# WEEKLEY v. CLARK

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · March 31, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418703

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 31, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MONROE WEEKLEY, III, )
)
Petitioner, ) Civil Action No. 21-660
)
v. ) District Judge J. Nicholas Ranjan
) Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly
MICHAEL CLARK, Superintendent, SCT )
Albion; and ) Re: ECF Nos. 127 and 128
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF )
PENNSYLVANIA, and DISTRICT )
ATTORNEY OF BEAVER COUNTY )
)
Respondents. )
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Monroe Weekley, III (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the at the
State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”) in Albion, Pennsylvania. Petitioner
initiated this action by submitting a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus
by a Person in State Custody (the “Initial Petition”), which was received by this Court on
May 18, 2021.1 ECF No. 1. On February 22, 2022, Petitioner timely submitted an Amended
Petition, which attacks his criminal conviction in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County,
Pennsylvania, at Docket No. CP-04-CR-2162-2011. ECF No. 85 at 1.
Currently before this Court are Petitioner’s “Question for the Court,” ECF No. 127, and
his “Comprehensive Motion for Discovery,” ECF No. 128. In both filings, Petitioner seeks an

' The Initial Petition is dated May 7, 2021. ECF No. 1 at 15. This Court presumes that this is the
date on which Petitioner placed the Initial Petition in the prison mail system. Accordingly, this
federal habeas action is deemed filed on May 7, 2021 pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule.
Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1998).

order directing Respondents to produce various items of discovery. These motions are opposed
by Respondents. ECF No. 130. Petitioner has replied. ECF No. 135.
For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner has not met his burden to show good cause for
the requested discovery, and his motions will be denied.
I. FACTUAL HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief from his 2012 conviction in the Court of Common
Pleas of Beaver County, Pennsylvania for criminal homicide in violation of
18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2501(a), receiving stolen property in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3925, and
possession of firearms not to be carried without a license in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. §
6106(a)(1).2, ECF No. 85 at 1. See also Docket, Com. v. Weekley, No. CP-04-CR-2162-2011
(available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-04-CR-
0002162-2011&dnh=bLj]KCy WsNMrljdFEU WhkOg%3D%3D (last visited Mar. 31, 2023)).
The following is a recitation of the facts by the trial court in its opinion relative to
Petitioner’s second direct appeal, and which was adopted by the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
A. Facts and Investigation
This matter arises out of the death of Rashawn T. Cameron. At
approximately 11:35 am. on Sunday, November 21, 2010, the
Beaver County 911 Emergency Control Center received a
telephone call from an unidentified female located at the residence
of Willie Martin at 308 Cooper Street, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania.
The female reported that, inside the residence, an unknown male
was lying on the living room couch unresponsive and bleeding
from the face. As a result of the caller’s information, the
Emergency Control Center dispatched Aliquippa Police to the
reported address. Upon arrival at the residence at approximately
11:40 am., the responding officers observed a black male

? While not stated explicitly on the docket, the grading of Petitioner’s conviction for criminal
homicide was third degree murder. See Sentencing Order, ECF No. 41-12 at 5; see also 18 Pa.
C.S.A. §§ 2501 and 2502(c).

identified as Rashawn T. Cameron (hereinafter, “Cameron”) lying
in a pool of blood. His waist was positioned at the edge of a seat
cushion with his feet resting on the floor. A preliminary
examination of Cameron’s body by the responding officers and
Deputy Coroner Wayne Tatalovich revealed that Cameron
sustained a gunshot wound to the back of his head behind his left
ear with a large exit wound on his forehead above the right eye. He
was pronounced dead at the scene. During the search of the crime
scene, law enforcement located fragments of a lead projectile.
After performing an autopsy. Dr. James Smith determined that
Cameron died as a result of the gunshot wound and that Cameron
was the victim of a homicide.
On February 10, 2011, Assistant Chief County Detective Andrew
Gall and County Detective Robert Heberle interviewed Bradley J.
Karas (hereinafter, “Karas”) in connection with their investigation
of this matter. Karas told the officers that during the morning of
November 21, 2010, he was sleeping at the residence of James C.
Stewart III (hereinafter, “Stewart”) at 181 Baker Street. Aliquippa,
Pennsylvania. According to Karas. Defendant arrived at Stewart’s
residence between 6:30 a.m. and 7:30 a.m. wearing dark jeans,
black boots, a black hoodie, and carrying a black book bag. Karas
stated that, after seeing Defendant, he fell asleep again and awoke
at approximately 10:30 a.m. Shortly thereafter, Karas walked into
the kitchen and observed Defendant and Stewart talking. Karas
stated that he also observed Defendant remove what appeared to be
a .44 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver handgun from his black
book bag. Defendant then asked Karas to take the handgun
downstairs to clean it and warned that the handgun should not be
touched until after it was cleaned. Karas stated that, after he
complied with Defendant's request, Defendant and Stewart left
Stewart's residence and attempted to sell the handgun to James E.
Connor III (hereinafter, “Connor”).
Karas told Detectives Gall and Heberle that, upon returning to
Stewart’s residence. Defendant described the murder of Cameron.
Defendant told Karas that he and an unidentified black male
purchased a $50.00 piece of crack cocaine from an unidentified
individual at a crack house on Plan 11 in Aliquippa. Defendant, the
unidentified black male, and someone Defendant referred to as the
“Vic” went outside of the crack house for about a minute and then
the “Vic” and Defendant went back inside the crack house.
Defendant stated that, when the “Vic” sat on the couch and bent
over to retrieve something from under the coffee table, Defendant
shot the “Vic” in the head. Defendant stated that he attempted to
rob the “Vic” but found nothing in his pockets. Defendant then

walked to Valley Terrace, left his clothes near a dumpster, and
proceeded to Stewart’s residence.
After he related these events. Defendant remained at Stewart's
residence until approximately 4:00 p.m., when an unidentified
white female driving a white Chevrolet Cavalier picked Defendant
up and drove him from the residence. Karas told the detectives
that, as Defendant left, he was carrying the same black book bag
that had previously held the revolver.
Also on February 10, 2011, Detective Heberle and Sergeant Steve
Roberts of the Aliquippa Police Department reported to Connor’s
residence at 171 Baker Street. Aliquippa. Pennsylvania to question
Connor and to attempt to retrieve the .44 caliber revolver that
Stewart allegedly sold to Connor on behalf of Defendant. Connor
admitted that he purchased a .44 Magnum Ruger Redhawk
revolver (hereinafter, “Redhawk revolver”) from Stewart, and,
based on information provided by Connor, the investigators were
able to recover the Redhawk revolver. Through an inquiry
conducted at the Beaver County Emergency Control Center, law
enforcement officials discovered the identity of the owner of the
Redhawk revolver and that it was reported missing by the owner in
May of 2010.
On February 11, 2011, Connor reported to the police station and
provided a statement regarding how he acquired the Redhawk
revolver. Connor indicated that, at some point towards the end of
November 2010, Stewart came to his residence and sold him the
Redhawk revolver for $400.00, Stewart told Connor that he would
be unable to transfer ownership of the firearm until he located the
previous owner.
Later that day, Sergeant Roberts, Detective Heberle, and Captain
Anthony Q. McClure interviewed Stewart at the Aliquippa Police
Department. Stewart told the officers that, on the morning of
November 21, 2010, he awoke to find Defendant in his residence.
According to Stewart, Defendant stated that he had done
something bad and proceeded to tell Stewart about the murder of
Cameron. Defendant stated that he regretted bringing Cameron to
Stewart’s residence to purchase a gun because Cameron was
working with the police and Cameron owed him $600.00.
Defendant also stated that, at approximately 3:00 a.m. earlier that
morning, Defendant went to Willie Martin’s residence to get his
money from Cameron and caught Cameron doing something
“foul” as he entered the house. Defendant stated that he then aimed
his gun at Cameron and demanded his money. According to

Defendant, Cameron reached for his gun and a fight over
Defendant's gun ensued. Defendant stated that he ultimately struck.
Cameron with his gun and then shot him.
Stewart told the officers that following this conversation,
Defendant asked Karas to clean his gun, and Karas complied. After
cleaning the gun, Karas wrapped it in a black t-shirt and placed it
in Defendant’s black book bag. Stewart indicated that Defendant
offered to sell the gun to him but Stewart declined and suggested
selling it to Connor. Defendant agreed, and Stewart went to
Connor's residence to arrange the deal. Stewart stated that he gave
Connor’s money to Defendant and that Defendant handed Stewart
the black book bag containing the gun. Stewart then gave the gun
to Connor and returned the black book bag to Defendant.
‘On February 17, 2011, Detective Heberle, Captain McClure, and
Detective Tim Staub interviewed Roger L. Henderson, Jr.
(hereinafter, “Henderson”) regarding a statement Stewart made to
him. Henderson indicated that on December 29, 2010, he met with
Stewart to exchange handguns. According to Henderson, Stewart
stated that Defendant had previously given him a bloody handgun
that was used in the shooting death of Cameron.
On February 18, 2011, Sergeant Donald Couch of the Aliquippa
Police Department submitted the Redhawk revolver and the
mutilated bullet fragment seized from the crime scene to the
Pennsylvania State Police Greensburg Regional Crime Laboratory.
On February 24, 2011, the forensic scientist from the serology
department at the Greensburg Laboratory notified Sergeant
Roberts that the firearm tested positive for the presence of blood
and that there would be future tests comparing the blood from the
firearm with the blood samples obtained from Cameron. The
forensic examination also revealed that the mutilated bullet
fragment recovered from the crime scene was discharged from the
Redhawk revolver.
On February 28, 2011, Captain McClure submitted an application
for a search warrant requesting that he be permitted to take the
following actions: report to the Community College of Beaver
County, where Defendant was a student, and seize the black book
bag Defendant may be carrying and the black boots and black
hoodie he may be wearing; transport Defendant to the Heritage
Valley Medical Center so that two purple top tubes of blood may
be extracted from him; search Defendant’s residence at 717
Washington Street, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania as well as the
curtilage for any black book bags, .44 caliber ammunition, black

boots, black hoodie, indicia of residence, and any other items
believed to be associated with the shooting death of Cameron; and
search any vehicles that are possessed by Defendant. In support of
his request, Captain McClure’s application included the
information listed above that was gathered from the witness
interviews and initial investigation. At 8:40 a.m. on February 28,
2011, the Honorable Judge John P. Dohanich signed and
authorized Captain’s McClure's search warrant application.
After securing the search warrant, Captain McClure and other
detectives proceeded to the Community College of Beaver County
to execute the search warrant. Upon arriving at Defendant’s class
the detectives and campus security asked the instructor to have
Defendant exit the classroom, Defendant stepped into the hallway,
and the detectives put him in handcuffs. He was subsequently
searched for weapons, and a campus security officer took the black
book bag he was carrying and gave it to the detectives. Defendant
was then transported to the detectives’ office. While at the office
the detectives discovered that the search warrant (hereinafter,
“unexecuted search warrant”) they obtained earlier that day
provided the wrong date of birth and wrong Pennsylvania Driver’s
License Number for Defendant. After realizing their mistake, the
officers transported Defendant back to the Community College and
returned his book bag to him.
Later that day, Captain McClure retyped the search warrant
application and submitted it to Judge Dohanich who signed and
authorized it at 3:20 p.m. Other than the corrected date of birth and
driver’s license number, the new search warrant contained the
same information as the unexecuted search warrant. After
obtaining the search warrant (hereinafter, “search warrant for
Defendant’s clothes, book bag, and blood”), the detectives
proceeded to Defendant’s residence at approximately 5:05 p.m,
and searched the premises, seizing Defendant’s black and plaid
Dakine back pack from his living room as well as Defendant’s
Carhart black hooded jacket size 5X, black and yellow reversible
hooded sweatshirt, and black Nike Reax size 13 shoes from his
person. They subsequently transported Defendant to the Heritage
Valley Medical Center to have Defendant’s blood drawn ultimately
obtaining two purple capped tubes of Defendant’s blood.
At approximately 9:00 p.m. on March 1, 2011, Captain McClure
again met with Stewart, who indicated that he received a call from
Defendant on his cell phone earlier that evening. According to
Stewart, Defendant related to Stewart how the police drew blood
from him and seized his book bag and some of his clothing on

February 28, 2011. Defendant also indicated that he believed it was
Karas, Alvin J. Flowers (hereinafter, “Flowers”), or a woman
named Donzi Perry (hereinafter, “Perry”) who were providing
information about Cameron’s murder to the police. Defendant
explained that both Perry and Flowers had first-hand knowledge of
the homicide because Perry was sitting outside of Willie Martin’s
home when it occurred and Flowers was performing oral sex on
Cameron inside the house just before Defendant shot Cameron.
Stewart told Captain McClure that at some point during his
conversation with Defendant, Stewart suggested that they
communicate by text message rather than talk on the phone.
Defendant agreed, and the two sent several text messages to each
other speculating about who was responsible for notifying law
enforcement about the homicide. During the interview, Stewart
permitted Captain McClure to review the text messages using
Stewart's cell phone. Captain McClure reviewed the messages and.
identified (724) 406-2036 as Stewart's cell phone number and
(724) 513-1579 as the number for the cell phone Defendant was
using.
On March 3, 2011, Captain McClure sent preservation letters to
Cricket Communications and Sprint / Nextel Communications to
preserve the records from Stewart’s and Defendant's cell phone
numbers, respectively. Captain McClure requested that the
subpoena compliance departments of the companies preserve these
records for the period of February 28, 2011 to March 3, 2011. On
March 12, 2011, the subpoena specialist for Sprint / Nextel
Communications confirmed that the call detail records, subscriber
information and customer account notes for the cell phone number
(724) 513-1579 were being preserved. The subpoena specialist
further indicated that a search warrant was required to release any
content or stored communications.
On March 14, 2011, Captain McClure submitted two search
warrant applications requesting the billing and account
information, call detail records, and text messages for Stewart’s
and Defendant’s cell phones. The applications contained
information obtained from the March 1, 2011 interview of Stewart
as well as the same information included in the application for the
search warrant for Defendant's clothes, book bag, and blood. On
March 14, 2011, this Court signed and authorized the search
warrant for Stewart's cell phone records at 3:05 p.m. as well as the
search warrant for Defendant’s cell phone records (hereinafter,
“first search warrant for Defendant's cell phone records”) at 3:15
p.m. Based on a review of the record, no evidence was obtained as
a result of these search warrants.

B. Criminal Proceedings
On July 18, 2011, Sergeant Roberts filed a Criminal Complaint
against Defendant, charging him with criminal homicide (18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a)), robbery (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)@)),
receiving stolen property (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a)), firearms not to
be carried without a license (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1)), and
crimes committed with firearms (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6103). On the
same day a watrant was issued for Defendant’s arrest, and
Defendant was taken into custody. While incarcerated in the
Beaver County Jail. Defendant's phone conversations were
recorded. During these conversations, a message was broadcasted
multiple times warning that the conversation was being recorded.
On September 2, 2011, a subpoena duces tecum was issued for
recorded telephone conversations involving Defendant from the
date of his incarceration to September 1, 2011. Warden William
Schouppe of the Beaver County Jail complied with the subpoena
(hereinafter, “subpoena for jail recordings”).
On November 15, 2011, a subpoena duces tecum was issued to
Sprint / Nextel for the subscriber information, call detail records
including text messages, and cell site tower location data for cell
phone number (724) 513-1579 for the dates and times of
November 19, 2010 at 12:00 p.m. to July 18, 2011 at 12:00 p.m.
Sprint / Nextel did not provide any of the requested information
except for a list of phone numbers and a letter stating that the
requested data could not be supplied because the proper paperwork
was not issued. As a result, on November 23, 2011, Detective
Chamberlain submitted an application for search warrant
requesting the same information for the period of November 19,
2010 at 12:00 p.m. to November 18, 2011 at 12:00 p.m. In the
affidavit, Detective Chamberlain indicated that Stewart testified
during the November 9, 2011 preliminary hearing regarding
communications he had with Defendant. Stewart testified that he
was receiving text messages from Defendant, who was using a cell
phone with the number (724) 513-1579. Detective Chamberlain
also indicated that he verified that this cell phone was active
before, during, and after the investigation into Cameron's death. At
approximately 1:12 p.m. on November 23.2011, Judge Dohanich
signed and authorized the search warrant (hereinafter, “second
search warrant for Defendant’s cell phone records”). Sprint /
Nextel provided the requested information on December 5, 2011.
On that same date, the Commonwealth filed an Information
charging Defendant with criminal homicide, robbery, receiving

stolen property, and firearms not to be carried without a license.
On May 21, 2012, Defendant filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial
Application, which included several different motions. A hearing
on Defendant’s Application was held on June 1, 2012 and June 4,
2012. During the hearing, the Court denied Defendant's request for
a bill of particulars, and in an Order filed on June 11, 2012, the
Court addressed Defendant’s discovery issues. On July 5, 2012, the
Court issued an Order denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
Evidence.
Trial in this matter commenced on August 6, 2012. During the
testimony of Stewart, the Commonwealth displayed to the jury a
series of photographs of text messages exchanged between
Defendant and Stewart on March 1, 2011, Defendant initially
objected to the presentation and admission of the photographs, and
the Court overruled Defendant’s objection. On August 10, 2012,
Defendant filed a Trial Motion for Suppression of Evidence and
Mistrial, seeking to suppress the text message exchange and all
evidence derived from the seizure of it. According to Defendant,
Stewart testified that he sent text messages to Defendant at Captain
McClure’s direction in violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping
and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (hereinafter, “Wiretap
Act”). The Court held a hearing on Defendant’s Trial Motion on
August 14, 2012 and issued an Order on August 15, 2012 denying
Defendant’s Trial Motion. The trial concluded on August 20, 2012
with a jury verdict of guilty on the charges of third degree murder,
firearms not to be carried without a license, and receiving stolen
property and a jury verdict of not guilty on the charges of first and
second degree murder and robbery.
On October 3, 2012, Defendant was sentenced to serve an
aggregate term of 24 and one-half years to 52 years of
incarceration and to pay an aggregate fine of $11,500.00. In
addition Defendant was ordered to pay restitution in the amounts
of $9,440.00 to the Pennsylvania State Police Laboratory for lab
fees, $1,711.00 to Cameron’s father for funeral expenses, and
$6,500.00 to the Victims Compensation Fund for funeral expenses.
On October 15, 2012, Defendant filed an Omnibus Post—Sentence
Application containing a Motion in Arrest of Judgment, a Motion
for a New Trial, and a Motion for Modification of Sentence.
Following the transcription of the notes of testimony. Defendant
filed a Supplemental Omnibus Post-Sentence Application on
January 2, 2012. Oral argument on Defendant's post-sentence
motions was held on February 4, 2013. On February 8, 2013. the
Court issued an Order denying Defendant's post-sentence motions.

ECF No. 41-14 at 1-10. See also Com. v. Weekley, No. 1732 WDA 2014, 2015 WL 6956530, at
*1 and 3-9 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court added the following recitation of the factual and
procedural history in connection with Petitioner’s second set of proceedings initiated pursuant to
the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546:
The evidence at trial showed that the victim died as a result of
being shot in the back of the head with a large caliber weapon. The
deceased victim was found by investigators slumped over a couch
with his pants pulled down around his knees. [Petitioner] went to
the home of James Stewart and knocked on the door. Brad Karas,
who was inside, let [Petitioner] in, told him that Stewart was
asleep, and that he could wait until Stewart woke up. When
Stewart eventually came downstairs and woke Karas back up,
[Petitioner] spoke to Stewart, admitting that he had shot and killed
the victim after a struggle, and that the victim had been doing
something “foul” when he entered the room. Stewart testified that
[Petitioner] told him that “he caught [the victim] sitting on a chair
in the house receiving fellatio from [Alvin] Jay Flowers.” Stewart
testified that [Petitioner] told him that the victim and [Petitioner]
had previously “pulled a lick,” meaning they had committed a
robbery together, that the victim had taken the $1,200 proceeds
from the robbery, and that the victim had failed to provide
[Petitioner] his $600 share of the proceeds. Karas testified that
[Petitioner] told him he had killed the victim over drugs.
While [Petitioner] and Stewart were talking, Karas was instructed
to clean [Petitioner’s] .44 Magnum Redhawk revolver, which he
did. Stewart then took the revolver, left the home with [Petitioner],
and walked to the residence of James Connor, who lived nearby.
Stewart sold the firearm to Connor, and gave the proceeds of the
sale to [Petitioner].
Stewart later began to cooperate with investigators. A series of
phone calls and text messages were made between Stewart’s cell
phone and [Petitioner’s|. The incriminating communications from
[Petitioner] indicated, among other things, that [Petitioner] thought
that Karas could not be trusted to keep from talking to the police,
that [Petitioner] did not think Karas would be believed by anyone
because he was a drug addict, and that “two womens [sic] word is
better than one he [sic] just a [friend].” [Petitioner] stated to
Stewart over the phone, “No gun no case.”

10

During the investigation, the firearm, which had been left by
Connor at his son’s residence, was recovered. A bullet and copper
jacket were also recovered from the crime scene in a location
consistent with the trajectory of the head wound suffered by the
victim. Forensic testing confirmed that the bullet found at the
scene was fired by the Redhawk revolver.
The jury returned a verdict on August 20, 2012, finding
[Petitioner] guilty of the third degree murder of the victim. The
jury also found [Petitioner] guilty of receiving stolen property and
carrying a concealed firearm without a license. On October 3,
2012, [Petitioner] was sentenced to serve an aggregate period of
incarceration of 24% years to 52 years. The conviction and
sentence were affirmed by the Superior Court [on direct appeal on
July 10, 2015]. Comf.] v. Weekley, 125 A.3d 447[, 2015 WL
6956530,] (Pa. Super. [Ct.] 2015) (unpublished memorandum).
The Superior Court affirmed [Petitioner’s] judgment of sentence
on the trial court’s opinion. [Petitioner] filed a petition for
allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which
denied allocatur on December 31, 2015.
Second PCRA Super. Ct. Op., Com. v. Weekley, 240 A.3d 196 (Table), No. 812 WDA 2019,
2020 WL 5015898, at *1-2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2020) (footnote and some internal brackets
removed).
Petitioner filed a first PCRA petition in order to reinstate his direct appeal rights after his
first direct appeal had been dismissed by the Superior Court due to Petitioner’s counsel’s failure
to file a timely opening brief at Docket No. 424 WDA 2013. ECF Nos. 41-8 and 41-10. This
relief was granted by the first PCRA trial court on September 19, 2014. ECF No. 41-11 at 1-2.
The second direct appeal followed.
On his second direct appeal, Petitioner raised the following issues with the Superior
Court.
I. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred in determining that the evidence was
sufficient to support a conviction for [rJeceiving [s]tolen
[p|lroperty, where the Commonwealth failed to offer any evidence
that [Appellant] knew the firearm was stolen.

11

II. The [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion in imposing consecutive
sentences, using an incorrect offense gravity score of 9 (loaded
weapon) rather than 7, which resulted in an unduly harsh sentence,
without considering [Appellant’s] specific circumstances and
rehabilitative needs when compared to the need to protect the
public.
Super. Ct. Second Direct Appeal Op., Com. v. Weekley, No. 1732 WDA 2014, 2015 WL
6956530, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015). The Superior Court affirmed Petitioner’s
judgment of sentence. Id. at *3. See also Concise Statement of Issues on Appeal, ECF No. 41-
13 at 1.
Petitioner timely sought leave to appeal his conviction to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court at Docket No. 326 WAL 2015. That court denied allocatur on December 31, 2015.
ECF No. 41-15. The docket for 326 WAL 2015 is available at
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/PacDocketSheet?docketNumber=326%20WAL%202015&d
nh=xcJn35%2Be%2FKjCQ6DbOwgj32%3D%3D) (last visited Mar. 31, 2023).
There is no indication on the record that Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court with respect to his direct appeal. As such, his conviction
became final on March 30, 2016 — 90 days after allocatur was denied. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13;
see also Jenkins v. Sup’t of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2013) (“On direct review,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Jenkins's petition for allowance of appeal on September
28, 2007... . Because Jenkins had ninety days to petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, his conviction became final on December 27, 2007.”).
The procedural history of underlying Petitioner’s attempt for state court post conviction
remedies continues as follows:
On October 5, 2016, [Petitioner] filed a [second] motion for post
conviction collateral relief. [ECF No. 41-17.] [Petitioner] was

12

appointed counsel, who, after several extensions, filed an amended
PCRA petition on June 19, 2017. [ECF No. 41-19 at 14.] The
PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition on June 8,
2018, and continued the hearing to August 1, 2018 in order to
allow the parties an opportunity to locate and test evidence that
was collected during the initial investigation of this case.
[Petitioner] was present for each day of the evidentiary hearing,
and was represented by counsel. Counsel for the Commonwealth
and the charging officer were also present. On August 1, 2018, the
PCRA court entered an order scheduling briefs and oral argument,
which was held.on December 13, 2018.
Second PCRA Super. Ct. Op., 2020 WL 5015898, at *2 (internal brackets removed). The
Second PCRA petition was denied by the trial court on April 29, 2019. ECF No. 41-26 at 1.
Petitioner timely filed an appeal to the Superior Court. ECF No. 41-27 at 1. The
Superior Court addressed Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on four bases.
1. Whether prior trial counsel was ineffective when prior trial
counsel failed to highlight the lack of forensic testing of the
vehicle swabs?
2. Whether the Commonwealth inadvertently withheld potentially
exculpatory evidence and whether prior trial counsel was
ineffective when prior trial counsel failed to highlight the lack of
forensic testing of the clothing worn by the initial suspect in the
case?
3. Whether prior trial counsel was ineffective for failing to fully
and adequately cross-examine witnesses with impeachment
evidence?
4. Whether there was actual prejudice to [Petitioner] when prior
trial counsel failed to adequately present exculpatory information
to the jury and adequately cross-examine key witnesses?
Second PCRA Super. Ct. Op., 2020 WL 5015898, at *2.
With respect to the second issue on appeal, the specific evidence at issue was “the
clothing found at Sheldon Sims’ residence.” Id. at *5. With respect to the third issue, the
witnesses were James Stewart and Bradley Karas, and the impeachment evidence at issue was
telephone records indicating that Petitioner called Stewart’s landline from his cellular phone. Id.
13

at *6. See also Petitioner Amended PCRA Br. filed Oct. 15, 2018, ECF No. 41-24 at 8-10. The
fourth issue was interpreted by the Superior Court to attack the cumulative effect of the above
alleged errors by trial counsel. Second PCRA Super. Ct. Op., 2020 WL 5015898, at *6-7. On
August 25, 2020, the Superior Court denied all four of these claims on the merits and affirmed
the decision of the Second PCRA trial court. Id. at *7.
Petitioner timely sought allowance to appeal from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on
September 17, 2020, which was denied on February 22, 2021. Com. v. Weekley, 249 A.3d 495
(Pa. 2021) (Table). See also Docket, No. 285 WAL 2020 (available at
https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/PacDocketSheet?docketNumber=285%20WAL%202020&d
nh=HZfzwTz3lOrjxgGYt9MK pg%3D%3D (last visited Mar. 31, 2023)).
On September 14, 2021, Petitioner filed a motion for DNA testing with the Court of
Common Pleas of Beaver County. See Docket, Com. v. Weekley, No. CP-04-CR-2162-2011
(available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-04-CR-
0002162-2011&dnh=bLjK CyWsNMrl]jdFEU WhkOg%3D%3D (last visited Mar. 31, 2023)).
After the issue was briefed, the trial court denied relief on January 4, 2022. Id. That court held
that it had jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s motion, but that he did not meet the requirements of
the applicable Pennsylvania statute. See Mem. Op. and Rule 907 Notice, dated Dec. 10, 2011.
Il. HABEAS PETITION
Petitioner initiated this federal habeas action on May 7, 2021 with the filing of the initial
Petition. He filed the Amended Petition on February 22, 2022. ECF No. 85. Respondents

14

answered the Amended Petition on April 20, 2022. ECF No. 109.> Petitioner timely filed a
Traverse to Respondents’ Answer on June 10, 2022. ECF Nos. 123, 124, and 125.
In the pending Amended Petition, Petitioner asserts the following grounds for relief.
Ground One: The Commonwealth withheld evidence and prior counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise the claim (Clothes found at Sheldon Sims’ residence).
ECF No. 85 at 6.
Ground Two: Prior trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue and present to the
jury, the information concerning the lack of forensic testing on the swabs
recovered from the vehicle [of Tamika Brown]. The P.C.R.A. Court’s
findings are not supported by the record. Id. at 8.
Ground Three: Prior trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately cross examine
important witnesses [James Stewart and Bradley Karas] with impeachment
evidence. The P.C.R.A. Court’s findings are not supported by the record.
Id. at 9.
Ground Four: The P.C.R.A. Court erred in finding no actual prejudice to the [Petitioner]
when prior trial counsel failed to adequately present exculpatory evidence,
cross examine key witnesses, and indecently investigate or petition the
court to test blood and DNA evidence. Id. at 11.
In their Answer, Respondents assert that Ground Four essentially is incorporated into the
analyses of Grounds One through Three. ECF No. 121 at 3 n.1. Respondents concede that these
claims are timely under the applicable statute of limitations and exhausted. Id. at 3-5.
In the Amended Petition, Petitioner also raises so-called “‘additional grounds,” which are
difficult to follow. As best this Court can discern, these “additional grounds” are as follows.
(a) The trial court erred in refusing to suppress various evidence.
ECF No. 85 at 17-18, 22-23.

3 The Answer was more than one month late, and a show cause order was necessitated to compel
Respondents to file it. ECF No. 98. Also, the Court was required to issue multiple orders to
compel Respondents to submit a complete copy of the record of Petitioner’s underlying state
court proceedings to this Court. ECF No. 96.

15 :

(b) The trial court erred in limiting examination of various
witnesses and in allowing or limiting the admission of various
evidence during trial. Id. at 17-19, 25-26.
(c) The trial court erred in refusing to issue certain jury instructions
requested by Petitioner. Id. at 19-20.
(d) Petitioner was held in isolation during pretrial detention, which
adversely affected his ability to effectively testify at trial. Id. at
20.4
(e) Petitioner’s sentence was improperly calculated. Id. at 20.
(f) Petitioner’s trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for
failing to investigate various individuals, some of whom were
fabricated by authorities. Id. at 21.
(g) Petitioner’s trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for
failing investigate potential exculpatory evidence. Id.
(h) The trial judge showed animosity toward Petitioner during trial
in front of the jury. Id. at 22, 26-28.
(i) The trial court erred when it did not grant a mistrial, and
permitted the admission of a search warrant and various
inculpatory text messages. Id. at 23-24.
(j) The prosecution committed misconduct by prosecuting
Petitioner despite alleged evidence supporting the conclusion that
another individual — Alvin “Jay” Flowers — had committed the
crime. Id. at 29.°

4 This likely refers to Petitioner’s claims in Weekley v. Shouppe, No. 11-1625, in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. ECF No. 85 at 13. In that lawsuit, he
asserted that his pretrial detention in solitary confinement prevented him from having a fair trial
in the state criminal case underlying the instant federal habeas proceeding. Id.
>In their Answer, Respondents group the “additional grounds” into the following categories:
(1) the trial judge exhibited personal animosity toward Weekley;
(2) objections raised by Weekley’s trial counsel were overruled;
(3) Weekley’s motion for a mistrial was denied; (4) the trial court
permitted the introduction of a search warrant and displays of text
messages where Weekley admitted to his crime; (5) the trial court
exhibited bias toward Weekley; and (6) prosecutorial misconduct
(continued . . . .)
16

Respondents answered the Amended Petition on May 10, 2022. ECF No. 121. Petitioner
submitted a Traverse on June 10, 2022. ECF Nos. 123 and 124.
On July 13, 2022, Petitioner submitted the two pending discovery motions. ECF Nos.
127 and 128. Respondents filed their response in opposition. ECF No. 130. Petitioner filed a
reply on September 16, 2022. ECF No. 135.
The pending discovery motions are ripe for consideration.
THE DISCOVERY MOTIONS
In the two pending discovery motions, Petitioner seeks the following discovery.
e DNA testing of any physical evidence in the possession of the prosecution
pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9543.1, as well as a search of the locations where that
evidence had been stored; alternatively, Petitioner seeks documentary evidence
that those items have been destroyed. ECF No. 128 at 4-10.
e A transcription of a recorded statement of trial witness Tamika Brown, in which
she purportedly stated that another individual had killed the victim Rashawn
Cameron. Id. at 11. Petitioner alleges that this recording was played at trial and
was entered into evidence. ECF No. 127 at 1. (Respondents, in contrast,
contended that this recording was played outside of the hearing of the jury only to
refresh Brown’s recollection, and it was not entered into evidence because it
failed to refresh her recollection. ECF No. 65 at 3. But this argument by
Respondents is contradicted by the trial transcript. See Trial Tr. of Aug. 16, 2012,
at 182-93. Petitioner further requests that this Court order Respondents to
produce the recording for in camera review. ECF No. 127 at 1.)
e Acopy of witness James Stewart’s sealed sentencing information in United States
v. Stewart, No. 11-cr-47 (W.D. Pa.). Petitioner alleges that Stewart received a
sentence of probation despite facing a guideline range of 30-37 months
imprisonment. ECF No. 128 at 12.

because the government prosecuted Weekley instead of the person
Weekley claims committed his murder.
ECF No. 121 at 11. In his Traverse, Petitioner concedes that this characterization is more or less
accurate, but lacks nuance. ECF No. 123 at 13-14. Petitioner also further argues that several
“additional grounds” raised in the Amended Petition were not opposed by Respondents. ECF
No. 125.

17

e Allegedly-newly discovered evidence regarding a deal for leniency for Stewart's
testimony at Petitioner’s trial. Petitioner alleges that this information was
withheld at trial. Id. at 13.
e Permission:to interview Alvin “Jay” Flowers, Jr., who currently is held in Beaver
County Jail. Id. at 14.
e A list of potential suspects provided by Gregory “Bookie” Williams to Sergeant
Steven Roberts of the Aliquippa police department. This list was not produced to
Petitioner during discovery in his criminal case, and allegedly does not include
Petitioner’s name. Petitioner contends that this is exculpatory because Williams
testified that, during his own investigation of the murder, “Petitioner’s name came
up during the conversation in regards to Petitioner and [the victim] having an
argument over money.” Id. at 23.
e Evidence that the government compensated Stewart, including paying Stewart’s
telephone bill, which Petitioner alleges was not produced in discovery. Id. at 24.
e The repoll database from the cell cite location data of Petitioner’s cellular phone.
Id. at 26.
Petitioner also seeks an evidentiary hearing regarding:
e Stewart’s federal sentence; newly discovered evidence that Rondell Slappy and
Roger McMillen — individuals referenced at trial — did not exist; that another
individual named Rodney Slappy was alive and married to Stewart’s cousin,
Tiffany Hubbard; the of omission Christian Davis’ name in handwritten notes
next to his phone number in Petitioner’s phone records provided by the
prosecution prior to trial; a 2015 affidavit of Jamie Butler indicating that
Petitioner was not at Stewart’s residence on the day of the murder and at least part
of the following day; a list of probable suspects prepared by witness Gregory
“Bookie” Williams,” which allegedly did not include Petitioner’s name; and DNA
evidence allegedly on Alvin Flowers’ clothing, Tamika Brown’s car, Cameron’s
underwear, a slug found at the scene, and various blood sample. Id. at 15-19.
At the requested evidentiary hearing, Petitioner would call certain witnesses to testify.
e Keri Bozich, his private investigator, regarding various issues discussed above.
Id. at 19.
e Agent Keven Kauffman of the ATF, regarding Stewart’s use as a confidential
source and allegedly lying about the existence of Rondell Slappy. Id. at 20.
e Sergeant Steven Roberts, regarding the list of potential suspects provided by
Gregory “Bookie” Williams, the chain of custody of evidence, and that the
murder weapon was not connected to Petitioner. Id.

18

e James Christopher Stewart, III, who allegedly would admit to having fabricated
the existence of several individuals, as well as Petitioner’s alleged confession to
the murder. Id. at 20-21.
e Alvin Flowers, Jr., regarding various statements made prior to Petitioner’s trial, as
well as that he and Cameron did not engage in a sex act, and that Petitioner never
was at the scene of the crime. Id. at 21-22.
Further, Petitioner seeks leave to appear at the evidentiary hearing by teleconference. Id. at 25.
Much of Petitioner’s requested discovery tracks with several previously filed motions
that were denied without prejudice as untimely. ECF Nos. 55, 56, 59, 89, 94, 99, 100, 104, and
119. Respondents responded to some — but not all — of Petitioner’s earlier motions, ECF Nos.
65, 92, 93, 103, and 106, and incorporate those arguments into their response to the present
discovery motions. ECF No. 130. While those responses will be considered when addressing
Petitioner’s instant motions, the Court notes that Respondents’ prior responses do not address
Petitioner’s prior Renewed Motion for Post-Conviction DNA Testing, ECF No. 55, Motion to
Unseal Witness’ Sentence Information, ECF No. 59, or Motion to Produce Material Evidence,
ECF No. 104.
Beyond incorporation of their prior briefing, Respondents’ opposition to the instant
discovery motions primarily consists of the argument that Petitioner is precluded from discovery
and an evidentiary hearing by the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Shinn v.
Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718,596 U.S. (2022). ECF No. 130 at 9-10.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Discovery in Federal Habeas Proceedings
“A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to
discovery as a matter of ordinary course.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997); Harris v.
Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 297 (1969) (“broad-ranging preliminary inquiry is neither necessary nor
appropriate in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding.”). Discovery is authorized in Rule 6(a)
19

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court only by leave of
court upon a showing by the petitioner of “good cause,” which may be made “where specific
allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully
developed, be able to demonstrate that he is ... entitled to relief[.]” Harris, 394 U.S. at 300; see
also Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09; Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 404 (3d Cir. 2012).
“The burden rests upon the petitioner to demonstrate that the sought-after information is
pertinent and that there is good cause for its production.” Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 209
(3d Cir. 2011). “[B]ald assertions and conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient ground to
warrant requiring the state to respond to discovery[.]” Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284,
301 (3d Cir. 1991); Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1987) (same).
Additionally, Rule 6 does not authorize what is commonly referred to as “fishing expeditions,”
and it is not enough for a petitioner to speculate that the discovery he seeks might yield
information that would support one of his claims or that it would give support to a new claim.
See, e.g., Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1493 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting with approval Munoz v.
Keane, 777 F. Supp. 282, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“petitioners are not entitled to go on a fishing
expedition through the government’s files in hopes of finding some damaging evidence”)); see
also Rega v. Wetzel, No. 13-cv-1781, 2014 WL 4079949, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2014);
Tedford v. Beard, No. 09-cv-409, 2010 WL 3885207, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2010) (“Because
a petitioner in a § 2254 case must first exhaust any claim in state court before he brings it in
federal court, a federal court must, in considering a state prisoner’s motion for discovery, take
into account any lack of diligence on the petitioner’s part in developing the record in state
court.”).

20

Further, where an assessment of a habeas petition reveals that it fails on some legal
ground, the proper course is to deny motions seeking factual discovery. Brown v. DiGuglielmo,
No. 07-3465, 2007 WL 4242266, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2007) (citing Williams v. Bagley,
380 F.3d 932, 974-76 (6th Cir. 2004)) (noting that discovery requests relating to procedurally
defaulted claims were properly denied because discovery could not lead to a colorable basis for
relief on those claims); Peterkin v. Horn, 30 F. Supp. 2d 513, 518-20 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (same).
In the instant case, with respect to Respondents’ argument based on Shinn, the United
States Supreme Court addressed in that case whether federal habeas courts may consider new
evidence not developed in state court when a prisoner relies on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1
(2012), in order to establish cause for procedurally defaulting a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1728. The Supreme Court held that the equitable rule
announced in Martinez does not permit a federal court to dispense with the narrow limits on
considering new evidence set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) recites:
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a
claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an
evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that -
(A) the claim relies on —
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable; or

6 The Supreme Court held in Martinez that the negligence of the prisoner’s state post-conviction
counsel can furnish cause to excuse procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel if state post-conviction proceedings provide the first opportunity to raise such a claim.
566 U.S. at 17.

21

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B)the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error,
no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of
the underlying offense.
(emphasis added).
A petitioner is at fault, and thus responsible for failing to develop the record in state
court, even if that failure is due to the negligence of his state post-conviction counsel. Shinn,
142 S. Ct. at 1734 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000)). This is consistent
with the general rule that a petitioner bears the responsibility for all state post-conviction
attorney errors because there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction
proceedings. Id. at 1735 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991) and Davila v.
Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2065 (2017)).
Although Martinez recognized an equitable exception to the doctrine of procedural
default, the Supreme Court in Shinn concluded that it had no power to redefine when a prisoner
“has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings” under the meaning
of the statute. Id. at 1736 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)). Thus, the requirements of Section
2254(e)(2) must be satisfied before a federal court may hold an evidentiary hearing or otherwise
consider new evidence on the merits of a defaulted ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.
Id. at 1738.
Additionally, because a hearing on cause and prejudice under Martinez would serve no
purpose if the evidence developed therein could not be considered on the merits of the claim, a
federal court may not hold an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider new evidence to assess

22

cause and prejudice under Martinez unless a petitioner meets the requirements of Section
2254(e)(2). Id. at 1738-39.
In the time since the briefing on the two pending discovery motions closed, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued its decision in Williams v. Superintendent
Mahanoy SCI, 45 F.4th 713 (3d Cir. 2022), which further underscores the strict application of
Section 2254(e)(2) to new evidence. In Williams, the Third Circuit held that a Petitioner could
not develop the facts to support a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in an evidentiary
hearing in federal court where his state post-conviction counsel had failed to develop the factual
basis for the claim in state court. Id. at 720 (citing Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1733). Further, the Third
Circuit concluded that, under Shinn, expanding the record through depositions or other discovery
under such circumstances was prohibited without satisfying the requirements of Section
2254(e)(2). Id. (citing Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1738).
But Shinn and Williams do not prohibit all discovery in a federal habeas case. As has
been recognized by at least one other district court within the Third Circuit, “[nJeither decision
addresses the completely different issue of the extent of a federal court’s authority to direct the
government to produce Brady evidence when a prisoner has shown good cause for its discovery
under Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.” Wholaver v. Wetzel, No. 11-CV-0164,
2022 WL 17082094, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2022).
In addition, Section 2254(e)(2) applies only when a petitioner is “at fault” for failing to
develop the state court record, which requires a lack of diligence. “If there has been no lack of
diligence at the relevant stages in the state proceedings, the prisoner has not ‘failed to develop’
the facts under § 2254(e)(2)’s opening clause, and he will be excused from showing compliance
with the balance of the subsection's requirements.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 437 (quoting

23

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)). Diligence for this purpose “depends upon whether the prisoner made a
reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue
claims in state court.” Id. at 435. If Petitioner shows sufficient diligence in attempting to
develop the record in state court as to the discovery requested in this proceeding, then Section
2254(e)(2) imposes no limitation on this Court’s ability to review the results of that discovery, or
to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
B. Many of the “Additional Grounds” Asserted in the Amended Petition are
Procedurally Defaulted.
In addition to Grounds One through Four, which Respondents concede were exhausted in
state court, ECF No. 121 at 5, Petitioner raises several “additional grounds” for relief in the
Amended Petition. ECF No. 85. As stated above, this Court has construed those “additional
grounds” as follows.
(a) The trial court erred in refusing to suppress various evidence.
Id. at 17-18, 22-23.
(b) The trial court erred in limiting examination of various
witnesses and in allowing or limiting the admission of various
evidence during trial. Id. at 17-19, 25-26.
(c) The trial court erred in refusing to issue certain jury
instructions requested by Petitioner. Id. at 19-20.
(d) Petitioner was held in isolation during pretrial detention, which
adversely affected his ability to effectively testify at trial. Id. at
20.
(e) Petitioner’s sentence was improperly calculated. Id. at 20.
(f) Petitioner’s trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for
failing to investigate various individuals, some of whom were
fabricated by authorities. Id. at 21.
(g) Petitioner’s trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for
failing investigate potential exculpatory evidence. Id.

24

(h) The trial judge showed animosity toward Petitioner during trial
in front of the jury. Id. at 22, 26-28.
(i) The trial court erred when it did not grant a mistrial, and
permitted the admission of a search warrant and various
inculpatory text messages. Id. at 23-24.
(j) The prosecution committed misconduct by prosecuting
Petitioner despite alleged evidence supporting the conclusion
that another individual —- Alvin “Jay” Flowers -- had committed
the crime. Id. at 29.
With the possible exceptions of items (e) and (g), it appears that none of Petitioner’s so-
called “additional grounds” were exhausted in the state courts prior to being raised in this federal
habeas proceeding. Additional ground (e) plausibly appears to have been exhausted as Issue II
on Petitioner’s direct appeal. Super. Ct. Second Direct Appeal Op., 2015 WL 6956530, at * 1.
To the extent that additional ground (g) relates to trial counsel, it is duplicative of Grounds One
and Two of the Petition. ECF No. 85 at 6, 8, and 21.
A federal court may be precluded from reviewing habeas claims under the “procedural
default doctrine.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732;
Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1996) (abrogated on other grounds by Beard v.
Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60-61 (2009)); Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666, 675 (3d Cir. 1996). This
doctrine is applicable where, inter alia, a petitioner’s claims are “deemed exhausted because of a
state procedural bar[.]” Lines v. Larkin, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000). Like the exhaustion
requirement, the procedural default doctrine was developed to promote our dual judicial system
and, in turn, it is based upon the “independent and adequate state law grounds” doctrine, which
dictates that federal courts will not review a state court decision involving a question of federal
law if the state court decision is based on state law that is “independent” of the federal question
and “adequate” to support the judgment. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. The PCRA’s one-year

25

statute of limitations has been held to be an “independent and adequate” state law ground for
denying habeas relief. Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 251 (d Cir. 2002).
Here, Petitioner argues that any procedural default should be forgiven. ECF No. 135 at 2.
However, the record does not support excusing the apparent default of additional grounds (a)-(d),
(f), and (h)-(j) under either the doctrine of “cause and prejudice” or the doctrine of “fundamental
miscarriage of justice.”
With respect to “cause and prejudice,” the United States Supreme Court has held that
where a petitioner has to follow state procedure within the required time period, the “federal
habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default
and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure
to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at
750; see_also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977) (failure to follow state’s
procedural rules results in procedural default, which bars federal review of petitioner’s claims
unless he can show cause and prejudice); Hull v. Freeman, 991 F.2d 86, 90-91 (d Cir. 1993)
(same). The Supreme Court in Coleman further stated that it recognized “the important interest
in finality served by state procedural rules and the significant harm to the States that results from
the failure of federal courts to respect them.” 501 U.S. at 750.
The Supreme Court has defined “cause” as “some objective factor external to the
defense.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). “[A] showing that the factual or legal
basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel ... or . . . some interference by
officials” are two examples, but not an exhaustive list. Id.
In order to show a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the Supreme Court requires a
petitioner to demonstrate that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction

26

of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995) (quoting Murray,
477 U.S. at 496). Under this standard, a petitioner must “support his allegations of constitutional □
error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy
eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence -- that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324.
Once such evidence is presented, a petitioner must show that “it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id. at 327.
Petitioner has adduced no new evidence of his actual innocence, nor do his arguments lead to the
conclusion that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror” would have convicted him.
The one-year period under Pennsylvania’s PCRA has passed. Indeed, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied allocatur in Petitioner’s second PCRA proceedings on February 22, 2021.
Com. v. Weekley, 249 A.3d 495 (Pa. 2021) (Table). Any additional ground that was not already
presented to the state court, and which does not fall into one of the narrow exceptions to the one-
year deadline for filing, is procedurally defaulted. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9545(b). Because none of
additional grounds (a)-(d), (f), and (h)-(j) satisfies either requirement, they are procedurally
defaulted.
Additionally, nothing in the record presented would allow this Court to excuse the
default. Petitioner presents no evidence on the record from which this Court could conclude that
procedural default of the additional grounds (a)-(d), (f), and (h)-(j) should be excused under
either cause and prejudice or actual innocence. Moreover, as described below, this Court is
precluded from considering any new evidence to support either such argument unless Petitioner
was not at fault for failing to develop the claim before the state court, or he meets the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1788-39. See also Williams v.
Sup’t Mahanoy SCI, 45 F.4th at 720.

27

But Petitioner’s additional grounds (a)-(d), (f), and (h)-(j) are not based on “a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i). Nor is any of the requested evidence
based on “a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise
of due diligence.” Id. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii). Furthermore, in spite of Petitioner’s attempt to blame
his post-conviction counsel for failing to develop the factual basis for his additional grounds,
ECF No. 135 at 3, he ultimately is responsible for her failure to do so. Shinn, 142 8. Ct. at 1734
(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 432). Accordingly, because Petitioner is at fault for
failing to develop the state court record, and Petitioner does not meet the requirements of Section
2254(e)(2), this Court may not consider whatever new evidence Petitioner believes will be
uncovered as a result of his discovery motion to support either the merits of his claims, or to
overcome his procedural default of additional grounds (a)-(d), (f), and (h)-G). Id. at 1738-39;
Williams v. Sup’t Mahanoy SCI, 45 F.4th at 720.
C. Petitioner has not Demonstrated Good Cause for DNA Testing.
Petitioner seeks an order requiring DNA testing of the following evidence.
a) Swabs of blood taken from Tamika Brown’s vehicle from a search with luminol
spray.
b) Clothing belonging to Alvin Flowers Jr. recovered from Ambridge Towers garbage
bin by Beaver County detectives. The clothes were worn by Flowers while he
showered, but DNA expert Ashlee Mangan testified that the clothes may still contain
evidence from the crime.
c) Saliva from the Boxer Shorts of victim Rashawn Cameron worn when he met his
demise.
d) Blood from mail found on the living room coffee table at the crime scene.
e) Mutilated Slug found in the living room diagrammed in Defense Trial Exhibit BB.

28

ECF No. 128 at 4. While Petitioner cites to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9543.1 as the legal basis for the
requested DNA tests, this Court’s authority to allow discovery in a federal habeas case does not
arise from a state statute, but from Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases, as set forth
above.
Petitioner did not seek DNA testing of any of this evidence as part of his second PCRA
proceedings. This deficiency was featured prominently in the Second PCRA Trial Court’s
opinion. Second PCRA Trial Ct. Op., ECF No. 41-26 at 18-19 (Flowers’ clothing tested
negative for blood as part of the PCRA proceedings; Petitioner never requested further testing or
DNA testing). See id. at 19 (Petitioner never sought to have second bullet, other blood, and
other evidence tested, despite knowing it existed). See also id. at 22-23 (neither Petitioner nor
prosecution sought to have swabs tested).
After the Superior Court affirmed the denial of his second PCRA petition — and after
filing the instant federal habeas petition — Petitioner sought DNA testing of the above items in
state court under the same Pennsylvania statute that he asserts here. See Post-Conviction DNA
Testing Mot., dated Sept. 14, 2021, at 2. After the issue was briefed, the trial court determined
that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion, but that Petitioner did not meet the requirements
for DNA testing under the statute. See generally Mem. Op. and Rule 907 Notice, dated Dec. 10,
2011. The state court recognized that each item of evidence that Petitioner sought to have tested
by way of that motion — and which Petitioner seeks to have tested here — was discovered prior to
his conviction. Id. at 6. Additionally, the trial court held that Petitioner had failed to show that
DNA testing — if conducted — would return exculpatory results that would establish his actual
innocence. The trial court found as follows.

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e Even if blood swabs returned the victim’s DNA from Tamika Brown’s car, that
would be consistent with the testimony of George Williams at trial that the victim
had been at Tamika Browns home only a few days prior to his murder. Id. at 9.
e The clothing of Alvin Flowers already tested negative for biological material.
Additionally, the clothing that Petitioner sought to be tested had been worn inside
a coat that also had been tested, and was unlikely to have exculpatory DNA
evidence.’ Id.
e The victim’s underwear already had tested negative for Petitioner’s DNA, and the
jury was informed of this at trial. If the DNA of Alvin Flowers were found on it
pursuant to further testing, that would be consistent with the prosecution’s theory
that Flowers was performing a sex act on the victim just prior to the murder. Id.
at 10.
e If DNA from another individual was found in the blood evidence from the
victim’s mail, it would not establish that Petitioner was innocent; merely that
another person had been in the apartment, as the jury already had been told. Id.
e The slug that Petitioner seeks to have tested was not the one that killed the
victim. If the slug had DNA from another individual, that would show that
another individual was in the apartment, not that Petitioner did not kill the victim.
Id. at 11.
The trial court instead relied on Petitioner’s “statement to Mr. Stewart that he killed the
[vlictim, combined with the forensic match of the bullet found at the crime scene to [Petitioner’s]
Redhawk revolver” as “ample evidence for a reasonable jury to find that [Petitioner] was guilty
of the murder.” Id. at 9.
Of particular significance, the Court finds that the record does not indicate that Petitioner
appealed from the trial court’s order denying DNA testing.

7 While Petitioner argues that testimony by Ashlee Mangan — a forensics expert who had testified
at trial and at Petitioner’s second PCRA proceedings — indicates that DNA evidence might exist,
it is noteworthy that the testing of Flower’s clothing for biological material took place after Ms.
Mangan’s testimony as part of Petitioner’s second PCRA proceedings. Compare PCRA Hr’g Tr.
dated June 8, 2018 at 73-95 (Mangan testimony) and id. at 169 and 173 (continuing the hearing
to test evidence) with PCRA Hr’g Tr. dated Aug. 1, 2018 at 7-11 (testing of conducted in front of
counsel on July 31, 2018) and id. at 20-27 (no blood or suspected blood found on clothes).

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It is true that the “good cause” standard of Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases differs from the “actual innocence” standard applied by the state court under Section
9543.1. But as a practical matter, the results here are the same.
First, none of the evidence that Petitioner seeks to have tested is new. See Mem. Op. and
Rule 907 Notice, dated Dec. 10, 2011, at 6. All of it was known to Petitioner prior to his
conviction. ECF No. 41-26 at 11. See also Second PCRA Super. Ct. Op., 2020 WL 5015898, at
*5_ And as the trial court recognized, Petitioner never sought to have it tested for DNA as part of
his second PCRA proceedings. Petitioner was not diligent in presenting this evidence to the state
court. Petitioner is responsible for this lack of diligence. Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1734. Petitioner
further does not assert a new rule of constitutional law applies to this evidence. Thus, Petitioner
cannot meet the requirements of Section 2254(e)(2) to support DNA testing.
Moreover, any claim based on the underwear, blood evidence from the victim’s mail, or
the slug that did not kill the victim is procedurally defaulted. Mem. Op. and Rule 907 Notice,
dated Dec. 10, 2011, at 6; Trial Tr. dated Aug. 13, 2012, at 122-23 (discussing absence of
Petitioner’s DNA on victim’s boxer shorts); Trial Tr. dated Aug. 10, 2012, at 126-29 and 216-17
(discussing blood on mail); Trial Tr. dated Aug. 16, 2012, at 264-68 (discussing the slug).
Further, with respect to the blood swabs and clothing, Petitioner has not shown that DNA
testing would show entitlement to relief. Harris, 394 U.S. at 300. As the state court recognized,
even if the tests of the blood swabs returned the victim’s DNA, those results would be consistent
with testimony placing the victim at Tamika Brown’s house shortly before the murder. Trial Tr.
dated Aug 9, 2012, at 210-11. Additionally, the evidence of record does not indicate the
presence of biological material on Flowers’ clothing — which is consistent with the theory that he
immediately showered in that clothing after the murder. Furthermore, even if the victim’s DNA

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were present on the clothing, that would be consistent with the theory that Flowers was at least
present in the victim’s home immediately prior to the murder, consistent with the prosecution’s
theory.
Therefore, Petitioner has failed to meet the good cause standard for this requested DNA
testing. Accordingly, his motion will be denied in this respect.
D. Respondents must Provide a Transcription of the Recorded Statement of
Tamika Brown or Explain its Absence.
Petitioner also seeks the transcription of a tape-recorded statement by Tamika Brown in
which she allegedly stated that she believed that Alvin “Jay” Flowers had killed the victim
Rashawn Cameron. ECF No. 128 at 11. The recorded statement was played at trial and admitted
into evidence. Trial Tr. dated Aug. 16, 2012, at 183-93. Petitioner also moves for the
undersigned to review the tape in camera, which he believes would support his motion for
transcription. ECF No. 127 at 1. A copy of the tape was not included with the state court
records provided by Respondents in response to the Service Order. ECF No. 11.
Respondents contend that this recording was played outside of the hearing of the jury
only to refresh Ms. Brown’s recollection at trial, and was not entered into evidence because it
failed to refresh her recollection. ECF No. 65 at 3. But, as stated above, Respondents’ assertion
is clearly contradicted by the state court record. Trial Tr. dated Aug. 16, 2012, at 183-93.
Tamika Brown’s recorded statement does not provide the basis of any of Petitioner’s
grounds for relief that were exhausted in state court. There can be no plausible argument that
Ms. Brown’s recorded statement was newly discovered, and the Pennsylvania PCRA’s strict one-
year deadline already has passed. Any claim arising therefrom would be procedurally defaulted.
Petitioner further has not demonstrated any diligence in seeking this information during his
PCRA proceedings. Accordingly, he has failed to demonstrate good cause.

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That said, Ms. Brown’s statement is part of the state court record which this Court
ordered to be produced by Respondents. ECF No. 11; ECF No. 96. The recorded statement was
played at trial in the presence of the jury. Trial Tr. dated Aug. 16, 2012, at 183-93. Accordingly,
Respondents will be required to produce a transcription of the taped statement, or to state the
reasons why they cannot do so.
E. Petitioner has not Demonstrated Good Cause for his Discovery Requests with
Respect to James Stewart.
Petitioner seeks the following discovery related to James Stewart — a witness whose
testimony at trial tied Petitioner to the .44 magnum pistol used to murder Rashawn Cameron, and
who testified that Petitioner confessed the murder to him.
e Acopy of witness James Stewart’s sealed sentencing information in United States
v. Stewart, No. 11-cr-47 (W.D. Pa.). Petitioner alleges that Stewart received a
sentence of probation despite facing a guideline range of 30-37 months
imprisonment. ECF No. 128 at 12.
e Newly discovered evidence regarding a deal for leniency for Stewart’s testimony
at Petitioner’s trial. Petitioner alleges that this information was withheld at trial.
Id. at 13.
e Evidence that the government compensated Stewart, including paying Stewart’s
telephone bill, which Petitioner alleges was not produced in discovery. Id. at 24.
But the requested information does not relate to an exhausted claim. See Com. v.
Weekley, 2020 WL 5015898, at *6 (exhausted grounds with respect to Stewart limited to
telephone records indicating that Petitioner called Stewart’s landline from his cellular phone on
November 21, 2010. See also Petitioner’s Amended PCRA Br. filed Oct. 15, 2018, ECF No. 41-
24 at 8-10 (showing same).
Neither is any of this requested information newly discovered. Stewart’s plea agreement
in United States v. Stewart, No. 11-cr-47 (W.D. Pa.), was discussed at trial, and Petitioner’s
counsel referenced it thoroughly to impeach Stewart on the stand. Trial Tr. dated Aug. 9, 2012,

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at 71-99. Petitioner’s counsel presented it to Stewart in front of the jury, and made him read
parts of the agreement into the record. Id. at 89 and 91-92. He did so after Stewart had stated
that he had “no agreement” with the federal government, Trial Tr. dated Aug. 8, 2012, at 200,
maximizing the plea agreement’s value as impeachment of Stewart’s veracity.
Furthermore, Agent Kauffman of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”)
conceded in his testimony that cooperation provided by Stewart would be considered by the
United States Attorney and a federal court when resolving Stewart’s federal charges, while
accurately stating that ultimately a judge would decide Stewart’s federal sentence regardless of
his cooperation or lack thereof. Trial Tr. dated Aug. 14, 2012, at 10-13, 20. Additionally,
Stewart testified at trial that the federal government had paid his phone bill. Trial Tr. dated Aug.
8, 2012, at 191.
Moreover, Stewart’s judgment sentence was entered in 2013 — more than five years
before Petitioner’s PCRA hearings took place — in a case of which Petitioner had actual
knowledge. Petitioner was aware of Stewart’s plea, and aware of his case number at least from
the record at trial. While Petitioner is correct that Stewart’s motion for a downward departure is
sealed, Stewart, No. 11-cr-47, ECF Nos. 63, 64, and 66, preliminary findings as to Stewart’s
guideline range are on the public record. Stewart, No. 11-cr-47, ECF No. 65 at 2 Stewart’s
sentence of probation was entered on the public docket on April 5, 2013. Stewart, No. 11-cr-47,
ECF No. 68 at 1.
Any claim related to Stewart’s plea agreement is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner is at
fault for failing to develop the record in state court, and it is clear from the record that he cannot
meet the requirements of Section 2254(e)(2). As such, Petitioner has failed to show good cause

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for discovery with respect to this evidence, and the motion will be denied with respect to the
same.
F. Petitioner has not Demonstrated Good Cause for Permission to Interview
Alvin Flowers.
Petitioner seeks permission to interview Alvin “Jay” Flowers, Jr., who currently is held
in Beaver County Jail. ECF No. 128 at 14. Flowers allegedly was performing a sex act on the
victim at the time of the murder, and initially was a suspect. Flowers asserted his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination at Petitioner’s trial. See Suppression Hr’g Tr. dated
Aug. 14, 2012, at 98-103, ECF No. 108 at 611-16. Petitioner believes that Flowers now will
testify that, among other things, he did not engage in a sex act with the victim, and that Petitioner
never had been to the scene of the crime. ECF No. 128 at 21-22.
This claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner also presents no evidence of what
Flowers actually would say. His motion is speculative, and thus does not meet the good cause
standard required by Rule 6. See, e.g., Deputy, 19 F.3d at 1493 (quoting with approval Munoz,
777 F. Supp. at 287) (“petitioners are not entitled to go on a fishing expedition through the
government’s files in hopes of finding some damaging evidence”). Petitioner’s motion will be
denied as to this requested discovery.
G. Petitioner has not Demonstrated Good Cause for Discovery from Gregory
“Bookie” Williams.
Petitioner seeks discovery of a list of potential “persons of interest” that was provided to
police on November 22, 2010, by Gregory “Bookie” Williams — an uncle of the victim. ECF No.
128 at 23; ECF No. 128-3 at 89. Petitioner alleges that the list was not produced through
discovery at his criminal trial. ECF No. 128 at 23. Petitioner speculates that the list would not

35

have Petitioner’s name on it. Id. at 18. He believes that this would be exculpatory because
Williams performed his own investigation. Id.
At trial, Williams testified that on November 22, 2010 — the day after the murder, and
sometime after he had learned that his nephew had been killed — he sought out Flowers because
he had heard that Flowers and Cameron had been together the prior night. When Williams
located Flowers, Flowers stated that he had nothing to do with the murder, and gave Cameron’s
gun to Williams, which Flowers had taken from Cameron and hidden in a grill. Trial Tr. dated
Aug. 9, 2012, at 206-207 and 212. Williams testified that he took the gun to his mother’s house,
called Aliquippa police, and turned over the gun to a police officer. Id. at 207-208.
On cross-examination, defense counsel characterized Williams as having “conducted a
little investigation of [his] own,” which Williams did not refute on the stand. Id. at 216. When
asked whether his investigation ever had indicated that Petitioner was at the scene of the murder,
Williams responded, “Well, I can’t say that it put him at the scene. The only thing, his name
came up during the conversation in regards to him and [Cameron] having an argument over
$400.” Id. at 216-17. Williams stated that he did not know when that argument had occurred.
Id. at 217.
A police report written by Sergeant Roberts provided by Petitioner indicates that
Williams brought a written list of “persons that he thought should be of interest [sic]” to police
on November 22 — the day after the murder. ECF No. 128-3 at 89. The report does not indicate
the contents of the list, or whether it was retained by the police, or merely shown to them by
Williams. Petitioner does not assert - and the record does not indicate — that the police report
was withheld during discovery. Id. See also ECF No. 99-6 at 1-2 (“Homicide Discovery List”

36

dated December 19, 2011, referencing “Aliquippa Police Report 10-00987.” This is the same
number on the report referencing Williams’ list. ECF No. 128-3 at 89.).
This list is not related to any ground for relief that was exhausted before the state courts.
Further, the existence of the list is not new — it was known to Petitioner prior to his conviction.
Any claim based on this list would be procedurally defaulted. Further, Petitioner has not met his
burden under Section 2254(e)(2), or otherwise to show good cause under Rule 6. Petitioner’s
motion will be denied with respect to this list.
H. Petitioner has not Demonstrated Good Cause with Respect to the Requested
Cell Site Location Data.
Petitioner also seeks discovery of the “repoll database” from his cell phone records. ECF
No. 128 at 26. Without elaboration, Petitioner states that the “repoll database” was withheld, and
would be exculpatory.
At the outset, Petitioner is unclear as to what information, specifically, is missing from
his phone records. For example, Petitioner’s phone records that were presented at trial included
the repoll numbers from his cellular telephone calls between November 20, 2010 at 7:59 p.m,
and November 21, 2010, at 1:38 p.m. See Second PCRA Trial Ct. Op., ECF No. 41-28 at 48
n.16, and 75-81. See also Trial Tr. dated Aug. 15, 2012, at 196. As such, it appears that the
repoll data were known to him prior to his conviction.
Additionally, Petitioner does not indicate how any of the purportedly missing data relate
to an exhausted claim, or how their absence could not have been discovered earlier with due
diligence, or that he was diligent in attempting to present them to the state court, or that they are
newly discovered. Petitioner has not met his burden under Section 2254(e)(2), or otherwise to
show good cause for discovery. Accordingly, his motion for discovery with respect to these data
is denied.

37

I. Petitioner has not Met his Burden to Show Entitlement to an Evidentiary
Hearing.
Petitioner also seeks an evidentiary hearing regarding the following.
e Stewart’s federal sentence; newly discovered evidence that Rondell Slappy and
Roger McMillen — individuals referenced at trial - did not exist; that another
individual named Rodney Slappy was alive and married to Stewart’s cousin,
Tiffany Hubbard; the omission Christian Davis’ name in handwritten notes next
to his phone number in Petitioner’s phone records provided by the prosecution
prior to trial; a 2015 affidavit of Jamie Butler indicating that Petitioner was not at
Stewart’s residence on the day of the murder and at least part of the following
day; a list of probable suspects prepared by witness Gregory “Bookie” Williams,”
which allegedly did not include Petitioner’s name; and DNA evidence allegedly
on Alvin Flowers’ clothing, Tamika Brown’s car, Cameron’s underwear, a slug
found at the scene, and various blood sample.. ECF No 128 at 15-19.
Petitioner asserts that at an evidentiary hearing, he would call certain individuals to
testify.
e Keri Bozich, his private investigator, regarding various issues discussed above.
Id. at 19.
e Agent Keven Kauffman of the ATF, regarding Stewart’s use as a confidential
source and allegedly lying about the existence of Rondell Slappy. Id. at 20.
e Sergeant Steven Roberts, regarding the list of potential suspects provided by
Gregory “Bookie” Williams, the chain of custody of evidence, and that the
murder weapon was not connected to Petitioner. Id.
e James Christopher Stewart, IIT, who allegedly would admit to having fabricated
the existence of several individuals, as well as Petitioner’s alleged confession to
the murder. Id. at 20-21; and
e Alvin Flowers, Jr., regarding various statement made up to and including
Petitioner’s trial, as well as that he and Cameron did not engage in a sex act, and
that Petitioner never was at the scene of the crime. Id. at 21-22.
Under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (the “AEDPA”), “a habeas
court is barred [under Section 2254(e)(2)] from holding an evidentiary hearing” generally.
Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at
430, and Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 665 (3d Cir. 2005)). See also Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181-

38

82. “In cases where an applicant for federal habeas relief is not barred from obtaining an
evidentiary hearing by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), the decision to grant such a hearing rests in the
discretion of the district court.” Palmer, 592 F.3d at 393 (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S.
465, 473 (2007)). Accord Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 2000) (“AEDPA,
unlike [Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)] and [Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1
(1992)], does not require that such a hearing be held. Instead, federal courts have discretion to
grant a hearing or not.”). In deciding whether to exercise that discretion, the district court “must
consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual
allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief’ under AEDPA’s
standards of review. Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474 (citation omitted); Palmer, 592 F.3d at 393
(quoting Campbell v. Burris, 515 F.3d 172, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (“bald assertions and conclusory
allegations do not afford a sufficient ground for an evidentiary hearing.”)).
Petitioner has not met his burden to show that under AEDPA, this Court is permitted to
hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to the bases that he seeks to raise. The reasons that
Petitioner has not met his burden under Section 2254(e)(2) with respect to Stewart’s federal
sentence; the list of probable suspects prepared by a trial witness Gregory “Bookie” Williams,”
and the requested DNA testing of various evidence are addressed above, and will not be repeated
here. The same logic applies to the remaining evidence — Petitioner does not show any of the
issues that he wishes to raise at an evidentiary hearing could not have been developed at the state
court with the exercise of due diligence.

39

Indeed, the issue of Rondell or Rodney Slappy was well known at trial.’ See Trial Tr.
dated Aug. 14, 2012, at 25 (“Stewart also said on the ride back that he was aware that Weekley
shot and killed another gentleman by the name of Slappy, and it turns out, and I will produce
information at a later point in time to say that this gentleman that he claimed to have knowledge
that [Petitioner] killed, he is still alive.”). Petitioner does not explain how Slappy’s existence
could not have been exhausted before the state courts through the exercise of due diligence, nor
does he provide any basis to excuse default, or to satisfy Section 2254(e)(2).
Next, Petitioner concedes that Christian Davis’ telephone number was on the telephone
records that were provided to him. See ECF No. 99 at 3; ECF No. 99-1 at 2-3. The records were
from Petitioner’s own cellular phone, and Christian Davis purportedly was the roommate of
Anthony Gaskins, Petitioner’s alibi witness at trial. See ECF No. 99 at 3-4; ECF No. 99-3 at 2
(discussing that Petitioner was “always” at Gaskin’s house). But Petitioner does not explain how
he either did not know the identity of the phone number in his own records without, and could
not determine it on his own with due diligence in order to present this issue of Davis’ name not
having been handwritten on the records to the state court. Nor does he provide any basis to
excuse default, or to satisfy Section 2254(e)(2).
Petitioner further does not explain his purportedly “new” evidence that Roger McMillen

— the individual who purportedly informed Stewart that Cameron had been killed, Trial Tr. dated
Aug. 8, 2012, at 210-11 — does not exist, or why evidence of the same could not be developed at

8 Based on the record, it is unclear whether “Rodney Slappy” and “Rondell Slappy” ever were
described as different individuals, or if police simply misheard and spelled the name differently
in their reports. Compare ECF No. 128-3 at 84 (interview of Stewart by Aliquippa police dated
February 11, 2011 mentioning “Rondel Slappy” and that ATF agents were present) with id. at 52
(ATF report of interview with Stewart, also dated February 11, 2011, mentioning “Rodney
Slappy.”).

40

the state court through due diligence. He also does not explain how such information would
meet Section 2254(e)(2).
As to the affidavit of Jamie Butler, ECF No. 128-3 at 92, it is dated November 23, 2015 —
roughly three years prior to his PCRA hearings. He asserts that he directed counsel to submit it
as a basis for relief, ECF No. 99-4 at 2, but the record does not indicate that it ever was. But
Petitioner bears the fault for counsel’s negligence in failing to develop the record at the PCRA
proceedings. Shinn, 142 S. Ct. at 1728 (quoting Williams v/ Taylor, 529 U.S. at 432).
Finally, even assuming that AEDPA did not bar the Court from holding an evidentiary
hearing, Petitioner has not carried his burden to persuade this Court to exercise its discretion to
do so on these bases. This is because he has failed to tie his desire for an evidentiary hearing to
Grounds One to Four of the Petition — which are the only grounds for relief that have been
exhausted in state court. Moreover, Petitioner has not provided any evidence that Roberts,
Stewart or Flowers will testify as Petitioner speculates that they will.’ Trial Tr. dated Aug. 16,
2012, at 218 (Roberts testimony linking murder weapon to Petitioner).
Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing will be denied. Further, Petitioner’s request to
appear at such a hearing will be denied as moot.

° Kauffman’s testimony at trial at least implies that he believed that Stewart untruthful in his
statement to police Petitioner had murdered Slappy. Trial Tr. dated Aug. 14, 2012, at 17-18 □□□
And did Mr. Stewart eventually come clean with you? A: Oh, I was present when he did come
clean[.]”); Id. at 26 (“Q: And of course, as with the other information, [Stewart] claimed to have
no personal knowledge [about Slappy]? A: That’s correct.”). But, to the extent that it is relevant
to any of the claims that are properly before this Court, this testimony already is of record.
Petitioner has not presented any reason to have an evidentiary hearing so that Kauffman can
repeat it.

Al

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Petitioner’s pending discovery motions, ECF Nos. 127
and 128, will be denied. Respondents shall produce a transcript of Tamika Brown’s recorded
statement, or explain with particularity why they cannot, on or before May 1, 2023.
An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, this 31st day March, 2023, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and
DECREED that:
1. Petitioner’s Question for the Court, ECF No. 127, is construed as a motion for
discovery, and DENIED.
2. Petitioner’s Comprehensive Motion for Discovery, ECF No. 128 is DENIED.
3. Petitioner’s request to appear at an evidentiary hearing via video conference is
DENIED as MOOT.
4. On or before May 1, 2023, and pursuant to the Service Order dated July 21, 2021,
ECF No. 11, Respondents shall file on the docket and produce to Petitioner a transcription of the
audio taped statement of Tamika Brown that was played at trial, or file a notice explaining with
particularity why it could not be transcribed. If Respondents are unable to locate the tape, they
must state with particularity the steps that they took to locate it, and attach a sworn affidavit
relative to those efforts.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Rule 72.C.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen
(14) days from the date of this Order to file an appeal to the District Judge which includes the
basis for objection to this Order. Any party opposing such an appeal may respond within
fourteen (14) days thereafter. Any appeal is to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States

42

District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to file a timely
appeal will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.

Dated: March 31, 2023 BY THE COURT:

Cae FF [tebeeh ie Eg
MAUREEN P. KELLY Ms fi
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ce: Monroe Weekley, UI
KS9184
SCI Albion
10745 Route 18
Albion, PA 16475
All counsel of record (via CM/ECF)

43

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418703. Public record. Not legal advice.