# YOUNGER v. R. GROSS

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · March 9, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418550

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 9, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418550

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting the Court’s own decisions “holding that gratuitous infliction of punishment is unconstitutional, even in the prison context.”
- holding that an amended complaint filed post-incarceration cures a former inmate’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies while imprisoned so long as the amended complaint relates back to the initial complaint
- holding that pro se plaintiff was still “required to designate specific facts by use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories . . . sufficient to convince a reasonable fact finder to find all the elements of her prima facie case”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHRISTOPHER YOUNGER, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 20-878
)
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge
R. GROSS, D. EDWARDS, A. TUCKER, )
and J. HOLT, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
I. Relevant Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff, Christopher Younger, is proceeding pro se and was granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. (ECF No. 3.) He commenced this civil rights action when he was a pretrial
detainee at Allegheny County Jail. (ECF No. 124 ¶ 1.) As of at least October 27, 2021, Younger
is no longer incarcerated. (See ECF No. 101.)
The Second Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading, names Allegheny
County Jail Officer Holt, Captain Edwards, Sergeant Tucker, and Officer Gross as Defendants in
their individual capacities. (ECF No. 104.) The Second Amended Complaint also named these
Defendants in their official capacities as well as Warden Orlando Harper; however, the Court
dismissed those claims with prejudice. (See ECF Nos. 30, 105, 115, & 116.) The claims at issue
arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. (Id.)

1 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United
States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case. Therefore, the undersigned has the authority to decide
dispositive motions and enter final judgment.
Pending now before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, which
argues that (1) Defendants did not violate the Eighth Amendment2 prohibition on excessive force,
(2) the Court should defer to the correction officials when dealing with issues concerning prison
administration, (3) the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claims,

and (4) Younger has failed to identify essential elements—a constitutionally protective activity
and a causal connection—of his retaliation claim. (ECF Nos. 123 & 125.)3
Although Younger filed a brief in opposition and supporting exhibits, he failed to properly
respond to Defendants’ Concise Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 124) as required by Local
Rule 56.C.1 because he failed to file any document that responds to each of the Defendants’
numbered paragraphs. “This rule requires non-moving parties to a motion for summary judgment
to file a responsive concise statement in which they must: respond to each numbered paragraph in
the movant’s concise statement; admit or deny the facts contained in the movant’s concise
statement; set forth the basis for denial if any fact within the movant’s concise statement is not
entirely admitted by the non-moving party, with appropriate citation to the record; and set forth,

in separately numbered paragraphs, any other material facts at issue.” Peay v. Co Sager, No. 1:16-
cv-130, 2022 WL 565391, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2022), report and recommendation affirmed by,

2As discussed further below, Defendants erroneously apply the Eighth Amendment standard instead of the Fourteenth
Amendment standard to this case.
3 Although Defendants’ Concise Statement of Material Facts contains a statement that “Plaintiff files complaints at
the jail related only to the conduct of Officer Gross” (ECF No. 124 ¶ 14 (citing ECF No. 124-3)), this fact is not
addressed in their Motion. Defendants do not move for summary judgment on the grounds of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), nor
could they, because the record reflects that Younger had been released by the time his Second Amended Complaint
was filed (see ECF Nos. 101 & 104). See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 98 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that an
amended complaint filed post-incarceration cures a former inmate’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies while
imprisoned so long as the amended complaint relates back to the initial complaint).

2
2022 WL 562936 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2022) (citing LCvR 56.C.1). “Courts located in the Western
District of Pennsylvania require strict compliance with the provisions of Local Rule 56.” Id.
(collecting cases).
The “severe consequences for not properly responding to a moving party’s concise

statement” are that “[a]ny alleged material facts ‘set forth in the moving party’s Concise Statement
of Material Facts . . . which are claimed to be undisputed, will for the purpose of deciding the
motion for summary judgment be deemed admitted unless specifically denied or otherwise
controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing party.’” Hughes v. Allegheny Cnty.
Airport Auth., No. 1:15-cv-221, 2017 WL 2880875, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 6, 2017) (citing
LCvR 56.E), aff’d, 728 Fed. Appx. 140 (3d Cir. 2018).
Although courts provide some leniency to pro se litigants when applying procedural rules,
pro se litigants may not ignore such rules. See Peay, 2022 WL 565391, at *2 (citing Mala v.
Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013) and McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S.
106, 113 (1993)). Thus, the Court will treat Defendants’ concise statement of material facts as

undisputed but will consider any contradictory facts asserted by Younger insofar as they are
supported in the record.4 Whetstone v. Fraley & Schilling Trucking Co., No. 22-1018, 2022 WL
4533847, at *2 (3d Cir. Sep. 28, 2022).
Finally, the parties’ submissions include two video recording of the June 14, 2019 incident.
(Defendants’ exhibit H-1 and H-2; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7). Where the events at issue have been
captured on videotape, the court must view the facts in the light depicted by the videotape in

4 Younger’s Second Amended Complaint is certified under the penalty of perjury and may be treated as an affidavit
for the purpose of opposing Defendants’ Motion. Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 n.3 (3d Cir. 1985).
3
determining whether there is any genuine dispute as to material facts. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380–81 (2007).
II. Factual Background
Based on a review of the parties’ briefing, the record, and the videos, many of the material

facts in Defendants’ concise statement are disputed.
It is undisputed that Younger’s claims against Gross, Holt, Edwards, and Tucker relate to
an incident that occurred on June 14, 2019 at the Allegheny County Jail, where Younger was a
pretrial detainee. (ECF No. 124 ¶ 1; ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 10–24.)
According to Younger, Gross entered Younger’s cell on June 14, 2019 and punched him
in the face five times because he was upset that Younger had asked for a captain and a grievance
after Gross would not let him go to the law library. (ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 10–11.) Younger then exited
his cell with his belongings, because Defendant Gross told him “N***** you trying to tell on me”
and told him “your (sic) going to the hole.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Thereafter, Gross “jumped on [Younger’s]
back to take [him] down” even though Younger was posing “‘no’ threat” to the correctional

officers at the scene. (Id. ¶ 14.) Then, seven to ten other correctional officers ran and tackled
Younger who was “never resisting.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Holt “jumped on [Younger’s] head,” causing him
to “badly chip” his front teeth. (Id. ¶ 16.) According to Younger, Tucker, another correctional
officer, tased Younger many times on his side, back, and shoulder and stated, “Lets (sic) f*** him
up,” even though Younger “never resisted” and “was never the aggressor in this situation.” (ECF
No. 104 ¶¶ 17–18, 31; ECF No. 133 at 4.) Edwards then ordered that Younger be placed in a
restraint chair, where he remained for eight or nine hours without food, medical treatment or
bathroom breaks (forcing him to urinate on himself twice), contrary to an alleged policy that

4
required him to be monitored every hour and given an opportunity to move his limbs every two
hours.5 (ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 19–21; ECF No. 133-1 at 23.)
In contrast, according to Defendants, Younger requested to go the library and “when he
was denied that privilege, [he] refused orders to return to his cell or be handcuffed.” (ECF No.

124 ¶ 4.) Defendant Gross entered Younger’s cell at which point Younger “had already begun his
non-compliance to Gross’s orders.” (ECF No. 124 ¶¶ 17–18 (citing video exhibit H-1); id.
(“Review of the video show that Plaintiff’s resistance throughout the course of the event that is the
subject of Plaintiff’s complaint.”).) Defendants argue that their actions (handcuffing, tasing, and
putting Younger in a restraint chair) were necessary to reestablish order because Younger was
defying orders. (See generally, ECF No. 125; see ECF No. 124 ¶ 7 (“When Officer Holt and the
other officers arrived on the scene, Plaintiff had already left his cell in defiance of Officer Gross’
orders and Officers were unable to get handcuffs on the Plaintiff.”); see also, ECF No. 124-4
(Gross reporting that “Younger said ‘fuck it im (sic) refusing to go in’ and preceeded (sic) to walk
around the bubble… I told Younger to cuff up and have a seat… Younger refused and said ‘you

arent (sic) cuffing me up’... [w]hen I attempted to handcuff Younger he aggressively kicked back
and was squared up with me… [f]or officer safety as well as the inmates we took control… and
secured him on the dayroom floor…”); ECF No. 124 ¶ 9 (“Tucker arrives on scene later and
viewing Plaintiff still non-compliant, tases Plaintiff to get control of him.”); see generally, ECF
No. 124-2 at 4 (Tucker reporting that “I observed officers on the floor… attempting to secure a
combative inmate in cuffs. I immediately pulled my … taser and placed it on Inmate Youngers
(sic) back and administered a 5 second drive-stun…”).

5 Neither party submitted proof on such policy.
5
Defendants offer no facts to dispute Defendant Edwards’ involvement. Rather they simply
acknowledge that Younger “alleges that at a later time, Defendant Edwards order[ed] that Plaintiff
be placed in a restraint chair, where he remained for nine hours without bathroom breaks, food, or
medical treatment.” (ECF No. 124 ¶ 10 (citing ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 19–20) (emphasis added).) This

contradicts Tucker’s Use of Force Occurrence report, which states that she ordered the restraint
chair and order Younger’s placement in the chair. (See ECF No. 124-2 at 4 (“I [Tucker] called for
a restraint chair from Intake.”); but see id. at 2 (Defendant Edwards’ report noting that “a restraint
chair was ordered” without specifying by whom.).)
Younger was later seen by a dentist for a fractured tooth (ECF No. 124 ¶ 13 (citing ECF
No. 124-6; see also, ECF No. 133-1 at 47, 55) and complains of bruising and PTSD problems
(ECF No. 124 ¶ 16; see also, ECF No. 133-1 at 44 (medical note that Younger “reported to have
been assaulted by a CO on 6/14/19 on 6F and still suffers pain from the injury. Individual reported
in gums/mouth and shoulder.”); id. (“inmate reports depression, helplessness, mood swings,
flashbacks, worry about several sick elderly relatives. He has been [diagnosed] with PTSD…”).

6
There are two videos of incident, neither of which contain sound. The first video is from
a hallway camera and depicts the following relevant events:
10:40:01 Two correctional officers are in the hallway walking towards the
door to the common room – Correctional Officer #1 (presumably,
Defendant Gross based on a review of the record) is located at the
door leading to the common room and Correctional Officer #2 is
coming from the hallway to the common room door. Because the
camera looks down the hallway and the door to Cell 123 is open
perpendicular to the hallway, there is no view directly into Cell
123. The camera’s view down the hallway is obstructed by the
door to Cell 123 except through a small portion of the cell door
window through which a figure can be seen.
10:40:06 Both correctional officers are at the door to the common room and
turn around to face the door to Cell 123. They then turn and
proceed through the doors and into the common room.
10:40:14 An inmate (presumably, Plaintiff Younger based on a review of
the record) exits Cell 123 and walks down the hallway. As he is
walking, he talks to Gross and then continues down the hall off
view of the camera.
10:40:34 Younger reappears on camera walking back down the hallway to
Cell 123 and reenters Cell 123.
10:41:00 Gross crosses the common room from the back heading towards
the hallway, goes through the common room door leading to the
hallway, and walks to Cell 123.
10:41:11 Gross reaches the door of Cell 123 and opens it slightly more,
however Younger is not visible. A discussion appears to ensue.
Gross appears to take out a shiny metal object (presumably,
handcuffs based on a review of the record).
10:41:18 Correctional Officer #2 arrives from the common room to the door
frame that lead to the hallway. Gross continues speaking and
points to Correctional Officer #2 in the door frame leading to the
common room.
10:41:28 Correctional Officer #2 begins to walk away from the hallway and
back into the common room. Gross, with his hand on the cell
door, continues discussion.
7
10:41:32 Gross, leaving the door to Cell 123 open, looks around outside of
the cell and into the common room. He then turns around and
goes back towards the door of Cell 123. The camera’s view of
Gross is partially obstructed as he steps behind the open cell door.
10:41:37 Gross, again, leaves the cell door and walks towards and into the
common room.
10:41:46 Gross turns around and walks back to Cell 123 with Correctional
Officer #2 trailing behind.
10:41:55 Gross arrives at the door of Cell 123. Correctional Officer #2 is
at the door between the common room and the hallway. Gross
continues discussions with the occupant of Cell 123.
10:41:57 Gross pushes the cell door open slightly more.
10:42:00 Correctional Officer #2 has arrived near the door of Cell 123 and
stands within a couple feet of the door. Gross continues
discussion with the occupant of Cell 123.
10:42:11 Gross moves towards the inside of Cell 123 with something in his
hands. Through the cell door window, Gross appears to be
reaching towards the occupant of Cell 123. Correctional Officer
#2 is still standing nearby.
10:42:14 Correctional Officers #3 and #4 (presumably, Vause and Holt6)
come running through the common room and through the door to
the hallway. Correctional Officer #2 walks slowly closer to the
door of Cell 123.
10:42:19 Gross is not visible, and Vause, Holt, and Correctional Officer #2,
are grouped in front of the door of Cell 123.
10:42:23 Gross, Vause, and Holt are all entering (or attempting to enter)
Cell 123, with Correctional Officer #2 staying back and
observing.
10:42:25 Gross, Vause, and Holt exit the cell with Younger, who is carrying
a bag of items. They are moving Younger down the hallway and

6 It is unclear which correctional officer is Vause or Holt based on exhibits and the videos. (See ECF No. 124-2 at 2
(“I reviewed the incident [via video]. At 10:41:10 Officer Gross was outside of Inmate Younger’s cell. At 10:42:14
Officer Gross attempts to cuff Inmate Younger and enters cell 123 followed by Officer Vause. At 10:42:26 Inmate
Younger is brought out of cell 123 by Officers Gross, Vause and Holt.”).); see also ECF No. 124-5 at 2 (Holt Incident
Report stating that he arrived at the scene and “saw Officers Gross and Vause attempting to handcuff” Younger.).

8
towards the door to the common room. Gross appears to be trying
to grab Younger’s arms, and either Vause or Holt is assisting with
his arms. The other of Vause or Holt along with Correctional
Officer #2 are following.
10:42:29 Gross and either Vause or Holt are holding on to Younger’s arms
and move him through the door to the common room. The other
of Vause or Holt is talking into a walkie talkie, and Correctional
Officer #2 is following.
10:42:31 All individuals have made it through the door to the common
room. Looking through the doorframe, Gross and either Vause or
Holt, with Younger in hand, all lean to the left. They appear to
fall on the ground together, with the other of Vause or Holt7
jumping down to join the group.
10:42:35 Correctional Officer #2 joins the group on the ground and appears
to assist.
10:42:37 Through the window to the common room, it appears that all four
correctional officers are on top of and surrounding Younger. The
video camera angle makes discerning who is causing whom to
move difficult, because the pile of individuals is obstructed by the
bottom half of the wall into the common room. The camera only
looks through the door frame and the windows into the common
room.
10:42:48 Suddenly, about a dozen correctional officers come running into
the common room from the back door and surround the five
individuals (Younger, Gross, Vause, Holt, and Correctional
Officer #2) who are on the floor. Some appear to assist on the
floor, whereas others stand around the group observing.
10:43:30 For the remainder of the video, some correctional officers are on
the floor, while about six or more are observing the group on the
floor, and several others leave the common room.

7 Given that Younger’s sole allegation against Defendant Holt is that he jumped on Younger’s head. It would make
sense that Holt is the person jumping down to join the group, however based on the video, one cannot tell for certain
whether this individual is Vause or Holt.
9
The second video is from a camera in the adjoining common room and depicts the
following relevant events:
10:42:00 Through the windows of the common room, the lower half of
bodies of Gross discussing with Younger in Cell 123 are visible.
Correctional Officer #2, standing several feet away, from the Cell
123 is also partially visible. The bag of items appears to be by
Younger’s feet.
10:42:12 Vause and Holt enter the frame, walking from the back of the
common room towards the common room door that leads into the
hallway with the cells. Observing through the common room
windows into the hallway, it appears that Gross is attempting to
grab Younger’s hands and place handcuffs on them.
10:42:14 Vause and Holt begin running through the common room towards
the common room door that leads into the hallway to the cells.
10:42:17 Gross enters Cell 123 as Vause and Holt approach the door to Cell
123.
10:42:22 Gross, Vause, and Holt appear to have entered Cell 123; however,
Correctional Officer #2 is partially obstructing the view of the
entrance to the cell.
10:42:25 Gross, Vause and Holt exit the cell with Younger (and his bag of
items) and move down the hallway and towards the door leading
into the common room. Correctional Officer #2 follows.
10:42:27 Younger appears to be briefly pressed up against the glass of the
windows into the common room.
10:42:29 Younger, with his bag, comes through the door to the common
room with Gross “bear hugging” his arms. Vause, Holt, and
Correctional Officer #2 are following.
10:42:31 Gross leans his body towards his left side, swinging Younger,
whose arms are being held by Gross, with him.
10:42:31 Vause and Holt join Gross in pulling Younger down. The four
individuals all fall to the floor.
10:42:37 Correctional Officer #2 runs around the group and kneels on the
ground to join.
10
10:42:39 For about 10 seconds, all correctional officers are leaning over top
of Younger, who is moving, and they grabbing at his arms and
legs. Younger’s face is pinned to the floor by a correctional
officer’s arm/elbow.
10:42:51 11 other correctional officers enter the frame, running and
encircling the group on the floor. Seven remaining standing,
whereas five joining the group on the floor. Younger is not visible
as every space surrounding him contains a correctional officer.
10:42:56 A correctional officer (presumably, Defendant Tucker based on a
review of the record) is standing in the circle with her back
towards the door to the hallway and has a small black rectangular
item in her hand (presumably, the Taser based on a review of the
record). She appears to be taking something off the Taser.
10:42:57 Tucker reaches down with the Taser into the circle of correctional
officers who are holding Younger down. She appears to make
contact between the Taser and Younger’s back. During this time,
there appears to be generalized moving of Younger and/or the
correctional officers and the side of Younger’s face is being
pressed down on the floor with a hand. Seven correctional
officers are observing.
10:43:13 Tucker retracts her arm with the Taser from the circle.
Approximately 15 seconds have elapsed since Tucker first made
contact between the Taser and Younger’s back.
10:43:20 Four of the correctional officers on the floor get up and there
appear to be just three correctional officers left on the floor with
Younger who appears to have both arms behind his back in a
position suggesting handcuffs. The rest of the nine correctional
officers are observing.
10:43:39 Only two correctional officers appear to be on the floor
immobilizing Younger, the rest are standing up and looking
around or down on the floor.
10:44:17 All but eight correctional officers leave the frame. As before, only
two correctional officers appear to be on the floor holding
Younger, the rest are standing up and looking around or down at
the floor.
10:44:23 Younger moves and Tucker leans down with the Taser. Two other
correctional officers approach to hold Younger.
11
10:44:25 Tucker makes contact with the Taser and the back of Younger’s
right thigh. Younger does not appear to be moving and is being
held down by four correctional officers.
10:44:42 Younger’s head moves, and a correctional officer places his hand
on the side of Younger’s head and presses against the floor.
10:44:54 Three correctional officers (plus an additional one who entered
the frame at 10:44:39) stand around the group watching. Four
correctional officers pin Younger down while Tucker maintains
contact between the Taser and the back of Younger’s right thigh.
10:45:59 Tucker retracts the Taser from the back of Younger’s right thigh
and a yellowish glow appears. Approximately 1 minute and 35
seconds have elapsed since Tucker first made contact between the
Taser and the back of Younger’s right thigh.
10:46:00 Tucker appears to be placing the Taser on Younger’s back
between his shoulder blades. At this point, only three correctional
officers are pinning him down and six are overlooking the scene.
10:46:07 Another correctional officer joins to pin down Younger; however,
there was no discernable movement from Younger. Three
correctional officers are milling around, and two correctional
officers are overlooking the scene.
10:46:47 A correctional officer enters the frame wheeling the restraint
chair.
10:46:52 Tucker retracts the Taser from Younger. Approximately 52
seconds have elapsed since Tucker first made contact between the
Taser and Younger’s back between his shoulder blades.
10:47:02 Tucker hands the four remaining correctional officers on the floor
what appears to be a long leash-like item (presumably, a tether8
based on a review of the record), which they connect to Younger’s
handcuffs.
10:47:13 A correctional officer is placing shackles on Younger’s ankles.
10:47:27 Younger is assisted up by the four correctional officers who help
pull him up and tether is held by Tucker.

8 See ECF No. 124-2 at 4 (“I ordered the officers to secure the tether to the cuffs and to apply shackles to [Younger’s]
ankles.”).
12
10:47:29 When he is fully standing, Younger says something to a
correctional officer who is standing in front of him. He continues
to speak as he is walking backwards towards the restraint chair
with the other correction officers.
10:47:36 Younger is seated, without struggle, in the restraint chair. He
continues to talk to the same correctional officer as four other
correctional officers are arranging his straps in the restraint chair.
10:47:48 While the four correctional officers are arranging the straps in the
restraint chair, Tucker goes around Younger and places the Taser
on the front of his left thigh.
10:47:51 A correctional officer places a white large sock-like item over
Younger’s face (presumably, the spit mask9 from a review of the
record). Younger begins rocking his head back and forth. Tucker
is still holding the Taser on Younger’s left thigh.
10:48:06 Younger’s head (either through the correctional officer’s hands or
by the correctional officer pulling on the spit mask) is being held
back against the restraint chair. Four other correctional officers
appear to be working on the restraints.
10:48:29 Tucker retracts the Taser from Younger’s left thigh.
Approximately 41 seconds have elapsed since Tucker first made
contact between the Taser and Younger’s left thigh.
10:48:43 Four to five correctional officers appear to continue working on
the restraint as Tucker walks around and is behind Younger. Five
other correctional officers are overlooking the scene.
10:48:58 Tucker appears to take her Taser out of its holster, while four
correctional officers are holding Younger in the restraint chair.
10:49:01 Tucker appears to place the Taser on the middle of Younger’s
back.
10:49:06 Younger leans forward in the restraint chair, although it is unclear
if this is his own volition or due to three or four correctional
officers pressing him down.

9 See ECF No. 124-2 at 4 (“I ordered the officers to stand him up, walk him backwards and place him in the restraint
chair and to apply [] a spit mask.”)
13
10:50:08 Tucker removes the Taser from Younger’s back. Approximately
1 minute and 7 seconds have elapsed since Tucker first made
contact between the Taser and Younger’s back.
10:50:22 Tucker moves around to the front of Younger and reaches over
his head to place the Taser on Younger’s upper back. Four to five
other correctional officers appear to be holding him in place.
10:50:33 Tucker removes the Taser from Younger’s upper back.
Approximately 11 seconds have elapsed since Tucker first made
contact between the Taser and Younger’s upper back.
10:50:48 The four or five correctional officers have continued to keep
Younger in place leaning forward in the chair.
10:51:17 The spit mask appears to have slid off of Younger’s face, and he
looks up and is talking, while four to five correctional officers
continue to adjust the restraint chair.
10:25:26 A correctional officer pulls the spit mask back up over Younger’s
face as three other correctional officers continue to adjust the
restraint chair.
10:51:55 All correctional officers step back away from the restraint chair.
Younger’s mouth is still covered.
10:52:06 A correctional officer tilts the restraint chair back and begins
moving Younger away.
10:52:15 A correctional officer takes a picture of Younger in the restraint
chair.
Throughout both videos it is difficult to determine (due to the fact that a complete view of
Younger is frequently obstructed by other correctional officers surrounding him or physical
obstacles such as a wall or cell door) why Younger is moving—through his own movements, those
of multiple correctional officers engaged in the encounter, or a combination of both.
14
III. Legal Standard
As the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide, summary judgment must be granted if
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to adduce

facts sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party’s case, and for which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence which shows the lack of
a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). Once that burden has been met, the non-moving party must set forth “specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” or the factual record will be taken as presented by
the moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. Id. (internal citation omitted).
An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court of
Appeals has held that “where the movant bears the burden of proof at trial and the motion does not

establish the absence of a genuine factual issue, the district court should deny summary judgment
even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.” Nat’l State Bank v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New
York, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
In following this directive, a court must take the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party and must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all doubts in that party’s
favor. Hugh v. Butler Cty. Fam. YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005); Doe v. Cty. of Ctr.,
Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir. 2001).
Although courts must hold pro se pleadings to “less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), at the summary
15
judgment stage a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from his burden of providing some affirmative
evidence, not just mere allegations, to show that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See, e.g.,
Barnett v. NJ Transit Corp., 573 F. App’x 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that pro se plaintiff
was still “required to designate specific facts by use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or

answers to interrogatories . . . sufficient to convince a reasonable fact finder to find all the elements
of her prima facie case”) (citation and quotation omitted); Siluk v. Beard, 395 F. App’x 817, 820
(3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with
relevant rules of procedural law”). However, courts should “consider as affidavits [Plaintiff’s]
sworn verified complaints, to the extent that they are based upon personal knowledge and set out
facts that would be admissible in evidence.” Porter v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrs., 974 F.3d
431, 443 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).
Finally, because a “district court must construe the evidence and draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” “[i]n qualified-immunity
cases, that ‘usually means adopting . . . the plaintiff’s version of the facts,’ … unless ‘no reasonable

jury could believe it.’” Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Scott,
550 U.S. at 378–80). However, “[i]n cases where there is a reliable video depicting the events in
question, courts must not adopt a version of the facts that is ‘blatantly contradicted’ by the video
footage.” Id. (citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 380).

16
IV. Discussion
A. Summary Judgment Will Be Denied on Younger’s Excessive Force Claim

1. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Objective-Unreasonableness Standard

For an excessive force claim, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely
or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.
389, 396–97 (2015). The Court previously outlined the applicable framework:
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is
inapplicable to pretrial detainees, who are instead protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects a pretrial detainee against
“punishment.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158-67 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)); see, e.g., Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 372 –75; Murray
v. Keen, 763 F. App’x 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2019) (“sentenced prisoners are protected
from only punishment that is ‘cruel and unusual,’ while pretrial detainees are
protected from any punishment.”) (citing Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 166–67); Robinson
v. Danbert, 673 F. App’x 205, 209 (3d Cir. 2016) (the Fourteenth Amendment
“‘protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to
punishment.’”) (quoting Kingsley v. Henrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397–98 (2015),
which quoted Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)).

The following six “Kingsley factors” are considered when evaluating a pretrial
detainee’s excessive force claims: “[1] the relationship between the need for the use
of force and the amount of force used; [2] the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; [3]
any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; [4] the
severity of the security problem at issue; [5] the threat reasonably perceived by the
officer; and [6] whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Robinson, 673 F.
App’x at 209 (quoting Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. 2473).

(ECF No. 30 at 9–10).
2. Defendants Fail to Apply the Proper Standard
Despite acknowledging that Younger was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged
excessive force incident (see ECF No. 125 at 4–5; ECF No. 124 ¶ 1), Defendants’ motion applies
17
the Eighth Amendment standard,10 which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment for convicted
individuals. (See ECF No. 125 at 2–4.)
The objective standard from Kingsley cannot be applied mechanically, but instead
“requires ‘careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Jacobs v.

Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396).
To determine whether the Defendants used objectively unreasonable force requires the Court to
“analyze these circumstances ‘from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.’” Id.
(citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397). In doing so, “‘[s]afety and order at these institutions requires
the expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable
solutions to the problems they face.’… ‘Officers facing disturbances “are often forced to make
split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”’” Id.
(citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 399).
Defendants’ motion, although arguing that the Court should defer to their security concerns
for inmates and officers within the facility, fails to address any of the Kingsley factors regarding

the excessive force alleged against each Defendant and boils down to the argument “[t]he actions
of each of the [] Defendants was clearly in an effort to maintain or restore discipline in the facility.”
(ECF No. 125 at 2–5.) Thus, the Court will not grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants
on the issue of excessive force. Further, as discussed in the context of Defendants’ qualified
immunity argument, there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to the issue of whether
each Defendant used excessive force.

10 For example, while Defendants analogize this case to Mohamad v. Barone (ECF No. 125 at 4), the excessive force
claim in that case arose under Eighth Amendment. 494 F. App’x 212, 213–215 (3d Cir. 2012).
18
3. Defendants’ Qualified Immunity Claims
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity is an
objective decision to be decided by the court as a matter of law. Carswell v. Borough of
Homestead, 381 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). A defendant “bears the burden of establishing his
entitlement to qualified immunity.” Jefferson v. Lias, 21 F.4th 74, 80 (3d Cir. 2021).
“A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the
challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable
official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (alterations
in original). It is intended to shield officers who make “reasonable but mistaken judgments about
open legal questions” and provides protection of “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 743. The ultimate question is whether the state
of the law when the offense occurred gave Defendants “fair warning” that their acts were
unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
Thus, in “the familiar qualified immunity analysis, the court asks ‘(1) whether the
[defendant] violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established, such
that ‘it would [have been] clear to a reasonable [defendant] that his conduct was unlawful.’” El v.
City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 334 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177,
182 (3d Cir. 2011). The court may address the steps in either order. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

19
4. Because Genuine Issues of Material Fact on the Alleged Force Used by
Defendant Gross Prevent a Finding of Qualified Immunity, Summary
Judgement Will Be Denied

i. There Is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to whether Defendant
Gross Violated Younger’s Right to be Free from Excessive Force
under the Fourteenth Amendment

There is a genuine issue of material fact whether Defendant Gross violated Younger’s right
to be free from excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to Younger’s Second Amended Complaint, Gross entered his cell on June 14,
2019 and punched him in the face five times. (ECF No. 104 ¶ 12.) After that, Younger exited
with his belongings because Gross told him “N***** you trying to tell on me” and told him “your
(sic) going to the hole.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Thereafter, Gross then “jumped on [Plaintiff’s] back to take
[him] down” even though Younger was posing “‘no’ threat” to the correctional officers at the
scene. (Id. ¶ 14).
As recounted in the outline of the videos above, there is an instance in which Gross (along
with Holt and Vause) enter Younger’s cell, but neither video shows exactly what occurred in Cell
123. Although Defendants argue that the video shows that Younger had “already begun his non-
compliance to Gross’s orders when Gross enters the cell” (ECF No. 125 at 9), the videos (which
do not have audio) do not show Younger (because he appears to be in his cell—contrary to
Defendants’ assertions). Further, the initial discussion with Gross did not appear heated given
Gross walked around several times leaving the door to Cell 123 open. When Gross finally entered
Cell 123, neither video captures the interaction within Cell 123 until Younger is finally extracted
by Gross, Holt, and Vause. Although Defendants argue that the video proves that Gross did not
punch Younger in the face because Younger was standing and walking, drawing all reasonable
20
inferences in Younger’s favor, the fact that he is walking outside (with Gross and Vault or Holt)
holding him, is not dispositive on this issue.11
Finally, Defendants argue that as Younger is standing up and walking out, he is continuing
to be non-compliant when exiting the cell. (ECF No. 125 at 9.) However, drawing all reasonable

inferences in Younger’s favor, it is difficult from the video (which does not have audio) to
determine who is responsible from Younger’s moving (Younger himself or Gross, Holt, and/or
Vause pulling on him in different directions). Further, the Defendants do not address Younger’s
claim that Defendant Gross then “jumped on [Plaintiff’s] back to take [him] down” even though
Younger was posing “‘no’ threat” to the correctional officers at the scene. (ECF No. 104 ¶ 14.)
From the video in the hallway, it is unclear why Younger, Gross, and either Holt or Vause leaned
to the left and fell over, though from the video in the common room, drawing all reasonable
inference in Younger’s favor, it would appear that Gross “bear hugged” and swung Younger down
to the floor.
Drawing all reasonable inference in Younger’s favor, there is a genuine dispute of material

fact whether Gross used an objectively reasonable amount of force when he punched Younger in
the face five times and pulled Younger on the floor.

11 Further, the picture of Younger after the entire encounter is so poor that it is impossible to determine the extent of
his injuries. (See ECF No. 133-1 at 71). This is equally true for the version on ECF and the paper copy submitted to
Chambers.
21
ii. Adopting Younger’s Version of the Facts, the Right to be Free from
Excessive Force in the Form of Five Unprovoked Punches to the
Face and Slamming a Non-Resistant Pretrial Detainee to the Ground
Was Clearly Established under the Fourteenth Amendment at the
Time

As discussed above, there is a genuine dispute of material fact whether Gross used an
objectively reasonable amount of force in his interaction with Younger. Adopting Younger’s
version of the facts, it was clearly established at the time of the incident that a correctional officer
punching a non-resisting pretrial detainee (who was asking to file a grievance and speak to a
captain about library time) in the face five times and then jumping on him to get him to ground
when escorting him away would be a violation of Younger’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be
free from excessive force. See Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty, 8 F.4th 187, 197 (3d Cir. 2021) (“the
Supreme Court has made clear that officers may not expose inmates to gratuitous force divorced
from any legitimate penological purpose.”)
“Although mindful of the United States Supreme Court’s admonition that qualified
immunity is to be decided ‘at the earliest possible stage in litigation,’” Hayhurst v. Upper
Makefield Twp., No. 06-3114, 2007 WL 1795682, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2007) (citing Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)), given the genuine issues of material fact as to whether (and
how) these events occurred—considering Younger’s certified Second Amended Complaint,
Gross’ incident reports, the lack of video evidence of what occurred in Cell 123, and inconclusive
videos as to whether Younger was actively resisting during the incident—the Court is unable to
resolve the issue of the qualified immunity on summary judgment. Thus, Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment in favor of Gross on this claim will be denied.

22
5. Because Genuine Issues of Material Fact on the Alleged Use of the Taser
by Defendant Tucker Prevent a Finding of Qualified Immunity, Summary
Judgement Will Be Denied

i. There is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to whether Defendant
Tucker Violated Younger’s Right to be Free from Excessive Force
under the Fourteenth Amendment

Defendants characterize Younger’s claims against Tucker as only “one action”: her “use
of the taser was in violation of Plaintiff’s rights.” (ECF No. 125 at 8.) Younger’s Second
Amended Complaint contends that “Tucker tased Plaintiff in his side, back and shoulder” while
he was handcuffed and caused him nerve problems. (ECF No. 104 ¶ 17.) He further contends that
Tucker stated “Lets (sic) fuck him up.” (Id.)
Despite Defendants’ attempt to minimize Tucker’s involvement as only “one action,” the
video in the common room appears to show Tucker’s taser making contact with Younger’s body
six separate times for an approximate total of 4 minutes and 41 seconds, much longer than the
three, five-second stuns described in Tucker’s Use of Force Occurrence Report. (See ECF No.
124-2 at 3–4; see also ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 17, 31 (Younger stating that “Tucker tazed Plaintiff in his
side, back and shoulder,” approximately “3 to 6 times in his body and handcuffed”); see also, ECF
No. 133-1 at 10 (officer report noting that “Tucker drive stunned [Younger] with her [Taser] to
get inmate Younger to lean forward to take handcuff off the inmate.”); ECF No. 133 at 4 (alleging
that “Tucker tased [Younger] while in the restraint chair at 10:49 am”).) While it is impossible to
tell from watching the videos whether the Taser was actively stunning Younger the entire time
Tucker made contact between Younger’s body and the Taser, the Court must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of Younger at summary judgment.
Further, even among Defendants’ own documents in support of summary judgment, there
is a lack of clarity as to whether and to what extent (handcuffs, shackles, restraint chair, and
23
physical force by various correctional officers) Younger was subdued when Tucker used the Taser.
Compare ECF No. 124-2 at 2 (“Tucker used her taser to incapacitate the inmate until control was
gained or compliance was given.”) with id. at 4 (“Once they were able to cuff him, he continued
to resist… [w]hile we were waiting for the restraint chair, inmate Younger became combative and

attempted to kick Officer Panza at which time, I administered a 5 second drive-stun to the back
part of his thigh”) and id. (“I ordered officers to secure the tethers to the cuffs and to apply the
shackles to [his] ankles… Once in the chair, I ordered the officers to secure his limbs one by one…
he resisted and to gain control, I administered a 5 second drive stun to the upper part of his back.”)
Drawing all reasonable inference in Younger’s favor, there is a genuine dispute of material
fact whether Tucker used an objectively reasonable amount of force when tasing Younger,
including the number of times the Taser was used, the length of time it was applied, and whether
Younger was resisting or subdued at the time.
ii. Adopting Younger’s Version of the Facts, the Right to be Free from
Excessive Force in the Form of Electric Shock when a Non-
Resisting Pretrial Detainee is Subdued by Officers and/or Other
Mechanical Restraints Was Clearly Established under the
Fourteenth Amendment at the Time

As discussed above, there is a genuine dispute of material fact whether Tucker used an
objectively reasonable amount of force in using her Taser on Younger. Adopting Younger’s
version of the facts, it was clearly established that at the time of the incident using a Taser against
a non-resisting pretrial detainee who had already been subdued would be a violation of Younger’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th
187, 197 (3d Cir. 2021) (noting in the context of a pretrial detainee that the “Supreme Court has
made clear that officers may not expose inmates to gratuitous force divorced from any legitimate
penological purpose” and collecting cases predating 2015 showing that “striking a physically
24
restrained and nonthreatening inmate—was clearly unlawful under the precedent of this Court and
our sister circuits.”); see e.g., Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding under
the Eighth Amendment12 that it is “established that an officer may not kick or otherwise use
gratuitous force against an inmate who has been subdued”); see also, Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d

104, 110, 114 (4th Cir. 2019) (reversing grant of summary judgment under the Eighth Amendment
where inmate was subjected to a series taser shocks while “handcuffed and surrounded by up to
six officers,” first when inmate was standing and refusing to hold still for a picture, then 16 seconds
later when he was lying on the ground, and then less than one minute later when the officers pulled
the inmate back up.)
Given that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to how Tucker used the Taser, the
Court is unable to resolve the issue of the qualified immunity on summary judgment. Thus,
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Tucker on this claim will be denied.
6. Because Genuine Issues of Material Fact on the Alleged Force Used by
Defendant Holt Prevent a Finding of Qualified Immunity, Summary
Judgement Will Be Denied

i. There Is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to whether Defendant
Holt Violated Younger’s Right to be Free from Excessive Force
under the Fourteenth Amendment When Jumping on Younger’s
Head

From a review of the parties’ summary judgment papers and the videos, it appears that
Defendant Holt is either Correctional Officer #3 or #4. (See ECF No. 124-5 at 2 (Holt’s incident
reports identifies that he arrived at the scene and “saw Officers Gross and Vause attempting to

12 As noted in the Court’s discussion on Kingsley, Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual punishment” is a more
difficult standard for a convicted prisoner to meet than the Fourteenth Amendments standards protecting pretrial
detainees against being “punished.” Thus, cases finding violations of a clearly established Eighth Amendment right
against the use of excessive force necessarily would apply to a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right against
the use of excessive force.
25
handcuff” Younger).) Defendants argue that Younger “only alleges that Holt ‘jumped on
Plaintiff’s head,’” and, therefore, this was an “objectively reasonable response used in an attempt
for an officer to restore discipline of the situation.” (ECF No. 125 at 7.) In doing so, they cite to
a concise statement of material fact that states that “[w]hen Officer Holt and the other officers

arrived on the scene, Plaintiff had already left his cell in defiance of Officer Gross’ orders and
Officers were unable to get handcuffs on the Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 124 ¶ 7 (citing ECF No. 124-
5).) This statement of fact is contradicted by the video evidence (where Younger appears to be in
his cell based on the angle at which Defendant Gross is talking to him) and by Edwards’ report on
the videos of the incident (in which he says, “Officer Gross attempts to cuff Inmate Younger and
enters cell 123…” and [a]t 10:42:26 Inmate Younger is brought out of cell 123 by Officers Gross,
Vause and Holt” (ECF No. 124-2 at 2) (emphasis added)).
Drawing all reasonable inference in Younger’s favor, there is a genuine dispute of material
fact whether Holt used an objectively reasonable amount of force when jumping on Younger’s
head.

ii. Adopting Younger’s Version of the Facts, the Right to be Free from
Excessive Force Under the Fourteenth Amendment When Jumping
on Younger’s Head without Reason Was Clearly Established under
the Fourteenth Amendment at the Time

As discussed above in the context of the other Defendants, based upon the genuine issues
of material fact that exist as to which individual was Holt, what Younger’s behavior was at the
time of the incident, and what were the overall circumstances at the time, the Court is unable to
resolve the issue of the qualified immunity on summary judgment. Thus, Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment in favor of Holt on this claim will be denied.
26
7. Because Genuine Issue of Material Facts on the Use of the Restraint Chair
by Defendant Edwards Prevent a Finding of Qualified Immunity,
Summary Judgement Will Be Denied

i. There Is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to whether Defendant
Edwards Violated Younger’s Right to be Free from Excessive Force
under the Fourteenth Amendment by Ordering His Placement in a
Restraint Chair for Nine Hours without Food, Bathroom Breaks,
Medical Care or Intermittent Relief from the Restraints

In Hope v. Pelzer, the Supreme Court identified criteria relevant to the use of excessive
force test for mechanical restraints for convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment and found
that “(1) where the inmate had ‘already been subdued, handcuffed, [and] placed in leg irons,’ and
(2) there was a ‘clear lack of an emergency situation’ such that ‘[a]ny safety concerns had long
since abated,’ then (3) subjecting the inmate to ‘substantial risk of physical harm’ and ‘unnecessary
pain’ serves no penological justification.” Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 180 (3d Cir. 2015)
(citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002)).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has concluded that the standard enunciated
under Hope is an excessive force claim, not a conditions of confinement claim. Young v. Martin,
801 F.3d 172, 180 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying Hope to an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim
for use of restraint chair); but see, Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133. 142 n.6 (3d Cir. 2020) (“We have
not held that mechanical restraints cannot be considered in a conditions-of-confinement case;
indeed, the improper use of mechanical restraints may be considered in a conditions-of-
confinement case.”)
Thus, “[b]y extension of the Supreme Court’s holding in Hope, that a convicted prisoner’s
claim involving use of mechanical restraints is governed by the Eighth Amendment excessive
[force] analysis, a pretrial detainee’s claim of excessive force must be analyzed under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause” as set forth in Kingsley, which “protects a pretrial
27
detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Freeman v. Schaffer, No.
18-11566, 2019 WL 2367083, at *5 (D.N.J. June 5, 2019) (citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10 (1989)); see also, Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979) (“[I]n the absence of an expressed intent to

punish, a pretrial detainee can nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are not ‘rationally
related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose’ or that the actions ‘appear excessive in
relation to that purpose.’”)); see also, Francis v. Smith, No. 2:21-cv-948, 2022 WL 3701582, at
*3–4 (W.D. Pa. July 28, 2022), report and recommendation adopted by, 2022 WL 3700909 (W.D.
Pa. Aug. 26, 2022) (applying the Kingsley factors to a pretrial detainees excessive force claims
related to a restraint chair).
Neither party addresses Hope’s factors nor how they would apply in the case of a pretrial
detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF Nos. 125 & 133.) Instead, Defendants argue
that this case is similar to another case in which summary judgment was granted when a convicted
prisoner (who behaved belligerently and refused orders) was placed naked with only a sheet over

his lap in a restraint chair for twenty-four hours, but was not deprived of food, shelter, medical
care, or safety during that time. (ECF No. 125 at 3–4, 7–8 (citing Mohamad v. Barone, 494 F.
App’x 212, 213 (3d Cir. 2012).) Defendants argue that, by comparison, Younger does not allege
being naked and was kept in the restraint chair for only nine hours, and thus they should be granted
summary judgment. (Id.)
Defendants’ argument ignores not only Younger’s status as a pretrial detainee as opposed
to convicted prisoner but also his allegations in the certified Second Amended Complaint that he
was “without 10 min[utes of] relief every two hours, was not feed (sic), nor given medical

28
treatment for his injuries” and “was made/forced to urine on his self two times because [he] was
not given permission to go to the bathroom.” (ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 20–21.)
Of those facts, Defendants only address the medical care and argue that “Younger was seen
by the nurse around 3:30 pm on June 14, 2019 who noted that he was stunned on the right arm that

there were no further injuries.” (ECF No. 124 ¶ 12 (citing ECF No. 124-7).) A closer look at the
report calls into question whether that medical note even relates to the June 14, 2019 incident.
Tellingly, the note was made on June 16, 2019 at 3:22:53 PM and reports that “at approx[imately]
12:45pm client was dry stunned on right arm by staff, due to refusing to put arms back in cell from
door slot. No injuries were noted.” (ECF No. 124-7 at 2) These assertions are contradicted by the
fact that (1) the video footage shows the incident occurring around 10:40 a.m. (not 12:45 p.m.),
(2) no incident report refers to Tucker stunning Younger’s right arm (and there is no visible
indication of that in either video), and (3) the video footage shows that Younger’s cell door was
wide open (as opposed to Younger refusing to put arms back in the cell from the door slot).
Further, below that June 16, 2019 note, there is in fact another entry for June 14, 2019 at 1:23 p.m.,
however that is where the report cuts off.13 (ECF No. 124-7 at 2.)

Drawing all material inferences in Younger’s favor, there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Defendant Edwards14 violated Younger’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by

13 Based on Younger’s exhibits in opposition to the Defendants’ Motion, it appear that Younger did received some
medical attention from mental health practitioners on June 14, 2019. However, these notes also contain inconsistencies
as to his mental health status. Compare ECF No. 133-1 at 45 (noting at 1:35 pm on June 14, 2019 “per officer’s (sic)
and the nurse in front of intake, inmate has been screaming from restraint chair that he is suicidal”) with id. at 44
(noting at 8:35 pm on June 14, 2019 “[i]nmate stated he doesn’t understand why he is on suicide watch on 5C. [I]nmate
claims he was not screaming he was suicidal while in the restraint chair in intake.”).
14 Indeed, there is even a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant Edwards is the correct defendant
here. As mentioned above, Defendants offer no facts related to Defendant Edwards, including any involvement in the
incident, his authority with respect to ordering a restraint chair, or his authority with respect to leaving Younger in the
restraint chair. Rather, Defendants simply acknowledge that Younger “alleges that at a later time, Defendant Edwards
Footnote continued on new page…
29
placing a non-resistant inmate in a restraint chair and leaving him without food, bathroom breaks,
medical treatment, and the ability to move his limbs for up to nine hours.
The Court is unaware of Third Circuit precedent adapting the Hope test15 in the context of
a pretrial detainee (or whether the Kingsley16 factors would take precedence).17 Using either test

with Younger’s version of the facts, however, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the use of the restraint chair in the conditions described by Younger in his Second
Amended Complaint (and generally unrebutted by Defendants) would be violative of his
Fourteenth Amendment rights.

orders that Plaintiff be placed in a restraint chair, where he remained for nine hours without bathroom breaks, food,
or medical treatment.” (ECF No. 124 ¶ 10 (citing ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 19–20).) Looking at Tucker’s Use of Force
Occurrence report, it appears that she ordered the restraint chair and ordered Younger’s placement in the chair. (See
ECF No. 124-2 at 4 (“I [Tucker] called for a restraint chair from Intake.”); but see id. at 3 (Defendant Edwards noting
that “a restraint chair was ordered” without specifying by whom.). There is no information whether the person who
ordered the restraint chair is also the person who is responsible for keeping an individual in a restraint chair. Thus,
the Court is left with Younger’s allegation that Edwards ordered the placement in the restraint chair in which Younger
remained for nine hours versus reports that identify Tucker (or no one) as the person ordering the restraint chair.
15 For example, from Tucker’s own report, Younger was already handcuffed and shackled when he was placed into
the restraint chair. (ECF No. 124-2 at 4; see also ECF No. 124-5 (“Once inmate Younger was placed in handcuffs
and leg irons he was placed into the restraint chair.”).) Further, given the number of correctional officers milling
around in the video, there is a question as to whether there was an emergency situation or any safety concerns. Young,
801 F.3d at 180. Finally, the allegations that Younger was left without food, medical care, bathroom breaks, and
regular relief for nine hours may have subjected him to a “‘substantial risk of physical harm’ and ‘unnecessary pain’
serv[ing] no penological justification.” Id. Further, the Hope test arises out of the Eighth Amendment “cruel and
unusual punishment” context, which is a more difficult standard for a convicted prisoner to meet than the Fourteenth
Amendments standards protecting pretrial detainees like Younger against being “punished.”
16 Given the number of officers milling about, the fact that Younger was already handcuffed and shackled, the use of
the Taser while he was in the restraint chair, and questions as to whether he was, in fact, non-compliant, there exist
genuine issues of material fact regarding the six Kingsley factors.
17 Though “courts have recognized that brief periods in restraints of twenty fours or less typically will not give rise to
an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim,” Crawford v. White, No. 1:14-CV-1682, 2015 WL 3753930, at
*13–*14 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2015), those cases are not dispositive to the issue here, where the Fourteenth Amendment
protects Younger as “a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Kingsley v.
Henrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397–98 (2015).
30
ii. Adopting Younger’s Version of the Facts, the Right to be Free from
Excessive Force through the Use of a Restraint Chair for Nine Hours
without Food, Bathroom Breaks, Medical Care or Intermittent
Relief from the Restraints Was Clearly Established under the
Fourteenth Amendment at the Time

Defendants argue that Defendant Edwards is entitled to qualified immunity based on the
fact that no constitutional violation occurred (ECF No. 125 at 8 (citing Mohamad v. Barone, 494
F. App’x 212, 213 (3d Cir. 2012).) They further argue that placing Younger in a “restraint chair
was a good faith effort to restore discipline on the pod and in the facility.” (Id.) In doing so, they
do not address whether it was clearly established as of June 14, 2019 that placing a non-resistant
pretrial detainee in a restraint chair and leaving him without food, bathroom breaks, medical
treatment, and ability to move limbs for up to nine hours would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Hope v. Pelzer, the United States Supreme Court reversed a finding of qualified
immunity for correctional officers when they attached a subdued inmate (who was already
handcuffed and in leg irons) to a “hitching post” for seven hours in the sun without a shirt on and
who was given water only once or twice and no bathroom break. 536 U.S. 730, 734–35 (2002).
The Supreme Court found that the “obvious cruelty inherent in this practice should have provided
respondents with some notice that their alleged conduct violated [plaintiff’s] constitutional
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. at 745.
In Young v. Martin, the Third Circuit found that the fourteen-hour use of a restraint chair
for compliant inmate who was naked with a smock on his lap in an air-conditioned cell with straps
that were initially too tight violated his Eighth Amendment rights. 801 F.3d at 175–76. In that
case, the inmate “was already subdued when subjected to mechanical restraint” and “not violent,
combative, or self-destructive at any point during the incident leading up to his prolonged
confinement in the restraint chair.” Id. at 181. Further, there was no “emergency situation” as the
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incident only lasted seven minutes “during which two [correctional officers] chatted and laughed
while they watched the scene unfold” and the inmate voluntarily complied instructions during that
time. Id. Finally, the Third Circuit found that there was a dispute whether “the prison officials
exposed [plaintiff] to a ‘substantial risk of physical harm’ and ‘unnecessary pain’ by placing him
in the restraint chair” in violation of the limits set forth by the prison’s own regulations.18 Id. at

181–82.
However, the Third Circuit left the question of whether the state of the law at the time of
the incident in 2009 “gave the [d]efendants ‘fair warning that their alleged treatment of [plaintiff]
was unconstitutional,’” and whether the “confinement in the restraint chair violated prison
regulations of which the [d]efendants were aware” to the district court. Id. at 182. This Court
turns to that question now.
As articulated by the Third Circuit in Baloga v. Pittston Area School District,
For a right to be clearly established, “there must be sufficient precedent at the time
of action, factually similar to the plaintiff's allegations, to put defendant on notice
that his or her conduct is constitutionally prohibited.” Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of
Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
Although the right at issue may not be defined “at a high level of generality,”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011),
the precise action in question “need not have previously been held unlawful” for
the right to be clearly established. Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 993 (citing Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987)); see also
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002)
(“[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even
in novel factual circumstances.”). Where there is neither Supreme Court nor circuit

18 As noted above, Younger alleges that Defendants violated their own policy, but neither party provided evidence of
such a policy (or the lack thereof).
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precedent on point, “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” may
establish the federal right at issue. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (citation omitted).

927 F.3d 742 (3d Cir. 2019); see also, Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 182 (3d Cir. 2022); Peroza-
Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2021).
As early as 2002, the Hope test outlined the factors to determine whether mechanical
restraints violate the Eighth Amendment. Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, 748 (noting the Court’s own
decisions “holding that gratuitous infliction of punishment is unconstitutional, even in the prison
context.”) Next, both Young’s holding—that the Eighth Amendment was violated where a
subdued inmate was naked in a restraint chair for fourteen hours with straps that were initially too
tight—and Kingsley’s holding—that, because a pretrial detainee is protected from excessive force
that amounts to punishment (rather than cruel and unusual punishment), the objective
reasonableness standard applies—preceded the incident in this case by four years.
Adopting Younger’s version of the facts, it was clearly established at the time of the
incident that placing a pretrial detainee, who was already subdued (handcuffed and placed in
shackles) for nine hours in a restraint chair without food, bathroom breaks, medical treatment for
his injuries, and his periodic relief from the restraints, was a violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment right.
However, given that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the circumstances that
led to Younger being placed into restraint chair and the conditions in which he was kept, the Court

is unable to resolve the issue of the qualified immunity on summary judgment. Thus, Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Edwards on this claim will be denied.

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B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Younger’s First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Will Be Granted in Part and Denied in Part

1. First Amendment Retaliation
To assert a claim for First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff “must show (1)
constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an adverse action by prison officials ‘“sufficient to deter a
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights,”’ and (3) ‘a causal link
between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.’”
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d
Cir. 2001))
2. Defendants Take a Narrow View of Younger’s Retaliation Claim
Defendants argue that (1) Younger fails to identify a constitutionally protected activity,
and (2) to the extent that the Court were to find the use of the law library to be a constitutionally
protected activity, only Gross knew of Younger’s intention to use the law library at the time the
incident occurred. (ECF No. 125 at 10). Defendants further argue that there is no causal
connection between Younger’s use of the law library and any of the Defendants’ actions.19 (Id.)
Younger’s response does not address his retaliation claim. (See ECF No. 133.)
By arguing that access to the law library is not constitutionally protected conduct and
therefore Younger’s retaliation claim fails, Defendants take a narrow view of the Second Amended
Complaint and the events described therein, despite the well-established obligation to liberally

construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings. Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).

19 Based on Younger’s Second Amended Complaint, his retaliation claim is only directed against Gross, Tucker, and
Edwards, but not Holt. (See ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 30–33.)
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With respect to Gross, Younger’s Second Amended Complaint alleges that “[o]n or about
June 14, 2019, Defendant [] Gross entered plaintiff’s cell and assault[ed] plaintiff because plaintiff
asked for a captain and a grievance because [] Gross would not let Plaintiff go to the library.”
(ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 11–14 (alleging that Gross told Younger “N***** you trying to tell on me,”

“your (sic) going to the hole,” after which “Gross jumped on Plaintiff’s back to take Plaintiff
down.”).) Thus, the action that allegedly triggered the use of excessive force was not Younger’s
request to go to the law library itself, but rather his request to speak to captain and assert a
grievance. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that for the purposes of a
retaliation claim, there is no “substantive distinction between retaliation for informing prison
officials of an intent to file a grievance or requesting the necessary forms to do so on the one hand,
and actually filing such a grievance on the other.”).
With respect to Edwards and Tucker, there is no indication that either of them knew that
Younger sought to speak to a captain and requested a grievance related to his law library time, as
it appears from the Second Amended Complaint that they arrived on the scene after the altercation

between the Gross and Younger had begun. (See ECF No. 104 ¶¶ 15–19.)
Thus, on Younger’s First Amendment retaliation claim, the Court will deny summary
judgment with respect to Gross but will grant summary judgment in favor of Edwards and Tucker,
because Younger has failed to establish causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights
and the adverse actions.

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V. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgement will be granted
with respect to the First Amendment Retaliation against Defendant Edwards and Defendant
Tucker. The remainder of the Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: March 9, 2023 /s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418550. Public record. Not legal advice.