# NOLF v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · December 4, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10419243

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 4, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MELISSA A. NOLF , )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 22-368-E
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
)
Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 4th day of December, 2023, upon consideration of the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of
Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for supplemental security income
under Subchapter XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., finds that the
Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.
Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.
Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s
decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,
1
merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642
F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff’s underlying argument is that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
failed to accurately assess the opinion of an impartial medical expert, Dr. Amy Hamilton,
who testified at Plaintiff’s hearing, and, as a result, inadequately crafted the mental and
physical limitations contained in Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). As part
of these arguments, Plaintiff avers that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Hamilton’s opinion
and performed an insufficient cursory analysis. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the
ALJ relied on his own lay opinion when crafting the mental and physical limitations in the
RFC. The Court disagrees and finds that the ALJ properly considered the record evidence
and formulated Plaintiff’s RFC.

The ALJ included several mental and physical limitations at issue in Plaintiff’s
RFC. These culminated in the following:

After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has
the residual functional capacity to perform a reduced range of sedentary
work. She can lift/carry and push/pull 10 pounds occasionally and less
than 10 pounds frequently. During an eight-hour workday, she can sit for
six hours and stand/walk for approximately two hours. She can perform
simple tasks. She can have occasional contact with coworkers,
supervisors, and the public. She cannot perform work involving fast paced
quotas. She is restricted from exposure to chemical pollutants.

(R. 16).

In formulating the mental limitations of this RFC, the ALJ considered the opinions
of several doctors, including that of Dr. Hamilton. (R. 11). Dr. Hamilton testified about
Plaintiff’s limitations given her mental health diagnoses, major depressive disorder and
post-traumatic stress disorder. (R. 71, 73-74). Specifically, she testified that Plaintiff
would be able to perform simple tasks without fast paced quotas and that she could not
handle more than occasional interactions with others in the workplace. (R. 18; 71-74).
She also testified that Plaintiff might require up to two absences per month and would be
off-task 10% of the time, but admitted that this conclusion was “completely speculative”
because Plaintiff lacks recent work history and Plaintiff’s need for absences would not be
clear until Plaintiff attempted to work, which she has not done in 25 years. (R. 18, 73-
74) (emphasis in decision). In addressing this testimony, the ALJ stated:

It is possible that the claimant would have excessive absences. However,
the burden of proof rests upon the claimant and the totality of the evidence
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does not prove that it is more likely than not that the claimant would have
excessive absences.

(R. 18).

The ALJ also analyzed the opinions of state agency medical consultants, Drs. Stacie
Jean Barnes, Psy.D, and Frank M. Mrykalo, Ed.D., and found these opinions to be
persuasive in crafting the mental limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC. (R. 18). The ALJ noted
that Drs. Barnes and Mrykalo agreed that Plaintiff would be able to meet the basic mental
demands of work on a sustained basis. (Id. (citing Exs. C4A, C6A)). Additionally, Drs.
Barnes and Mrykalo opined that Plaintiff had the abilities to sustain an ordinary routine
without special supervision, to work in proximity to others without being distracted, and to
make simple work-related decisions. (R. 113, 133). Both doctors also agreed that
Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to maintain attention and concentration for
extended periods of time, and in her capacity to perform activities within a schedule,
maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances. (R. 112-13,
133).

In crafting the physical limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered the
opinions of state agency medical consultants Drs. Phillip Matar, M.D., and Gayle Christina
Gustitus, D.O. (R. 17). These doctors opined that Plaintiff could perform light work
involving occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, occasional stooping, and
frequent performance of postural activities. (R. 17 (citing Exs. C4A/10-11, C6A/11-12)).
To Plaintiff’s benefit, the ALJ was not persuaded by these opinions and decided the totality
of the evidence demonstrated that Plaintiff should be limited to sedentary work. (R. 17-
18). Based on all of the evidence, the ALJ ultimately concluded Plaintiff was not disabled
because she could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
(R. 19).

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Hamilton’s opinion
regarding Plaintiff’s work-preclusive absences. (Doc No. 8 at 10-15). The Court
disagrees. The ALJ sufficiently considered Dr. Hamilton’s opinion as to Plaintiff’s
possible absences and concluded that Plaintiff had not proven that it was more likely than
not that she would have excessive absences. (R. 18). An ALJ “is not required to accept
all medical opinions in crafting the RFC, he must give some reason for discounting the
evidence he rejects.” Mitchell v. Colvin, No. 14-998, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38530, at
*4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2015). Here, Plaintiff mischaracterizes the ALJ’s opinion by
contending the ALJ “rejected” Dr. Hamilton’s opinion. (Doc. No. 8 at 10). On the
contrary, the ALJ found Dr. Hamilton’s opinion generally persuasive. (R. 18). The ALJ
even noted that “[i]t is possible that the claimant would have excessive absences[,]” but
concluded that the Plaintiff had not met her burden of proof to show that it was more likely
than not that she would have work-preclusive absences. (Id.). Plainly, Plaintiff never
3
established that she would have the necessary absences per-month that would preclude her
from engaging in work on a regular and ongoing basis.

Additionally, the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Hamilton’s opinion pursuant to the
applicable regulations. “[T]he two most important factors for determining the
persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and supportability.” 82 Fed. Reg. at
5853. See also §§ 416.920c(b) and (c). One court has explained the distinction between
supportability and consistency as follows: “supportability relates to the extent to which a
medical source has articulated support for the medical source’s own opinion, while
consistency relates to the relationship between a medical source’s opinion and other
evidence within the record.” Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-CV-1197, 2021 WL
1565832, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2021). Here, the ALJ clearly analyzed the required
consistency and supportability factors, stating, “Given the claimant’s limited mental health
treatment, the overall record is inconsistent with finding that the claimant would be unable
to perform at least simple tasks involving some contact with others. This is supported by
examinations documented in progress notes that reflect anxious mood without significant
cognitive or behavioral deficits.” (R. 18). This finding was generally consistent with Dr.
Hamilton’s opinion, who opined that Plaintiff would be able to perform simple tasks
without more than occasional interaction with others in the workplace. (R. 18).

As for Plaintiff’s arguments that the ALJ inadequately crafted the mental and
physical limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC by improperly substituting his own lay opinion for
that of the medical experts (Doc. No. 8 at 15-24), the Court disagrees and finds the ALJ’s
RFC to be supported by substantial evidence. This Court has previously rejected the
argument that ALJs must premise their RFC findings upon a specific medical opinion.
Hornyak v. Colvin, No. CV 15-74-E, 2016 WL 1255288, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30,
2016) (citing Doty v. Colvin, No. 15-74-E, 2014 WL 29036 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2014);
Callahan v. Colvin, No. 13-1634, 2014 WL 7408700 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2014)). The
ALJ is obligated to review all record evidence in determining what limitations are
appropriate for inclusion in the RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). It is possible for
an ALJ to fulfill that obligation without inappropriately substituting his or her lay opinion
for that of a medical expert. See Galloway v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 20-4669, 2021
WL 4477145, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021). Here, as to Plaintiff’s mental limitations,
the ALJ did not substitute his lay opinion by omitting Drs. Barnes and Mrykalo’s opined
limitations as to Plaintiff’s ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended
periods, need for off-task time, and absenteeism, as Plaintiff argues. (Doc. No. 8 at 17).
Rather, the ALJ explained that Drs. Barnes and Mrykalo found that Plaintiff would be able
to meet the basic mental demands of work on a sustained basis, and that Plaintiff had failed
to meet her burden to show work-preclusive off-task time and absenteeism. (R. 18-19).
Plaintiff’s arguments that the ALJ did not explain the omission of certain limitations
relating to attendance, punctuality, and off-task time are merely a request to reweigh the
evidence. (Doc. No. 8 at 18).
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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 7) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 9) is GRANTED.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

Additionally, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ based the
Plaintiff’s physical RFC limitations on his own lay opinion. (Doc. No. 8 at 21). As
explained above, the ALJ is tasked with reviewing all the evidence in determining the
appropriate RFC limitations, and an ALJ is able to meet this obligation without substituting
his own lay opinion for that of a medical expert. See Galloway, 2021 WL 4477145, at
*4. In this case, the ALJ articulated how he formulated Plaintiff’s physical limitations by
explaining Plaintiff’s medical history, including diagnoses of asthma and COPD,
subsequent testing showing respiratory and cardiac issues, and examinations indicating
Plaintiff is obese. (R. 17-18). The ALJ noted he found the State Agency Reviewing
Physicians overstated Plaintiff’s postural limitations and did not adequately address her
respiratory and cardiac issues. (R. 18). While these opinions were the only ones related
to Plaintiff’s physical health, the ALJ properly formulated Plaintiff’s physical RFC
limitations based on the entirety of the record. Indeed, to Plaintiff’s benefit, the ALJ
reduced Plaintiff’s RFC to sedentary work. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ’s RFC is
supported by substantial evidence.

For these reasons, the Court affirms the decision of the ALJ.
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10419243. Public record. Not legal advice.