# Soto-Santana v. Wengen

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · May 3, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10414675

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 3, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EDWIN SOTO-SANTANA, et al., : Civ. No. 3:23-CV-1819
:
Plaintiffs, :
:
v. : (Magistrate Judge Bloom)
:
STEPHAN WENGEN, :
:
Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
This case comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss
filed by the defendant, Stephan Wengen. (Doc. 11). The plaintiffs, Edwin
Soto-Santana and Yanahira Soto, filed this action against Wengen, an
officer with the Wilkes-Barre City Police Department, alleging claims of
false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. (Doc. 1). These claims arose from the
plaintiffs’ January 2023 arrest for defiant trespass after the charges
against them were ultimately dismissed. ( ).
Wengen has now moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the
plaintiffs’ claims against him fail as a matter of law. (Doc. 11). After
consideration, we agree and will grant the defendant’s motion.
II. Background
The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs, who are mother and son,

resided at 250 Carey Avenue in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, in a ground
floor apartment. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 12-13). The building was owned by a Mr.
Elbattah. ( ¶ 14). In July of 2022, Ms. Soto informed Mr. Elbattah that

there was a plumbing issue in the building, but Mr. Elbattah did not
repair the issue. ( ¶¶ 16-17). After several months, Ms. Soto contacted

the City of Wilkes-Barre in December of 2022 to inform them that the
issue had still not been repaired. ( ¶ 18). After Ms. Soto contacted the
City, the City sent Dan Kratz, a code enforcement officer, to inspect the

property. ( ¶ 19). Upon inspection, Mr. Kratz determined that the
property was unfit for human habitation due to the plumbing issue
reported by Ms. Soto and an HVAC issue in the second-floor apartment.

( ¶¶ 20-21). Thus, Mr. Kratz posted a notice at the property that the
building was unfit for human habitation. ( ¶ 21).
Following the notice that their apartment was unfit for human

habitation, the plaintiffs began residing with a friend of their pastor.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 27). Mr. Elbattah then began making repairs on the Carey
Avenue property. ( ¶ 23). The complaint avers that on January 9, 2023,
while Mr. Elbattah was making repairs at the property, he gave the
plaintiffs permission to be present in the apartment because most of their

belongings were there. ( ¶¶ 24-26). Around 6:00 p.m., officers from the
Wilkes-Barre City Police Department, including Defendant Wengen,
arrived at the property after receiving a report that someone was

trespassing at the Carey Avenue property. ( ¶¶ 27-28). The complaint
asserts that a neighbor informed the officers that Ms. Soto had been

residing in the apartment overnight despite the building being deemed
uninhabitable. ( ¶ 33).
Officer Wengen attempted to contact Ms. Soto at the apartment,

but she did not answer the door, so a neighbor gave Wengen Mr.
Elbattah’s phone number and Wengen called him to the apartment. (Doc.
1 ¶¶ 36-40). After Mr. Elbattah arrived at the property, Wengen was able

to contact the plaintiffs, at which time Ms. Soto allegedly told Wengen
that although she knew the building was uninhabitable, she “felt she
could stay there because her apartment was being fixed.” ( ¶ 43). The

complaint further asserts that Mr. Elbattah informed Wengen that he
had given the plaintiffs permission to be at the property that day while
he made repairs. ( ¶ 44).
Ultimately, Wengen arrested the plaintiffs and charged them with
defiant trespass. (Doc. 1 ¶ 45). The plaintiffs were released the same

evening after being processed by the Wilkes-Barre Police. ( ¶ 54). The
charges against the plaintiffs were dismissed after Wengen failed to
appear at a preliminary hearing on March 8, 2023. ( ¶ 64).

Based on these assertions, the plaintiffs filed this action against
Wengen, alleging claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and

malicious prosecution. (Doc. 1). They assert these claims under § 1983
and state law. ( ). For his part, Defendant Wengen has filed a motion
to dismiss the claims against him, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims fail

as a matter of law because he had probable cause to arrest them for
defiant trespass. (Doc. 11). This motion is fully briefed and is ripe for
resolution. (Docs. 12-14). After consideration, we conclude that the

plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, we will grant the
defendant’s motion to dismiss.
III. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6)
permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under

federal pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under
this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the

complaint as true, , 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-

movant.” , 20 F.3d 1250,
1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal
conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”

; , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice”).

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter , when presented with a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-
part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim
should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for
relief.” at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more
than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint
has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. ,
515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in ,
“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’ ” , 129 S. Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility”
determination will be “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.”

, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on
the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public
record. , 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court
can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant
attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are
based on the [attached] documents.”
, 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if
the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically
attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the
court may consider the document in its determination.
, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the
court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion

to dismiss. , 20 F.3d at 1261.
B. The Motion to Dismiss will be Granted.

The plaintiffs assert their claims pursuant to § 1983 and state law,
alleging that they were arrested and prosecuted for defiant trespass
without probable cause. However, as we will explain, we conclude that

Officer Wengen had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs, and as such,
their false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims
fail.

To state a claim for false arrest under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead
facts to establish that he or she was arrested without probable cause.
, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995). Probable

cause exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy information or
circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge are sufficient to
warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has

been committed by the person being arrested.” ,
308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing , 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964)). Further, where the police lack probable cause for an arrest, “the
arrestee has a claim under § 1983 for false imprisonment based on a
detention pursuant to that arrest.” , 47 F.3d at 636.1

Section § 3503(b) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines a defiant
trespasser as a person who, “knowing that he is not licensed or privileged
to do so, [ ] enters and remains in any place as to which notice against

trespass is given by: . . . (ii) posting in a manner prescribed by law or
reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders[.]” 18 Pa. Cons.

Stat. § 3503(b)(1)(ii). The statute provides a defense to prosecution if “the
actor reasonably believed that the owner of the premises, or other person
empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him to enter or

remain.” § 3503(c)(3). Here, the complaint avers that Mr. Kratz posted a
notice on the building that stated the residence was unfit for human
habitation. (Doc. 1 ¶ 21). The plaintiffs do not dispute that they knew the

property was deemed uninhabitable; rather, they assert that Officer
Wengen lacked probable cause to arrest them for defiant trespass

1 Because the plaintiffs also assert their claims under Pennsylvania law,
we note that state law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment
require essentially the same showing as a claim brought under § 1983—
an arrest without probable cause and an unlawful detention.
, 557 F. Supp. 2d 581, 593 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (setting forth the
elements for false arrest and false imprisonment claims under
Pennsylvania law).
because he was told that Mr. Elbattah gave the plaintiffs permission to
be present at the Carey Avenue property while he made repairs. For his

part, Wengen asserts that notwithstanding Mr. Elbattah’s alleged
permission, he had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs because Mr.
Elbattah had no authority to override the City’s closure of the property

and authorize the plaintiffs to remain at the property.
Wengen attaches portions of the City’s ordinance regarding code

enforcement, which provides that “[i]nspection of premises and the
issuing of orders in connection therewith, under the provisions of this
article shall be the exclusive responsibility of the enforcement officer. . .

. No order of correction of any violation under this article shall be issued
without the approval of the enforcement officer[.]” (Doc. 12-1 at 4). The
ordinance further states that the enforcement officer is responsible “to

enforce the provisions of this article.” ( ). While the plaintiff contends
that the ordinance constitutes extrinsic evidence that cannot be
considered on a motion to dismiss, courts may consider “matters of public

record” that are attached to a motion to dismiss.
, 998 F.2d 1192, 1196
(3d Cir. 1993). Matters of public record include city ordinances. ,
, 2019 WL 6130773, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2019)
(citing , 55 F. Supp. 3d 750, 754 n. 3 (W.D. Pa. 2014)).

As such, we may consider the City ordinance in deciding the current
motion.
Here, we conclude that Officer Wengen had probable cause to arrest

the plaintiffs for defiant trespass. The complaint establishes that the
plaintiffs knew that the building on Carey Avenue was closed because it

was deemed uninhabitable by the code officer. The complaint further
asserts that despite this knowledge, Ms. Soto “felt she could stay there
because her apartment was being fixed.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 43). However, because

the City’s ordinance permits only the enforcement officer to issue orders
regarding premises, the fact that Mr. Elbattah allegedly gave the
plaintiffs permission to be at the property does not negate the notice

posted by the code officer that the building was uninhabitable.
Accordingly, when Wengen arrived at the property on January 9, 2023,
and was informed that the plaintiffs had been staying there despite the
building being closed, he had probable cause to believe that they
committed the crime of defiant trespass.2

Relying on , 663 A.2d 191 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995), the plaintiffs contend that because Mr. Elbattah allegedly gave
them permission to be at the property, they relied on a good faith but

mistaken belief that they were entitled to be there, negating the
element of defiant trespass. (Doc. 13 at 8-9). However, as the

defendant correctly notes, the defendant in presented evidence
at a non-jury trial that he made a mistake of fact as to whether he was
permitted to enter onto the property in question. , 663 A.2d at

194-95. Thus, in reversing the defendant’s conviction, the Superior Court
held that “[w]hen evidence of a mistake of fact is introduced, the
Commonwealth retains the burden of proving the necessary criminal

intent beyond a reasonable doubt.” at 195.

2 We are constrained to note that while the complaint asserts that Mr.
Elbattah gave the plaintiffs permission to be present at the property
while he performed repairs on January 9, 2023, the complaint also
asserts that Officer Wengen was informed by a neighbor that the
plaintiffs were staying at the property overnight. (Doc. 1 ¶ 33). These
allegations further support a finding that the facts and circumstances
available to Officer Wengen at the time of the plaintiffs’ arrest
established probable cause to believe they were committing the offense of
defiant trespass.
Here, however, Wengen did not have to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the plaintiffs had the requisite criminal intent in order to have

probable cause for an arrest. Rather, it is well settled that “[p]robable
cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element
of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.”

, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). Thus, “the evidentiary standard for
probable cause is significantly lower than the standard which is required

for conviction.” , 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005)
(citing , 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that
probable cause only requires a “fair probability” that a person committed

the relevant crime)). In the instant case, the facts and circumstances
available to Wengen at the time he arrested the plaintiffs—that the
plaintiffs were staying at the Carey Avenue property despite the property

being closed by the City—were sufficient to establish probable cause that
they were committing the offense of defiant trespass. Accordingly, we
conclude that the plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims

fail as a matter of law.
In a similar vein, we conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to state
a claim for malicious prosecution. To state a claim for malicious
prosecution, the plaintiffs must allege facts to establish that “(1) the
defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding

ended in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding
without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a
purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff

suffered a deprivation of liberty[.]”3 , 290 F. Supp.
3d 371, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting , 750 F.3d 273, 296-

97 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted)). Here, as we have concluded with
respect to the plaintiffs’ false arrest claim, we conclude that the plaintiffs
have failed to establish that Wengen initiated proceedings against them

without probable cause. ,
787 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Probable cause is a complete
defense to false-arrest and malicious prosecution claims.”).

Finally, we conclude that Officer Wengen is entitled to qualified
immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not

3 The elements of a state law malicious prosecution claim are virtually
identical to the elements of a § 1983 claim apart from the fifth element,
which is not required under Pennsylvania law. ,
752 F. Supp. 2d 643, 658 n.16 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” , 555 U.S.

223, 231 (2009). This doctrine “provides ample protection to all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). While generally a question of law to be

decided at the earliest possible stage, “a genuine dispute of material fact
on the issue of qualified immunity may preclude summary judgment.”

, 571 F.3d 318, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2009).
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must be
established by the official seeking immunity. , 750 F.3d

273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing , 615 F.3d 197, 223 (3d
Cir. 2010)). To determine whether an official is entitled qualified
immunity, a court must determine (1) whether the official violated a

constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established.
, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); 555 U.S. at 236
(permitting federal courts to exercise discretion in deciding which of the

two prongs should be addressed first).
A right is clearly established if “every reasonable official would
have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”
, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015). To be clearly established, “existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” (quoting , 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
Courts must not define the right “at a high level of generality.”
(quoting , 563 U.S. at 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074.) Rather, the inquiry

should focus on “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is
clearly established.” (quoting , 563 U.S. at 742). Ultimately,

“[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is
clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” ,

533 U.S. at 202. The plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating
that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time
of the claimed violation. , 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984);

, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997).
To determine whether a right is clearly established, the court may
look to cases from the Supreme Court, controlling circuit precedent, or “a

robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” from other circuit
courts. , 974 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2020)
(quoting , 877 F.3d
136, 142 (3d Cir. 2017)). Unpublished cases cannot establish a right
because they do not constitute binding authority. ,

975 F.3d 327, 340 (3d Cir. 2020). However, in rare cases, the conduct may
be clearly established from the obviously unlawful nature of the conduct
“even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.”

, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018) (citing
, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)).

Here, where we have found that Officer Wengen had probable cause
to arrest and charge the plaintiffs with defiant trespass, we cannot
conclude that his conduct “violate[d] clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
, 555 U.S. at 231. Accordingly, Officer Wengen is entitled to
qualified immunity from these claims.

IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motions to dismiss (Doc.
11) will be GRANTED, and the complaint will be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.
An appropriate order follows.
Daryl F. Bloom
United States Magistrate Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10414675. Public record. Not legal advice.