# BROWN v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · July 28, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418968

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 28, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NIARE LAMAR BROWN, :
Petitioner :
v. : Case No. 3:23-cv-70-KAP
MELISSA HAINSWORTH, WARDEN, :
S.C.I. LAUREL HIGHLANDS, :
Respondent :
Memorandum Order

Petitioner Brown is an inmate at S.C.I. Laurel Highlands who filed a petition dated
April 13, 2023 seeking a writ of habeas corpus discharging him from custody pursuant to
two sentences imposed on him in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County at
Commonwealth v. Brown, CP-41-CR-1017-2018 (C.P.Lycoming) and Commonwealth v.
Brown, CP-41-CR-1095-2021 (C.P.Lycoming).
Both custom and Rule 2(e) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases require that
“[a] petitioner who seeks relief from judgments of more than one state court must file a
separate petition covering the judgment or judgments of each court.” The remedy for a
violation of Habeas Rule 2(e) is to dismiss without prejudice or sever the petition into two
separate petitions, unless judicial economy counsels otherwise. See Lynch v. Garman,
2018 WL 5984850 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2018)(collecting cases), report and recommendation
adopted, 2018 WL 5978113 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2018). For the reasons explained below I
resolve both matters here.
Initially, most of the claims in the petition are undeveloped sentence fragments
repeating tropes from the sovereign citizen literature, see generally United States v. Cook,
2019 WL 2721305 at *2 (E.D. Tenn. June 28, 2019), and are directed to both criminal
matters without any distinction. Brown claims that he is entitled to “sovereign immunity”
and that he was charged as a “corporate fictitious” entity, as distinct from the “flesh and
blood man” who spells his name in the now common parse syntax form “Niare-Lamar:
Brown,” using a hyphen between the first and middle name and a colon before the
surname. Brown’s first three claims present no basis for relief.
Rule 2(c) of the Rules governing Habeas Corpus Cases under Section 2254 in the
United States District Courts, 42 U.S.C.§, also applicable to Habeas Corpus Cases under
Section 2241 by Rule 1(b), requires a petitioner to set forth in the petition all the claims
and the facts that support those claims. See also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655
(2005)(quoting with approval the Advisory Committee's Note on Habeas Corpus Rule 4,
that “[N]otice pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts that point
to a real possibility of constitutional error.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This is
1
because a habeas petition is not a criminal proceeding against the petitioner where the
rules are primarily structured to safeguard the petitioner, it is a civil action against
petitioner’s jailer in which the petitioner bears the burden of attacking his conviction. See
Ryan v. Gonzales, 568 U.S. 57, 73 (2013). Habeas proceedings exist to remedy extreme
malfunctions in state court prosecutions, Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011),
and setting aside Brown’s fourth claim that he was denied the violation of the right to
represent himself, his petition does not make allegations of fact that if correct would show
an extreme malfunction. A petition is not the opening salvo in an iterative attempt to
develop such claims.
The respondent asserts that the petition attacking the sentence in Commonwealth
v. Brown, CP-41-CR-1017-2018 (C.P.Lycoming) is untimely. This is incorrect. The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) contains a statute of
limitations at 28 U.S.C.§ 2244(d) that, with limited exceptions, requires a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.§ 2254 to be filed within one year of the date the
petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).

That 1-year limitations period is tolled when a properly filed application for state
collateral review is “pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In addition to that statutory tolling,
the Supreme Court recognizes equitable tolling of the limitations period in habeas cases
if petitioner can show extraordinary circumstances, that is: 1) petitioner has been
pursuing his rights with reasonable diligence and some extraordinary circumstance (such
as serious attorney misconduct) prevented the timely filing of the petition, Holland v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); or 2) petitioner offers a “credible” or “convincing” claim
of actual innocence. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013).

2
The Response, ECF no. 6, sets out the timeline of these matters, and the relevant
records are at ECF nos. 7 and 8. In Commonwealth v. Brown, CP-41-CR-1017-2018
(C.P.Lycoming), Brown was convicted after a nonjury trial on a charge of burglary and
other offenses and was sentenced on December 5, 2019, to an aggregate 3-6 years
imprisonment. On counseled direct appeal, Brown raised only one claim, that the trial
had erred in not finding the trial had been untimely under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600: Brown did
not raise a Sixth Amendment Speedy trial claim. The Pennsylvania Superior Court
affirmed Brown’s conviction and sentence at Commonwealth v. Brown, 237 A.3d 495
(table, text at No. 2091 MDA 2019, 2020 WL 2790449 (Pa.Super. May 29, 2020), and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Brown’s petition for allowance of appeal without
opinion. Commonwealth v. Brown, 243 A.3d 731, 732 (table)(Pa. December 30,2020).
The 90-day period for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court expired
on March 30, 2021. At that point Brown’s sentence became a final judgment under
AEDPA and the limitations period began running under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Brown filed a timely pro se petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq., on May 10, 2021, 41 days later. In the PCRA petition
Brown alleged that his counsel had been ineffective for not raising a Sixth Amendment
claim with the Rule 600 claim. This properly filed collateral attack tolled the limitations
period. The trial court appointed counsel who filed a no merit letter and moved to
withdraw, believing that the pro se petition only raised a Rule 600 claim. The trial court
ordered appointed counsel to address the Sixth Amendment claim, and after reviewing
an amended no merit letter ultimately granted the motion to withdraw and denied the
petition on March 14, 2022. Brown filed a pro se notice of appeal, but the Pennsylvania
Superior Court dismissed it for failure to file a brief on August 10, 2022. Commonwealth
v. Brown, No. 652 MDA 2022 (Pa.Super. August 10, 2022).
At this point Brown’s collateral attack was no longer “pending” and the limitations
period began running again. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 333. It expired 324 days
later on June 30, 2022. The petition was filed before that and is therefore timely.
The petition is meritless. First, Brown raised no claim of a violation of the right to
represent himself in the state court. As for the claim of ineffectiveness that he did raise, a
state law Rule 600 claim and a Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause claim are obviously
both directed to the timeliness of trial, but they are quite distinct. See Wells v. Petsock,
941 F.2d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 1991). As the Supreme Court pointed out in Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972), states are free to prescribe specific rules but there is no
constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a
specified number of days or months. It is not ineffective assistance of counsel to decline
to assert a Sixth Amendment claim whenever counsel asserts a Rule 600 violation.
3
In a case where there is a colorable Sixth Amendment claim it must be fairly
presented to the state courts to exhaust it: even when a state law claim and federal claim
are similar, presentation of a state law claim does not exhaust the federal claim. Duncan
v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995). Brown did not attempt to exhaust a federal claim on
direct appeal, and his failure to file a brief defaulted any federal claim he might have been
able to exhaust on collateral review. Brown is responsible for his default because it
occurred at a stage where he had no Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987)(Sixth Amendment right to appointed
counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.)
As for the petition attacking the sentence in Commonwealth v. Brown, CP-41-CR-
1095-2021 (C.P.Lycoming), it too is timely and in three of its four claims suffers from the
defects noted above, but petitioner has not yet exhausted his state court remedies. Brown
was sentenced on August 8, 2022 to an aggregate 30-72 months, after a counseled nolo
contendere pleas to a number of criminal trespass charges. Brown attempted to file a pro
se appeal which was ignored because he was represented by counsel. This appears to be
the basis for the fourth claim in the petition, that Brown was denied the right to represent
himself. Brown filed a timely PCRA petition on March 1, 2023. It is doubtful that it raises
the claim the denial of self-representation claim presented here and primarily makes
sovereign citizen claims, plus what might be a claim that the plea agreement was not
honored because the sentence imposed did not specify that it was concurrent to an earlier
one. The trial court appointed counsel, and the matter was scheduled for a hearing on
counsel’s no merit letter and motion to withdraw on July 14, 2023. That is obviously well
after the habeas petition was filed.
Regardless of any result of the July 14 hearing, because petitioner had not
exhausted his state court remedies before filing his habeas petition, his fourth claim is
unexhausted. AEDPA commands that relief on such a claim “shall not be granted,” 28
U.S.C.§ 2254(b)(1). AEDPA permits me to deny the claim, 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(b)(2), but
there is no reason to foreclose any claim that Brown might have if he is denied relief in
the state courts. The petition insofar as it attacks the sentence in Commonwealth v.
Brown, Case No. CR-1095-2021 (C.P.Lycoming) is denied without prejudice as
unexhausted.
A certificate of appealability should not be issued unless a habeas petitioner “has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
The Supreme Court held in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), that:

When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without
reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of
appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
4
constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling.
A substantial showing is not synonymous with success: a petitioner need only show that
jurists of reason would debate the correctness of the district court's denial of a habeas
petition. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Hickox v. Superintendent
Benner Twp. SCI, 2020 WL 6437411, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 2020). At the same time, it is
more than good faith or the absence of frivolity on the part of the petitioner. Miller-E] v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338. There is no colorable exhausted claim in the petition, and no
certificate of appealability is issued.
The Clerk shall mark this matter closed. This is a final appealable order.
i040
DATE:_July 28, 2023
Keith A. Pesto,
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice by ECF to counsel and by U.S. Mail to:
Niare Lamar Brown QA-3056
S.C.I. Laurel Highlands
5706 Glades Pike
P.O. Box 631
Somerset, PA 15501

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418968. Public record. Not legal advice.
