# CHILCOTT v. CITY OF ERIE

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · September 30, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10416993

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 30, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10416993

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding “even if police officers have a reliable tip saying that someone is carrying a gun, that information alone will not provide enough evidence to support a Terry stop”
- holding that the reasonable suspicion inquiry is highly fact-dependent in nature

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TROY CHILCOTT, )
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 1:20-CV-289
)
)
v. ) Re: Motion for summary judgment [15]
) Motion for summary judgment [19]
)
CITY OF ERIE and )
CORPORAL SARAH SCHARDT, )
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
U.S. District Judge Susan Paradise Baxter

I. Relevant Procedural History
On July 26, 2019, Plaintiff Troy Chilcott (“Chilcott”) was pulled over by Defendant
Sarah Schardt (“Schardt”), a corporal with the City of Erie Police Department, who was
responding to a radio dispatch concerning a disturbance in her vicinity that involved a weapon.
Chilcot was arrested but the charges were later dismissed by the state court. Chilcott initiated this
litigation on September 30, 2020. See ECF No. 1. He alleges claims against Schardt and the City
for unlawful search and seizure (Count I) and false imprisonment (Count II) under the Fourth
Amendment, and a Monell claim (Count III) based on the City’s failure to train its police
officers. See id. The parties decided to forego discovery and proceed directly to cross motions for
summary judgment. See ECF No. 14. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Chilcott
has filed a motion for partial summary judgment on liability. The motions are now ripe for
disposition.
II. Standard of Decision
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that

summary judgment must be granted if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Under Rule 56, the
district court must enter summary judgment against a party “who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323,

quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In other words, the moving party has the initial burden of proving to
the district court the lack of evidence supporting the non-moving party’s claims. Id. at 330.
After the moving party has satisfied this low burden, the non-moving party must provide
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial to avoid summary judgment. Id. at 324. The
non-moving party must then oppose the motion, and in doing so “‘may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of [its] pleadings’ but, instead, ‘must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions will not
suffice.’” Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2018) quoting D.E. v.
Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2014).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 288, citing Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher
Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006). The court may not “weigh the evidence” or “determine
the truth of the matter.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Instead, the

court’s role in reviewing the facts of the case is “to determine whether there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Id.

III. Factual Background
The following factual background is set forth pursuant to the standards detailed above.
As required by Local Rule and by the undersigned’s Practices and Procedures, both parties have
filed Concise Statements of Material Facts in support of their respective motions for summary
judgment. However, Defendants have not responded to Plaintiff’s Concise Statement as required
and so the unopposed statements are deemed admitted. See infra, footnote 4.

On July 26, 2019, at 8:33 p.m. Denise Henderson called 911 to report a disturbance in the
1900 block of East Eighth Street in the City of Erie. Ms. Henderson described overhearing an
argument inside the home of a neighbor. She reported that
“I’m calling from 1911 East Eighth Street, but I’m calling because at 1912 East
Eighth Street there’s some fight going on, and a man came out of the house with a
pistol talking about ‘you pistol whipped me’ and walking down Bacon Street with
a pistol.”

Ms. Henderson related that she saw a man come out of the house and saw him put a black pistol
in his pants. Three minutes later, the Erie Police Department dispatched officers to respond to the
call. The initial radio dispatch indicated that the call was a “weapons call” and that there was a
“male walking down the street waving a pistol” and that the subject male “got into a gray Ford F-
150 northbound on Bacon.” She described the truck as having shrubbery in the bed.
Based on her proximity, Corporal Schardt who was in uniform and driving a patrol car in
the area responded to the call. A few minutes later, Schardt observed a vehicle matching the
description provided by dispatch around 12th and Downing Streets. Schardt then turned around

and took a position behind the truck now sitting at the intersection of 12th and Downing Streets.
As the traffic light changed to green, Schardt activated her car’s emergency red/blue lights and
siren to conduct a traffic stop.
Plaintiff pulled his truck over into the grass. With her gun drawn, Corporal Schardt
ordered him out of his vehicle. Other police officers arrived and placed Mr. Chilcott in
handcuffs. Corporal Schardt was then dispatched to another call and she left the scene. Evidence
found in Mr. Chilcott’s vehicle formed the factual basis for his arrest and the filing of criminal
charges. None of the criminal charges were based on Chilcott’s conduct prior to the traffic stop.
As a result of his arrest, Chilcott was incarcerated for eight months which caused

significant financial hardship for his family. Plaintiff alleges that during his incarceration, he lost
his job. In order to make ends meet, his wife was forced to quit her job of seventeen years so
that she could draw on her 401(k) retirement account to pay for a criminal defense attorney and
to have funds for family and household expenses. The Chilcott’s credit was ruined, vehicles
including a camper and a truck were repossessed, and they defaulted on credit cards. They also
lost their health insurance because Mrs. Chilcott had to quit her job in order to draw on her
401(k) account.
IV. The Motions for Summary Judgment
Defendant Schardt argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on the unlawful
search claim and the false imprisonment claim because she had a reasonable suspicion to initiate
the vehicle stop. She principally contends that the information provided to her and other officers
regarding a disturbance involving a gun on a city street, together with a specific description of

the suspect’s vehicle provided her with a reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Chilcott.
Further, Defendants contend that even if Schardt is found to have violated Chilcott’s
constitutional rights, she is entitled to qualified immunity. The City contends that because of a
Monell claim’s derivative nature and because Schardt did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights, the Monell claim fails.
As to the Fourth Amendment claims, Chilcott contends Schardt did not have a reasonable
suspicion to stop him. First, Chilcott points to the decision of the state court in his criminal
prosecution which concluded that the record was devoid of facts from which Schardt could have
formed a reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. See Commonwealth v. Chilcott, 240 A.2d 202

(Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2020). Second, and irrespective of the application of the state court
decision, Chilcott contends that the information provided to Schardt from the police dispatcher
was insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion. Lastly, Chilcott argues that Schardt is not
entitled to qualified immunity. Concerning his Monell claim, Chilcott contends that he should be
entitled to discovery as to the failure of the City to train its police officers.
V. Discussion and Analysis
Difficult constitutional issues are typically involved in cases where qualified immunity is
in question.1 “When qualified immunity is raised at the summary judgment stage, the Court’s
analysis of the merits of the claims for purposes of summary judgment essentially merges with
its analysis of the existence of a deprivation of federal rights for the purposes of qualified

immunity.” Deitrick v. Costa, 2014 WL 268681, at *8 (M.D. Pa. 2014) citing Gruenke v. Seip,
225 F.3d 290, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the Court will first address whether
Chilcott’s rights were violated, and, if so, then determine whether Schardt is entitled to qualified
immunity.2

A. The Fourth Amendment Claims against Corporal Schardt
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he rights of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
“What is reasonable depends upon all the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and

the nature of the search or seizure itself.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,
537 (1985). At Count I, Chilcott alleges that Schardt “had no legitimate basis to pull Mr. Chilcott

1 To determine if an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, courts utilize a two-prong
analysis. Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. Apr. 8, 2021). At the first prong,
the court asks if the facts, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, ...
show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001). Second, the court must “ask whether the right was clearly established,” id., because “the
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear such that the unlawfulness of the action [wa]s
apparent in light of pre-existing law,” Dougherty v. School Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 993 (3d
Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2 A court may analyze and address these two prongs in whichever order it finds most appropriate
for the case. Lozano v. New Jersey, 9 F.4th 239 (3d Cir. 2021) citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
over,” thus challenging the constitutionality of Schardt’ s investigatory stop under the Fourth
Amendment. See ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 46-55.
Generally, warrantless searches “are presumptively unreasonable….” United States v.
Ramos, 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006) citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-7
(1967). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968), the Supreme Court announced an exception

to that general rule: “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief,
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (explaining Terry holding). See also
United States v. Lyons, 2020 WL 429112, at *4 (W.D. Pa. 2020) (“A seizure under Terry is also
known as an investigatory stop and requires that officers have reasonable articulable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot before they may restrain or detain a suspect.”). Courts have held
that “stopping a car and detaining its occupants is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”
United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995).
Such investigatory stops are permitted if a police officer can “point to specific and

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant the intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. In order to make the required showing of
reasonable suspicion, “the officer must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213,
217 (3d Cir. 2000). The reasonableness of an officer’s suspicions are fact-specific to the
circumstances confronting the officer and “must be measured by what the officers knew before
they conducted their search” and not what they found during or after the search. Florida v. J.L.,
529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000).
At Count II, Chilcott raises a false imprisonment claim, also under the Fourth
Amendment. See ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 56-63. Here, Chilcott alleges that he endured eight months of
unlawful detention, as occasioned by the unconstitutional search and seizure. Id., ¶ 59. A claim
for false imprisonment under § 1983 is based in the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against
unreasonable seizures. Garcia v. County of Bucks, 155 F.Supp.2d 259, 265 (E.D. Pa.

2001).Therefore, where a claim that an officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to detain a person is
sustained, a claim for false imprisonment may also be sustained. See, e.g., Cost v. Borough of
Dickson City, 2020 WL 6083272, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2020), aff’d, 2021 WL 2255505 (3d
Cir. June 3, 2021).
Accordingly, the lack of reasonable suspicion is an element of both claims. In other
words, Chilcott must demonstrate that there was a lack of reasonable suspicion for the traffic
stop to establish either of his legal claims against Corporal Schardt. And, conversely, if Corporal
Schardt had reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop, both claims fail.

1. The state court decision lacks preclusive effect in this case.
Before turning to its own independent analysis, this Court must first resolve whether the
state court rulings in Chilcott’s criminal prosecution—finding a lack of reasonable suspicion—
have preclusive effect in this Section 1983 case. Chilcott seeks to use the state court decisions
that Schardt lacked a reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop as determinative of the question for
purposes of his § 1983 unlawful search and seizure and false imprisonment claims.
Chilcott’s civil rights case is based on a traffic stop that led to his arrest and prosecution
for possession of firearms without a license, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving under the
influence, and driving under a suspended license. None of these criminal charges were factually
based on conduct that occurred prior to the vehicle stop, but instead are the result of evidence
found in Chilcott’s vehicle after it was stopped by police. Chilcott moved to suppress that
evidence in state court. At a suppression hearing, the state trial court concluded Corporal Schardt
did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop Chilcott’s truck and, as a result, suppressed the
evidence and dismissed the criminal charges against him. The Commonwealth appealed to the

Pennsylvania Superior Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that
Schardt’s testimony during the suppression hearing
… demonstrates convincingly that when Corporal Schardt effectuated the traffic
stop sub judice, she could cite no articulable facts that established or described
Chilcott’s role in criminal activity or his imminent intent to perpetrate an offense,
apart from his possession of a firearm. …

In the absence of articulable, individualized suspicion that Chilcott
engaged in criminal activity or was intent on committing an
offense, the trial court correctly concluded that Chilcott’s mere
possession of a firearm did not raise valid grounds to support an
investigative detention.

Commonwealth v. Chilcott, 240 A.3d 202, at *5 (Pa. Super. Aug. 26, 2020).
Chilcott contends that this Court must preclude Schardt from arguing in federal court that
her traffic stop was constitutional. Schardt disagrees, arguing that she should be allowed to
defend herself against the Fourth Amendment claims in federal court. She contends that the state
courts’ probable cause determinations cannot have preclusive effect in this later civil rights
action because the state court judgment is not binding on the parties in this action. This Court
agrees with Defendants.
Generally, defendants in a § 1983 action may raise a collateral estoppel defense when a
plaintiff attempts to relitigate an issue decided adversely against him in a state criminal
proceeding. See Ingram v. Lupas, 353 Fed. App’x 674, 676 (3d Cir. 2009) citing Anela v. City of
Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063, 1068 (3d Cir. 1986). The opposite, however, is not true. See Smith v.
Hanuska, 2011 WL 995985, at *5 (M.D. Pa. 2011). A plaintiff’s assertion that collateral estoppel
bars a defendant in a § 1983 action from relitigating a Fourth Amendment issue decided
adversely to the government in a criminal prosecution is without support in this jurisdiction. See
id.
Collateral estoppel does not apply here because Schardt and the City were not parties to

the criminal proceedings against Chilcott in the state courts. Nor were they in privity with the
Commonwealth in those criminal proceedings. A defendant in a § 1983 action, sued in his or her
individual capacity, is not considered to be in privity with the government in a prior criminal
prosecution. See Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 199 n.18 (3d Cir. 2000) citing Morgan v Gertz,
166 F.3d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir. 1999). See also Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir.
1998) (state court’s ruling suppressing evidence not entitled to preclusive effect in § 1983 action
against police officers as officers were not parties to the criminal prosecution nor in privity with
the state); 18A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice And
Procedure 2d § 4458 (2002) (“A judgment against a government or one government official does

not bind a different official in subsequent litigation that asserts a personal liability against the
official[.]”).
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that collateral estoppel does not automatically
bar relitigation of the reasonable suspicion determination in this proceeding. See, e.g., Zamichieli
v. Andrews, 2016 WL 8732421, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 2016). Therefore, the Court will make its own
independent determination of whether Schardt’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment.
2. Defendant Schardt had reasonable suspicion to stop Chilcott.
Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and its progeny, “an officer may, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350,
353 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Reasonable, articulable suspicion is a

less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than a
preponderance of the evidence, and only a minimal level of objective justification is necessary
for a Terry stop.” United States v. Delfin–Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). See also DeNinno v. Municipality of Penn Hills, 269 Fed.
Appx. 153, 158 (3d Cir. 2008). That is to say, this requirement is not particularly onerous:
“reasonable, articulable suspicion is a ‘less demanding standard than probable cause and requires
a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence,’ and only a ‘minimal level of
objective justification’ is necessary for a Terry stop.” Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 396, quoting
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) and United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7

(1989). Still, “a police officer does have the initial burden of providing the ‘specific, articulable
facts’ to justify a reasonable suspicion to believe than an individual has violated the … laws.”
Id. at 397. The court has to “consider whether the ‘rational differences from those facts
reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.’” Id. quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. In the end, the court must
“weigh ‘the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture.’” Id. quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8.
This is a highly factual inquiry. See United States v. Goodrich, 450 F.3d 552, 553 (3d Cir. 2006)
(holding that the reasonable suspicion inquiry is highly fact-dependent in nature). As the
Supreme Court has emphasized, “in the end we must ... slosh our way through the fact bound
morass of ‘reasonableness.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).
The key piece of information in this case was what the dispatcher told police officers: a
suspect was “waving a pistol” while walking down a city street and then left the scene in a gray
pick-up truck with a lot of shrubbery in the truck bed. The record reflects that an Erie Police
Department radio dispatcher, upon receiving information from the 911 operator, sent out a call
for officers to respond to a “weapons call” in the area of 1912 East Eighth Street where “there’s a

male walking down the street waving a pistol.”3 ECF No. 15-3, p. 2 (transcript of radio dispatch).
The dispatcher further indicated that the subject “got into a gray Ford F-150 northbound on
Bacon [Street]” and that the truck is “going to have some shrubs in the back of the F-150.” Id.
That the suspect was “waving a pistol” was further confirmed by the bulletin generated
to Erie police officers on their Computer Aided Dispatch system (“CAD”). According to the
CAD report generated at 8:35 p.m., Schardt was notified of a “Priority
1/Weapons/Firearms/MALE WALKING DOWN THE STREET WAIVING A
PISTOL/WEAPONS INCIDENT.” ECF No. 15-2, p. 1-2. This is the sum and substance, i.e., the
totality of the circumstances, presented to Schardt before she identified a “Chevy with shrubs in
the back” and commenced her investigatory stop. Id., p. 3.4

Weighing the totality of the circumstances, these facts satisfy the officer’s need to “point
to specific and articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of the
officer’s experience” in determining whether the officer had reasonable suspicion. That a suspect

3 Neither party challenges the reliability of the 911 tip.

4 Corporal Schardt testified that she did not observe any violations of the Vehicle Code or
witness any behavior that suggested Chilcott was engaged in criminal conduct while driving that
otherwise would have justified the traffic stop. The sole basis for the stop was the information
provided by the 911 caller as related to Schardt through the police dispatch radio and CAD on
her patrol car’s computer screen. These facts are deemed admitted pursuant to Local Rule 56 due
to Defendants’ failure to file a response to the opposing party’s concise statements. These facts
are also supported by the record before this Court as Schardt testified to as much at the
suppression hearing. See ECF No. 15-5, pages 1-2.
was waving or brandishing a gun has been found to provide police officers with reasonable
suspicion sufficient to seize a person. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held
an investigatory stop to be reasonable when the officers were provided information including a
car’s make, model, and color, along with the race of the driver, and that a 911-caller had
witnessed the driver brandishing a gun in public. See United States v. Torres, 2008 WL 2813035,

at *1 (3d Cir. July 23, 2008). See also McClendon v. Lewis, 2005 WL 217026, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 27, 2005) (holding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop suspect after receiving
information from a police radio broadcast reporting the description of a “male waving a gun.”).
Chilcott argues that carrying a gun is not a crime in Pennsylvania and thus, cannot be the
basis for reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. The United States Supreme Court has determined
that, without more, a reasonable suspicion cannot arise from a tip that a person was carrying a
gun. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 268. See also United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir.
2000) (holding “even if police officers have a reliable tip saying that someone is carrying a gun,
that information alone will not provide enough evidence to support a Terry stop”). But this

argument ignores the fact that the reports provided Schardt with more than just the information
that the suspect was carrying a gun. Indeed, she received information which indicated that there
was a disturbance at a residential address and that a suspect was “waving a pistol” while walking
down the street after having been in a physical altercation. As the Supreme Court has noted,
“[f]irearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions …
Terry’s rule … responds to this very concern.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 272. Corporal Schardt was not
presented with information that someone was observed on the street merely carrying a weapon.
It is irrelevant to the legal determination here that the dispatcher may have incorrectly
reported that the suspect was “waving a pistol.” See ECF No. 24, p. 8. Nothing requires
dispatchers or police “to act with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial process.”
Lyons, 2020 WL 429112, at *12, citing United States v. Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 212 (3d Cir.
2008).
Thus, because Schardt had a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, she did not
violate Chilcott’s constitutional rights in conducting an investigatory stop of his vehicle. The

existence of reasonable suspicion defeats both the unlawful search and seizure claim and the
false imprisonment claim. Because no constitutional violation occurred, it is not necessary to
discuss Schardt’s qualified immunity argument. Summary judgment will be granted in favor of
Corporal Schardt and against Chilcott in this regard.

B. The Monell Claim against the City of Erie
Chilcott brings a Monell claim against the City of Erie based on its failure to train its
police officers. A Monell claim against a municipality will not lie where, as here, a plaintiff
“suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of an individual police officer.” City of Los

Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
Because Corporal Schardt’s conduct did not violate Chilcott’s constitutional rights, the
Monell claim against the City fails.

An appropriate Order follows this Memorandum Opinion.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10416993. Public record. Not legal advice.