# MILLER v. HARTWELL

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · March 14, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10417569

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 14, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DARREN L. MILLER, )
Plaintiff, ) C.A. No. 1:19-cv-339
)
v. )
) RE: Motion to Dismiss the
) Amended Complaint [75]
AMANDA HARTWELL, et al, )
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
U.S. D.J. Susan Paradise Baxter

Pending before this Court is the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by
Department of Corrections’ Defendants Ennis, Smock, and Santos. ECF No. 75. The motion will
be granted in part and denied in part.

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Darren Miller is a pro se litigant currently incarcerated at SCI Fayette. Mr.
Miller brings this action against Defendants Dr. Hartwell1, Ennis, Smock, and Santos. His claims
arise out of his treatment by prison staff at SCI Albion following an injury. In his Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff asserts three claims arising under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments against the three Department of Corrections Defendants. These Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss [ECF No. 75] and Plaintiff has filed a brief in opposition [ECF No. 87]. The
motion is fully briefed and is ripe for disposition by this Court.

1 Defendant Dr. Hartwell is represented by private counsel and has filed an Answer in response
to the Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 78.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Motions to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewics, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a
motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the
merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)
citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.
2004). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard
established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court
must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and view them in a light

most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir.
2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a
plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub.
Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) citing Morse v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the Court accept legal
conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, citing Papasan, 48 U.S.
at 286). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).

Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the
following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim.’ Second, the court should identify
allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are
not entitled to the assumption of truth.’ Finally, ‘where there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.’

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) quoting Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). This determination is “a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
B. Pro Se Filings
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the complaint must be held to
“less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant’s pleadings to state a valid
claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant’s failure to cite
proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982);
Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be
inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”). Thus, the Court may
consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate. But “any pleading must still contain
sufficient factual allegations that, when accepted as true, ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Heffley v. Steele, 2019 WL 5092127, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2019), aff’d, 826
Fed. App’x 227 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).

III. THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff asserts three claims arising under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
against the Department of Corrections Defendants. Plaintiff identifies Defendant Paul Ennis as
the Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services; Jerri Smock as the Correctional Health Care
Administrator; and Santos as a Unit Manager assigned to E-A Unit. ECF No. 67.
In August 2019, after Plaintiff was diagnosed with a rupture of his Achilles’ tendon, Dr.
Hartwell, a prison doctor, ordered bottom bunk and bottom tier status for him. Plaintiff then was
examined by an outside orthopedic surgeon who prescribed an orthopedic boot with a 40 degree
wedge. The guards accompanying Plaintiff to that appointment refused to allow Plaintiff to

receive the wedged boot and instead demanded that Plaintiff be given a plastic boot. Plaintiff
claims that plastic boot was ill-fitting and did not stabilize his foot resulting in increased swelling
and pain.
Upon returning to the prison, Plaintiff submitted sick call slips trying to obtain the
prescribed boot and his requests were ignored. Plaintiff spoke with CHCA Smock on August 14th
and followed up with her through a request slip the following day. Plaintiff sent a copy of the
request slip to Defendant Ennis.
Defendant Santos, the unit manager, was aware of Plaintiff’s injury and aware of Dr.
Hartwell’s order for bottom bunk/bottom tier housing status. Plaintiff did not receive the bottom-
tier housing assignment. On September 12, 2019, as he was walking up the stairs to his cell,
Plaintiff fell backward down several metal steps landing on his head and tailbone. As a result of
the fall, Plaintiff continues to suffer “paralysis in his lower extremities, nerve damage, and
piercing pain from [his] lower back down the back of [his] legs to [his] feet.” Id. at ¶ 42.

Following the fall and a trip to the hospital emergency room, Plaintiff was admitted to the
prison infirmary. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Hartwell released Plaintiff, verbally berating him for
feigning injury and denying his request for a wheelchair. Plaintiff alleges that because of the lack
of a wheelchair, he had no access to showers, law library, and his personal property.
Plaintiff brings the following claims against the Department of Corrections Defendants:
Count I – violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against Santos and
Smock based on the failure to carry out doctor’s orders for a bottom tier housing
assignment;

Count II – violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments based on deliberate
indifference against Smock and Ennis based on the denial of medical care for
non-medical reasons; and

Count III – violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against Smock and
Ennis based on denial of wheelchair and access to showers and violation of First
Amendment right to petition based on lack of access to the law library and the
administrative remedy process.

IV. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
To the extent that Plaintiff is advancing any of his claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, they will be dismissed.
The more-specific-provision rule provides that, “if a constitutional claim is covered by a
specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be
analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of
substantive due process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997). See also
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (“Where a particular Amendment provides an
explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government
behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be
the guide for analyzing these claims.”). Pursuant to this principle, allegations of inadequate

medical care in the prison context must be analyzed “under the more specific Eighth Amendment
standards set forth in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976),” rather than the more general
standards applicable to Fourteenth Amendment claims. Classen v. Nutter, 2017 WL 6017341, at
*7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2017). The same is true of First Amendment right to petition claims. See,
e.g., Riley v. Beard, 2011 WL 1204264 (W.D. Pa. 2011).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims cannot survive a motion to
dismiss and cannot be cured by amendment. See, e.g., Davis v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr.,
2016 WL 1072911, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2016) (dismissing substantive due process claims
regarding plaintiff's medical care because such claims “are more appropriately analyzed under
the more specific Eighth Amendment provision than under the more general and open-ended

standard of substantive due process”); Lane v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 2015 WL
5016512, *12 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2015) (dismissing plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim as
redundant of his First Amendment claim).

V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS
Plaintiff alleges that Department of Corrections Defendants Smock and Ennis violated his
First Amendment rights by 1) depriving him of an available administrative remedy process and
2) denying him access to the law library.
The First Amendment confers a “right to petition the Government” which traditionally
encompasses access to the courts. Capozzi v. N’Diaye, 2022 WL 37344, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 4,
2022) quoting Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 294 n.17 (3d Cir. 2018). However,
there is no First Amendment2 right to an “administrative grievance process...” Gittens v. Scholtz,

2019 WL 3417091, at *4 (D.N.J. July 29, 2019) quoting Horsh v. Clark, 2019 WL 1243009, at
*5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2019). See also Bakhtiari v. Spaulding, 2017 WL 2778524, at *14 (M.D.
Pa. 2017) (inmate “has no constitutional right to a grievance process.”).3
On the other hand, prisoners do maintain a constitutional right of access to the Courts
which includes access to an adequate law library. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996);
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). But, inmates “may only proceed on access-to-courts
claims in two types of cases[:] challenges (direct or collateral) to their sentences and conditions
of confinement.” Williams v. Russell, 2021 WL 5050116, at * 9 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2021) citing
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The First Amendment does not guarantee
inmates a minimum amount of time in the law library. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (Supreme

Court precedent “does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into
litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall

2 Similarly, inmates have “no constitutional right to a grievance procedure” under the Fifth
Amendment (see Caldwell v. Beard, 324 Fed. App'x 186 (3d Cir. 2009)), nor the Fourteenth
Amendment (see Peterson v. Holmes, 2012 WL 5451435 (D.N.J. 2019).

3 Here, Plaintiff mistakes the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act for a
constitutional right. While the PLRA does require the exhaustion of administrative remedies
before filing suit in federal court, it does not confer a private constitutional right to a grievance
process. There is no “independent constitutional right to state administrative grievance
procedures.” See Boyd v. Werholtz, 443 Fed. App’x 331, 332 (10th Cir. 2011). Instead, the PLRA
created an affirmative defense that must be pled and proven by defendants that the claims were
not exhausted. See Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013). Significantly here,
the Defendants have withdrawn any arguments related to exhaustion. See ECF No. 76, pages 4-5.
claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their
sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement.
Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly
constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.”) (emphasis in original).

Certain pleading standards apply to access-to-courts claims. Where prisoners assert that
defendants’ actions have inhibited their opportunity to present a past legal claim to the Court,
they must show (1) that they suffered an “actual injury”—that they lost a chance to pursue a
“nonfrivolous” or “arguable” underlying claim; and (2) that they have no other “remedy that may
be awarded as recompense” for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access
suit. Id. “To that end, prisoners must satisfy certain pleading requirements: the complaint must
describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,’ and
it must describe the ‘lost remedy.’ ” Id. at 205–06. “The underlying claim, ... is an element that
must be described in the complaint as though it were being independently pursued.” Christopher
v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).

Here, Plaintiff only alleges that he was deprived of access to the law library “over long
periods of time.” He does not explain how he was injured by missing time in the law library. As
pled, Plaintiff has failed to state an access-to-courts claims.4
Dismissal will be granted as to both portions of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim at
Count III. Because Plaintiff’s claim based on the First Amendment right to petition is not
actionable under any set of facts, amendment in this regard is futile and will be denied. However,
Plaintiff will be given the opportunity to amend to state an access-to-courts claim.

4 Besides failing to lay out the elements of an access-to-courts claim, Plaintiff has not provided
sufficient factual detail as to the participation of Smock or Ennis.
VI. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
So then, the only remaining claims against the Department of Corrections Defendants
are:

Count I – deliberate indifference against Santos and Smock based on the failure to
carry out the order for a bottom tier housing assignment;

Count II – deliberate indifference against Smock and Ennis for the denial of
medical care based on non-medical reasons; and

Count III – deliberate indifference against Smock and Ennis based on denial of
wheelchair and deprivation of showers.

To prevail on any § 1983 claim, a plaintiff “must show that each and every defendant was
‘personal[ly] involve[d]’ in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3
(M.D. Pa. 2006) quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006). In other words,
each defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit ... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or
her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358
Fed. Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). In the absence of specific allegations that a defendant played
a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See Mearin v.
Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish certain defendants
played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
These principles apply with equal force where the defendants are supervising prison
officials. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that
liability for supervisory officials must still be based on “personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs”); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[L]iability cannot be predicated
solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”). Although a supervisor cannot encourage
constitutional violations, “a supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to
supervise and discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her

subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v. Grabowski, 922
F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990).5

Count I
The deliberate indifference claim at Count I is based on the failure of Santos
and Smock to carry out Dr. Hartwell’s order for a bottom tier housing assignment. Defendants
argue for the dismissal of both Defendants because Plaintiff has not pled their personal
involvement. Defendants are mistaken.
Plaintiff alleges that both Santos and Smock had a duty under §10 of the Policy 13.2.1
(which imposes a duty to ensure that medical orders are properly documented, monitored, and

carried out, and to inform other staff of others properly house inmates) (id. at ¶ ¶ 31-32); were
aware that their failure to ensure a bottom tier assignment would likely mean he was assigned to
top tier (id. at ¶ 39); acted with deliberate indifference in causing Plaintiff to be housed on the
top tier because they each knew of, yet disregarded Plaintiff’s order of bottom tier and the
attendant likelihood that Plaintiff would undergo extreme pain and physically injure himself

5 A supervisor-defendant may only be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates
if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and
maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm; or (2)
participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in
charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex
rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).
should he be housed on the top tier (id. at ¶ 41). Moreover, Smock, the CHCA, was required to
forward a copy to Santos and Santos was required to ensure that all three shifts were informed of
the bottom tier assignment (id. at ¶ 33) and Santos, the unit manager, had personal knowledge of
Dr. Hartwell’s orders for a bottom bunk/bottom tier housing assignment (ECF No. 67, ¶ 29) and
yet assigned Plaintiff to a top tier cell on September 11th (id. at ¶ 36)

These factual allegations are sufficient to state the personal involvement of these
Defendants and to withstand a motion to dismiss. While Plaintiff will have the burden to prove
these allegations at trial, this claim will be allowed to proceed to discovery.

Count II
At Count II of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Ennis and Smock, together
with Dr. Hartwell, acted with deliberate indifference by denying him medical care for non-
medical reasons. ECF No. 67, ¶ 79.6
Plaintiff alleges that a team, of which Dr. Hartwell, Ennis, and Smock were members,

made a concerted decision to “label” him as feigning the extent of his injuries and denied him a
wheelchair and other unspecified medical treatment for his paralysis. These Defendants told
Plaintiff that “after the team discussed your alleged injury, we decided that you do not require
any further treatment because nobody believes you.” ECF No. 67, at ¶ 50. Plaintiff believes that
he has been denied medical assessments, diagnostic testing, rehabilitation, and referrals to
specialists thereby risking any chance of curing his paralysis and nerve pain. Id. at ¶ 55.
Although they are limited, these allegations are sufficient to implicate the personal

6 This portion of the Amended Complaint does not provide any further specifics but does
incorporate paragraphs 1-55.
involvement of Ennis and Smock. At this stage of the proceedings, this Court must assume the
veracity of these allegations. See Burtch, 662 F.3d at 221. The motion to dismiss will be denied
in this regard.

Count III
The remaining claim at Count III is an alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment
against Smock and Ennis based on denial of access to showers “over a long period of time.” ECF
No. 67, ¶ 81.
While the deprivation of showers may rise to the level of deliberate indifference (see
Williams v. Russell, 2021 WL 5050116 (E.D. Pa. 2021)), Plaintiff has not provided any factual
allegation detailing how either Smock or Ennis were personally involved in the deprivation.
Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed.

VII. FUTILITY OF AMENDMENT

In pro se civil rights actions, “district courts must offer amendment—irrespective of
whether it is requested—when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing so
would be inequitable or futile.” Coleman v. Acad. Bus LLC, 858 Fed. App’x 584, 585 (3d Cir.
2021) quoting Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d
Cir. 2007); Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“the court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so
requires.”).
The Court’s final inquiry is whether the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims is with or without
prejudice and whether to grant him leave to amend his claims. Leave to amend is appropriate
unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d
Cir. 2004). The Court will grant leave for Plaintiff to amend his claim for denial of access-to-
court arising from the deprivation of access to the law library and the personal involvement of
Ennis and Smock.
However, the Court finds that leave to amend the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims would

be futile and will deny same. See Alston, 363 F.3d at 235. To summarize, the Fourteenth
Amendment claims are precluded by the more specific provision rule and the claim that Plaintiff
was denied a purported right to exhaustion under the petition clause of the First Amendment
claim is not actionable.
An appropriate Order follows this Memorandum Opinion.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10417569. Public record. Not legal advice.