# WOODSON v. CRISSMAN

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · August 24, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418025

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 24, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418025

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “courts derive their authority and obligation to monitor and control the conduct of litigation from many sources, including statutory (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927) and procedural (e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c), 16(f), 37(b), 41(b), 55)”
- noting that the inherent none of the court extend to matters such as discovery and settlement negotiations
- noting that defendants “had to endure protracted satellite litigation in discovering the extent.of plaintiffs’ deceit and in pursuing an appropriate remedy for their fraud on the court”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

)
STEVEN W. WOODSON, JR., Case No. 1:20-cv-288 Erie
)
Plaintiff ) RICHARD A. LANZILLO
) UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
V. )
) MEMORANDUM OPINION ON
JODI SHEESLEY, et al., ) DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
) SANCTIONS
Defendants )
) ECF No. 65

I. Introduction
Plaintiff Steven W. Woodson, Jr., an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional
Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest), initiated this pro se civil rights action on September 28, 2020.
See ECF No. 1. In his Amended Complaint — the operative pleading in this action — Woodson
alleged that prison officials violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by ignoring
his frequent threats to commit acts of self-harm. See ECF No. 27 at J] 12-39. With respect to
moving Defendant Angel Gressel, a Nurse Practitioner at SCI-Forest, Woodson alleged that he
informed Gressel that a voice in his head was urging him to harm himself and that he was having
visions of his arm “all cut up.” Jd. ff 14-17, 21-23. Woodson also alleged that he had
previously engaged in acts of self-harm on December 12, 2019 and December 23, 2019. Id. 24.
Despite this, Gressel allegedly instructed him to “try not to hurt [him]self” and to “find
something to occupy [his] mind.” Jd. 18-19. Later that day, Woodson “seriously” cut himself
while in his cell. Id. [§ 26-27. .

On October 28, 2021, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation that
Gressel’s motion to dismiss be granted as to Woodson’s equal protection and state law medical

negligence claims but denied as to his Eighth Amendment claim and his negligence claim based
ona complete denial of medical care. ECF No. 44. . United States District Judge Susan Paradise
Baxter adopted the Report and Recommendation Memorandum Order issued on
December 20, 2021. ECF No. 49. Gressel filed an answer on April 21, 2022, and this case
proceeded to discovery. See ECF Nos. 58, 60.
On June 27, 2022, Gressel filed the instant motion for sanctions based on several
inappropriate, offense, and obscene letters that Woodson mailed to Gressel’s attorney under the
guise of settlement offers. ECF No. 65. Gressel has submitted copies of the letters under seal
for the Court’s examination. ECF Nos. 67-70.
The first letter, dated February 25, 2022, is titled “Initial Written Offer of Settlement.”
ECF No. 67. It begins with a “definitions” section in which Woodson provides his own
definitions of various intimate body parts, sexually explicit acts, and other obscene and
inappropriate words and phrases.! ECF No. 67 at 1-2. Plaintiff goes on to describe, in graphic
detail, his request for various obscene images, pornographic magazines, and erotic books as
partial settlement for his claim.” Jd. at 3-6. He also asks for such oddities as “pregnancy
magazines” and “massage school quality books/manuals” on “massaging females” and
“massaging pregnant women.” /d. at 6. Finally, Woodson requests that Gressel send him 300
pornographic images, characterized as “Hot Shots,” for which he has supplied detailed, lurid

'In one of nis milder definitions, Woodson defines “sexy” to mean: “pretty face: nice tees “b”, “oc”, “d” cup breast;
pretty feet, and an ass that’s more than a handful, but less than about forty (40) inches around.” /d.at2, □□

_ ? Woodson also includes a financial demand.

descriptions.’ Jd. at 6-11. Most disturbingly, Woodson attached 23 pornographic images to the
letter to demonstrate the precise type of pornography he is seeking. Jd.
On March 18, 2022, Woodson sent a second “Written Offer of Settlement” to Gressel’s
counsel. ECF No. 68. Woodson again requested obscene materials including photo books,
erotic and sexually explicit novels, and pornographic magazine subscriptions. Id.
Woodson sent a third purported offer of settlement on March 28, 2022. ECF No. 69.
Among his requests: “a book of women being given non-erotic massages with the photographs
showing the women completely naked from both the front & back of their bodies,” “two (2)
photo illustrated obstetric and gynecology books,” “a book on breast augmentation with
photographs of women before, during, and after the surgery,” “books with photographs of naked
pregnant women having home-births and in the various birthing positions,” several magazine
subscriptions, and three erotic novels featuring such oddly specific topics as mother-son and
sibling incest, “nuns having sex,” and “male bosses having sex with their employee’s wives.” Jd.
Woodson’s final settlement letter, sent on April 25, 2022, contained similar requests. ECF No.
70.
Based on the graphic, vulgar and harassing nature of these “settlement letters,” Gressel
requests that Woodson’s remaining claims against her be dismissed as a sanction. ECF No. 65.
Woodson, in response, maintains that the pornographic items he requested are “well within the
parameters of what is acceptable in the DOC” and that his requests “[were] not in any way
intended to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or increase the cost of litigation.” ECF No. 72 at 1-
2. Woodson avers that the images and descriptions that he sent were merely “helping aids” to

3 By vay of example, one of Woodson’s tamer requests is for “Five (5) shorts of different nude, sexy, young white
women in the shower, under the water, leaning forward with their arms out in front, hands on the wall, feet spread,
with big butts, shot from behind with picture of the full body.” /d. at 7. Many of his requests are far more graphic.

ensure. that opposing counsel could. deliver the precise types of pornography he is seeking. /d. at
3. Woodson concludes that his conduct “does not merit a Complete Dismissal of his claims, but
merit[s] a warning instead.” Jd. at 4.
IIl.. Analysis -
_As the basis for her request for sanctions, Gressel invokes Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procédure which requires a party to certify that any “pleading, written motion, or other
ponerpriled or submitted to the court “is not being arecented for any improper purpose, such as
to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(b)(1). A court may order sanctions for a violation of Rule 11 “after notice and a reasonable
opportunity to respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). Gressel contends that Rule 11 sanctions are
warranted because “the sending of sexually explicit letters and images under the guise of a
‘settlement’ letter was clearly done for improper purposes, was unreasonable under the
circumstances and resulted in harassment of counsel and Defendant.” ECF No. 66 at 4.
will be discussed more thoroughly below, the Court agrees that Woodson’s letters
served no purpose other than to harass and demean defense counsel and her client. That said, it
is not clear whether Rule 11 applies to the settlement letters at issue. Asa general matter,
“letters and correspondences are not considered ‘other papers’ or ‘filings with the District
Court’ as described in Rule 11. Pritchard». Dow Agro Sciences, 2009 WL 1813145, at *6
(WD. Pa. June 25, 2009) (quoting VDI Techs. v. Price, 781 F.Supp. 85, 95 (D.N.H. 1999));
GREGORY F. J OSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE §
5(D)(2) (a) (4th ed. 2008) (“A paper—like a letter—that has not been, or is not required to be,
presented to the court is not a ‘paper’ for which Rule 11 sanctions are available.”). Because

Woodson’s letters were never intended for filing or presentation to the Court, they appear to fall
outside.of the purview of Rule 11. os
Nevertheless, “[a] federal court has the authority to, and must not avoid the responsibility
for, monitoring the conduct of all litigants and attorneys who come before it.” Derzack v. Cnty.
of Allegheny, Pa., 173 F.R.D. 400, 411 (W.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Derzack v. Cnty. of
Allegheny Child. & Youth Servs., 118 F.3d 1575 (3d Cir. 1997). The inherent powers of federal
courts include the “well-acknowledged” power “to levy sanctions in response to abusive
litigation practices.” Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980) (citations omitted).4
Among other things, these sanctions include the ultimate sanction.of dismissal and the less
severe sanction of an assessment of attorney’s fees. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 45
(1991) (citations omitted). A court may assess attorney’s fees against a responsible party “when
a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons” or when it finds
that “fraud has been practiced upon it, or that the very temple of justice has been defiled.” Jd. at
45-46 (citations omitted). The most drastic sanction of dismissal “should be reserved for those
cases where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Poulis v.
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 866 (3d Cir. 1984).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has set out a six-factor balancing test to guide
a court in determining whether a case or claim should be dismissed as a sanction for dilatory

4 In addition to Rule 11, several other statutory and procedural rules of conduct authorize the imposition of
sanctions. See Derzack v. County of Allegheny, Pa., 173 F.R.D. 400, 412 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (noting that “courts
derive their authority and obligation to monitor and control the conduct of litigation from many sources, including
statutory (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927) and procedural (e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c), 16(f), 37(b), 41(b), 55)”). Each of
these sources is typically “tailored to certain categories of participants or aspects of litigation, and ... subject to
procedural and substantive limitations peculiar to each.” Jd. Thus, where misconduct clearly implicates a specific
tule or statute, the court should ordinarily resort to that rule or statute when crafting a sanction or discipline. Martin
v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995). Where no rule applies, however, the court’s “inherent power is broad
and can be called upon ... to fill-in the interstices between particular rules of conduct.” Derzack, 173 F.R.D. at 412
(citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46-50 (1991).
;

behavior a misconduct. See Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir,
1984). The court must consider: 1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; 2) the
prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to
discovery; 3) a history of dilatoriness: 4) heres the conduct of the party or attorney was willful
oe in bad faith: 5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of
alternative sanctions ; and 6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense: Id. at 868. There is no
“magic formula” or “mechanical calculation” to determine whether a case should be dismissed
for failure to prosecute, Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992), and not all six
factors need to weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal is warranted. Hicks v. Feeney, 850
F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, the court must “properly consider and balance” each of the six
factors based on the record. See Hildebrand y, Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir.
2019) (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868).

As recently emphasized the Court of Appeals, “dismissal with prejudice is an
‘extreme’ sanction” that should be employed as a “last, not first, resort.” Hildebrand, 2019 WL
1783540, at *3 (quoting Nat’! Hockey League v. Metro Hockey Club, Inc., 427 US. 639, 643
(1976), and Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867, 869). Close calls should “be resolved in favor of reaching a
decision on the merits.” Id. (citing Adams v. Trs. of the N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Tr. Fund,
29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir. 1994)). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals “has not hesitated to affirm
the district court’s imposition of sanctions, including dismissals in appropriate cases.” /d. (citing
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867 n. 1).

> The Poulis factors are towards dilatory conduct by a litigant, typically in the nature of a failure to
prosecute a case. As such, certain elements, such as the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery
requests, are less applicable in cases where the sanctionable conduct at issue involves harassment or fraud. Under
such circumstances, the Court may instead consider “the impact on the judicial system and the threat to the integrity
of the courts.” See Derzack, 173 F.R.D. at 414 (“Where fraud on the court is the underlying misconduct upon
which the district court is considering dismissal, a modified Poulis analysis provides the most suitable framework”).

. Before analyzing the Poulis factors, the Court wishes to emphasize the extraordinarily
inappropriate, vulgar, and puerile nature of Woodson’s letters. Littered with pornographic
images, graphic descriptions of sexual acts, and perverse requests for obstetric and gynecological
materials, Woodson’s letters cannot, under any circumstances, be construed as reasonable and
legitimate settlement proposals. :As Gressel notes in her motion, the provoking nature of
Woodson’s pommunicaiens is further underscored by his perenees that most of the
materials he is seeking would be illicit contraband under prison percents See ECF No. 66 at
4 (quoting DOC Policy, DC-ADM 803, defining “obscene material”). By sending these
requests, Woodson has transgressed all acceptable boundaries of appropriate conduct and, in the
estimation of this Court, “defiled .. . the very temple of justice.” Chambers, 502 U.S. at 45
(quoting source omitted). Some form of sanction is clearly warranted.
In determining whether that arcion should include dismissal, the Court first must
consider the extent to which the responding party is personally responsible for the sanctionable
conduct. Adams v. Trs. of the N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870, 873 (3d
Cir. 1994) (“[1n determining whether dismissal is appropriate, we look to whether the party
bears personal responsibility for the action or inaction which led to the dismissal.”). There is no
question that Woodson was solely responsible for his decision to send obscene and vulgar
materials to Gressel and her attorney. While Woodson attempts to deflect blame by noting that
he is “far from versatile in the vernacular of the various peoples of the ‘Upper-Class’, such as
lawyers, judges, executives, teachers, or even a collegian,” the Court rej ects the notion that an
advanced education is required for an individual to understand that it is inappropriate to send

6 The same is true of the thumbnail images attached to Woodson’s first settlement letter. The Court trusts that
defense counsel has, in her discretion, submitted copies of those letters to the appropriate officials at Woodson’s
Institution. . .

unsolicited pornography. Woodson’s dogged insistence that his letters amounted to legitimate
settlement demands is untenable and unpersuasive. This factor weighs heavily in favor of
dismissal. . . .
.- The second Poulis factor assesses whether the adverse party has suffered. prejudice
because of the dilatory party’s behavior. While this factor primarily addresses the evidentiary
burdens and costs associated with the offending party’s misconduct,’ see Adams, 29 F.3d at 874,
it also considers “the extra costs of repeated delays in filing of motions necessitated by the
improper behavior.” Derzack, 173 F.R.D. at 415 (noting that defendants “had to endure
protracted satellite litigation in discovering the extent.of plaintiffs’ deceit and in pursuing an
appropriate remedy for their fraud on the court”). Here, Gressel’s motion for sanctions was
clearly necessitated by Woodson’s improper behavior, tilting this factor in favor of dismissal.
The third Poulis factor — a history of dilatoriness — also supports the need for sanctions,
albeit minimally. While Woodson’s misconduct is not directly associated with the type of
dilatory behavior that this factor normally addresses, the Court notes that his actions have
impeded the timely progression of this lawsuit by shifting the focus from the underlying merits
to the impropriety of his behavior. This digression will almost certainly require an extension of
the existing deadlines for discovery and post-discovery motions, hampering the parties’ efforts to
resolvé this action in an efficient manner.
With respect to the fourth Poulis factor, “[w]illfulness involves intentional or self-serving
behavior.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. This factor strongly supports the imposition of some sort of
sanction. Given his familiarity with the applicable prison regulations, it can be strongly inferred
that Woodson knew that his inappropriate requests could not have been granted, As such, the

7 Typical examples include the loss of evidence or the diminishment of witness recollection stemming from an
inordinate delay.
oe : .

Court concludes that the most likely purpose behind Woodson’s letters was to either
intentionally harass an opposing party and her attorney or to engage in provoking behavior for
his own self-serving amusement and gratification. Whichever the case, this factor supports □

dismissal. □□
The fifth factor addresses the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. Poulis; 747
F.2d at 869. Courts have frequently observed that monetary sanctions may be ineffective where
the Plaintiff is indigent. See, e.g., Brennan Clouse, 2012 WL 876228, at *3 (WD. Pa. Mar.
14, 2012) (citing Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002)). On the other
hand, “dismissal with prejudice is an ‘extreme’ sanction” that should be employed as a “last, not
first, resort.” Hildebrand, 2019 WL 1783540, at *3 (quoting Nat’! Hockey League v. Metro
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976), and Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867, 869). Given the
serious nature of Woodson’s claims, discussed below, this factor cuts slightly against dismissal.
Next, the Court must consider the potential merit of Plaintiff's claims. A claim will be
deemed meritorious “when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support
recovery by plaintiff.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70. Here, Woodson alleges that he informed
Gressel that he intended to engage in self-harm at the direction of a voice in his head, but that
Gressel failed to take any meaningful action despite knowing that Woodson had harmed himself
in the past. Because of her inaction, Woodson alleges that he succumbed to the voice and
“seriously” cut himself while in his cell. As evidenced by the fact that some of Woodson’s
claims have already survived a motion to these allegations, if established at trial, could
support a potential recovery. This factor weighs heavily against dismissal.

_

i Finally; the Court concludes that Woodson’s behavior,-if unsanctioned, has the potential
io undermine “the public interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial system.” Derzack,
173 F.R.D. at 416. As explained by one court: ho ,

Our legal system is built on rules and procedures. Litigants who bring
matters before this court must conduct themselves in an appropriate
fashion. ... Litigants who avail themselves to the jurisdiction of the court
to seek redress must conduct themselves within the orderly
administration of justice and the rules of the court.
Perna v. Electronic Data Systems, Corp., 916 F.Supp. 388, 401 (D.N.J. 1995). Settlement
negotiations are an-integral part of that judicial process. Derzack, 173 F.R.D. at 416 (noting that
the inherent none of the court extend to matters such as discovery and settlement negotiations)
(quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44). By forcing Gressel, her attorney, and the Court’s staff to
confront offensive materials while engaged in a good-faith effort to equitably resolve and
adjudicate his claims, Woodson engaged in sdnctionable misconduct while “under the authority
and jurisdiction of the _ District Court and its rules and procedures.” /d. (quoting Perna, 916
F.Supp. at 400). The adverse impact on the legal system from using federal court proceedings as
an excuse to transmit pornographic content is obvious.
The final step in the Poulis analysis is to weigh the above factors “in order to assure that
the ‘extreme end’ sanction of dismissal or default is reserved for the instances in which it is
justly merited.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870. As noted above, the Court finds that the first and fourth
cor in addition to the impact of Woodson’s behavior on the judicial process, each strongly
favor Aemmiecale The second and third Priore favor dismissal, but only slightly, while the fifth
and sixth factors weigh heavily against dismissal and in favor of alternative sanctions. Given the
relative equilibrium of the Poulis factors, the serious nature of Woodson’s underlying claims, the
well-established principle that close calls should be “resolved in favor a reaching a decision on

10

the merits,” and the fact that alternative pénalties are available, the Court declines to employ the
extreme end sanction of dismissal. Hildebrand, 2019 WL 1783540, at *3 (citing Adams v. Trs.
of the N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir. 1994). Instead, the
Court will issue the following order imposing alternative sanctions: =
1, Within twenty days following the date of this Order, Woodson must
_. Submit another certified copy of his inmate account statement (or □
institutional equivalent) for the 6-month period immediately preceding
the issuance of this Order, obtained from the appropriate official of each
prison at which the prisoner is or was confined.
2. After the Court has received Woodson’s certified inmate account
statement, the Court will calculate an appropriate monetary sanction and
direct Woodson to pay that same amount to attorney Cassidy L. Neal at
her address of record as the party injured by the violation giving rise to
the sanction.
3. Woodson shall not communicate directly with defense counsel without
___ the prior approval of the Court, except he may send correspondence
necessary to propound or respond to legitimate and appropriate
discovery requests. □
4, Under no circumstances shall Woodson transmit any materials of a
sexual, explicit, or pornographic nature to any attorney or party in this
action or request such materials from any party or attorney.

Should Woodson fail to comply with any of these directives, the Court will recommend
that Woodson’s claims against Gressel be dismissed, with prejudice, for sanctionable misconduct
and a refusal to obey court orders. In the meantime, the Clerk will be directed to
administratively close this case and stay all further deadlines and discovery until such time as
Woodson has fully complied with the Court’s instructions.
II. Conclusion □
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion for sanctions is granted in part and
denied in part. An order setting forth the terms of the sanction will follow.

11

7k ‘A. LANZILLO Cf
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: August of, 2022 .

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10418025. Public record. Not legal advice.