# JENKINS v. GIRL'S HOPE OF PITTSBURGH, INC.

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · July 8, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10417814

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 8, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DAWN JENKINS, both as Administratrix )
of the Estate of CHELSEY L. SPEER, )
Deceased, and as an individual in her own )
right, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 20-1762
)
GIRL’S HOPE OF PITTSBURGH, INC., )
a Non-Profit Corporation; PRIMARY )
HEALTH NETWORK, a Non-Profit )
Corporation; NASIM SHAJIHAN, M.D., )
an individual; SHANNON C. LEBAK, )
an individual; JENNIFER HEID, an )
individual; LISA TEDDE, an individual; )
and SR. ELAINE SCHINDLER, )
an individual, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently before the Court are the Renewed Motion for Substitution of Party and brief in
support thereof (Docket Nos. 32, 33) and the Renewed Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 34) filed
by the United States of America, Plaintiff’s response in opposition to the motions (Docket No. 36),
and the United States’ reply (Docket No. 37). Additionally, the United States incorporates into its
Renewed Motion for Substitution of Party the briefs and exhibits attached to its prior motion for
substitution of party. (Docket Nos. 11, 26). Similarly, the United States incorporates into its
Renewed Motion to Dismiss the briefs and exhibits attached to its prior motion to dismiss. (Docket
Nos. 13, 27). Plaintiff, however, has not incorporated her previously filed briefs in opposition to
the United States’ prior motions into her response to the United States’ renewed motions.
For the reasons set forth herein, the United States’ motions are granted.
I. Background
On October 15, 2020, Plaintiff Dawn Jenkins filed a Complaint in the Court of Common
Pleas of Beaver County, Pennsylvania, which included one Count (Professional Negligence)
against Defendants Primary Health Network (“PHN”), Nasim Shajihan, M.D. (“Dr. Shajihan”),

and Shannon C. Lebak (“Ms. Lebak”) (collectively, the “PHN Defendants”); one Count
(Negligence) against Defendants Girl’s Hope of Pittsburgh, Inc., Jennifer Heid, Lisa Tedde, and
Sr. Elaine Schindler; and two Counts (Wrongful Death and Survival) against all Defendants.
Docket No. 1-1). Plaintiff’s claims against the PHN Defendants are based upon the care that they
allegedly provided to Plaintiff’s deceased minor daughter, Chelsey L. Speer (“Chelsey”). (Id.).
Chelsey died tragically on September 19, 2016, at age 13, when she hung herself at a facility
operated by Girl’s Hope of Pittsburgh, Inc. (Id.). At that time, Chelsey was a resident scholar at
the facility, and she had been receiving mental health treatment and counseling at PHN prior to
her death. (Id.).

On November 16, 2020, the United States removed the action to Federal Court pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 233. (Docket No. 1). The United States then filed two motions: 1) Motion for
Substitution of Party (Docket No. 10); and 2) Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 12). In its first
motion, the United States requested that it be substituted as a named Defendant in place of the
PHN Defendants for purposes of Plaintiff’s professional negligence (Count I), wrongful death
(Count III), and survival (Count IV) claims. (Docket No. 10). In its second motion, the United
States argued that, after it is substituted as a named Defendant, the claims against it should be
dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. (Docket No. 12).
In response to the United States’ motions, Plaintiff requested that the Court permit the
parties to conduct limited discovery regarding certain specific issues that she argued were crucial
to the Court’s rulings on such motions. On September 24, 2021, the Court ordered the parties to
engage in a 60-day period of limited discovery, and the Court denied the United States’ motions
without prejudice to refiling after the completion of such discovery. (Docket Nos. 28, 29). The

Court subsequently granted a consent motion for an extension of time and ordered that limited
discovery be completed by January 24, 2022. (Docket Nos. 30, 31). On February 14, 2022, the
United States filed its Renewed Motion for Substitution of Party and its Renewed Motion to
Dismiss. (Docket Nos. 32, 34). The renewed motions have been fully briefed by the parties and
are ripe for decision.
II. Standard of Review: Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the “court’s ‘very power to hear the case.’” Petruska v. Gannon
Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n,

549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). There is an important difference between a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion that attacks a complaint on its face, and a Rule 12(b)(1) motion that attacks the existence
of subject matter jurisdiction in fact – apart from any pleadings. See Mortensen, 594 F.2d at 891.
With a facial attack, a court must consider the allegations of a complaint as true, as with a motion
filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See id. With a factual attack, however,
the Court ordinarily is not required to limit its inquiry to the facts as they are pled in the complaint
because a presumption of truth is not attached to the plaintiff’s allegations, and the plaintiff bears
the burden of proving that jurisdiction over the subject matter at issue exists. See id.; see also
Brown v. Tucci, 960 F. Supp. 2d 544, 561 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Dev. Fin. Corp. v. Alpha Hous.
& Health Care, 54 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 1995)).
In its Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the United States specifies that it is making a factual
attack upon Plaintiff’s Complaint.
III. Legal Analysis

A. Motion for Substitution of Party
Before considering the United States’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the Court must address
the Renewed Motion for Substitution of Party. In that motion, which incorporates by reference
the previously filed Motion for Substitution of Party, the United States asks that the Court
substitute it as a named Defendant in place of PHN, Dr. Shajihan, and Ms. Lebak, and requests
that the PHN Defendants be dismissed from the case. (Docket Nos. 32, 33).
As regards this case, Section 2 of the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act
of 1992 (the “Act”), Pub. L. No. 102-501, 106 Stat. 3268 (1992), provides that certain federally
funded entities and their employees will be deemed to be employees of the Public Health Service,

a federal agency, for purposes of medical malpractice claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), (c), (g).
The Act further provides that the Federal Tort Claims Act (the “FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et
seq., is the exclusive remedy available to a plaintiff who sues a Public Health Service employee
due to “personal injury, including death, resulting from the performance of medical, surgical,
dental, or related functions.” 42 U.S.C. § 233(a). Section 233(c) of the Act provides that, upon
proper certification that a defendant in a medical malpractice suit was acting within the scope of
his federal employment at the time of the incident underlying the suit, the proceeding shall be
“deemed a tort action brought against the United States under the provisions of the [FTCA].” 42
U.S.C. § 233(c). The FTCA specifies that all tort claims filed thereunder are to be brought in the
name of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346; Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th
Cir. 1995); Allgeier v. United States, 909 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1990).
The United States argues that, applying these statutes to this case, the Court should
substitute the United States as a named Defendant in place of the PHN Defendants here. In her
original response to the United States’ Motion for Substitution of Parties, as noted, supra, Plaintiff

asked that the Court deny the motion and order the parties to engage in ADR while also conducting
limited discovery to resolve certain issues that Plaintiff raised in her brief. Upon consideration of
Plaintiff’s request, the Court ordered a short period of discovery limited to ascertaining whether
the complained-of care was related to grant-supported activity under 42 C.F.R. § 6.6(d), such as,
but not limited to, billing, payment, and insurance coverage information in connection with the
care rendered to Chelsey by the PHN Defendants. (Docket Nos. 28, 29). The Court declined to
order the parties to engage in ADR while such discovery was conducted, however, and the United
States’ motions were simply denied without prejudice to refiling after the parties engaged in the
limited discovery. (Id.).

Now that the period of limited discovery has ended, the United States has refiled both of
its motions. In its Renewed Motion for Substitution of Parties, the United States again requests
that the United States be substituted for the PHN Defendants in accordance with the Act and the
FTCA, as set forth in its original Motion for Substitution of Parties. The United States indicates,
additionally, that the information produced during the limited discovery period has resolved the
concerns that Plaintiff previously raised in response to the United States’ original Motion for
Substitution of Parties.
The Court notes at the outset that, in response to the United States’ Renewed Motion for
Substitution of Parties, Plaintiff has abandoned the issues that she previously flagged as being of
concern in connection with such a motion, including a question as to whether her private health
insurance paid for Chelsey’s treatment which in turn raised questions regarding the billing
practices utilized in connection with Chelsey’s care. As noted, the United States points out, and
Plaintiff does not dispute, that the limited discovery has apparently resolved any lack of clarity
regarding the issues that Plaintiff previously raised and has revealed (among other things) that: all

of Chelsey’s care at PHN was billed to and fully paid for by Medicaid, and not by any of Plaintiff’s
private insurance; neither Plaintiff nor Chelsey was personally charged for Chelsey’s care by PHN,
Dr. Shajihan or Ms. Lebak, nor did Plaintiff or Chelsey owe or pay any out-of-pocket costs for
Chelsey’s care at PHN; and there is no evidence that Dr. Shajihan or Ms. Lebak contracted
separately with a third-party entity to provide services to Chelsey, or that they somehow billed for
their services separately. (Docket No. 33).
Nevertheless, having completed the limited discovery that she requested, Plaintiff now
makes a new argument. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the amount of federal support that PHN
received, combined with the fact that PHN received reimbursement from a third party (Medicaid)

for Chelsey’s care, indicates that the care rendered to Chelsey was – practically speaking – in no
real way “related to . . . grant-supported activity” under 42 C.F.R. § 6.6(d). (Docket No. 36 at 4).
Thus, Plaintiff contends that the FTCA should not apply here (and the United States should not be
substituted for the PHN Defendants) because PHN is only partially funded by its annual federal
grant, and because Chelsey’s care was paid for by Medicaid which she describes as a third-party
state-run program. (Id. at 7-8). In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites to the deposition
testimony of Carl Sizer, Chief Financial Officer for PHN, which indicates that the federal grant
awarded to PHN was dedicated to salaries and represented only a small portion of the overall
budget of the organization. (Id. at 29-32). Noting Mr. Sizer’s testimony – but failing to cite any
law in support of her argument – Plaintiff baldly asserts that Dr. Shajihan and Ms. Lebak should
therefore not be considered federal employees for purposes of the FTCA. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff also
argues that – while she has admittedly found no case law to support such an argument directly –
the fact that Chelsey’s care was paid for by Medicaid indicates that her care was in no real way
related to grant-supported activity. (Id. at 7-8).

Plaintiff therefore proposes that “PHN has more in common with a private entity than with
a federal agency,” and that it should, quite simply, not be “entitled to claim FTCA protection.”
(Docket No. 36 at 7). Plaintiff concludes that “the third-party reimbursement received by PHN
for Chelsey’s care, combined with its minimal federal support, necessarily compels the conclusion
that the nexus or relationship between PHN’s federal funding and the care actually received by
Chelsey is far too attenuated to support the position of the United States.” (Id. at 8).
However, as the United States argues, PHN’s corporate status and funding structure does
not present a barrier with regard to substitution of parties, since Congress explicitly provided that
“non-profit private” organizations may qualify as employees of the Public Health Service and

receive coverage under the FTCA, and since courts regularly substitute the United States for
private health care centers and their deemed employees under the statute. (Docket No. 37 at 2
(citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 233(g)(1) & (4) and various cases)). Furthermore, as the United States
indicates, the statute itself contains no requirement that health care centers fund any particular
percentage of their budget with federal money in order to receive FTCA coverage. Rather, the
statute provides that a “‘public or non-profit private entity receiving Federal funds under Section
254b’ can be deemed a Public Health Service employee,” without reference to a federal grant’s
size or its proportionate share within an entity’s overall budget. (Id. at 3 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 233(g)(4))). The United States also notes that PHN and its employees have been the subject of
such substitutions in the past. (Id. at 3 n.3 (citing various cases, including Stewart-Wilson v. United
States, No. 2:17-cv-01335, 2019 WL 1894707, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2019); Peronis v. United
States, No. 2:16-cv-01389, 2018 WL 4740170, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2018); Fish v. United
States, No. 08-919, 2009 WL995468, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2009)). Furthermore, Plaintiff
has provided no legal support for her contention that Chelsey’s Medicaid coverage excludes her

from the Secretary’s determination that an entity is deemed to be an employee of the Public Health
Services. As the Court previously remarked, supra, Plaintiff concedes that she can find no case
on point to support such argument. The United States also indicates – and Plaintiff does not dispute
– that no evidence has surfaced in discovery showing that Dr. Shajihan or Ms. Lebak billed for
their services separately, received any sort of direct payment from Plaintiff, or otherwise acted
outside of the scope of their respective employment when treating Chelsey. Thus, the Court
concludes that the amount of federal funding that PHN receives and the way in which such funding
is allocated (and the fact that Chelsey’s care was fully paid to PHN by Medicaid) does not prevent
coverage by the FTCA here. Thus, upon consideration of the parties’ arguments, the Court does

not agree with Plaintiff’s contention that Chelsey’s care at PHN was not related to grant-supported
activity.
Therefore, the Court finds that the United States’ Renewed Motion for Substitution of
Parties should be granted, and the United States should be substituted for the PHN Defendants in
this matter. In so finding, the Court notes that the Amended Complaint alleges claims of
professional negligence with regard to the health care provided by PHN, Dr. Shajihan, and Ms.
Lebak, which are claims governed by the FTCA. See 42 U.S.C. § 233(a). Additionally, PHN is a
federally qualified health center and a “deemed entity” for purposes of coverage under the Act.
See 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), (c), (g). Furthermore, HHS has deemed Dr. Shajihan and Ms. Lebak to
have been employees of PHN at all times relevant to Plaintiff’s Complaint, and thus that they are
employees of the federal government for purposes of coverage under the Act. (Docket No. 11-1,
¶¶ 5, 6). Also, the United States Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania, as a duly
authorized representative of the Attorney General, has found that PHN was a private entity
receiving grant money from the Public Health Service pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 233, and has

certified that Dr. Shajihan and Ms. Lebak were both acting within the scope of their employment
at the time of the incidents alleged in the Complaint. (Docket No. 1-2).
Accordingly, the United States’ Renewed Motion for Substitution of Parties is granted, and
the United States is substituted for the PHN Defendants in this case.
B. Motion to Dismiss Based on Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In its Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the United States argues that the claims asserted against
the PHN Defendants in Counts I, III, and IV of the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because, after the United States has been substituted as
a named Defendant for the PHN Defendants in those Counts (as is necessary under the applicable

statutes), the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such claims. The United States
incorporates by reference the facts, law, and argument contained in the briefs it previously filed in
support of its original Motion to Dismiss, as well as the exhibits and declaration attached thereto.
(Docket No. 34 at 1). Plaintiff, however, has not responded to the United States’ Renewed Motion
to Dismiss other than by referring to it generally in connection with opposing the United States’
Renewed Motion for Substitution of Party. (Docket No. 36). In that regard, while maintaining
that the United States should not be substituted for the PHN Defendants, Plaintiff asks that the
Court not dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and that the Court also return the
case to the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County for disposition – yet she provides no specific
argument or law in support of such requests. (Id. at 8). In any event, since the Court has ruled
that the United States shall be substituted for the PHN Defendants in this matter, the Court must
next consider whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the United States
that are now before it.
As federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, a district court may only hear a case if

it is authorized to do so by a congressional grant of subject matter jurisdiction. See Ins. Corp. of
Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982). Establishing that
a district court has jurisdiction is a “threshold matter [that] ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of
the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’” Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1988) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v.
Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). Additionally, the “United States, as sovereign, is immune from
suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define
that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)
(internal citations omitted). Thus, in order to sue the United States, a plaintiff’s allegations must

invoke a valid waiver of sovereign immunity. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).
As explained, supra, in order to bring a tort claim against the United States, its agencies,
or its employees acting within the scope of their activities – as in this case – a plaintiff must file a
claim under the FTCA.1 Before a claim can be brought under the FTCA, however, a plaintiff must
first exhaust any administrative remedies by “present[ing] the claim to the appropriate Federal
agency,” and waiting either for a final denial of the claim by the agency in writing, or for six
months to pass without the agency taking action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). A district court cannot

1 The Court notes that, in order to file a timely claim under the FTCA, a plaintiff generally must file an
administrative claim within two years of the date that the claim accrued. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); Santos v. United
States, 559 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 2009).
hear an FTCA claim if such administrative steps have not been completed, as the administrative
exhaustion prerequisite under the FTCA is a strict requirement. See McNeil v. United States, 508
U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Wadhwa v. Nicholson, 367 F. App’x 322, 325 (3d Cir. 2010). Moreover,
“the plaintiff bears the burden under the FTCA of showing that [she] has filed proper
administrative claims with the appropriate administrative agency.” Robinson v. United States,

Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-1106, 2014 WL 2940454, at *7 (M.D. Pa. June 30, 2014) (citing Medina
v. City of Philadelphia, 219 F. App’x 169, 172 (3d Cir.2007) (“Plaintiff carries the burden of proof
to establish presentment of her claim to HUD.”); Livera v. First Nat’l State Bank of New
Jersey, 879 F.2d 1186, 1195 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Because Plaintiff alleges injury arising from medical care provided by employees of the
Public Health Service, in order to have exhausted her administrative remedies before bringing this
lawsuit, Plaintiff should have first submitted an administrative claim to the Department of Health
and Human Services (“HHS”). See Bilyeu v. Phoenixville Hosp. Co., LLC, Civil Action No. 17-
1456, 2017 WL 2572515, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2017) (citing Huertero v. United States, 601 F.

App’x 169, 170 (3d Cir. 2015)). However, Plaintiff does not allege in her Complaint that she
submitted any such administrative claim, nor does she argue in her response to the Unites States’
motion that she has done so, nor is there any indication elsewhere in the filings on the docket in
this case that Plaintiff submitted an administrative claim or that she attempted to do so.
In fact, Plaintiff makes no specific argument whatsoever in opposition to the United States’
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (other than her request that the Court not dismiss her case
on such basis), although she also asks the Court to remand her case to state court. As the Court
has explained, however, Plaintiff’s tort claims against the PHN Defendants must be filed in federal
court under the FTCA, which requires prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, and Plaintiff
has failed to show exhaustion here. Absent such a showing of exhaustion of administrative
remedies by Plaintiff, the Court cannot find that it has subject matter jurisdiction over her claims.
See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“[T]he burden of
establishing the [existence of subject-matter jurisdiction] rests upon the party asserting
jurisdiction.”). Furthermore, as Plaintiff’s tort claims against the PHN Defendants cannot be

brought under the FTCA in state court, remand of such claims is not appropriate, and Plaintiff’s
claims must be dismissed.2 See, e.g., Robinson, 2014 WL 2940454, at *6 (explaining that “where
an FTCA lawsuit is filed before the exhaustion process is completed, we are compelled to dismiss
that action” (citing Miller v. United States, 517 F. App'x 62, 63 (3d Cir. 2013); Roma v. United
States, 344 F.3d 352, 362 (3d Cir. 2003)); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. at 111–12
(holding that where a court lacks jurisdiction to rule on a prematurely filed action, even if an
agency denies the related administrative claim soon after the federal lawsuit is filed, such claim is
properly dismissed)).
Accordingly, the United States’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction is granted, and the claims against the PHN Defendants (or against the United States,
which is being substituted as a named Defendant for the PHN Defendants) are dismissed without
prejudice.

2 Although Defendant argues, additionally, that no exceptions to the rule requiring timely administrative
exhaustion apply in this case, the Court finds it unnecessary to reach such issues at present since this action is being
dismissed on exhaustion grounds. See Robinson, 2014 WL 2940454, at *8 (in which the court dismissed the original
complaint as unexhausted, but explained that such dismissal was without prejudice to plaintiff’s re-filing of a
complaint as a new action, if and when plaintiff completed the administrative agency exhaustion required by the FTC;
and noting that, in a variety of factual contexts, courts have expressly sanctioned dismissal of FTCA actions as
unexhausted without prejudice in order to enable plaintiffs to perfect the exhaustion of their administrative remedies
(citing Wadhwa v. Nicholson, 367 F. App'x 322, 325 (3d Cir. 2010); McLaurin v. United States, 392 F.3d 774, 782
(5th Cir. 2004); Konarski v. Brown, No. 03-5340, 2004 WL 1249346, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 7, 2004); Bailey v. United
States, 992 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir.1993))).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the United States’ Renewed Motion for Substitution of Party is
granted. Accordingly, the United States of America is substituted as a named Defendant in place
of the PHN Defendants for purposes of the Professional Negligence (Count I), Wrongful Death
(Count III), and Survival (Count IV) claims alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint. The PHN

Defendants, Primary Health Network, Nasim Shajihan, M.D., and Shannon C. Lebak, are
dismissed with prejudice from the case.
Additionally, the United States’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted.
Accordingly, Count I, which alleges professional negligence against the PHN Defendants
(now against the United States as a named Defendant) is dismissed without prejudice to re-filing
if Plaintiff is first able to properly exhaust her claims at the administrative level.
Count II alleges a state law negligence claim against Defendants Girl’s Hope of Pittsburgh,
Inc., Jennifer Heid, Lisa Tedde, and Sr. Elaine Schindler. As Plaintiff has asked that the case be

remanded to state court and has not asked the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that
claim, the Court will remand Count II to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time
before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case
shall be remanded.”).
Counts III and IV assert wrongful death and survival actions (presumably under
Pennsylvania law) citing Plaintiff’s allegations and claims of negligence, and those Counts do not
present independent claims. See Lansberry v. Altoona Area School Dist., 356 F. Supp. 3d 486,
504 (W.D. Pa. 2018). To the extent that Counts III and IV include claims against the PHN
Defendants (now against the United States), such claims are dismissed without prejudice to refiling
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, along with Count I. To the extent that Counts III and IV
include claims against Defendants Girl’s Hope of Pittsburgh, Inc., Jennifer Heid, Lisa Tedde, and
Sr. Elaine Schindler, the Court will remand those Counts of the Complaint to state court, along
with Count II.
An appropriate Order follows.

s/ W. Scott Hardy
W. Scott Hardy
United States District Judge
Dated: July 8, 2022

cc/ecf: All counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10417814. Public record. Not legal advice.