# SAVE OUR SALTSBURG SCHOOLS v. BLAIRSVILLE-SALTSBURG SCHOOL DISTRICT

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · June 1, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10416658

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 1, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAVE OUR SALTSBURG SCHOOLS,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-601

v. Hon. William S. Stickman IV

BLAIRSVILLE-SALTSBURG SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Save Our Saltsburg Schools (“SOSS”) is “a community group representing
students and parents of students enrolled in Saltsburg schools.”1 (ECF No. 1, ¶ 5). It also
purports to represent “community members and/or residents, as well as owners of businesses
located in Saltsburg, Pennsylvania.” (Id.). On May 6, 2021, SOSS filed a Complaint asserting
four causes of action: Count I, 42 U.S.C. § 1983—Procedural Due Process; Count II, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983—Equal Protection; Count III, Violation of Pa. Const. Art. 3, § 14; and Count IV, Breach
of Fiduciary Duty. SOSS’s claims arise out of the decision of Defendant Blairsville-Saltsburg
School District (“School District”) to merge its two middle schools: Blairsville Middle High

1 Plaintiff appears to be an unincorporated association. Unincorporated associations have
capacity to assert claims under the Constitution and laws of the United States pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3)(a). “[A]n association may have standing in its own right to
seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the
association itself may enjoy . . . . Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have
standing solely as the representative of its members.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
SOSS may, therefore, pursue the interests of its members, which includes parents and students
attending SMHS.
School (“BMHS”) and Saltsburg Middle High School (“SMHS”), and close SMHS. A day after
filing its Complaint, SOSS filed an Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction asking the
Court to restrain the School District from merging the two middle schools and closing SMHS.
(ECF No. 2). The School District filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (ECF No. 11) and a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (ECF No. 17). SOSS filed a

Response to the Motion to Dismiss which purported to “withdraw” Counts I and III (the due
process claims under the Federal and State constitutions, respectively).2 (ECF No. 19, p. 2 n.2).
It argued, however, that it has pled cognizable claims for a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause and the School District’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty.
The Court will dismiss those counts abandoned by SOSS (Counts I and III). Further, and
as explained herein, the Court holds that SOSS failed to plead a cognizable claim of a violation
of Equal Protection. As such, Count II must be dismissed. With the failure of the federal claims,
and thus the basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court will dismiss the remaining state law
fiduciary duty claim.

2 A plaintiff wishing to withdraw particular claims without prejudice must amend the complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Ctr. for Orthopedics & Sports Med. v.
Horizon, No. 13-1963, 2015 WL 5770385, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2015); see also Waris v.
Mackey, No. 09-1103, 2009 WL 4884204, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2009) (“The proper procedure
for dismissing less than all of the claims in an action is a motion to amend under . . . Rule
15(a).”); Chan v. Cnty. of Lancaster, No. 10-CV-03424, 2013 WL 2412168, at *16 (E.D. Pa.
June 4, 2013) (same). Under Rule 15(a)(1), a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of
course within twenty-one days of serving it or, if the pleading requires a response, twenty-one
days after service of the responsive pleading or twenty-one days after service of a Rule 12(b)
motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A)–(B). All other amendments must be done with the opposing
party’s consent or the court’s leave. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts are instructed to freely give
leave to amend when justice so requires. Id. Given the time constraints under which this case is
proceeding, the Court will permit SOSS’s withdrawal of claims in its Brief in Opposition. (ECF
No. 19, p. 2 n.2).
I. BACKGROUND
The School District has, for the purposes of this case, two middle high schools, Saltsburg
Middle High School (“SMHS”) and Blairsville Middle High School (“BMHS”). SOSS alleges
that on February 24, 2020, the School District scheduled a public hearing to discuss the
consolidation of the two schools into BMHS, which would result in the closure of SMHS.

Ultimately, the School District, through a vote of its elected school board, decided to do so.
SOSS asks the Court to enjoin the merger.
SOSS alleges several purported irregularities in the School District’s decision-making
process. First, SOSS claims that the School District never considered any alternative plan
whereby BMHS would be closed, even though SMHS was more recently built. SOSS claims
that the School District lacked any “rational basis” for its failure to do so. SOSS also disputes
the accuracy of the representations made by the School District about issues surrounding the
merger, including, among other things, finances and class size. SOSS also alleges that the
School District failed to present more detailed information about the proposed consolidation,

even though it was asked to do so by parents, teachers and other members of the community.
SOSS claims that a public hearing to discuss the proposed merger was held on January 11
and 12, 2021. There, students, alumni, parents, teachers, business owners and community
members voiced opposition to the consolidation. SOSS argued, among other things, that the
merger would burden SMHS students due to the increased distance and busing times required to
get them to the BMHS facility. SOSS alleges that it presented an expert report highlighting
problems associated with the merger. It attached the report to the Complaint and quotes from it
therein. Ultimately, the efforts of SOSS and others to stop the merger failed and, on April 22,
2021, the School District’s board voted to consolidate the two schools and to close SMHS.
SOSS contends that the School District made light of its concerns throughout the process
and pre-judged the situation—even making up its mind—before the public hearing and without
giving due heed to concerns raised by the public. It argues that the School District’s decision
was made without rational basis, in a bad-faith manner and in violation of the alleged fiduciary
duty owed to SOSS. It also contends that the decision will negatively impact students who

attend SMHS and impact their access to education and ability to learn.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The School District asserts both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) as
the basis of its Motion to Dismiss. Essentially, it argues that SOSS has failed to assert
cognizable constitutional claims as a matter of law and, therefore, there is no basis for the
exercise of federal jurisdiction. Thus, their motion is most appropriately analyzed under Rule
12(b)(6).
A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.
Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). A plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that,

if accepted as true, state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court must
accept all well-pled factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).
The “plausibility” standard required for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss is not
akin to a “probability” requirement but asks for more than sheer “possibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, the complaint’s factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations are true even if doubtful in fact. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility is
present when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even
if the complaint’s well-pled facts give rise to a plausible inference, that inference alone will not
entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 682. The complaint must support the inference with facts to
plausibly justify that inferential leap. Id.

“[A] motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds
that plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84
(3d Cir. 2011). Although the Court must accept the allegations in the Complaint as true, it is
“not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir.
2007) (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
There is no question that decisions impacting the education of children hit close to the

proverbial home and elicit strong emotions from many different constituencies. There is,
likewise, no question that decisions regarding public education are largely left to the broad
discretion of local school officials and are predominantly guided by state law. Only in rare
circumstances will federal questions, much less constitutional considerations, be involved. Here,
SOSS attempts to inject claims under the United States Constitution into what is,
quintessentially, a matter of state law and local discretion. Their assertion of violations of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is
without merit and cannot stand.
A. SOSS failed to plead a plausible equal protection claim.
SOSS’s Complaint pleads a claim for violation of equal protection—class of one—
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count II pleads that “the consolidation and permanent closure of
SMHS has deprived Plaintiff, through its members who are Saltsburg students, of an equal and
adequate public education.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 41). “Furthermore, Blairsville students will not be

subjected to the same conditions, as described hereinbefore above, which will ultimately impact
Saltsburg students’ access to education and ability to learn.” (Id. ¶ 42). These allegations are
unquestionably bare-boned. Looking back into the factual allegations of the Complaint one may
see additional allegations that, possibly, support SOSS’s equal protection claims. SOSS claims
that “Saltsburg students would be subjected to long bus rides which would endanger their safety,
decrease their accessibility to extracurricular activities, and limit their ability to obtain a quality
education once they finally arrived at the Blairsville campus.” (Id. ¶ 23). However, while
SOSS’s own expert report (presented to the School District’s board and quoted in the Complaint)
expresses concerns about bussing time and academic performance, it also states that
“consolidation would reduce Saltsburg and Blairsville students’ overall participation in

extracurricular activities, especially athletics.” (Id. ¶ 24) (emphasis added). Giving the
Complaint every inference and benefit of the doubt, SOSS’s equal protection claim can broadly
be summed up as contending that “the consolidation and permanent closure of SMHS has
deprived Plaintiff, through its members who are Saltsburg students, of an equal and adequate
public education.” (Id. ¶ 28).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that “[n]o state
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. The clause does not preclude the government from distinguishing between
persons and classes of persons, but rather precludes a state from “treating differently persons
who are in all relevant respects alike.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). A “class of
one” equal protection claim occurs “where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally
treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the
difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). “[T]o state a
claim for ‘class of one’ equal protection, a plaintiff must at a minimum allege that he was

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated by the defendant and that there was
no rational basis for the treatment.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 243 (3d. Cir.
2008). A plaintiff is not required to identify “actual instances where others have been treated
differently for purposes of equal protection[,]” but “an allegation of an equal protection violation
still must contain a claim that a plaintiff has been treated differently from others who are
similarly situated.” Id. at 244.3 In sum, in order to sustain a “class of one” equal protection
claim, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly
situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the
difference in treatment.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d. Cir. 2006).

3 Phillips was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal. Subsequent district court
cases from within the Circuit have speculated that, to the extent that Phillips did not require the
identification of specific instances of disparate treatment, it has likely been superseded by the
tighter pleading standards required by Iqbal. See Myers v. Shaffer, No. 02:11-CV-01107, 2012
WL 3614514, at *12 n.7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2012); Archer v. York City Sch. Dist., No. 1:13-CV-
2826, 2014 WL 12884086, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2014) (“We agree that developments in
federal pleading requirement under Iqbal render Phillips’ general-allegations standard
problematic and conclude that ‘[m]ere allegations of mistreatment without identification of
similarly situated individuals who were treated differently will not support an equal protection
claim.’”). Indeed, in Phillips the Circuit relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in DeMuria v.
Hawkes, 328 F.3d 704, 707 (2d. Cir. 2003), in formulating the looser pleading standard.
Following Iqbal, the Second Circuit recognized that DeMuria was superseded and held that a
general allegation of differential treatment was not sufficient to maintain a class of one equal
protection claim. Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d. Cir. 2010).
The Court agrees with the cases’ holdings that Phillips has been superseded by Iqbal. However,
it is not outcome determinative here because, as explained above, SOSS has failed to even
remotely plead disparate treatment from others similarly situated, and the Court cannot discern
any lack of rational basis for the merger at issue.
Regarding the first element—disparate treatment from others similarly situated—it is
well established:
While persons are similarly situated under the Equal Protection Clause when they
are alike in all relevant respects, the law in the Third Circuit does not require the
plaintiff to show that the comparators are identical in all relevant respects but only
that they are alike. Determining whether an individual is similarly situated to
another is a case-by-case, fact-intensive inquiry.
Borrell v. Bloomburg Univ., 955 F. Supp. 2d 390, 405 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (cleaned up).
As to the rational basis prong, it is important to note that a plausible claim that there was
no rational basis for the alleged difference in treatment is a constitutive element of a “class of
one” claim. “A plaintiff must show that the differential treatment was irrational and wholly
arbitrary. These challenges fail when there is any reasonably conceivable state of fact that could
provide a rational basis for the classification.” Tucker Indus. Liquid Coatings, Inc. v. Borough of
E. Berlin, 85 F. Supp. 3d 803, 811 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (internal citations omitted). Government
actions are granted great deference under the rational basis test, and a plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to overcome the presumption of rationality. Archer v. York City Sch. Dist., No.
1:13-CV-2826, 2014 WL 12884086, at *10 (M.D. Pa. February 27, 2014). This can create some
tension with the liberal pleading standards that give the non-moving party the benefit of any
inference at the motion to dismiss stage.
The Third Circuit has indicated that, to reconcile the tension between the liberal
pleading standard and deference to the government under rational-basis review,
“we accept as true all of the complaint’s allegations, including all reasonable
inferences that follow, and assess whether they are sufficient to overcome the
presumption of rationality that applies to [government classifications].”
Id. (quoting Rucci v. Cranberry Twp., 130 F. App’x 572, 575 (3d Cir. 2005)).
SOSS failed to plead a plausible equal protection “class of one” claim. It neither asserts
that SMHS students are being treated differently than any similarly situated class—including
BMHS students, nor has it pled enough to overcome the presumption of rationality afforded to
the School District.
There is nothing in the Complaint that plausibly asserts that SMHS students are being
treated differently than students of BMHS or anyone else. Rather, they will attend the same
school as those students currently attending BMHS. There is no allegation that the students of

the two existing schools will be treated any differently in the merged school, that they will have
different academic or athletic opportunities, different teachers or different facilities within the
existing physical plant. Nevertheless, the Complaint makes the conclusory allegation that
“the consolidation and permanent closure of SMHS has deprived Plaintiff, through its members
who are Saltsburg students, of an equal and adequate public education” and that “Blairsville
students will not be subjected to the same conditions as described hereinbefore above . . . .”
(ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 28–29). There is scant support for this contention in the allegations of the
Complaint.
The only contention that would remotely support an equal protection claim is that SOSS

purports that, due to the merger, SMHS students will be forced to commute further to the
combined school at the existing BMHS facility than students who currently attend BMHS.
SOSS alleges that this could hinder academic and athletic participation. This argument is also
unavailing. In any school district, there will be students who live nearer or farther from the
school facilities. This does not inure to a constitutional violation for those students who have a
longer and less convenient commute. Further, when there is a merger of schools where one is
closed and one remains open, some students lose their existing school, will be uprooted and will
have to travel farther than others to attend the new school. This does not vest an equal protection
claim in those whose school closes. In every school district, some students live closer and some
farther from the school. This is simply not the type of distinction that implicates the Equal
Protection Clause. The distinction that SOSS appears to plead is not a distinction of
constitutional relevance. It cannot support a “class of one” equal protection claim.4
Nor has SOSS pled enough to get over the presumption of rationality. Indeed, SOSS has
not plausibly pled that the alleged differential treatment was “irrational and wholly arbitrary.”

Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2004). Undoubtedly, SOSS asserts
several areas of disagreement about the School District’s decision, but none rise above
disagreements on matters of prudential judgment and even remotely approach the level of
“irrational and wholly arbitrary.” This is highlighted by SOSS’s own filings.
The expert report that SOSS attached to its Complaint and that it alleges was presented to
the School District’s board surely supports its position that the merger and closure of SMHS was
a bad idea, perhaps even wrongheaded, but it does not show that there was no conceivable
rational basis for doing so or that the decision to close SMHS can only be attributed to irrational
and wholly arbitrary acts. The report, for example, concedes some potential benefits to the

School District as a result of the closure of SMHS:

4 While SOSS’s Brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss abandons its Procedural Due
Process claim, it interjects into its Equal Protection argument allegations relating to the School
District’s deliberative process, or alleged lack thereof. For example, as an alleged differential
treatment, SOSS argues:

The Defendant also argues that the Plaintiff has failed to articulate any differential
treatment between the Blairsville and Saltsburg students. In support of this
argument, the Defendant makes no reference to or explains the impact of
Paragraph 11 of the Complaint, which alleges a failure of the Board to consider
any proposed consolidation plan other than the closure of the Saltsburg schools
with a removal of those students to the Blairsville campus.

(ECF No. 19, p. 7). Even if true, this process-based argument does not establish the differential
treatment needed to assert an equal protection claim.
There are some benefits of the educational elements associated with the proposed
closing of SMHS such as: possibly more student accessibility to clubs; increased
focus on science; some of the proposed course offerings would likely be of
interest to students; increased career and technical education (CTE) offering to
students; some of the proposed STEAM Academy offerings appear to align with
the proposed Project Lead the Way program and potentially improved use of
supplies.

(ECF No. 1-1, p. 3). To be fair, it concludes that “the identifiable weaknesses of the academic
program are much more significant than its strengths” and proceeds to highlight several such
weaknesses. (Id.). But this shows a different position on a matter of prudential judgment. It
does not show—as SOSS must—that the School District’s decision was irrational and wholly
arbitrary.
Count II of SOSS’s Complaint sets forth a formulaic and conclusory assertion of an equal
protection “class of one” violation. Even giving it every inference and benefit of the doubt,
SOSS failed to plead a plausible equal protection claim. State law vests school districts with
broad authority over determinations relating to school closures and consolidations. Only in the
rarest circumstances should courts, especially federal courts, interject themselves into decisions
made by school directors and only where the constitutional or other federal issue is clear and
unavoidable. This makes sense—not every exercise of local governmental discretion implicates
federal issues. Most do not. School leaders are directly and democratically accountable to their
constituents and have a much deeper understanding of district-wide issues than unelected federal
judges. This is why the law affords their decisions a presumption of rationality. Nothing pled in
this case disturbs that presumption.
For these reasons, Count II will be dismissed. The dismissal will be with prejudice
because, in light of the totality of the facts pled and the prevailing law, the Court holds that
amendment would be futile. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434
(3d Cir. 1997) (a court may decide to deny leave to amend for reasons such as undue delay, bad
faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, and futility); see also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice – Civil
§ 15.15[4] (2019) (“An amendment is futile if it merely restates the same facts as the original
complaint in different terms, reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled, fails to state a
legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.”).

B. The Court will dismiss the state law claims without prejudice to refile in
state court.
Counts IV of SOSS’s Complaint asserts claims arising under state law. Because Count I
has been abandoned and Count II is being dismissed with prejudice, there is no longer federal
question jurisdiction over any claim in this case. With the failure of the only bases of federal
jurisdiction, the Court will dismiss the state law claim without prejudice to SOSS’s ability to
refile in state court.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Count I (which has been abandoned) and Count II will be
dismissed with prejudice. Counts III and IV assert only state law claims and will be dismissed
without prejudice to SOSS’s ability to refile in state court. Because the Court is dismissing
SOSS’s Complaint it will, likewise, deny as moot its Emergency Motion for Preliminary
Injunctive Relief.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ William S. Stickman IV
Date: June 1, 2021 WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10416658. Public record. Not legal advice.