# NATIONWIDE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE CO. v. ROCKFORD COMMERCIAL WAREHOUSE, INC.

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · April 28, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10415540

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 28, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10415540

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the court could not link the events at issue in that case “to [defendant’s] deliberate activities aimed at Pennsylvania.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NATIONWIDE PROPERTY & )
CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., as subrogee ) 2:18-cv-01458-RJC
of, Gregory Beaver d/b/a/ Beaver’s Tire )
Service, and GREGORY BEAVER, d/b/a/ )
Beaver’s Tire Center, ) Judge Robert J. Colville
)

)
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. )
)
ROCKFORD COMMERCIAL )
WAREHOUSE, INC. d/b/a ROCKFORD )
CONSUMER PRODUCTS, CARKU )
TECHNOLOGY, LLC, and SHENZHEN )
CARKU TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., )
)

)
Defendants,
)

OPINION
Robert J. Colville, United States District Court Judge
Before the Court are Renewed Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (ECF
Nos. 41 and 46) filed by Defendant Rockford Commercial Warehouse, Inc. (“Rockford”) and
Defendant Shenzhen Carku Technology Co. Ltd. (“Shenzhen Carku”). In response to these
Motions, Plaintiffs seek transfer of this action to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, which they assert has personal jurisdiction over all Defendants. Pls.’ Resp. to
Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss 3, ECF No. 48. This matter has been fully briefed and is now
ripe for consideration.
I. Factual Background & Procedural History
This action arises out of a fire that occurred at Plaintiff Gregory Beaver’s automotive repair
shop, Beaver’s Tire Service, located at 8465 State Route 22, New Alexandria, Pennsylvania. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 13, 18, ECF No. 4. At all material times, Plaintiff Nationwide Property and Casualty
Insurance insured Beaver’s Tire Service. Id. at ¶14. Plaintiffs Nationwide Property and Casualty

Insurance and Gregory Beaver (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege that the fire at issue was caused
by a jump starter (the “Jump Starter”), and specifically a Rockford Consumer Products Pocket
Power Jump Starter Model No.: RFDPPJS2976DLX. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 19, ECF No. 4. Plaintiffs
allege that the Jump Starter was manufactured, designed, distributed, marketed, sold, and/or
assembled by Defendants Rockford, Shenzhen Carku, and/or Carku Technology, LLC (“Carku,
LLC”). Am. Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 4. Plaintiffs have clarified their allegations in stating that
discovery has revealed that the Jump Starter was manufactured by Shenzhen Carku, and was
shipped to and then distributed by Rockford. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss 2,
ECF No. 48. Plaintiffs aver that the Jump Starter was defective and dangerous, and assert claims

against Defendants sounding in negligence and strict liability. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-36.
Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) on November 13, 2018.
Rockford filed an Answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11) on December 14, 2018,
and Shenzhen Carku filed an Answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (ECF No. 19) on April
15, 2019. Rockford and Shenzhen Carku also previously filed materially similar Motions to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (ECF Nos. 27 and 32).1 In response to these Motions,

1 The Answer (ECF No. 19) and Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 32) filed on behalf of Shenzhen Carku were also
purportedly filed on behalf of Carku, LLC. The Court notes, however, that counsel for Shenzhen Carku filed Motions
to Withdraw as Carku, LLC’s counsel in which counsel averred that: 1) Carku, LLC is dissolved; 2) while the
insurance carrier that had retained counsel initially stated that both Carku, LLC and Shenzhen Carku were covered
under the applicable policy, only Shenzhen Carku is in fact covered under the policy; 3) Shenzhen Carku has no
business relationship with Carku, LLC; and 4) while counsel has been in contact with their client Shenzhen Carku,
counsel has had no contact with a representative of Carku, LLC. Mot. to Withdraw ¶¶ 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11-14, ECF Nos.
Plaintiffs requested an opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery, and alternately moved for
transfer of this action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Pls.’
Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 35. On July 18, 2019, the Court denied Defendants’ Motions
to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 27 and 32) without prejudice, and granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Jurisdictional Discovery. Order, ECF No. 37.

Following the period of jurisdictional discovery permitted by the Court’s July 18, 2019
Order (ECF No. 37), Rockford and Shenzhen Carku each filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (ECF Nos. 41 and 46). Rockford and Shenzhen Carku argue that
this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over any Defendant in this matter. Plaintiffs filed a
“Response to Defendants’ Renewed Motions to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs’ Request to Transfer this
Matter to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois” (ECF No. 48) on
November 19, 2019. Plaintiffs oppose dismissal of this action, but do not advance any argument
as to why this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Rather, Plaintiffs renew their
request that this Court transfer this matter to the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, which Plaintiffs assert has personal jurisdiction over all Defendants. Rockford
filed a Reply in Support of its Renewed Motion (ECF No. 49) on November 22, 2019. Rockford
does not oppose transfer to the Northern District of Illinois, but argues that any such transfer may
only be effected pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Rockford’s Reply in Supp. 1, ECF No. 49.
Shenzhen Carku filed a Reply in Support of its Renewed Motion on November 25, 2019.
Shenzhen Carku opposes transfer to the Northern District of Illinois, and argues that the United

38, 39. Counsel were permitted to withdraw on August 26, 2019. Order, ECF No. 40. Carku, LLC is currently
unrepresented, and, in light of the representations set forth above, may not have appeared before this Court in any
fashion to date.
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois does not have personal jurisdiction over
Shenzhen Carku. Reply in Supp. 1-3, ECF No. 50.
II. Legal Standard
“[I]n reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), we ‘must accept all of the
plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.’” Pinker v. Roche

Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan,
954 F.2d 141, 142 n. 1 (3d Cir.1992)). Once a defendant has properly raised a jurisdictional
defense, however, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, either by sworn affidavits or other
competent evidence, sufficient contacts with the forum state to establish personal jurisdiction.
North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning Natural Gas Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir.1990) (per curiam).
“[W]hen the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need
only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction and the plaintiff is entitled to have its
allegations taken as true and all factual disputes drawn in its favor.” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v.
Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368

(3d Cir. 2002)).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, district courts are authorized to exercise
personal jurisdiction over non-residents to the extent permissible under the law of the state in
which the district court is located. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning Nat. Gas
Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir. 1990). In exercising personal jurisdiction, the court must first
ascertain whether jurisdiction exists under the forum state’s long-arm jurisdiction statute and then
determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d
481, 489-90 (3d Cir.1985). This inquiry has been collapsed in Pennsylvania, as the Pennsylvania
long-arm statute provides that: “the jurisdiction of the tribunals of this Commonwealth shall extend
to all persons . . . to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may
be based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution
of the United States.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322(b); Van Buskirk, 760 F.2d at 490. The reach of the
Pennsylvania long-arm statute is thus “coextensive” with the due process clause. North Penn Gas,

897 F.2d at 690. The due process clause permits the court to assert personal jurisdictional over a
nonresident defendant who has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of [a] suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotations omitted).
III. Discussion
Initially, Plaintiffs have seemingly abandoned any argument that this Court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any Defendant in this matter. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’
Renewed Motions to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs’ Request to Transfer this Matter to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (ECF No. 48) advances no argument and

introduces no evidence to support this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over any
Defendant, but rather opines that Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern
District of Illinois. Because Rockford and Shenzhen Carku have raised jurisdictional defenses,
Plaintiffs’ bear the burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. North Penn
Gas Co. v. Corning Natural Gas Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir.1990) (per curiam). In
requesting to conduct jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiffs explained:
Here, whether there is specific jurisdiction over the defendants will depend
on their business activities relating to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Specifically, those activities that caused and/or allowed the jump starter to be
shipped to and sold in Pennsylvania. This will involve discovery of the bills of
lading, purchase orders, invoices, dealings, marketing materials, and contracts with
any third party distributors and/or purchasers doing business with the defendants.
This type of discovery will be narrowly tailored and will reveal whether the
defendants were aware their product was being shipped to and sold in Pennsylvania,
whether they sought to do business in Pennsylvania, and whether they purposefully
availed themselves of Pennsylvania and its marketplace.

Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, and Pls’ Req. for Limited Jurisdictional Disc. 4, ECF No.
35. Following the period of discovery permitted by Court Order (ECF No. 37), Plaintiffs have
advanced no argument as to why this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants,
and instead request a transfer. Such can be considered a concession that the jurisdictional
discovery at issue does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction by this Court.2 In any
event, for the reasons discussed below, this Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established a prima
facie case that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any Defendant in the present
matter.
A. Personal Jurisdiction in Pennsylvania
“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)
corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” BNSF Ry.
Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126
(2014)). The “paradigm” forums where a corporate defendant is at home are the corporate
defendant’s place of incorporation and its principal place of business. BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct.
at 1558 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)). “The exercise of general jurisdiction is not
limited to these forums; in an ‘exceptional case,’ a corporate defendant’s operations in another

2 Plaintiffs’ reliance on 28 U.S.C. §1631 further indicates that Plaintiffs concede that this Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over Defendants.
forum ‘may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that
State.’” Id. (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19).
Plaintiffs do not set forth allegations or evidence which establish a prima facie case that
any Defendant is incorporated in Pennsylvania or has its principal place of business in
Pennsylvania, or that any Defendant has systematic and continuous contacts with this forum. As

such, there is no basis in the present matter to conclude that any of the foreign corporation
Defendants are at home in this forum. Accordingly, this Court concludes that, in the present action,
it does not have general personal jurisdiction over any Defendant.
Specific jurisdiction is appropriate only if the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of a
defendant’s forum-related activities, “such that the defendant ‘should reasonably expect being
haled into court’” in that forum. Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consolidated Fiber Glass Prod.
Inc., 75 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)). The Third Circuit has explained the three-part
analysis for specific jurisdiction. “First, the defendant must have ‘purposefully directed [its]

activities’ at the forum. Second, the litigation must ‘arise out of or relate to’ at least one of those
activities. And third, if the prior two requirements are met, a court may consider whether the
exercise of jurisdiction otherwise ‘comport[s] with fair play and substantial justice.’” O’Connor
v. Sandy Lane Hotel, 496 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). To find that a
plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant's contacts with the forum state, the Third
Circuit requires “a closer and more direct causal connection than that provided by the but-for test.”
Id. However, the required causal connection is looser than the tort concept of proximate causation.
Id. (citing Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 99-100 (3d. Cir.2004). The appropriate
analysis is fact-intensive, focusing on the “reciprocity principle upon which specific jurisdiction
rests” -- whether the defendant received the benefits and protections of a state’s laws to the extent
that it should, as a quid pro quo, submit to the burden of litigation in the state. Id. at 323.
Following review of the pleadings and the entire record in this matter, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have set forth no allegations and/or evidence with regard to Carku, LLC’s contacts with
this forum. Further, the exhibits attached to Plaintiffs’ Response (ECF No. 48) are exclusively

targeted toward establishing personal jurisdiction over Rockford and Shenzhen Carku in the
Northern District of Illinois, and do not support a finding that any Defendant purposefully directed
activities to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The only allegation which arguably supports
this Court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants is that the Jump Starter
caused a fire in Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs’ allegations, and the Exhibits attached to Plaintiffs’
Response (ECF No. 48), however, do not sufficiently establish that the Jump Starter’s eventual
presence in this forum is a result of Defendants’ purposeful activities specifically directed at
Pennsylvania.3 See D'Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94,
103 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that the court could not link the events at issue in that case “to

[defendant’s] deliberate activities aimed at Pennsylvania.”)). As such, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of setting forth a prima facie case that Defendants purposefully
directed its activities at this forum. Accordingly, the Court finds that, in the present action, it does
not have personal jurisdiction over any Defendant.
B. Transfer
Plaintiffs request that this Court transfer this action to the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610 of this title or
an appeal, including a petition for review of administrative action, is noticed for or

3 See Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A at 6; Ex. B at 6, ECF No. 48 (discovery responses indicating
that neither Rockford nor Shenzhen Carku can explain how the Jump Starter eventually made its way to Pennsylvania).
filed with such a court and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the
court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any
other such court (or, for cases within the jurisdiction of the United States Tax Court,
to that court) in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it
was filed or noticed, and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in
or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was
actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is transferred.

28 U.S.C. § 1631. The Third Circuit has explained that a district court which lacks personal
jurisdiction over a defendant can transfer a case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. D'Jamoos ex rel.
Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 107 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Island Insteel
Sys., Inc. v. Waters, 296 F.3d 200, 218 n.9 (3d Cir. 2002)). Thus, transfer is appropriate in this
action if: 1) the action originally could have been brought in the Northern District of Illinois; and
2) transfer is in the interest of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
1. Could this Action have been Brought in the Northern District of Illinois?
The requirement that the action originally could have been brought in the transferee district
is satisfied if “venue is proper in the transferee district and if the transferee court could have
properly exercised personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the action.” Covelman v. Hotel
St. Regis, No. 14-5757 (RBK/KMW), 2016 WL 762661, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2016) (citing Shutte
v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 24 (3d Cir. 1970)). The party seeking transfer must establish
a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction in the transferee forum to satisfy the requirement that
the case could have been brought in the transferee forum. D'Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff
v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 109 (3d Cir. 2009). “The plaintiff meets this burden and
presents a prima facie case for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by ‘establishing with reasonable
particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.’” Mellon Bank (E.)
PSFS, Nat. Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Provident Nat. Bank v.
California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 819 F.2d 434 (3d Cir.1987)).
a. Venue and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Venue is proper over Shenzhen Carku, a company “organized and existing under the laws
of the People’s Republic of China,”4 in any district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3). See
In re HTC Corp., 889 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[V]enue laws (as opposed to
requirements of personal jurisdiction) do not restrict the location of suits against alien defendants,

unless Congress has specifically provided otherwise.”). Rockford and Carku, LLC are
corporations and “reside in any district where they are subject to personal jurisdiction.” Lehr v.
Stryker Corp., No. CIV.A. 09-02989, 2010 WL 3069633, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2010) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c)). Thus, if the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
has personal jurisdiction over these Defendants, that forum is also a proper venue. Further, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois would have original subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as the amount in controversy in
this matter exceeds $75,000 and this civil action is between citizens of different states. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 1-9; ECF No. 4. The Court must thus address the issue of whether the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants in
this matter.
b. Personal Jurisdiction
“[T]he Illinois long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction to the full extent
permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, so here the state statutory and
federal constitutional inquiries merge.” Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 2010)
(internal citation omitted). The key inquiry is “whether the defendants have sufficient ‘minimum
contacts’ with Illinois such that the maintenance of the suit ‘does not offend traditional notions of

4 Shenzhen Carku’s Answer ¶ 8, ECF No. 19.
fair play and substantial justice.’” Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 700-01 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, (1945)).
Rockford is incorporated in Illinois and its principal place of business is 8105 Burden Road,
Machesney Park, Illinois, 61115. Schuster Decl. Ex. A at 3-4, ECF No. 43. Accordingly,
Rockford is at home in the Northern District of Illinois, and the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois has general personal jurisdiction over Rockford. BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017). Further, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Carku, LLC’s state
of incorporation was Illinois, and have advanced uncontroverted evidence which supports the
same. Am. Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 4; Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Ex. B, ECF No. 35.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have set forth a prima facie case that Carku, LLC is subject to general
personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Illinois. See Midlantic Nat. Bank v. Hansen, 48
F.3d 693, 696 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[A]n ‘inactive’ corporation (that is, a corporation conducting no
business activities) has no principal place of business, and is instead a citizen of its state of
incorporation only.”).

Plaintiffs argue that Shenzhen Carku is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in the
Northern District of Illinois. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss 8, ECF No. 48. After
review of the entire record in this matter, the Court finds the following facts to be relevant to the
question of specific jurisdiction in the Northern District of Illinois:
The Jump Starter was a Rockford Consumer Products Pocket Power Jump Starter Model
No.: RFDPPJS2976DLX.5 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 19, ECF No. 4. The line of jump starters at issue
was first manufactured in 2012. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A at 7, ECF
No. 48. Shenzhen Carku is a corporation that is incorporated in and has its principal place of

5 For ease of reference, the Court shall refer to this product line as the “line of jump starters at issue.”
business in China. Id. at 3-4. Shenzhen Carku is in the business of manufacture and trade, and is
the original equipment manufacturer of “Rockford jump starters.” Id. at 4. Shenzhen Carku admits
that it manufactured the line of jump starters at issue, but denies that it designed these jump starters.
Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. G at 4, ECF No. 48. At the times relevant to
this lawsuit, Shenzhen Carku was a party to a “Sales Contract” (“the contract”) with an entity

identified in the contract as “STC Int’l, Shanghai, Sun Tech Limited” (“STC”),6 wherein STC and
Shenzhen Carku agreed that STC would distribute Shenzhen Carku’s products to North America.
Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. D at 1, ECF No. 48. Shenzhen Carku has
described the relationship between Shenzhen Carku, STC, and Rockford as follows:
It is admitted that Shenzhen Carku receives purchase orders from STC and ships
the ordered product, that may include Rockford Consumer Products jump starters,
to multiple distributors, including Sun Tech Limited in Hong Kong. Sun Tech
Limited then ships the jump starters to Rockford Commercial Warehouse, Inc., who
is a distributor of the jump starters in the United States.

Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. G at 4, ECF No. 48.
Shenzhen Carku does not sell jump starters to the United States market directly. Pls.’ Resp.
to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A at 5, ECF No. 48. It has sold more than 5,000,000 jump
starters since the beginning of 2012. Id. The contract between STC and Shenzhen Carku provides
that Shenzhen Carku is the “automobile emergency jump starter manufacturer,” and that STC is
their “distributor to purchase [Shenzhen Carku’s] manufactured product to directly or indirectly
sell to [the] North American Market.” Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. D at 1,
ECF No. 48. A graphic provided in the contract provides the following:

6 Rockford refers to STC as “Super Test Corporation,” while Shenzen Carku refers to STC as “Sun Tech Limited.”
See Rockford’s Br. in Supp. 3, ECF No. 42; Shenzhen Carku’s Br. in Supp. 4, ECF No. 47. While it is not clear where
this disagreement over STC’s name stems from, the parties’ filings make clear that they are referring to the same
entity, and that STC is a foreign distributor of jump starters.
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Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.” Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. D at 6, ECF No. 48. Notably, Rockford is
explicitly identified in this image in the second tier of the distribution ladder, directly below only
Shenzhen Carku, and on the same tier as STC, who is described as Rockford’s “mother company
in Hong Kong.” Id. Rockford lists “STC International” and “Rockford Consumer Products” as
two of its active “assumed names,” according to the Illinois Secretary of State database. Pls.’
Resp. to Defs.” Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. B at 2, ECF No. 48.
In support of its original Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 32), Shenzhen Carku attached the
Declaration of Michael Zhang, the General Manager of Shenzhen Carku, which provided:
Shenzhen Carku’s distributor for power starters, Rockford, is an independent
corporation, incorporated in Illinois with its principal place of business in Illinois.
Rockford is responsible for the distribution of Shenzhen Carku jump starters in the

13

United States and purchases the tools it sells from Shenzhen Carku in China via
purchase order. Rockford is a party to this lawsuit.

Mot. to Dismiss Ex. C at ¶ 9, ECF No. 32.7
Rockford “forwarded” the jump starters to third parties at several locations within the
United States at the direction of STC, though Rockford’s representative could not recall the
number of shipments Rockford made or the dates of such shipments. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed
Mot. to Dismiss Ex. B at 5, ECF No. 48. Rockford forwarded some shipments to “Integrated
Supply Network,” a Florida company which Rockford avers has ten facilities in the United States,
but none in Pennsylvania. Id. Rockford also forwarded jump starters to “Medco,” a company it
fails to identify other than by name. Id. Rockford asserts that it did not sell or make money on
jump starters, but rather did so as a way of “helping” STC. Id.
Plaintiffs have submitted two invoices which evidence that two shipments of 10,0000 units
each of the line of jump starters at issue were shipped from SLC to Rockford on May 2, 2014 and
May 15, 2014 respectively. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. C. The May 15,
2014 invoice (No. ISN-SHA14012A to J ’CU’) indicates that the shipment was sent from
“Shenzhen, China,” and the total price listed is $237,600.00. Id. The 10,000 total units are
itemized into smaller quantity orders, all of which provide for a purchase price and are listed under
the heading: “FOR ISN SHIPMENT.” Id. The May 2, 2014 invoice (No. ISN-SHA14009A to J
’CU’) indicates that the shipment was sent from “Shanghai, China,” and the total price listed was
$232,200.00. Id. The 10,000 total units are also itemized into smaller quantity orders, but the

smaller quantity orders are not listed under a “FOR ISN SHIPMENT” heading. Id.

7 Paragraph 11 clarifies that Shenzhen Carku sells the products to a distributor, presumably STC, who forwards the
products to the United States. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. C at ¶ 11, ECF No. 32.
Rockford asserts that it responded to customer inquiries regarding lost and/or broken jump
starters in only 2013 and 2014. Id. at 7. This assertion is seemingly belied by three email
correspondences from May 2016 involving Adam Clayton, owner and president of Rockford,
attached to Plaintiffs’ Response (ECF No. 48) as Exhibits E, F, and J. These email exchanges are
largely difficult to follow, as they involve numerous individuals, utilize several unexplained

abbreviations, and mostly fail to identify the title or the employer of the individuals who sent the
emails, as well as the title or employer of individuals to whom the substance of the emails refer.
It is clear, however, that representatives from STC and Rockford discussed, via email, a May 2016
visit to Rockford by Leon, a Shenzhen Carku employee,8 to address issues with products identified
as “Rockford brand” and “RFD2976” at Rockford.9 Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss
Ex. E 3-4, ECF No. 48. Exhibit F sets forth Leon’s itinerary. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot.
to Dismiss Ex. F, ECF No. 48. Exhibit J confirms that Leon performed work while at Rockford,
apparently performing work on approximately 6,000-7,000 jump starters. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’
Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. J at 1, ECF No. 48.

Neither Rockford nor Shenzhen Carku is aware of the method by which the Jump Starter
eventually arrived in Pennsylvania. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A at 6; Ex.
B at 6, ECF No. 48. Rockford is unaware whether the Jump Starter was one that it had forwarded,
but asserts that Rockford never shipped jump starters directly to Pennsylvania, and that it did not

8 The email address for “Leon,” per Exhibit F, is sales02@carku.com. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss
Ex. F, ECF No. 48. The email exchange attached to Plaintiffs’ Response as Exhibit J clearly identifies Leon as a
“Shenzhen Carku Technology Co.,Ltd” employee with the email address of sales02@carku.com. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’
Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. J, ECF No. 48. Shenzhen Carku also admits that a Shenzhen Carku representative
visited Rockford in 2016 to provide “support service.” Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. G at 6-7,
ECF No. 48
9 The Court notes again that the line of jump starters at issue is the Rockford Consumer Products Pocket Power Jump
Starter Model No.: RFDPPJS2976DLX. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 19, ECF No. 4
ship jump starters to the retailer from which Plaintiffs purportedly purchased the Jump Starter.
Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. B at 4, ECF No. 48.
The party seeking transfer must establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction in the
transferee forum to satisfy the requirement that the case could have been brought in the transferee
forum. D'Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 109 (3d Cir.

2009). “In evaluating whether the prima facie standard has been satisfied, the plaintiff ‘is entitled
to the resolution in its favor of all disputes concerning relevant facts presented in the record.’”
Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir.1983)).
The Seventh Circuit has explained that “specific personal jurisdiction is appropriate where
(1) the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at the forum state or purposefully availed
himself of the privilege of conducting business in that state, and (2) the alleged injury arises out
of the defendant’s forum-related activities.” Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir.
2010) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). “The exercise of

specific personal jurisdiction must also comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice as required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Tamburo, 601 F.3d at
702 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
Plaintiffs assert that the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has
specific personal jurisdiction over Shenzhen Carku under the stream of commerce theory of
establishing personal jurisdiction. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss 9, ECF No. 48.
Shenzhen Carku asserts that it does not directly sell or ship jump starters to any United States
forum, and that it has no way of determining whether the Jump Starter at issue was sent to
Rockford. Shenzhen Carku’s Br. in Supp. 13-14, ECF No. 47. Shenzhen Carku argues that it thus
cannot be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in any United States forum related to the sale of
the Jump Starter. Id. at 12. Shenzhen Carku further argues that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury does not
arise from Shenzhen Carku’s purposefully directed direct activities towards Illinois. Id.
“If a defendant delivers products into a stream of commerce, originating outside the forum

state, with the awareness or expectation that some of the products will be purchased in the forum
state, that defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction in the forum state.” Jennings v. AC
Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)). Courts utilize two different approaches, both of which
originate from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court of California, Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102 (1987), in determining whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory is appropriate. Justice O’Connor’s lead
Opinion in Asahi, which was joined by three Justices, articulated the first approach:
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an
act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. Additional
conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in
the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum
State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular
advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a
distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State. But a
defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product
into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the
stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
Justice Brennan’s concurring Opinion in Asahi, also joined by three Justices, explained that
personal jurisdiction based upon a defendant’s placement of a product into the stream of commerce
is consistent with the Due Process Clause as long as the defendant “is aware that the final product
is being marketed in the forum State.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California,
Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
In J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011), Justice Kennedy delivered a
plurality Opinion which rejected Justice Brennan’s approach, and explained that a “defendant’s
transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to

have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted
that its goods will reach the forum State.” J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882
(2011). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has explained that,
“[b]ecause a majority of the justices did not support Justice Kennedy's opinion, it is not
controlling,” and that “the Seventh Circuit has not taken a position on the appropriate stream-of-
commerce test, except to the extent that the court in [Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941
(7th Cir. 1992)] indicated that it would continue applying Justice Brennan’s ‘more permissive’
stream-of-commerce approach until a majority of the Supreme Court rejected it.” In re
Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prod. Liab. Litig. Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, No. 14

C 1748, 2016 WL 5890022, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2016) (quoting Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks,
963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992)).
In the present case, it makes no difference which stream of commerce approach the Court
applies because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden at this stage of the
proceedings of establishing a prima facie case of Shenzhen Carku’s minimum contacts with Illinois
under the more stringent approach applied by Justice O’Connor in Asahi.
Plaintiffs have set forth evidence which shows that at least 20,000 units of the line of jump
starters at issue were shipped to Rockford from STC over the course of a two-week period during
the relevant timeframe. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. C. While Shenzhen
Carku is not directly referenced in the invoices at issue, the product referred to by the invoices is
the exact Shenzhen Carku-manufactured line of jump starters at issue in this litigation, and is one
of the products contemplated by the contract between Shenzhen Carku and STC. See Pls.’ Resp.
to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. C; Ex. D at 5, ECF No. 48. The shipment from STC to
Rockford evidenced by the invoices is also the exact method of distribution prescribed by the

contract between Shenzhen Carku and STC. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex.
D at 6, ECF No. 48. At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiffs are “entitled to the resolution in
its favor of all disputes concerning relevant facts presented in the record.” Purdue Research
Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir.1983)). The Court is
satisfied that these invoices evidence shipment of 20,000 units of the line of jump starters at issue
to Illinois consistent with and pursuant to the contract between Shenzhen Carku and STC.
Accordingly, Shenzhen Carku clearly placed the line of jump starters at issue into the stream of
commerce, and 20,000 units of the line of jump starters were shipped to Illinois.

Under Justice O’Connor’s approach in Asahi, additional conduct indicating an intent to
serve the market in the forum state is required under the stream of commerce theory before a court
may exercise personal jurisdiction. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano
Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). In Asahi, Justice O’Connor explained:
Assuming, arguendo, that respondents have established Asahi’s awareness that
some of the valves sold to Cheng Shin would be incorporated into tire tubes sold in
California, respondents have not demonstrated any action by Asahi to purposefully
avail itself of the California market. Asahi does not do business in California. It
has no office, agents, employees, or property in California. It does not advertise or
otherwise solicit business in California. It did not create, control, or employ the
distribution system that brought its valves to California.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. See also Nelson by Carson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1126 (7th
Cir. 1983) (“[E]ven though Bunnan and United did not originate the distribution system and do
not control it, they did place the flannel shirts in and move them along a stream of commerce
destined for retail sale throughout the United States in Woolworth's retail stores. In determining
whether it is reasonable to hale Bunnan and United into court in Wisconsin, a critical fact is

whether those defendants were aware of that distribution system.”).
At all times relevant herein, Shenzhen Carku and STC were parties to a contract which
provided that STC would distribute products manufactured by Shenzhen Carku, including the line
of jump starters at issue, to North America. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. D
at 1; 5, ECF No. 48. Rockford, an entity incorporated in Illinois and whose principal place of
business is Illinois, is explicitly listed in the contract, directly under Shenzhen Carku, on the same
distribution tier as STC, which is described as Rockford’s “mother company in Hong Kong.” Pls.’
Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. D at 6, ECF No. 48. See also Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’
Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. G at 4, ECF No. 48 (“It is admitted that Shenzhen Carku receives

purchase orders from STC and ships the ordered product, that may include Rockford Consumer
Products jump starters, to multiple distributors, including [STC] in Hong Kong. [STC] then ships
the jump starters to [Rockford], who is a distributor of the jump starters in the United States.”).
These facts demonstrate that Shenzhen Carku, in entering into a distribution contract with
STC, created and directed the distribution system of the line of jump starters at issue specifically
to Illinois. Shenzhen Carku did not merely place the line of jump starters at issue into the stream
of commerce with the awareness that the jump starters may eventually be sold in Illinois, but rather
expressly permitted and purposefully directed distribution of such jump starters directly to the state
of Illinois. That Shenzhen Carku did not send the units themselves, but instead used a foreign
distributor, does not alter the fact that Shenzhen Carku is party to a contract that expressly directs
shipment of the jump starter line at issue to Illinois. This Court finds that the creation by contract
of the specific distribution system at issue constitutes additional conduct on the part of Shenzhen
Carku indicating an intent to serve the market in Illinois.10 In light of the foregoing, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs have set forth a prima facie showing that Shenzhen Carku placed the line of

jump starters at issue into the stream of commerce, and that Shenzhen Carku purposefully directed
the distribution of those products to Illinois and availed itself of the privilege of conducting
business in Illinois.
The Court must next consider whether the alleged injury arises out of Shenzhen Carku’s
forum-related activities. Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). Because Plaintiffs are not Illinois residents
and because the alleged injury took place in Pennsylvania, Plaintiffs need to establish a link
between the Jump Starter which caused the injury at issue and Shenzhen Carku’s forum-related
activities. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137

S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (“What is needed—and what is missing here—is a connection between
the forum and the specific claims at issue.”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ argument that “each contact
discussed above was directly related to Shenzhen Carku’s sale of defective [j]ump [s]tarters, which
is the issue giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims[,]” does not assert the kind of direct connection required
by the Supreme Court’s holding in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San
Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). In spite of this, Plaintiffs set forth sufficient allegations

10 While the Court finds that this alone is sufficient to satisfy the “additional conduct” requirement, the Court also
notes that a Shenzhen Carku representative traveled from China to Illinois provide support service with respect to
jump starters at Rockford in May 2016. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Ex. E, F, and J; Ex. G at 6-7,
ECF No. 48. This support service provided by Shenzhen Carku for the line of jump starters at issue in Illinois alone
may not constitute sufficient additional conduct indicating an intent to serve the Illinois market, but certainly tends to
indicate such an intent when considered in addition to the facts discussed above.
and evidence to establish a prima facie showing that this action arises out of Shenzhen Carku’s
Illinois contacts.
Plaintiffs allege that Rockford distributed the Jump Starter. Am. Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 4;
Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss 2, ECF No. 48. Plaintiffs also set forth evidence
that tends to establish that Rockford did, during the timeframe relevant to this case, distribute the

line of jump starters at issue within the United States. Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to
Dismiss Ex. B at 5; Ex. G at 4, ECF No. 48. Further, there is no evidence before the Court that
establishes that any other United States distribution channel, to the extent the same exists, is
responsible for the Jump Starter’s distribution. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have, at this preliminary
stage of the proceedings, set forth a prima facie showing that their claims arise out of Shenzhen
Carku’s forum-related activities.
“The exercise of specific personal jurisdiction must also comport with traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice as required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.” Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of

Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In considering
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice, “the
following factors are relevant: ‘the burden on the defendant, the forum State’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and
the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.’”
Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 709 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)).
“When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum
in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.”
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
The Court acknowledges that traveling to the United States for the present case presents a
burden to Shenzhen Carku as a foreign Defendant. The Court notes, however, that Shenzhen Carku
has raised no argument with respect to the extent of this burden. The Court further notes that a

Shenzhen Carku representative has traveled to Illinois to provide support with respect to the line
of jump starters at issue, and Shenzhen Carku itself obtained an insurance policy in Illinois.
Further, while Plaintiffs are not Illinois residents, Plaintiffs will be required to litigate in Illinois
with respect to two other Defendants in this matter, and certainly have an interest in litigating all
of their claims in one forum within the United States. Illinois also has an interest in applying its
product liability laws. See Kopfman v. Ensign Ribbon Burners, LLC, 803 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919
(N.D. Ill. 2011). Accordingly, this Court finds that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois over Shenzhen Carku comports
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

For all of the reasons discussed above, this Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden
of establishing a prima facie case that the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois has personal jurisdiction over Shenzhen Carku.11 12 Accordingly, transfer is appropriate if
transfer is in the interest of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1631.

11 Because this Court finds that the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has specific
personal jurisdiction over Shenzhen Carku, the Court shall not address whether that Court may also exercise general
personal jurisdiction over Shenzhen Carku. As such, the Court did not, in reaching its decision, consider the fact that
Shenzhen Carku acquired an insurance policy in Illinois that lists an Illinois mailing address for Shenzhen Carku or
the screenshot of Shenzhen Carku’s purported website that features a United States office with an Illinois address.
This Court finds that such facts are related to general, as opposed to specific, jurisdiction.
12 The Court notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has described the standard of review
for a motion to dismiss challenging personal jurisdiction as follows:

If personal jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(2), the court must decide whether any
material facts are in dispute. If so, it must hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve them, at which
2. Interest of Justice
The Court concludes that, in the present case, transfer is in the interest of justice. Should
this Court transfer this action, Plaintiffs will not have to pay a filing fee in the Northern District of
Illinois. Further, transfer will prevent the statute of limitations from resuming with respect to
Plaintiffs’ claims. These factors weigh in favor of transfer. Covelman v. Hotel St. Regis, No. 14-

5757 (RBK/KMW), 2016 WL 762661, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2016) (“Doing so would prevent
Plaintiffs from paying another filing fee, and it would prevent the statute of limitations from
resuming. These factors indicate that a transfer is in the interest of justice.”). Further, transfer, as
opposed to dismissal, provides the most efficient path forward for this litigation, as dismissal
would require Plaintiffs to refile their action in another forum and require the parties to refile their
respective Answers. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466–67 (1962) (applying 28
U.S.C.A. § 1406(a), but employing a similar “interest of justice” analysis and explaining that “[t]he
section is thus in accord with the general purpose which has prompted many of the procedural
changes of the past few years—that of removing whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious

point the party asserting personal jurisdiction must prove what it alleged. Until such a hearing takes
place, the party asserting personal jurisdiction need only make out a prima facie case of personal
jurisdiction.

Hyatt Int’l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Tobin for Governor v. Illinois State Bd. of
Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir.2001); 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure, § 1351, pp. 226–27 (2d ed. Supp.2001)). “When the district court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine
jurisdiction, the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Purdue Research Found. v.
Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Hyatt, 302 F.3d at 713).
This Court has not conducted an evidentiary hearing, and the Court’s review has been limited to whether the
facts contained in the record establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction such that transfer is appropriate. See
D'Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 109 (3d Cir. 2009) (the party seeking
transfer must establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction in the transferee forum to satisfy the requirement
that the case could have been brought in the transferee forum). The Court notes that it enters its Order in this matter
without prejudice such that the transferee District Court can conduct an evidentiary hearing, if and when it determines
the same is appropriate, to determine whether the higher standard of preponderance of the evidence is met. See Marine
Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1981) (“Eventually, of course, the plaintiff must establish
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, either at a pretrial evidentiary hearing or at trial. But until such a
hearing is held, a prima facie showing suffices, notwithstanding any controverting presentation by the moving party,
to defeat the motion.” (citations omitted)).
and orderly adjudication of cases and controversies on their merits.”). Accordingly, the Court
finds that transfer is in the interest of justice.
IV. Conclusion
This Court finds that it does not have personal jurisdiction over any Defendant in this
matter. Plaintiffs have, however, met their burden of establishing a prima facie showing that the

United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has personal jurisdiction over each
of the Defendants. Further, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims, and is an appropriate venue. Accordingly,
the Court will deny the Renewed Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (ECF Nos.
41 and 46) filed by Rockford and Shenzhen Carku, and will grant Plaintiffs’ Request to Transfer
this Matter to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (ECF No. 48).
The Court shall transfer this action to the Western Division, which is the home forum of Defendant
Rockford. An appropriate Order of Court follows.
BY THE COURT:

s/Robert J. Colville____________
Robert J. Colville
United States District Court Judge

DATED: April 28, 2020

cc/ecf: All counsel of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10415540. Public record. Not legal advice.