# BOOZER v. BARNS

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · December 18, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10416140

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 18, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

)
RICHARD L. BOOZER, SR.,
)

)
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 3: 18-cv-0006
)

)
v. Chief United States Magistrate Judge
)
Cynthia Reed Eddy
)
MARGARET BARNES, CRNP,
)

)
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

I. Introduction
Defendant Margaret Barnes, CRNP, has filed a motion for summary judgment
contending that no reasonable fact finder could find that she was deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. After considering the motion (ECF No. 168), the brief and
materials in support of the motion (ECF Nos. 169, 170, 173), Plaintiff’s response and materials
in opposition (ECF Nos. 192, 193), and Defendant Barnes’s reply (ECF No. 235), the motion
will be granted.
Plaintiff, Richard L. Boozer, Sr., is a state prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections currently incarcerated at SCI-Houtzdale. After granting summary
judgment to Defendants Correct Care Solutions, Inc., Dr. Mohammad Naji, Patrick Nagle, and
Casey Thornley based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the sole claim
remaining is an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference against Margaret Barnes,
CRNP. Plaintiff contends that on four occasions Defendant Barnes “delayed and denied

1 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have voluntarily
consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct proceedings in this case, including
trial and the entry of a final judgment. See ECF Nos. 34 and 37.
Plaintiff access to sick call evaluations by refusing to process his sick call requests slips . . .
thereby cancelling Mr. Boozer’s appointments by sending written notes upon Plaintiff’s sick
call requests.” P’s resp. in opposition at 3. (ECF No. 192). Defendant Barnes responds that no
reasonable fact finder could find that she was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious

medical needs.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment may be granted if, drawing, all inferences in favor of the non-
moving party, “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Melrose, Inc.
v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir. 2010).
A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of
the suit under applicable law. Bland v. City of Newark, Nos. 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2018)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Disputes must be both:
(1) material, meaning concerning facts that will affect the outcome of the issue under

substantive law, and (2) genuine, meaning there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed
factual dispute “to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth.”
In re Lemington Home for Aged, 659 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 2011).
A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of supporting its assertion
that fact(s) cannot be genuinely disputed by citing to particular pat of materials in the record –
i.e., depositions, documents, affidavits, stipulations, or other materials – or by showing that: (1)
the materials cited by the non-moving party do not establish the presence of a genuine dispute,
or (2) that the non-moving party cannot produce admissible evidence to support its fact(s). Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The moving party may discharge its burden by “point out to the district
court” the “absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case” when the nonmoving
party bears the ultimate burden of proof for the claim in question. Conoshenti v. Public Service
Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dept. of
Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 192 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

325 (1986)).
Conversely, in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party
must support its assertion that fact(s) are genuinely disputed by citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, or by showing that: (1) the materials cited by the moving party do not
establish the absence of a genuine dispute, or (2) the moving party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support its fact(s). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). When determining whether there are
any genuine issues of material fact, all inferences should be drawn in favor of the non-moving
party. Berckley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court’s function is not to weigh the
evidence, to determine the truth of the matter, or to evaluate credibility. See Montone v. City of

Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2013). Rather, “[i]n determining whether a genuine dispute
of material fact exists, [the Court] view[s] the underlying facts and draw[s] all reasonable
inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.” Bland, 900 F.3d at 84 (citing Dougherty
v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014)).
III. Factual Background
The following relevant factual background is taken from the summary judgment record
and is viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as he is the non-movant.
The undisputed medical evidence reflects that Plaintiff has a history of chronic
constipation secondary to prior laxative abuse. Plaintiff was transferred from SCI-Greene to
SCI-Houtzdale on March 31, 2016.
At the heart of this case, are four Sick Call Requests submitted by Plaintiff in October

2016, and another Sick Call Request submitted by Plaintiff in November 2016, to which he
alleges that Defendant Barnes “delayed and denied Plaintiff access to sick call evaluations by
refusing to process his sick call request slips, complaining of serious medical conditions.
Thereby cancelling Mr. Boozer’s appointments by sending written notes upon Plaintiff’s sick
call requests.” P’s Resp. at 3 (ECF No. 192).
The medical record evidence reflects that on August 16, 2016, Dr. Muhammad Naji, the
Medical Director at SCI-Houtzdale, evaluated Plaintiff regarding his complaints of chronic
constipation. Plaintiff reported that his current medications were not helping. Dr. Naji decided
to discontinue the prescriptions for Colace, Miralax, and FiberLax and prescribed Lactulose and
Milk of Magnesia as needed. (Id., Exh. A at 18, 161).

The first sick call request at issue was submitted by Plaintiff on October 12, 2016 in
which he stated,
All and any medications updated finally I complain that my bowel movements
are hard and some minor blood is appearing. Conclusion – I request to know
specifically the date, the reasons, person and why I was removed from Colace
and Fiberlax.

(ECF No. 170-2, Exh. B at 13). It appears from the record that Defendant Barnes cancelled this
sick call request and instead reviewed Plaintiff’s medical chart. (Id. at 7). She provided a written
response stating, “Mr. Boozer – I restarted your Colace and Fiberlax.” (Id., Exh. A at 219).2

2 While Barnes’s written note indicates that Colace was restarted, the Order History
Report indicates that Colace was not restarted. Instead, the summary judgment record reflects
The next day, on October 13, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a second sick call request in
which he again stated,
All and any medications updated finally I complain that my bowel movements
are hard and some minor blood appearing. Conclusion – I request to know
specifically, the date, reasons person and why I was removed from my Colace
and Fiberlax medications.

(Id., Exh. B at 14). It appears that this sick call request was also cancelled. The summary
judgment record reflects, however, that on October 13, 2016 at 6:55 AM, Defendant Barnes
placed an order for FiberLax 625 mg tablet to continue until May 10, 2017. (Id. at 17).
On October 14, 2016, Plaintiff again placed a sick call request in which he stated,
All and any medications updated. Next, I complain that my bowel movements
are hard and some minor blood appearing. Finally, I request to know specifically,
the date, person, reason or why I was removed from my Colace and Fiberlax
medications.

(Id. at Exh. B. at 15). Again, it appears that this sick call request was cancelled; however, five
days later, on October 19, 2016, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Naji in the chronic care clinic.
At that time, no acute distress or complaints of rectal bleeding was noted. (Id. at Exh. A at 157-
58, 194). Two days later, on October 21, 2016, PA-C Nagle met with Plaintiff regarding his
requests for Colace and FiberLax. PA-C Nagle noted that Plaintiff’s medication previously had
been adjusted by Dr. Naji and no further adjustments were to be made at that time. (Id., Exh. A
at 157).
On October 23, 2016, Plaintiff submitted his fourth sick call request in which he stated,
Update refills for multivitamins, aspirin, . . . Colace . . and FiberLax . . . as
original prescri[p]tion.

(Id. at 220). Defendant Barnes cancelled the sick call request, but provided Plaintiff with a
written response, stating “Mr. Boozer, meds were renewed.” (Id.).

that on October 13, 2016, Defendant Barnes ordered Relafen and FiberLax. (ECF No. 170-1,
Exh. A at 17 – 18).
On November 16, 2016, Plaintiff submitted the fifth sick call request in which he wrote,
“This is request to prescribe Fiberlax twice daily and to reorder Colace twice daily.” (Id. at
221). On November 17, 2017, Defendant Barnes met with Plaintiff in response to his sick call
request. At that time, his prescription for FiberLax was renewed, but not the prescription for

Colace. (Id. at 157, 221).
IV. Discussion
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Barnes inappropriately cancelled his sick call requests
and prevented him from being evaluated in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
In accordance with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, the government is obliged “to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing
by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). “[D]eliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . .
. proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 104 (citation omitted). Such a claim requires that
a plaintiff allege “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prisoner officials that

indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d
575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003); see also West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1978) (“This
standard is two-pronged. It requires deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials and it
requires the prisoner’s medical needs to be serious.”).
A medical need is “serious” if “it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation omitted). “The seriousness of an inmate's medical
need may also be determined by reference to the effect of denying the particular treatment.” Id.
Defendants do not challenge that Plaintiff has a serious medical need. Accordingly, the Court
turns to whether Defendant Barnes exhibited deliberate indifference towards that need.
The “deliberate indifference” a plaintiff must allege lies “somewhere between the poles
of negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other” and is frequently equated with

recklessness as that term is defined in criminal law. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37
(1994). This standard “affords considerable latitude to prison medical authorities in the
diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of inmate patients.” Inmates of Allegheny
Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979). Where a prisoner has received medical
care and only the adequacy of the treatment is disputed, courts are often reluctant to second
guess professional medical judgment. See id. However, deliberate indifference can be
manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment, and the denial
of prescribed medical treatment. See Durmer, 991 F.2d at 64; Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318,
330 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Deliberate indifference may be shown by intentionally denying or delaying
medical care.”). A mere difference of opinion between the prison medical staff and the inmate

regarding the diagnosis or treatment received by the inmate does not constitute deliberate
indifference. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346. Indeed, “[m]ere medical malpractice, negligence, and
courses of treatment inconsistent with the desires of the prisoner . . . do not constitute deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.” Lopez v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 499 F. App’x 142, 146
(3d Cir. 2012) (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)). The key question is
whether the defendant has provided the inmate with some type of treatment, regardless of
whether it is what the inmates desires. See, e.g., Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d
274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990)(“[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior
will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”).
Here, the record reflects that from the time Plaintiff was transferred to SCI-Houtzdale,
he was provided significant medical care for his serious medical needs. From April 2016
through May 2017, he was seen by the medical staff, including Dr. Naji, Defendant Barnes, PA-
C Thornley, and PA-C Nagle, at least twenty times for his complaints relating to chronic

constipation. (ECF No. 170, Exh. A). Additionally, he was seen by the medical staff on
numerous other occasions for his complaints of cracked skin, back pain, and right arm pain.
Although Plaintiff’s four sick call requests were cancelled in October 2016, his medications, to
the extent medically permissible,3 were able to be renewed without being seen in sick call.4 The
medical records reveal that Plaintiff was provided timely and appropriate care for his chronic
constipation and his requests that his stool softener be renewed in October 2016 were granted.
Further, in response to Plaintiff’s November 16, 2016, sick call request, Defendant Barnes met
with him the following day and explained that FiberLax would be renewed but Colace was not
able to be renewed.
What medical treatment should be undertaken is within the appropriate discretion of the

correctional health care provider, and as long as that judgment is meaningfully and
appropriately exercised, such treatment will satisfy the Eighth Amendment. Here, while
Plaintiff faults Defendant Barnes for cancelling his sick call requests, the undisputed summary
judgment record reflects that his requested medication was renewed to the extent medically
appropriate.
The record is clear that at most, Plaintiff’s claims of deliberate indifference amount to a
mere disagreement with the treatment he was provided – or a misunderstanding of how

3 Colace was not renewed per Dr. Naji’s August 16, 2016 order. Plaintiff’s prescriptions
could only be renewed as determined by the medical director’s judgment.

4 It is worth noting that having his prescriptions renewed in this fashion allowed Plaintiff
to receive what he was asking for without having to pay any co-pay.
medications can be renewed – which is not sufficient to substantiate a claim of deliberate
indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This Court finds no support in the summary
judgment record that the medical treatment Plaintiff received amounted to deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. Rather, the record reveals remarkable attentiveness to

all of Plaintiff’s serious medical needs on the part of Defendant Barnes and the medical staff at
SCI-Houtzdale.
V. Conclusion
The Court finds that the summary judgment record is void of any plausible evidence
from which a fact finder could find that Defendant Barnes was ever deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted to Defendant
Barnes. An appropriate Order follows.

s/Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: December 18, 2020

cc: RICHARD LONEY BOOZER, SR.
CS-5766
SCI HOUTZDALE
P.O. BOX 1000
209 Institution Drive
Houtzdale, PA 16698-1000
(via U.S. First Class Mail)

All Counsel of Record
(via ECF electronic notification)

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10416140. Public record. Not legal advice.