is therefore not likely to succeed on the
merits of an ADA claim as to his gym access claim.

c. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm
The other “weighty” element considered when analyzing a request for a preliminary
injunction is the likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party if the request is denied. The
plaintiff bears the burden of making this showing. Pettaway, 2014 WL 3747672, at *3 (citing Hohe
v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989)). Humphrey “must demonstrate immediate irreparable

injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm.” Id. (citing ECRI v. McGraw–Hill,
Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Here, there is no showing of immediate irreparable harm. Humphrey’s main complaint,
lack of access to the main gym, is not substantially serious for these purposes. Defendants state
that Humphrey was never restricted from receiving medical care or treatment for his various
injuries, and Humphrey did not have a doctor’s order or other medical direction stating that he

needed to use the specific equipment in the main gym to exercise his legs. (ECF No. 19-1, ¶¶ 10–
11). At best, Humphrey’s complaints as to the inadequacy of the Unit gym equipment is an issue
of his preference. Humphrey still has access to gym equipment, just not the equipment he would
prefer. This alleged inadequacy falls far short of a showing of immediate irreparable harm.
As for the alleged restriction of his access to library and religious services, mootness
undercuts Humphrey’s arguments as to this factor. Humphrey (and others on his Unit) have been
provided access to the external law library and religious services. (Id. ¶ 8). But even if such weren’t

the case, the availability of in-Unit services reduces the impact of any potential harm. Thus,
Humphrey is not likely to suffer an immediate irreparable harm because he has access to gym
services, albeit more limited, and to full religious and library services.

d. Remaining Preliminary Injunction Elements
The remaining considerations carry less weight but are nonetheless important.
These factors concern the burden of the issuance of any injunction on the non-moving party
and the balancing of the public interest in the grant or denial of the relief sought.

Defendants would likely be burdened in that the infrastructure and policies of the
PDC would need to undergo a substantial rework to ensure all similarly situated skilled
care inmates are treated in the same manner as Humphrey would be if the relief he seeks
were granted. Given the repeated caution from our Court of Appeals regarding deference
to prison administration and policies in these circumstances, especially when those policies
concern inmate health and safety, the Court concludes that granting Humphrey’s proposed
preliminary injunction would substantially burden Defendants, and even on the record
Humphrey advances, that burden would substantially outweigh the benefit of the relief

sought.
As for the public interest, while there is such an interest in ensuring that prisoners
are treated fairly by prison officials and the policies that they enforce, ensuring necessary
access to the types of services individual inmates require, when considering that there were
adequate replacement services offered for each alleged deprivation of which Humphrey
complains, it is difficult to conclude that the public interest would be better served by the
issuance of a preliminary injunction in the circumstances present here.
III. Conclusion

Humphrey has failed to show that he is likely to succeed on the merits and that he is likely
to suffer immediate irreparable injury with respect to his claims regarding inadequate access to
religious, law library, and gym services at SCI Laurel Highlands, as would support the grant of the
extraordinary relief he seeks.
The Court DENIES Humphrey’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order (ECF No. 4) without prejudice. This action will now proceed as to merits-related
matters before Magistrate Judge Kelly.

An appropriate Order will issue.

s/ Mark R. Hornak
Mark R. Hornak
Chief United States District Judge

Dated: October 24, 2023
cc: All counsel of record.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10419252. Public record. Not legal advice.