# EMIGH v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · September 20, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418172

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 20, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418172

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that each fact incorporated into the RFC need not have been found by a medical expert

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CRYSTAL DAWN EMIGH, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 21-1258
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
)
Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 20th day of September, 2022, upon consideration of the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, upon review of the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under
Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and her claim for supplemental
security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., finds that
the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.
Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp.
942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision
must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely
because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705
(3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff raises two main arguments as to why she believes the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) erred in finding her not to be disabled. First, she argues that the ALJ’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) determination is not supported by substantial evidence because he
failed to properly evaluate the opinion evidence. Second, she asserts that the ALJ improperly
failed to consider her long work history in making his “credibility” determination. The Court
finds no merit to either argument.

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in his formulation of the RFC by omitting the
limitation included in the opinion of state agency reviewer Melissa Franks, Psy.D., that she
would be limited to carrying out one or two step tasks. (R. 114). Plaintiff argues that Dr.
Franks’ opinion is consistent with that of consultative examiner Stacy Golman, Psy.D. (R. 543-
50), and with the record evidence as a whole. While acknowledging that the ALJ included in the
RFC that Plaintiff was restricted to understanding, remembering, and carrying out “simple work
instructions and tasks at a SVP 2 level” (R. 36), Plaintiff points out that the vocational expert
testified that such a restriction is materially different from a limitation to one or two step tasks.
(R. 78-79).

The Court first notes that it is important to remember that the ALJ’s RFC findings are
generally consistent with most parts of the opinion evidence. The specific issue is the omission
of a limitation to one or two step tasks in the RFC. The ALJ very clearly explained why he was
not adopting that part of Dr. Franks’ opinion, citing specific evidence regarding Plaintiff’s
conservative and static treatment and the consistent improvement of her symptoms with
medication, her generally normal mental status examinations, her educational and vocational
background, and her activities of daily living. While Plaintiff contends that these factors do not
demonstrate her ability to perform sustained work activity for a regular work schedule, the ALJ
did not cite them for this purpose, but to demonstrate that she had the mental functional capacity
to perform more than one or two step tasks. (R. 40). The Court agrees that these factors – such
as driving, managing money, and caring for children – are quite relevant to such a finding.
Moreover, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ considered the entire record and did not
discuss only those parts that supported his findings. The ALJ, in fact, acknowledged that
Plaintiff occasionally presented with poor concentration, fatigue, flat affect, and increased
depression, but also observed that, even when the record did demonstrate abnormalities,
Plaintiff’s conservative course of treatment remained the same. (R. 39).

In challenging the ALJ’s thorough analysis, Plaintiff is essentially asking the Court to
reconsider the evidence and adopt her own interpretation of what that evidence shows. However,
if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal
court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the
claim differently. See Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986);
Berry, 738 F. Supp. at 944 (citing Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705). “The presence of evidence in the
record that supports a contrary conclusion does not undermine the [ALJ’s] decision so long as
the record provides substantial support for that decision.” Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306
Fed. Appx. 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009). As discussed, the ALJ’s RFC findings here were well
supported by the record.

Plaintiff further asserts that, by dismissing the only two opinions in the record as to her
mental capacity and making his own determination as to Plaintiff’s mental RFC, the ALJ
improperly relied on his own lay interpretation of the evidence. The Court emphasizes, however,
that it does not matter that each of the ALJ’s RFC findings does not correspond to a particular
medical opinion, nor was the ALJ required to seek outside medical expert review in formulating
Plaintiff’s RFC. As this Court has consistently explained, “[t]he ALJ – not treating or examining
physicians or State agency consultants – must make the ultimate disability and RFC
determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). See also
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c), 416.927(d)(2), 416.946(c); SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL
374183 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). “There is no legal requirement that a physician have made the
particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington v.
Barnhart, 174 Fed. Appx. 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006). See also Chandler, 667 F.3d at 362 (holding that
each fact incorporated into the RFC need not have been found by a medical expert). As the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Titterington, “[s]urveying the medical evidence to
craft an RFC is part of an ALJ’s duties.” 174 Fed. Appx. at 11. Accordingly, an ALJ is not
prohibited from making an RFC assessment even if no doctor has specifically made the same
findings. See Hayes v. Astrue, Civ. No. 07-710, 2007 WL 4456119, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17,
2007).

In this case, the ALJ thoroughly explained how he considered all of the evidence and how
that evidence translated into the RFC findings. Despite Plaintiff’s concern that the ALJ “played
doctor” and relied on his own lay interpretation of the evidence, the Third Circuit has made clear
that an ALJ’s performance of his or her administrative duties in formulating an RFC does not
constitute “improper lay opinion regarding medical evidence.” Chandler, 667 F.3d at 362.
Given the United States Supreme Court’s reminder that the threshold for meeting the substantial
evidence standard “is not high,” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154, the Court has no problem
determining that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings.

As to Plaintiff’s claim that her testimony was entitled to substantial credibility because of
her work history, the Third Circuit has previously indicated that an ALJ should consider
affording substantial credibility to a claimant’s testimony about her work capabilities when the
claimant has worked for a long period of time. See Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 409
(3d Cir. 1979); Taybron v. Harris, 667 F.2d 412, 415 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1981); Podedworny v. Harris,
745 F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir. 1984). The Court notes that an ALJ’s consideration of a claimant’s
testimony is still often referred to as a “credibility” determination, though that term has been
eliminated from the Commissioner’s policy concerning “subjective symptom evaluation.”
Schneider v. Berryhill, No. CV 17-1299, 2019 WL 698471, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2019)
(citing SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (S.S.A. Mar. 16, 2016)) (explaining SSR 16-3p
“clarif[ied] that the subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s
character”). Plaintiff’s claim was filed prior to the issuance of SSR 16-3p, but, in any event, it is
clear that work history remains evidence ALJs are to consider as part of the inquiry into whether
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 13) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 15) is GRANTED as set forth herein.

s/Alan N. Bloch
United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

a claimant’s subjective symptoms are supported by other evidence in the record, and a
substantial work history still tends to support a claimant’s “testimony about his work
capabilities.” Rinier v. Berryhill, No. CV 17-125, 2018 WL 3574941, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 25,
2018).

However, an ALJ does not err by failing to afford a claimant’s testimony heightened
consideration based solely on her work history. See Corley v. Barnhart, 102 Fed. Appx. 752,
755 (3d Cir. 2004). There generally must be other factors, such as evidence of severe
impairments or attempts to return to work, for a claimant to be entitled to heightened credibility.
See id.; Shore v. Kijakazi, No. CV 20-1169-SRF, 2022 WL 782701, at *10 (D. Del. Mar. 15,
2022); Hodnett v. Saul, No. CV 2:18-1074, 2019 WL 3778383, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2019);
Polardino v. Colvin, No. CIV.A. 12-806, 2013 WL 4498981, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2013)
(holding that “a claimant's work history alone is not dispositive of the question of her credibility,
and an ALJ is not required to equate a long work history with enhanced credibility”). It is more
significant that the ALJ base his or her evaluation of a claimant’s testimony on a broad view of
the record and that the finding be supported by substantial evidence. See Sanborn v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 613 Fed. Appx. 171, 177 (3d Cir. 2015).

Here, there is no evidence in the record of any additional factors, such as severe
impairments or attempts to return to work, that would warrant a finding of heightened credibility.
Indeed, the ALJ discussed at significant length why he found that Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints were not consistent with the objective medical evidence and her treatment history and
activities of daily living. Moreover, the ALJ was clearly well aware of Plaintiff’s work history –
her work history was discussed at length during hearing, and the ALJ specifically noted
Plaintiff’s educational and work history in making his RFC findings. (R. 40, 57-59). See Rinier,
2018 WL 3574941, at **4-5 (finding the ALJ “clearly was aware of” claimant's work where the
ALJ calculated quarters of coverage, discussed whether claimant could perform past relevant
work, referenced claimant’s past jobs, and heard testimony concerning past work).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the proper legal standards and that
substantial evidence supports his findings. The Court will therefore affirm.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418172. Public record. Not legal advice.