# MATTHEWS v. NEW LIGHT, INC.

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · October 20, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418195

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 20, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418195

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming the dismissal of an ADA claim where the EEOC charge indicated discrimination on the basis of “sex; female; pregnancy related” under Title VII (as amended by the PDA

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANNA MAE MATTHEWS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 22-427
)
NEW LIGHT, INC., )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Anna Mae Matthews brings this action against her former employer, Defendant
New Light, Inc., alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”), Pub.
L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)), the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
(“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (Docket No. 1). Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Counts III and IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Docket No. 9). In its motion and brief in
support, Defendant urges the Court to dismiss those Counts for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Docket Nos. 9, 10). Plaintiff has filed a brief in opposition to Defendant’s motion (Docket No.
12), and Defendant has filed a reply (Docket No. 13). After careful consideration of the parties’
arguments and for the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.
I. Background
As the parties are well-acquainted with the factual background of this case, at this
juncture the Court will present an abbreviated version of the facts, as alleged in the Complaint
and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, that are relevant to the motion presently before the
Court. Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant in June 2018 as a Direct Care staff
member. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 9). A year later, Plaintiff was promoted and became responsible for
two of Defendant’s locations and the management of eight employees, and she oversaw clients
with extensive needs requiring the provision of basic living assistance, management of personal

finances, mental and emotional engagement, and organization of medical care. (Id. ¶¶ 10-13).
Defendant assigned Plaintiff a mentor, Monica Goheen, who advised Plaintiff during one of their
regularly scheduled meetings that the position of Site Manager was a “twenty-four/seven job,”
and that “[t]his is not a job that you can have a family in, and, if you’re thinking about having
babies, you need to step down.” (Id. ¶¶ 16-19).
In late 2020, Plaintiff learned that she was pregnant with twins. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 20). In
January 2021, Plaintiff disclosed her pregnancy to Defendant’s management, including to
Debora Andreas, Defendant’s owner. (Id. ¶ 21). On March 11, 2021, Plaintiff unexpectedly
received a message from Defendant’s Director of Human Resources, informing her that she was

suspended from her position, but providing no reason for such action. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24). On March
17, 2021, Plaintiff met with Ms. Andreas, who accused Plaintiff of “poking at” another employee
who had recently been written up for neglecting a client, and of advising an employee against
accepting work with one of Defendant’s clients. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27).
Ms. Andreas also informed Plaintiff that she was worried about Plaintiff’s ability to
handle her job and its required hours while she was pregnant. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 30). Ms.
Andreas stated that Plaintiff was working too many hours for a pregnant woman, particularly one
who was pregnant with twins, and that it was not good for Plaintiff’s health and safety. (Id.
¶ 31). Ms. Andreas said that the job had been difficult for her, personally, when she had a baby
and that she could not imagine having twins and being able to complete the necessary tasks and
workload. (Id. ¶ 32). Plaintiff alleges, however, that she was fully capable of completing all
aspects of her job and never contested the number of hours assigned, nor did her performance
suffer as a result of her pregnancy. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34). Nevertheless, Ms. Andreas informed
Plaintiff, who was almost 28 weeks pregnant at the time, that she was terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37).

In April 2021, Plaintiff cross-filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC and the
PHRC.1 (Docket Nos. 1, ¶ 5; 1-1, ¶¶ 23-24). On December 22, 2021, the EEOC issued a right to
sue letter to Plaintiff’s counsel. (Docket Nos. 1, ¶ 6; 1-2 at 2). On March 10, 2022, Plaintiff
filed this lawsuit. (Docket No. 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following claims
against Defendant: Gender/Pregnancy Discrimination in Violation of Title VII, particularly the
PDA (Count I); Gender/Pregnancy Discrimination in Violation of the PHRA (Count II);
Perceived-As Disability Discrimination in Violation of the ADA (Count III); and Perceived-As
Disability Discrimination in Violation of the PHRA (Count IV). (Id. at 5-9). Defendant has
filed its Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

and the parties have filed briefs supporting and opposing the motion. (Docket Nos. 9-13). The
matter is now ripe for decision.
II. Standard of Review
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations contained in the
complaint must be accepted as true and must be construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and the court must “‘determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint,
the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.’” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.
2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)); see Bell

1 Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge of Discrimination (minus the EEOC cover sheet), as well as the Dismissal and
Notice of Rights that she received, are attached to the Complaint as Exhibits 1 and 2. (Docket Nos. 1-1, 1-2).
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,” the complaint must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, while “this standard does not require

‘detailed factual allegations,’” Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
It should be further noted, therefore, that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The
Supreme Court has noted that a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard “‘does not impose a

probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise
a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element.”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, the requirement that a
court accept as true all factual allegations does not extend to legal conclusions; thus, a court is
“‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
In the context of the claims presented here, Plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust her
administrative remedies is properly considered under Rule 12(b)(6). See Wilson v. MVM, Inc.,
475 F.3d 166, 174-76 (3d Cir. 2007); Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 (3d Cir.
1997). In conducting its analysis, the Court may properly consider documents that were filed in
Plaintiff’s EEOC proceeding. See Smith v. Pallman, 420 F. App’x 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2011);
Rogan v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 777, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2000), aff’d, 276 F.3d 579 (3d
Cir. 2001).
III. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s Alleged Disability Under the ADA
In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims for both “Pregnancy/Gender Discrimination”
under Title VII (which incorporates the Pregnancy Discrimination Act), and “Perceived-As
Disability Discrimination” under the ADA. In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant seeks only the
dismissal of Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims, but not her claims of pregnancy
discrimination. Plaintiff alleges in Counts III and IV of the Complaint that, by terminating her
employment, Defendant discriminated against her based on her “Perceived-As Disability,”
pregnancy, in violation of the ADA and the PHRA.2 (Docket No. 1 at 7-9). Defendant argues
that Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination based on her pregnancy fails because she has

not alleged a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
In order to state a claim of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must
allege that: (1) the plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the plaintiff is
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his or her job, with or without
reasonable accommodation; (3) the plaintiff’s employer subjected plaintiff to an adverse
employment action; and (4) such action was taken because of plaintiff’s disability. See Taylor v.

2 The Court need not differentiate between Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claims under the ADA and the
PHRA because the disability discrimination provisions of the two statutes are substantially similar, and courts,
including the Third Circuit, have consolidated their analyses of a plaintiff’s PHRA and ADA claims, explaining both
in terms of the plaintiff’s ADA claims. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999)
(citing Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996)). Therefore, Counts III and IV will be addressed
together as one claim herein.
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999). A “disability” with respect to an
individual is defined in the ADA as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). In order to be
“regarded as having such an impairment,” the plaintiff must have been subjected to an adverse

employment action because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, regardless
of whether the impairment or perceived impairment actually limits any of the plaintiff’s major
life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(3)(A).
Here, Plaintiff argues that she has adequately alleged a “disability” under subsection (C)
of the statute because she was regarded as, or perceived as, having an impairment – pregnancy –
by Defendant. (Docket No. 12 at 5). However, in passing the PDA, Congress brought
discrimination based on uncomplicated pregnancies under the auspices of Title VII’s gender
discrimination protections. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 330-
31 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The PDA “expressed Congress’ view that discrimination

based on a woman’s pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, although complications and impairments caused
by pregnancy may constitute a disability under the ADA, pregnancy alone is not a disability
within the meaning of the ADA. See Seiple v. Two Farms LLC, No. 20-5650, 2021 WL 601171,
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2021) (citing cases); Brown v. Aria Health, No. 17-1827, 2019 WL
1745653, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2019) (“A routine pregnancy is not considered a disability
within the meaning of the ADA.”); Ahern v. Eresearch Tech., Inc., 183 F. Supp. 3d 663, 668
(E.D. Pa. 2016) (“Pregnancy, alone, does not constitute disability.”); Varone v. Great Wolf
Lodge of the Poconos, LLC, No. 15-304, 2016 WL 1393393, *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2016) (noting
that “although pregnancy is not an impairment within the meaning of the ADA and is never a
disability on its own, some pregnant workers may have impairments related to their pregnancies
that qualify as disabilities under the ADA”); Oliver v. Scranton Materials, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-
00549, 2015 WL 1003981, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2015) (in which the Court could not find that
the plaintiff’s pregnancy-related complications did not give rise to an ADA claim as a matter of

law, but it dismissed the plaintiff’s claims because she failed to specify the nature of such
complications).
Here, Plaintiff avers in the Complaint that she was pregnant, but she does not aver that
she had any pregnancy-related complications, medical conditions, or impairments that
substantially limited her major life activities. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
regarded her as pregnant (which is not a disability under the ADA), but she does not specifically
allege that Defendant regarded her as having pregnancy-related complications (which may
constitute a disability under the ADA). Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff argues that the
statements of Ms. Goheen and Ms. Andreas show that Defendant perceived her as disabled under

the ADA, the Court disagrees. Upon review of such comments, set forth supra, the Court notes
that those comments address Plaintiff’s pregnancy or pregnancy generally, and may therefore be
relevant to Plaintiff’s claim of gender-based pregnancy discrimination under Title II as averred
in Counts I and II, but the comments do not show that Defendant perceived Plaintiff as
experiencing pregnancy-related complications that could implicate a disability discrimination
claim under the ADA.
Therefore, the Court finds that, because Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant perceived her
as being disabled because of her pregnancy – and since pregnancy is not a disability on its own
under the ADA – Plaintiff has not alleged a disability under the ADA. Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Counts III and IV is therefore granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Counts III and IV are dismissed without prejudice to
amendment of the Complaint with sufficient facts to state a claim.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendant also argues in its Motion to Dismiss that Counts III and IV should be

dismissed because Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies as to her disability claim
before she filed the present lawsuit. Notably, the ADA provides for the same enforcement
procedures and remedies as those available under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); Spencer
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 469 F.3d 311, 315 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006). Thus, a plaintiff who seeks relief
under the ADA must first exhaust administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the
EEOC before filing a lawsuit in federal district court. See Rogan, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 783; 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). “The EEOC will then investigate the charge, and the plaintiff must wait
until the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter before she can initiate a private action.” Barzanty v.
Verizon Pa., Inc., 361 F. App’x 411, 413 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Burgh v. Borough Council, 251

F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001)). Similarly, in order to bring a lawsuit under the PHRA, “a plaintiff
must first have filed an administrative complaint with the PHRC within 180 days of the alleged
act of discrimination.” Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 925 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 43
Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. §§ 959(a), 962). Failure to do so precludes the availability of judicial
remedies under the PHRA. See id.
After a plaintiff has filed an administrative charge and received a right to sue notice, the
plaintiff’s lawsuit is then “limited to claims that are within the scope of the initial administrative
charge.” Twillie v. Erie Sch. Dist., 575 F. App’x 28, 31 (3d Cir. 2014). Thus, “[a]fter a charge is
filed, the scope of a resulting private civil action in the district court is defined by the scope of
the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.” Barzanty, 361 F. App’x at 414 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
see also Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996) (“‘The relevant test in determining
whether appellant was required to exhaust her administrative remedies, therefore, is whether the
acts alleged in the subsequent [lawsuit] are fairly within the scope of the prior EEOC complaint,

or the investigation arising therefrom.’” (quoting Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir.
1984))). This restriction in scope prevents “a plaintiff from ‘greatly expand[ing] an investigation
simply by alleging new and different facts when . . . contacted by the Commission following
[her] charge.’” Barzanty, 361 F. App’x at 414 (quoting Hicks v. ABT Assoc., Inc., 572 F.2d 960,
967 (3d Cir.1978)). “Where the allegations in the complaint are sufficiently distinct from those
presented in the EEOC charge, and were not part of the Commission’s investigation, courts have
required the exhaustion of administrative remedies before such allegations could be pursued in
district court.” Rogan, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 787.
Because Counts III and IV are being dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court need

not address the administrative exhaustion aspect of Defendant’s motion at this juncture.
However, if Plaintiff chooses to amend her Complaint in an attempt to include a cognizable
disability discrimination claim, she should be mindful of the ADA’s administration exhaustion
requirement. Additionally, the Court notes that in her Charge of Discrimination attached to the
Complaint, Plaintiff stated that she believes that she “was the victim of illegal discrimination on
the basis of [her] pregnancy in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act of 1955.” (Docket No. 1-1, ¶ 23).
Thus, Plaintiff should also keep in mind that courts discern between different types of
discrimination allegations, and that the mention of one type of discrimination in a charge does
not cause other types of discrimination to be automatically included within the scope of a
resulting EEOC investigation. See, e.g., Penaloza v. Target Corp., 549 F. App’x 844, 848-49
(11th Cir. 2013) (affirming the dismissal of an ADA claim where the EEOC charge indicated
discrimination on the basis of “sex; female; pregnancy related” under Title VII (as amended by
the PDA), but not disability discrimination under the ADA, and noting that a disability

discrimination claim could not “be expected to grow” out of her charge).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts III and IV of Plaintiff’s
Complaint is granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. Accordingly, Counts III and IV are dismissed without prejudice to amendment of the
Complaint with sufficient facts to state a claim.
An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: October 20, 2022 s/ W. Scott Hardy
W. Scott Hardy
United States District Judge

cc/ecf: All counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418195. Public record. Not legal advice.