# EASTMAN v. SMITH

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · January 31, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418470

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 31, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418470

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding no viable claim where a student died after touching a high-voltage wire during a science experiment
- finding that a fire truck driver, who had struck and killed an oncoming motorist while responding to an emergency call, was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law where there was no alleged intent to harm

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NATHAN B. EASTMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 19-577
)
BRANDON SMITH, BLACKHAWK )
SCHOOL DISTRICT INDUSTRIAL )
TECHNOLOGY INSTRUCTOR, )
in his individual capacity, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment and brief in support filed
by Defendant Brandon Smith in this matter (Docket Nos. 54, 55), Plaintiff Nathan B. Eastman’s
response and brief in opposition thereto (Docket Nos. 58, 59), and Defendant’s reply (Docket
No. 62). In addition to the motion and briefs, the Court has considered the parties’ concise
statements and counter statements of material facts and appendices that were filed in connection
with the briefs (Docket Nos. 56, 57, 60, 61).
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
I. Factual Background
As the parties are well-acquainted with the factual background of this case, at this
juncture the Court will present an abbreviated version of the facts relevant to Defendant’s
summary judgment motion. This case involves an alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights arising out of an accident that occurred in the industrial materials classroom at Blackhawk
Area Senior High School in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, on April 30, 2015. (Docket No. 19,
¶¶ 2, 3). On that day, Plaintiff, a minor student at the high school at the time, was in the process
of building a small wooden canoe. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5). While operating a drill press to make a series of
holes in a 2x4 piece of wood, the vise that was holding the wood onto the table slipped, at which
point Plaintiff’s hand was injured by the machinery. (Id. ¶¶ 5-7; Docket No. 60, ¶¶ 7, 47).
Defendant, the school’s industrial technology instructor, was Plaintiff’s instructor in the class.
(Docket No. 19, ¶¶ 2-5).

Although the parties disagree about the exact nature of certain events that occurred prior
to the accident, the Court – believing Plaintiff’s evidence and drawing all justifiable inferences in
his favor, as is required on summary judgment – considers the relevant events to have unfolded
as follows.1 Prior to the accident, Defendant had supplied students, including Plaintiff, with a
safety pamphlet indicating that projects should be secured to a drill press table by way of a vise
or clamp. (Docket No. 60, ¶ 46). Defendant had also instructed Plaintiff and other students that
if a vise was not clamped properly to a table, the vise could break free. (Id. ¶ 43). Defendant
had further instructed that if a project breaks free of a clamp, the first thing to do is to turn off the
power to the drill press, and never to put a hand near a moving drill bit. (Docket No. 56, ¶¶ 23,

24).

1 The relevant facts are derived from the undisputed evidence of record and from the disputed evidence of
record which is read in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in his favor.”).
Furthermore, Defendant has not responded to the additional responses and paragraphs set forth Plaintiff’s
Responsive Concise Statement of Material Facts (Docket No. 60) in accordance with Rule 56.D of the Local Rules
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The Court notes that, since Defendant
has not responded thusly, the additional material facts contained in those paragraphs (those which cite to evidence of
record that has been provided to the Court in accordance with Local Rule 56.C, and which can be construed as
setting forth purportedly undisputed material facts) can be deemed admitted for purposes of deciding Defendant’s
summary judgment motion. See LCvR 56.E. On the other hand, the Court further notes that Plaintiff has not
included in his Appendix (Docket No. 61) all of the deposition transcript pages to which he cites in his Responsive
Concise Statement of Facts. Regardless of whether such additional material facts are disputed or whether they are
deemed admitted for purposes of deciding Defendant’s motion, however, the Court reaches the same conclusions
herein.
On this occasion, Defendant set up the vise before Plaintiff used the drill press. (Docket
No. 60, ¶ 44). According to Plaintiff, Defendant did not use a clamp when he set up Plaintiff’s
boat hull project within the vise, so the vise was not clamped to the drill press table when
Defendant drilled the first hole into Plaintiff’s project. (Id. ¶¶ 45, 47, 48). According to
Plaintiff, when he then began to drill, the wood began to shake when he lowered the drill bit, and

his hand was pulled into the bit. (Id. ¶ 7). At the time of the accident, Defendant had turned his
attention away from Plaintiff’s activity in order to focus his attention on something else in the
classroom. (Docket No. 19, ¶ 17; Docket No. 26, ¶ 17). Plaintiff’s expert opined that the
accident occurred in part because Defendant had failed to ensure that Plaintiff’s project was
clamped.2 (Docket No. 60, ¶ 50).
The shop class in which the accident occurred was an elective class, Plaintiff did not have
any disabilities, and Plaintiff was not dependent on a teacher to assist him with the project on a
one-to-one basis. (Docket No. 56, ¶ 26). Plaintiff testified that he had been instructed on use of
the drill orally, in writing, and through actual demonstration, and that Defendant had also

instructed him before the accident never to put his hand near a moving drill bit. (Id. ¶ 20).
Plaintiff does not contend that Defendant was doing anything unlawful in turning away from the
drill press, and he admits that Defendant was allowed to assist other students at the time of the
accident. (Id. ¶ 29). Plaintiff and six other students admitted in deposition testimony that
Defendant was an “open guy” of whom one could ask questions. (Id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff also
admitted that, to his knowledge, Defendant did not want Plaintiff to get hurt. (Id. ¶ 28).

2 In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is liable, at least in part, based on the theory
that Plaintiff was directed to use a broken drill press and that the injury was caused, at least in part, by his using that
broken machine. (See Docket No. 19, ¶¶ 27, 28). In response to Defendant’s summary judgment motion, however,
Plaintiff appears not to pursue this theory and argues that inadequate clamping caused his injury. (See Docket No.
59 at 5-6).
On May 16, 2019, Plaintiff timely filed his Complaint in this matter (Docket No. 1). On
June 6, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Docket Nos. 6, 7).
After hearing oral argument on July 23, 2019, the Honorable Joy Flowers Conti granted
Defendant’s motion without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to amend the Complaint. On August
19, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 19). Defendant filed a motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint on August 30, 2019. (Docket Nos. 20, 21). On October
11, 2019, Judge Conti denied Defendant’s second motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 25).
Thereafter, Defendant filed his Answer to the Amended Complaint, and discovery ensued. The
case was reassigned to this judicial officer on September 23, 2020.
The Amended Complaint includes a single Count against Defendant, alleging a violation
of Plaintiff’s civil rights under the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Count I). (Docket No. 19 at 5-11). Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, plus
cost of suit, interest, and attorney fees.3 (Id. at 10). Defendant filed his Motion for Summary
Judgment, which has been fully briefed by the parties, and the motion is now ripe for decision.

II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The parties must support their
position by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including
those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute

3 Plaintiff indicates in his Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment that, after having
engaged in discovery, he is withdrawing his claim for permanent damage to his earning power. (Docket No. 58,
¶ 8).
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original). A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome
under the substantive law. See Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny, Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir.
1998) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). Summary judgment is unwarranted where there is

a genuine dispute about a material fact, that is, one where a reasonable jury, based on the
evidence presented, could return a verdict for the non-moving party with regard to that issue.
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all inferences in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party without weighing the evidence or questioning the
witnesses’ credibility. See Boyle, 139 F.3d at 393. The movant has the burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, while the non-movant must establish the
existence of each element for which it bears the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant has pointed to sufficient evidence of record to

demonstrate that no genuine issues of fact remain, the burden is on the non-movant to search the
record and detail the material controverting the movant’s position. See Schulz v. Celotex Corp.,
942 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 1991). Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to go beyond the
pleadings and show, through the evidence of record, that there is a genuine issue for trial. See
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324.
III. Discussion
As previously indicated, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains a single claim against
Defendant for violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No.
19 at 5). More specifically, Plaintiff brings suit pursuant to the “state-created danger” doctrine
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(Id. ¶¶ 30, 31; Docket No. 59 at 4-5).
A. Applicable Law
Section 1983 is the “vehicle for imposing liability against anyone who, under color of
state law, deprives a person of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws.’” Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 525 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 does
not create substantive rights by its own terms, but it instead provides remedies for violations of
rights that are established elsewhere in the Constitution or in federal law. See Kneipp v. Tedder,
95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir.1996). In order to establish a claim under Section 1983, two criteria
must be met: 1) the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under
color of state law; and 2) the conduct must deprive the plaintiff of rights secured under the
Constitution or federal law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Sameric Corp. of Del.,
Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir.1998).

While the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose an
affirmative duty on the state to protect individuals from harm caused by private citizens, one
exception to this rule is the “state-created danger” exception. See Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-200 (1989); Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204-05. In order to
establish a meritorious state-created danger claim, a Plaintiff must prove:
(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;

(2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience;

(3) a relationship between the state and the Plaintiff existed such that the Plaintiff
was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts, or a member of a discrete
class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state’s
actions, as opposed to a member of the public in general; and
(4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a
danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger
than had the state not acted at all.

Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and footnotes
omitted).
Although Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not established a state-created danger claim
because the conduct alleged in the Amended Complaint does not “shock the conscience,”
Defendant argues that, even if the Court assumes that the state-created danger elements are
established, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity in this matter.4 For purposes of
considering Defendant’s motion, and in accordance with Defendant’s reasoning, the Court will
therefore jump ahead to consider whether the defense of qualified immunity is available to
Defendant here.
According to the United States Supreme Court, qualified immunity “gives government
officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal
questions.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). The Supreme Court has set forth a
two-pronged inquiry for use in analyzing the defense of qualified immunity. See Tolan v.
Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014). The first prong concerns whether the conduct at issue
violated a federal right. See id. “The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks
whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” Id. at 656.
Courts may use their discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
they should tackle first. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

4 In denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Judge Conti did not discuss the
defense of qualified immunity at great length, noting that Defendant raised such defense only in a conclusory
manner and did not develop such argument. (Docket No. 25 at 4 n.1).
The Supreme Court has further refined the defense of qualified immunity, indicating that
it “‘shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Dorley v. S. Fayette Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 2:15-cv-00214, 2016 WL 3102227, at *3 (W.D. Pa.
June 1, 2016) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). Thus, such a constitutional

right “is clearly established if it is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11)).
Although there does not have to be “‘a case directly on point’” to find qualified immunity
appropriate in a particular instance, “‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.’” Id. (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12)). Furthermore,
in considering the clearly established law aspect, “the right may not be defined ‘at a high level of
generality.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). Therefore, the Court’s inquiry
into the constitutional right upon which a plaintiff says a defendant “infringed ‘must be
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Id.

(quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12).
B. Qualified Immunity Analysis
In moving for summary judgment, Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified
immunity as to the claim against him because the constitutional right that Plaintiff alleges was
violated was not clearly established at the time of Plaintiff’s accident. In order to determine
whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, a court must first define the particular
constitutional right at issue that was – or was not – “clearly established.” See Dorley, 2016 WL
3102227, at *3.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not define with particularity the right that was
allegedly violated. Rather, Plaintiff sets forth therein more general allegations including, for
example, that the injuries he suffered “were the foreseeable result of the deliberate indifference
of the Defendant as set forth [herein], which constitutes the state created danger that caused or
was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff to be deprived of his constitutional rights to personal

protection to which he is entitled” under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. (Docket
No. 19, ¶ 30). After engaging in discovery and narrowing his claim,5 however, Plaintiff
“acknowledges” in his opposition brief that there is no “case exactly on point in the context of
failing to clamp a vise to a drill press table.” (Docket No. 59 at 13). Thus, the specific right at
issue in this case appears to be, in Plaintiff’s own words, his right to be protected from the failure
to clamp a vise to a drill press table.
As explained previously, the question for the Court in applying the qualified immunity
doctrine is not only whether Defendant’s alleged conduct violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right,
but also whether, at the time of the episode that is the subject of the Amended Complaint, it was

clearly established or “‘beyond debate’ that this conduct was unconstitutional,” and the Court
may examine either prong of the analysis first. Dorley, 2016 WL 3102227, at *5. Here, in
analyzing the “clearly established” prong, the Court notes that, although it is perhaps difficult in
an instance such as this for Defendant to prove a “negative” (i.e., to cite a case showing that the
specific right alleged by Plaintiff is not clearly established), Defendant does cite to a number of
cases (cases that both parties admit are factually distinct from the present case) to support his
argument. Although Plaintiff, in response, does not address all of the cases that Defendant cites,
Plaintiff argues that the facts of the cases cited by Defendant, to show that there is no “clearly

5 As previously indicated, Plaintiff originally claimed that Defendant directed him to use a defective drill
press, but that aspect of his claim appears to have been abandoned as Plaintiff argues in response to Defendant’s
summary judgment motion that inadequate clamping caused his injury.
established” right here, are simply too different from the facts of the present case to support
Defendant’s position. (Docket No. 59 at 11-14). Instead, Plaintiff argues that the situation
presented here is more similar to other cases that he cites (cases that are admittedly also factually
distinct from the present case), in which courts found that defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity.

The first case that Defendant cites to support his position in favor of qualified immunity,
and which Plaintiff also specifically addresses, is Lichtenstein v. Lower Merion School District,
316 F. Supp. 3d 855 (E.D. Pa. 2018), in which the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, considering a student’s Section 1983 claim, found that school officials were not on
notice of the existence of a clearly established constitutional right. In that case, a special needs
student was injured while being transported in a broken chair to a high school pool. See id. at
861-62. The plaintiff in Lichtenstein alleged that school officials acted with deliberate
indifference since they were aware of the chair’s unsound condition and the harm that could
result to the plaintiff if the chair broke, which it did. See id. at 867-68. In its analysis of

qualified immunity, the court concluded that no special relationship theory or state-created
danger theory case had prevailed in a context sufficiently similar to the facts of that case so as to
provide notice of the alleged constitutional right at issue there. See id. at 872.
Defendant argues that the facts of Lichtenstein are more troubling than are the facts of
this case, in that here there is no “weakened chair” or student with special needs to consider, yet
the court in Lichtenstein found that school officials were immune from suit. The Court notes
that, while Defendant cites Lichtenstein as being relevant to Plaintiff’s argument that his injury
was caused by Defendant directing him to use a broken drill press, as noted supra, Plaintiff now
appears to have abandoned the theory involving a broken drill press in favor of the theory that
his injury was caused by Defendant’s failure to clamp his project to the drill press table. Thus, in
the absence of the broken drill press theory, Plaintiff argues that the facts of Lichtenstein are so
different from the facts presented here that Lichtenstein’s holding is irrelevant in the context of
this case.6 In any event, regardless of the theory being pursued in this case, the Court finds that
Lichtenstein does not establish whether the right that Plaintiff alleges was violated here was – or

was not – a “clearly established” constitutional right.
Among other cases cited in support of his summary judgment motion, Defendant cites to
one case the facts of which are quite similar to the facts of the present case, Voorhies v. Conroe
Independent School District, 610 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Tex. 1985). In that case, a shop teacher
removed a safety guard on a saw that subsequently injured a student. See id. at 868-69, 872. In
Voorhies, however, after reviewing the evidence, the court found that the plaintiff’s expert had
not provided any facts to support his opinions, and therefore the evidence presented was
inadequate to controvert the defendant’s facts and defeat the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. See id. at 873. In granting the defendant’s summary judgment motion on such basis,

however, the court did not reach the issue of qualified immunity. Plaintiff therefore notes that, in
the present case, the experts and Defendant himself all agree that use of a clamp to secure the
vise to the table was an essential safety measure in operating the drill press, so Voorhies is
distinguishable from this case. Regardless of whether the facts of Voorhies and this case are
sufficiently similar, the Court notes that, since the Voorhies court did not address the defense of
qualified immunity, that case – where a shop teacher removed a safety guard on a power saw
causing the student to injure his hand – does not establish that there was not a “clearly

6 Plaintiff does contend, however, that Lichtenstein is relevant to showing that, because an issue of material
fact exists here as to whether the project was clamped, summary judgment in favor of Defendant is precluded, but as
noted supra, the Court is already assuming for purposes of summary judgment that the project was not clamped, so
such contention does not make Lichtenstein relevant to this case.
established” constitutional right at issue, but neither did that case put Defendant on notice that
such a right was “clearly established.”
Defendant goes on in his briefing to cite a variety of other cases – many of which
Plaintiff does not address in his opposition brief, and none of which are factually similar to the
present case – but all of which Defendant indicates lend further support to his contention that he

is entitled to qualified immunity because the allegedly violated constitutional right here was not
“clearly established.” See, e.g., Foster v. Missouri Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 736 F.3d
759 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding that employees of the Missouri Department of Senior and Health
Services were entitled to qualified immunity in a case brought by owners of a home health care
company, where there was no showing that the defendants’ actions were inspired by malice or
that any such actions constituted a brutal and inhumane abuse of power); Perez v. Unified Gov’t
of Wyandotte Cnty., 432 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that a fire truck driver, who had
struck and killed an oncoming motorist while responding to an emergency call, was entitled to
qualified immunity as a matter of law where there was no alleged intent to harm); Turney v.
Waterbury, 375 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2004) (granting a deputy qualified immunity because he did

not know that an arrestee was a suicide risk, although he was told to keep a close eye on the
arrestee); Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 189 F. Supp. 3d 467 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (granting a
football coach qualified immunity where a high school player suffered a traumatic brain injury
during football practice, when the complaint alleged affirmative acts that increased the danger of
serious injury in that the player suffered one hard hit, was told to continue practicing, and then
was hit again); S.W. v. Clayton Cnty. Pub. Schs., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (granting
qualified immunity to a school principal and district superintendent, where a student alleged
sexual assault by a teacher, but there were no allegations that the defendants knew that a teacher
would act unlawfully toward any student, nor was actual malice pled); Collier v. Clayton Cnty.
Cmty. Serv. Bd., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (holding that a community service board
was entitled to qualified immunity in a case brought against them by an employee, where the law
was not sufficiently established to alert them that they might have been acting illegally); Reeves
by Jones v. Besonen, 754 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that, even if a high school

football coach had a constitutional duty to protect a player from assault by fellow students, the
coach was shielded by qualified immunity because there was no prior decision that had ruled that
school officials were constitutionally required to protect a student from assault during
extracurricular activities).
Plaintiff, in opposing Defendant’s motion, acknowledges that there are no cases precisely
on point here, but he argues that there need not be a prior case exactly like this one, and he
instead asserts that this case is “more akin to those situations where the conduct and resulting
injuries are a near certainty, and for those reasons are more closely aligned with case[s] such as
Stoneking and Kniepp.” (Docket No. 59 at 14). In Stoneking v. Bedford Area School District,

882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), a former student sued a school district, a principal, an assistant
principal, and a superintendent for a teacher’s sexual abuse. Ultimately, the United States
Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which held that
the district court did not err in denying the principal and assistant principal’s summary judgment
motion based on grounds of immunity, but that the superintendent’s summary judgment motion
should have been granted. In that case, the record indicated that the principal and assistant
principal had actual knowledge of the situation involving the teacher and engaged in affirmative
acts, but the superintendent did not engage in any affirmative acts. See id. at 730-31. In Kneipp
v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201-03 (3d Cir. 1996), police officers left an intoxicated woman to
walk home alone after having her husband leave the scene, after which she fell down an
embankment and suffered brain damage. In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the officers, who
knew the woman was extremely intoxicated, separated her from her source of protection, and
then abandoned her. See id. at 1210-11. Plaintiff also cites to Sciotto v. Marple Newton School

District, 81 F. Supp. 2d 559, 561 (E.D. Pa. 1999), in which a high school student wrestler was
seriously injured, and became a quadriplegic, when he was forced by his coach to wrestle a much
larger college graduate wrestler. In Sciotto, the court did not find that the coach was entitled to
qualified immunity, and did find that a reasonable official in the coach’s circumstances would
have understood the contours of the clearly established right at issue there, but, notably, a
question of fact also existed as to whether the wrestler alumni had intent for assault and battery
on the student. See id. at 572, 576-77. The Court notes that the facts of all three of these cases
vary significantly from the facts of the present case.
Meanwhile, Plaintiff makes no attempt to distinguish Dorley, another case from this

district upon which Defendant relies in briefing, from the present case. In Dorley, the Honorable
Mark R. Hornak, who is now Chief Judge of this district, held that coaches were entitled to
qualified immunity where a student alleged that the coaches encouraged violence and aggression
by upperclassmen upon underclassmen in football drills, and where the plaintiff contended that
his clearly established right to be free from bodily injury under the Fourteenth Amendment was
violated by a state-created danger. See 2016 WL 3102227. In his opinion in Dorley, Chief
Judge Hornak emphasized that, according to Spady v. Bethlehem Area School District, 800 F.3d
633 (3d Cir. 1989), the constitutional right at issue must be clearly established such that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violates that right and that
existing precedent must have placed the constitutional question beyond debate. See id. at *4-5
(citing Spady). Chief Judge Hornak further commented that Spady was a “game changer in the
school activities/state-created danger context.” Id. at *6.
Interestingly, in his brief Plaintiff does attempt to distinguish Spady from the present
case. In Spady, a section 1983 case arising out of a student’s death by “dry drowning” after a

mandatory swim class, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the deceased’s
physical education teacher was entitled to qualified immunity. See 800 F.3d at 635. The Court
of Appeals concluded there that cases such as Kneipp, Sciotto, and Stoneking – the very cases
that Plaintiff cites to support his argument that qualified immunity should not apply to Defendant
in this case – did not equate to a “student-athlete’s unfortunate accident,” as was presented in
Spady. See id. at 639-41. Although noting with regret that some of these cases “present heart-
wrenching circumstances,” the Court of Appeals found that “[t]o equate the intentional infliction
of painful corporal punishment or the sexual molestation of a student, however, with a student-
athlete’s unfortunate accident during wrestling practice or a rare instance of a delayed drowning

after a swim class is a bridge too far.” Id. at 640 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals
remarked that, aside from Kneipp and Sciotto, the plaintiff had not brought to the Court’s
attention, nor could the Court find, any cases of controlling authority in any jurisdiction that
clearly established the rule on which the plaintiff sought to rely. See id. at 641. In finding that
there was no clearly established constitutional right at issue there, the Court of Appeals indicated
that its decision was buttressed by numerous rulings from other courts that have addressed
injuries caused by public-school teachers. See id. (citing Nix v. Franklin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 311
F.3d 1373, 1378-79 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding no viable claim where a student died after touching
a high-voltage wire during a science experiment); Voorhies, 610 F. Supp. at 873 (discussed,
supra)). Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends, without providing significant support for such
argument, that the facts alleged in the instant case present far more egregious conduct than an
“unfortunate accident,” and that Defendant is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity in this
matter. (Docket No. 59 at 13-14).
Upon careful consideration of the various cases cited by the parties as well as the Court’s

independent research of the matter, it is evident that, in this particular case, Defendant was not
on notice that the conduct alleged by Plaintiff would violate a “clearly established” constitutional
right. In line with the reasoning of Spady, Dorley, and similar cases, even if Plaintiff did indeed
have a constitutional right to be protected from the failure to clamp the vise holding his project to
the drill press table, that right was not so “clearly established” in the Mullenix/Spady sense when
this incident occurred that it can be found to be “beyond debate.” The Court acknowledges that,
in determining that a right was “clearly established,” it does not need to find that “the very action
in question has previously been held unlawful.” See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987). However, it would simply be “a bridge too far” for the Court to find, considering the

varied fact situations presented in the numerous cases discussed above, that it was “beyond
debate” at the time of Plaintiff’s accident that the right allegedly infringed upon was a “clearly
established” constitutional right, such that a reasonable shop teacher would know that he was
violating a student’s constitutional right by failing to clamp a vise holding a project to a drill
press table.
Additionally, aside from the fact that the various cases cited (other than Voorhies) are
significantly different factually from the present case, the Court cannot find that the conduct
alleged here is otherwise so egregious or intentionally harmful that it can be considered “beyond
debate” that it violated Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional right at the time of the
incident at issue. See Spady, 800 F.3d at 641. In fact, even Plaintiff himself alleges – at most –
Defendant’s “incompetence,” as he admits that the Supreme Court held in Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 241 (1986), that the defense of qualified immunity provides protection “to all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” and that in the instant case,
“Defendant falls squarely into the first category.” (Docket No. 59 at 13).

Moreover, Plaintiff admittedly does not suggest that Defendant held any grudge or
wanted Plaintiff to get hurt, or that Defendant was doing anything unlawful at the time of the
incident, and Plaintiff admits that Defendant was allowed to assist other students in the
classroom at the time the accident occurred. (Docket Nos. 56, ¶¶ 28, 29; 60, ¶¶ 28, 29). Plaintiff
also admits that the shop class in which the incident occurred was an elective, that Plaintiff did
not have any disabilities, and that Defendant was not required to assist Plaintiff on a one-to-one
basis. (Docket Nos. 56, ¶ 26; 60, ¶ 26). Further, Plaintiff testified to having been given triple
instruction on using the drill – oral, written, and actual demonstration – and Defendant had
instructed him never to put his hand near a moving drill bit. (Docket Nos. 56, ¶ 20; 60, ¶ 20).

Defendant had also instructed Plaintiff and other students that if a vise was not clamped properly
to a table, the vise could break free, and that if a project breaks free of a clamp, the first thing to
do is to turn off the power to the drill press. (Docket Nos. 56, ¶ 23; 60, ¶¶ 23, 43). Thus, here
there is no indication, by allegation or through the evidence presented, that Defendant’s conduct
was intentionally or purposefully focused on causing physical harm to Plaintiff.
Chief Judge Hornak observed in Dorley as follows:
As the Spady Court observed, colorable constitutional violations had
previously been found in cases in which an adult educator directly engaged in
conduct that was both egregious and intentionally and purposefully focused on
causing physical harm to a student. See Spady, 800 F.3d at 641 (citing cases in
which an adult struck a student with a blunt object, knocking out an eye, and in
which an adult picked up a student by the throat and rammed his head into
bleachers and a fuse box). The Spady Court then contrasted those situations, each
involving what was in reality direct physical battery, with the array of Sciotto-like
cases, each of which (no matter the outcome) involved (as pled) grossly negligent
or reckless conduct which created a real and appreciable risk of serious harm, but
lacked an intent-to-injure component, and concluded that at least as of September
1, 2015 (the date Spady came down) the constitutional rights at issue
in Sciotto were not so “clearly established” as to be “beyond debate.” It is that
rule of law that this Court is bound to apply here.

2016 WL 3102227, at *5.
Similarly, here the Court finds that, even if Plaintiff had a constitutional right to be
protected from the failure to clamp the vise containing his project to the drill press table, that
right was not so “clearly established,” in light of Spady/Mullenix, when the incident at issue here
occurred, that it was “beyond debate.” Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant is
entitled to the defense of qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s claim against him.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant as to Count I of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint.
An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion follows.

Dated: January 31, 2023 s/ W. Scott Hardy
W. Scott Hardy
United States District Judge
cc/ecf: All counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418470. Public record. Not legal advice.
