# Parfaite v. Lippincott

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · February 26, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10414364

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 26, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10414364

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WALTER PARFAITE, : CIVIL NO: 3:22-CV-00316
:
Plaintiff, :
: (Magistrate Judge Schwab)
v. :
:
:
KIM LIPPINCOTT, :
:
Defendant. :
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction.
Plaintiff Walter Parfaite claims that the defendant violated his rights in
connection with criminal proceedings against him. Currently pending is the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we
will grant in part and deny in part the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
We will also set a new dispositive motions deadline.

II. Background.
Parfaite began this action by filing a complaint. See doc. 1. He also filed an
application to proceed in forma pauperis, which we granted. See docs. 5, 7. After
the defendant waived service and counsel for the defendant entered an appearance,
the parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c), and the case was referred to the undersigned. See doc. 18. Thereafter,
Parfaite filed an amended complaint, see doc. 20, and then a second amended

complaint, see doc. 22. The second amended complaint is the operative complaint.
See doc. 26 (order so stating).
The second amended complaint names one defendant: Kim Lippincott.

Parfaite mentions the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in his
second amended complaint. It is extremely difficult, however, to ascertain the
exact nature of Parfaite’s claims because he does not clearly set forth what is
alleged to have happened; he seems to assume—incorrectly—that the court is

aware of underlying events and how his allegations fit into those events. We have,
nevertheless, done our best to piece together Parfaite’s allegations to try to make
sense of what he is claiming.

Parfaite alleges that on February 23, 2021, Lippincott and other non-
defendant officers arrested him, and Lippincott charged him with drug violations.
Doc. 11 ¶ 4. According to Parfaite, Lippincott made numerous misrepresentations
and falsified evidence in connection with those charges, the events leading up to

those charges, and events following those charges. Id. ¶¶ 1–5, 7, 8. More
specifically, he alleges that Lippincott falsified a statement from her informant
Chester Miller. Id. ¶ 1. In this regard, he alleges, that although Miller said that a
Marli Plattenburg1 may have been the woman using drugs in a hotel bathroom, he
was unsure. Id. But, Parfaite asserts, Lippincott turned that purported uncertain

identification into a “positive false identification, of Marli Plattenburg.” Id. And
according to Parfaite, that false identification was used against him on October 7,
2021, and November 8, 2021. Id.2 He also alleges that Lippincott ran a “JNET

search on a silver SUV as well as taking [] photographs of the woman that was
driving.” Id. According to Parfaite, Lippincott falsely identified the woman as
Marli Plattenburg, even though the woman did not fit Plattenburg’s description and
Lippincott knew it was not Plattenburg. Id.

Parfaite also alleges that Lippincott failed to properly fill out a drug task
force activity form, that she mishandled drug purchase money, and that her
“changed and false reports” in this regard were used against him on October 7,

2021, and November 8, 2021. Id. ¶ 2. Parfaite further alleges that on February 23,
2021, “Lippincott fabricated physical evidence in regard to a bill from [a] February
22, 2021, controlled purchase she mishandled.” Id. ¶ 3. He asserts that the “false
and fabricated evidence” has been used against him from February 23, 2021, till

1 Parfaite does not allege who Marli Plattenburg is or how she otherwise fits
into the events.
2 Parfaite does not allege who used the positive identification against him or
in what context it was used.
the last week of March 2022,” when a superseding information was filed against
him. Id.

Parfaite also alleges that on February 23, 2021, Lippincott “maliciously
charged” him with controlled substances that another person had admitted were his
and with “controlled substances that were found in a little black purse with the

owners identification card next to them.” Id. ¶ 4. Further, according to Parfaite,
Lippincott included false statements in her affidavit3 regarding what a Matthew
Luce said about the drugs at issue, and she charged him with drugs that belonged
to others. Id. According to Parfaite, “[t]he fabricated claim and added weight of

controlled substances onto what [he] admitted to, tainted the probable cause in her
filed affidavit and made it stronger.” Id. And he contends that “[t]he defendants
[sic] added weight, fabricated and misrepresented statements and facts have been

used against [him] from the start, and violated [his] rights.” Id.
Parfaite also alleges that on February 23, 2021, Lippincott falsely claimed in
connection with a bail criteria form that he was convicted of possession with intent
to deliver in New Jersey and that he had misrepresented his identity. Id. ¶ 5.

According to Parfaite, given Lippincott’s false statements, he had no chance of
making bail on February 23, 2021. Id. Parfaite alleges that on March 12, 2021, he

3 Although not clear, it appears that Parfaite may be referring here to an
affidavit in connection with the criminal charges allegedly filed by Lippincott.
was removed from the Monroe County Prison and taken to the Scranton Federal
Courthouse, “where [he] was denied bail altogether do [sic] to the defendants [sic]

compounded actions in regard to this matter.” Id. Parfaite further alleges that
Lippincott testified falsely before the grand jury. Id. ¶ 8.
Parfaite also alleges that during a search preceding the charges, Lippincott

failed to intervene when other officers hid exculpatory evidence and threw and
destroyed his property. Id. ¶ 6. He asserts that Lippincott “failed to intervene and
protect [his] 4th and 5th Amendment rights, as well as [his] rights under brady.”
Id.4

Parfaite contends that Lippincott’s actions caused him severe mental and
emotional distress. Id. ¶ 7. He is seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
at 5 (Prayer for Relief). He is also seeking an apology from Lippincott and to have

her terminated from her job. Id.
Liberally construed, it appears that Parfaite is bringing a federal claim based
on the manner in which the search was executed; multiple federal claims of
fabrication of evidence; federal claims of hiding exculpatory evidence; and a

4 We construe Parfaite’s reference here to “brady” as a reference to Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “that the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”).
federal claim of testifying falsely before the grand jury.5 He also appears to be
bringing state-law claims.

Defendant Lippincott filed an answer to the second amended complaint. See
doc. 25. We set case management deadlines, see docs. 27, 71, 89, and the parties
had a full and fair opportunity to conduct discovery, with the court issuing

numerous orders on the issues that arose during discovery, see docs. 39, 46, 48, 49,
57, 58, 62, 63, 82, 93, 101.
Currently pending is defendant Lippincott’s motion for summary judgment.
See doc. 107. That motion has been briefed. See docs. 111, 118, 121.6

5 Given that Parfaite alleges that Lippincott “maliciously charged” him, see
doc. 22 ¶ 4, the second amended complaint can also reasonably be construed as
raising a malicious prosecution claim. But in his brief in opposition to Lippincott’s
motion for summary judgment, Parfaite disclaims any intent to raise a malicious
prosecution claim. See doc. 118 at 10. Thus, we do not construe the second
amended complaint as raising a malicious prosecution claim.
6 On April 27, 2023, Parfaite filed his brief in opposition. See doc. 118. On
May 3, 2023, he filed what he titled “Addendum to brief opposing Summary
Judgement [sic].” (“addendum”). See doc. 121. Although Parfaite did not seek or
obtain leave of court to file such an addendum, given that Lippincott has not filed a
reply brief objecting to Parfaite’s addendum, we will consider it. We note,
however, that we will not consider Parfaite’s proposed third amended complaint
and exhibits, as he requests in his addendum, because by an order dated June 6,
2023, we denied Parfaite’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. See
doc. 126.
III. Summary Judgment Standards.
The defendant moves for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). “Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that
do not present a ‘genuine dispute as to any material fact’ and for which a jury trial
would be an empty and unnecessary formality.” Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of
Health & Human Services, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of
the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that

demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). With respect to an issue on which the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, the moving party may discharge that
burden by “‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading; rather, the nonmoving party

must show a genuine dispute by “citing to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the

motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or “showing
that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which
that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322.
Summary judgment is also appropriate if the nonmoving party provides

merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). There must be more than a scintilla of evidence
supporting the nonmoving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts. Id. at 252. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for
trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986).

The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A

dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary
basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-
moving party. Id. at 248–49.

When “faced with a summary judgment motion, the court must view the
facts ‘in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” N.A.A.C.P. v. N.
Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). At the summary judgment stage, the judge’s
function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter; rather
it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249. The proper inquiry of the court “is the threshold inquiry of determining

whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any
genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact
because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250.

Summary judgment is warranted, after adequate time for discovery, against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “Under such circumstances, ‘there can

be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders
all other facts immaterial.’” Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 247 (3d

Cir. 2002) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “[S]ummary judgment is essentially
‘put up or shut up’ time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must
rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made

in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd.
v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).

IV. The Material Facts.
Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to file “a

separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered
paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be
tried.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. The Rule, in turn, requires the non-moving party to file
“a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, responding to the

numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required [by the moving party], as
to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.” Id. The
“[s]tatements of material facts in support of, or in opposition to, a motion shall

include references to the parts of the record that support the statements,” and “[a]ll
material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party
will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served
by the opposing party.” Id. “Local Rule 56.1 was promulgated to bring greater

efficiency to the work of the judges of the Middle District.” Weitzner v. Sanofi
Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018). “[T]he Rule ‘is essential to the
Court’s resolution of a summary judgment motion’ due to its role in ‘organizing
the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each
side proposed to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.’” Id. (citations

omitted).
Here, in accordance with M.D. L.R. Pa. 56.1, defendant Lippincott filed a
statement of material facts with citations to the record, see doc. 108, and

supporting documents, see doc. 108-1. As part of his brief in opposition, Parfaite
filed a response to that statement of material facts with two supporting documents,
See doc. 118. Parfaite should have filed his response to defendant Lippincott’s
statement of material facts as a document separate from his brief opposition. See

M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. But because Parfaite is proceeding pro se and because
defendant Lippincott has not objected to the court considering Parfaite’s response,
we will consider Parfaite’s response.7 Although we will consider Parfaite’s

7 We note that Parfaite’s response to defendant Lippincott’s statement of
material facts goes from paragraph 10 to paragraph 13. See doc. 118 at page 3. It
appears, however, that this was a misnumbering error—rather than an admission to
the skipped paragraphs 11 and 12—because based on the facts asserted by
Lippincott and Parfaite’s response it appears that what he labels as paragraphs 13
and 14 are really in response to Lippincott’s paragraphs 11 and 12. Compare doc.
108 ¶¶ 11, 12, with doc. 118 ¶¶ 13, 14. This misnumbering continues through
Parfaite’s response to paragraph 26 of Lippincott’s statement of material facts,
with Parfaite’s response to Lippincott’s paragraph 26, labeled as paragraph 28. See
doc. 118 at pages 5–6. Parfaite’s response has two paragraphs 27 and two
paragraphs 28. See id. at page 7. Thus, starting with his second paragraph 27,
Parfaite is back tracking with Lippincott’s numbered paragraphs. See id. at pages
7–8.
response to defendant Lippincott’s statement of material facts, where Parfaite has
not cited to record evidence to create a genuine factual dispute, we consider the

facts sets forth by defendant Lippincott to be undisputed.8 Considering the above,
as well as our duty to “construe all facts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party[,]” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting

Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 419 (3d Cir. 2015)), the following are the
material facts upon which we analyze defendant Lippincott’s motion for summary
judgment.
On February 23, 2021, Parfaite was arrested as part of an FBI sting operation

supported by the Monroe County Drug Task Force (“MCDTF”). Doc. 108 ¶ 1;
Doc. 118 ¶ 1. The MCDTF is a collaborative effort between the Office of the
District Attorney, the Pennsylvania State Police, the Pennsylvania Office of the

Attorney General, and local police departments focusing their combined efforts on
combating the sale and possession of illegal drugs. Doc. 108 ¶ 3; Doc. 118 ¶ 3.
Defendant Lippincott was employed as a detective by the Monroe County District
Attorney’s office, and through her employment there, she was a member of the

MCDTF. Doc. 108 ¶ 2; Doc. 118 ¶ 2.

8 For example, although Parfaite frequently purports to dispute a fact as not
relevant, where he does not set forth record evidence to create a genuine factual
dispute, we consider the fact as undisputed despite Parfaite’s relevancy objection.
Detective Lippincott, other members of the MCDTF, and agents from the
FBI conducted a surveillance operation in Monroe County based on reports from a

confidential informant of drug activity. Doc. 108 ¶ 4; Doc. 118 ¶ 4. The
investigation began on January 6, 2021, when Detective Lippincott received
information from a confidential informant who stated that he was able to purchase

methamphetamines and heroin from Matthew Luce who was currently on state
parole. Doc. 108 ¶ 5; Doc. 118 ¶ 5. The informant purchased drugs from Luce on
January 6, 2021, and January 8, 2021. Doc. 108 ¶ 6; Doc. 118 ¶ 6.
On February 17, 2021, the same informant told Detective Lippincott that he

was able to purchase drugs from Luce in Room 3 of the Paramount Motel. Doc.
108 ¶ 7; Doc. 118 ¶ 7. The FBI set up surveillance outside the hotel and
discovered that people were going in and out of the location, including Luce. Doc.

108 ¶ 8; Doc. 118 ¶ 8. On February 22, 2021, the same informant once again told
Detective Lippincott that he was able to buy drugs from Luce at Room 3 of the
Paramount Motel. Doc. 108 ¶ 9; Doc. 118 ¶ 9. Once again, a buy was arranged by
the informant. Doc. 108 ¶ 10; Doc. 118 ¶ 10. The informant told Detective

Lippincott that Luce was going to be staying in room 3 of this motel for some time.
Doc. 108 ¶ 10; Doc. 118 ¶ 10.
On February 22, 2021, Detective Lippincott prepared a federal search

warrant for the Paramount Motel, Room 3. Doc. 108 ¶ 11; Doc. 118 ¶ 13.
Detective Lippincott sent the search warrant to Assistant United States Attorney
(“AUSA”) James Buchannan, who approved it. Doc. 108 ¶ 11; Doc. 118 ¶ 13. She

then presented the warrant to United States Magistrate Judge Saporito, who also
approved it. Doc. 108 ¶ 11; Doc. 118 ¶ 13.
On February 23, 2021, at approximately 6:05 a.m. the search warrant was

executed at room 3 of the Paramount Motel. Doc. 108 ¶ 13; Doc. 118 ¶ 15.
Because of the criminal history of one of the occupants and because of information
regarding possible firearms in the room, the Pennsylvania State Police’s Special
Emergency Response Team executed the warrant. Doc. 108 ¶ 12; Doc. 118 ¶ 14.

Six people were in the room, including Parfaite. Doc. 108 ¶ 14; Doc. 118 ¶ 16. All
were detained. Doc. 108 ¶ 14; Doc. 118 ¶ 16. A search of the room revealed the
presence of heroin and methamphetamines. Doc. 108 ¶ 15; Doc. 118 ¶ 17.

Detective Lippincott was the primary investigator, and she completed and
filed a criminal complaint against Parfaite. Doc. 108 ¶ 16; Doc. 118 ¶ 16. Yet, she
asserts that it was not her decision to charge Parfaite or what those charges should
be; that was a decision made by the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Doc. 108 ¶¶ 16, 29.

But Parfaite points out that in her investigation log, Lippincott states that Assistant
District Attorney Rich White approved the state charges. Doc. 118 ¶ 18.9 Thus,
there is a genuine factual dispute regarding the degree of Lippincott’s involvement

regarding the state charges.
On March 3, 2021, AUSA James Buchanan filed a grand jury indictment in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (3:21-CR-

56-MEM) against Matthew Luce and Parfaite. Doc. 108 ¶ 17; Doc. 118 ¶ 19. The
seven-count indictment charged Parfaite in three of those counts. See United States
v. Parfaite, 3:21-cr-00056 (M.D. Pa.) at doc. 1.10 In Count 1, the indictment
charged that from November 26, 2020 to February 23, 2021, Luce and Parfaite

conspired “to knowingly and intentionally distribute and possess with intent to
distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable

9 Parfaite notes that Lippincott’s log also states that he was arraigned by a
Monroe County magistrate judge, who set a bail on 11 states charges. See doc. 118
¶ 18. The pertinent portion of Lippincott’s log reads:
Once I was able to complete the criminal complaint for Parfaite
I contacted ADA Rich White who approved charges. Detective
Mario Orlando co-signed the complaint. I contacted MDJ
Germano who instructed me to fax the complaint to his office
for him to be arraigned by video from the jail. The complaint
was faxed. Bail was set in the amount of $100,000 secured.
Doc. 108-1 at 9. This is consistent with the state court docket sheet that Parfaite
provided. See Doc. 118-1 (Commonwealth v. Parfaite, MJ-43401-CR-0000074-
2021 (Monroe Ctny.)). Further, according to that docket sheet, the state charges
were withdrawn on April 7, 2021. Id.
10 We refer here to the actual indictment, instead of Lippincott’s incomplete
and inaccurate summary of the indictment.
amount of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21
U.S.C. Section 841(a)(l) and 841(b)(l)(B), and to knowingly and intentionally

distribute and possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of a mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of heroin, a Schedule II controlled
substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(l) and 84l(b)(l)(B). All in

violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846.” Id. at 1–2. In Count 6, the
indictment charged that on or about February 23, 2021, Luce and Parfaite “did
knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute a substance
containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled

substance. All in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1).” Id.
at 4–5. And in Count 7, the indictment charged that on or about February 23,
2021, Luce and Parfaite “did knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to

distribute a substance containing a detectable amount of heroin, a Schedule II
controlled substance. All in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections
841(a)(1).” Id. at 5. The indictment also contained forfeiture provisions. Id. at 5–7.
On March 12, 2021, Parfaite was arraigned in federal court, and then Chief

Magistrate Judge Mehalchick ordered Parfaite to be detained. See United States v.
Parfaite, 3:21-cr-00056 (M.D. Pa.) at docs. 16, 18. As noted above, see supra note
9, the state charges against Parfaite were dismissed on April 7, 2021.
In the federal case, Parfaite was represented, at various times, by Attorneys
Carl J. Poveromo, James Scanlon, and Gino A. Bartolai, Jr. Doc. 108 ¶ 28; Doc.

118 ¶ 28 (second ¶ 28). Parfaite’s attorneys filed various pretrial motions
including an omnibus motion for pre-trial relief. Doc. 108 ¶ 19; Doc. 118 ¶ 21.
That motion included an exhaustive list of items that Parfaite’s defense team

wanted to prepare for trial. Doc. 108 ¶ 20; Doc. 118 ¶ 22. The motion asked the
AUSA for information that included the following:
a. a comprehensive request for written or recorded statements
by Parfaite;
b. the substance of all oral statements Parfaite made that the
AUSA intended to offer into evidence;
c. Any statement, confession, or admission, made by Parfaite
to investigation officers or to third parties.
d. investigators’ reports;
e. photographs and videos;
f. tangible evidence of all items seized from Parfaite’s Motel
room.
g. All documents subject to production pursuant to Brady v.
Maryland, and its progeny, including United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 96 (1976), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 105
(1972), and United States v. Bagley, 469 U.S. 1016 (1985).
Doc. 108 ¶ 19; Doc. 118 ¶ 21.
On March 21, 2022, Judge Mannion granted in part and denied in part
Parfaite’s omnibus motion. Doc. 108 ¶ 21; Doc. 118 ¶ 23. In his opinion, Judge
Mannion noted that the Government provided Parfaite with the following:
a. a CD containing 125 pages of documents, photographs, and
videos from the execution of a search warrant on February 23,
2021, a USB flash drive containing an audio file, digital
forensic reports, 12,667 pages of Facebook records and
documents from the Monroe County District Attorney’s office,
and fifty-two pages of additional discovery materials.
b. police reports and investigation paperwork for recorded
calls, pictures of the pre-recorded buy money, pictures and
video from the execution of the above-described search
warrant, criminal histories of the defendants, a copy of the
search warrants and applications for the above-described
Paramount Motel Room, and search warrant materials for
relevant social media accounts.
c. the audio [] recording of his February 23, 2021, statement to
investigators, digital forensic reports of the cellular phones
recovered from the motel room on February 23, 2021,
Facebook records from social media accounts, the consent to
search paperwork from Ashley Grimes, Amy Beth Gearhart,
Kayla Fields, the Miranda waiver form of Amy Beth Gearhart,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") 302 form
regarding the execution of the search warrant on February 23,
2021.
d. On July 16, 2021, the government provided “the complaint
affidavit and detention order concerning Defendant Luce,
interview notes from the February 23, 2021, police interviews
with Ashley Grimes and Ryan Yesner, a second copy of the
FBI 302 described above, the paperwork regarding the
consensualization of phone recordings, . . . , and two laboratory
reports from the Drug Enforcement Agency laboratory.”
e. on August 10, 2021, the government provided “a summary
of the expected testimony of the CIs in this case to Defendant
Parfaite,” and “[i]n that summary, the Government also
disclosed the expected testimony of the other individuals who
were either present in the [motel] room with the defendants on
February 23, 2021, or who bought controlled substances from
the defendants prior to February 23, 2021.”
f. Finally, on November 5, 2021, the government provided the
full, unredacted statements of both defendants, the digital
forensic report of Michael Sparano to Defendant Parfaite, the
jail calls from Parfaite from Lackawanna County Prison,
excerpts of the text conversations between co-conspirators
Luce, Parfaite, and Sparano, the MCDA incident report, the
recorded interview of unindicted co-conspirator Michael
Sparano, and additional criminal history paperwork regarding
Parfaite.
Doc. 108 ¶ 22; Doc. 118 ¶ 24. Judge Mannion noted that the Government
provided Parfaite with significant amounts of discovery:
In sum, as of November 8, 2021, the government has provided
Parfaite with 1145 pages of discovery, in addition to six digital
forensic reports, Facebook records from five social media
accounts, approximately 140 photographs, all the recorded
interviews of the co-conspirators in this case, and all the
laboratory reports from the analysis of any controlled
substances currently in the Government’s possession.
Since Parfaite’s pre-trial motions and the briefs of the parties
were filed, the court recognizes that the government has now
provided defendant with significant additional amounts of
discovery, and that Luce has pled guilty. Also, Parfaite now
has new counsel. Thus, some of Parfaite’s motions appear to be
moot.
Doc. 108 ¶ 23; Doc. 118 ¶ 25. The production of discovery during the criminal
prosecution was handled by the U.S. Attorney’s office. Doc. 108 ¶ 30; Doc. 118
¶ 30. The U.S. Attorney’s Office represented to Judge Mannion that it understood
its Brady obligations and would comply with all legal mandates. Doc. 108 ¶ 24;
Doc. 118 ¶ 26.
A superseding information filed on March 29, 2022, charged Parfaite with
one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamines. See United

States v. Parfaite, 3:21-cr-00056 (M.D. Pa.) at doc. 78. More specifically, it
charged that on or about February 23, 2021, Parfaite “knowingly and intentionally
possessed with intent to distribute 5 grams and more of methamphetamine, a

Schedule II controlled substance. All in violation of Title 21, United States Code,
Sections 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii).” Id. at 1. The superseding information also
contained forfeiture provisions. Id. at 2–3.
On March 29, 2022, Parfaite signed a plea agreement with the United States.

Doc. 108 ¶ 25; Doc. 118 ¶ 27 (first ¶ 27). In his plea agreement, Parfaite made the
following representations to the court:
a. Parfaite agreed to plead guilty to a felony information which
charged Parfaite with violations of Title 21, United States Code,
§ § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii), Possession with Intent to
Distribute 5 grams and more of methamphetamine.
b. Parfaite agreed that at the time the guilty plea was entered,
he would admit to the Court he was guilty of the offenses
charged in the Information.
c. Parfaite agreed to a forfeiture of assets listed in the forfeiture
allegation of the indictment;
[d]. Parfaite agreed not to pursue or initiate any civil claims or
suits against the United States of America, its agencies, or
employees, regardless whether he knew who they were, arising
out of the investigation, prosecution or cooperation, if any,
covered by this Agreement, including but not limited to any
claims for attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses arising
out of the investigation and prosecution of this matter.
[e]. Parfaite agreed that by entering a guilty plea in his criminal
case, he acknowledged that the Government’s position in his
prosecution was taken in good faith, had a substantial basis in
law and fact and was not vexatious.
Doc. 108 ¶ 26; Doc. 118 ¶ 28 (first ¶ 28). On March 31, 2022, Parfaite was
arraigned in open court and pleaded guilty to the superseding information. Doc.
108 ¶ 27; Doc. 118 ¶ 27 (second ¶ 27).
At the time that defendant Lippincott filed her statement of material facts,
Judge Mannion had not yet sentenced Parfaite. Doc. 108 ¶ 31; Doc. 118 ¶ 31. But

Judge Mannion has since done so. On November 15, 2023, Judge Mannion
entered a judgment, sentencing Parfaite to 72 months imprisonment to be followed
by a four-year term of supervised release. See United States v. Parfaite, 3:21-cr-
00056 (M.D. Pa.) at doc. 129.

V. Discussion
Parfaite’s constitutional claims are brought as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.
Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of

state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor
School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). Section 1983 “does not create any
new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal

constitutional or statutory right.” Id. To establish a claim under §1983, the
plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v.

County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
Defendant Lippincott contends that she is entitled to summary judgment
because she has testimonial immunity from Parfaite’s claim based on her alleged

false testimony; because Parfaite can not prove that he is actually innocent, his
malicious prosecution claim fails; because Parfaite’s claims are barred by the
favorable termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and because
she is entitled to qualified immunity.11 We address each of these arguments in

turn.

A. Testimonial Immunity.
We begin where there is agreement. Defendant Lippincott contends that she
has testimonial immunity from Parfaite’s claim based on her alleged false

testimony. A witness is absolutely immune from damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
based on his or her testimony in court. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326
(1983). This absolute immunity extends to police officers. Id. at 341–46. It also
extends to a police officer’s testimony before the grand jury. Rehberg v. Paulk, 566

11 For purposes of flow, we have reordered the arguments made by
defendant Lippincott. Defendant Lippincott’s arguments are addressed to
Parfaite’s federal claims. She does not address Parfaite’s state-law claims.
U.S. 356, 369–70 (2012). Here, Parfaite agrees that defendant Lippincott has
testimonial immunity from his claim based on her alleged false testimony. Thus,

we will grant summary judgment to defendant Lippincott as to Parfaite’s claim
based on her alleged false testimony.

B. Malicious Prosecution.
Defendant Lippincott construes Parfaite’s claims, at least in part, as a

malicious prosecution claim, and she contends that because Parfaite cannot prove
that he is actually innocent, his malicious prosecution claim fails. In this regard,
relying on case law that has since been abrogated, Lippincott contends that Parfaite
cannot meet the favorable termination requirement of a malicious prosecution

claim because he cannot show that he is actually innocent. But the Supreme Court
has held that “a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution
does not require the plaintiff to show that the criminal prosecution ended with

some affirmative indication of innocence.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49
(2022). Rather, “[a] plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended
without a conviction.” Id. The Third Circuit has recognized that Thompson
abrogated its prior decisions requiring an affirmative indication of innocence to

meet the favorable termination requirement. See Coello v. DiLeo, 43 F.4th 346,
354–55 (3d Cir. 2022) (so recognizing in the context of a discussion of the
favorable-termination requirement of Heck).

Parfaite does not, however, take issue with defendant Lippincott’s erroneous
assertion that a malicious prosecution claim requires a favorable termination that
affirmatively indicates innocence. Instead, Parfaite clarifies that he is not bringing

a malicious prosecution claim. See doc. 118 at 10. Rather, he clarifies, instead of
malicious prosecution, he asserts, among other claims, “a stand alone fabrication of
evidence claim.” Id. (also characterizing his claims as “evidence tampering,
falsifying official reports, misrepresenting facts in sworn reports, and tainting

probable cause to make it stronger).
As noted above, see supra note 5, given that Parfaite alleges that Lippincott
“maliciously charged” him, see doc. 22 ¶ 4, the second amended complaint can

also reasonably be construed to be raising a malicious prosecution claim. But
given Parfaite’s clear disclaimer of any intent to raise a malicious prosecution
claim, see doc. 118 at 10, we do not construe the second amended complaint as
raising a malicious prosecution claim.

C. The favorable-termination rule of Heck.
Defendant Lippincott contends that Parfaite’s claims against her are barred
by the favorable-termination rule of Heck.
In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that “in order to recover
damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other

harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid, a Section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a

state tribunal authorized to make such [a] determination, or called into question by
a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at
486–87, 490 (footnote omitted). “Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a
§ 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it
would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that
the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. The “favorable-

termination requirement is rooted in pragmatic concerns with avoiding parallel
criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter and the related possibility
of conflicting civil and criminal judgments.” McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct.
2149, 2157 (2019). “The requirement likewise avoids allowing collateral attacks

on criminal judgments through civil litigation.” Id.
When Heck applies, even if the plaintiff has exhausted available state
remedies, he has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction or

sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of
habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. “[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred
(absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable

relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to
conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration.”

Although defendant Lippincott contends that Parfaite’s claims are barred by
the favorable-termination rule of Heck, after setting forth the favorable-termination
rule, she makes only a cursory argument in that regard. That argument, in its
entirety, reads:

Parfaite seeks money for claims that can only be successful if
the court finds that he was unfairly prosecuted and convicted.
Yet, he acknowledged his guilt by pleading guilty and
represented that the acts of the prosecution team were made in
good faith. There is no right to recovery without collaterally
attacking his guilty plea and conviction. He is not innocent.
Heck v. Humphrey bars his claim.
Doc. 111 at 8. Defendant Lippincott fails, however, to make any attempt to show
why Parfaite’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, as
required for the favorable-termination rule to apply. Again, it appears that she
construes Parfaite’s claims, at least in part, as a malicious prosecution claim, but,
as already noted, Parfaite disclaims that he is bring a malicious prosecution claim.
Parfaite also stresses that his claims focus on the state charges that were
withdrawn. See doc. 118 at 5–9.12 Defendant Lippincott, who has not filed a reply
brief, has failed to respond Parfaite’s assertions in this regard. In sum, defendant

Lippincott has not developed an argument for why the specific claims that Parfaite
is asserting are barred by the favorable-termination rule of Heck. “The court will
not assess arguments which the movants have not made[.]” Carey v. Gayewski,

No. 1:23-CV-00168, 2023 WL 8935057, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2023).
Accordingly, we conclude that at this time, defendant Lippincott has not shown
that she is entitled to summary judgment based on the favorable-termination rule of
Heck.

D. Qualified Immunity.
Defendant Lippincott contends that she is entitled to qualified immunity.
But we conclude that she has not shown at this time that she is entitled to qualified
immunity.13

Despite their participation in constitutionally impermissible conduct,
government officials “may nevertheless be shielded from liability for civil
damages if their actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or

12 As set forth earlier, we also construe the second amended complaint as
raising a claim based on how the search was executed.
13 Although it does not affect our decision regarding qualified immunity, we
note that Parfaite’s brief in opposition appears to be missing two pages that
apparently address qualified immunity. See doc. 118 at 10–11 (brief numbered at
the bottom of the pages as pages 10 and 13).
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)). Qualified immunity ensures that before officers are subjected to suit, they
have notice that their conduct is unlawful. Id. “Qualified immunity balances two
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they

exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “If the law was clearly established, the
immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public

official should know the law governing his conduct.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19.
The qualified immunity analysis has two prongs. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
One prong of the analysis is whether the facts that the plaintiff has alleged or

shown make out a violation of a constitutional right. Id. The other prong of the
analysis is whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
201 (2001).
“To determine whether a right was ‘clearly established,’ we conduct a two-

part inquiry.” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021). “First,
we must ‘define the right allegedly violated at the appropriate level of specificity.’”
Id. (quoting Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012)). “This requires

us to frame the right ‘in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
general proposition.’” Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). “Second, we must
ask whether that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of its alleged violation,

i.e., whether the right was ‘sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (quoting Saucier, 533
U.S. at 202). “This is an ‘objective (albeit fact-specific) question,’ where ‘[an

officer]’s subjective beliefs . . . are irrelevant.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)).
“To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear
foundation in then-existing precedent.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). In

other words, “[t]he rule must be ‘settled law,’ which means it is dictated by
‘controlling authority’ or ‘a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority.’”
Id. (internal citations omitted). “It is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-

existing precedent.” Id. Rather, “[t]he precedent must be clear enough that every
reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff
seeks to apply.” Id.
If the law did not put the defendant on notice that his conduct would be

clearly unlawful, qualified immunity is appropriate. Bayer v. Monroe County
Children & Youth Services, 577 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2009). “In other words,
‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question

beyond debate.’” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). “This exacting standard ‘gives government
officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ by

‘protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.’” City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015)
(quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743).

“Defendants bear the burden of establishing qualified immunity.” White v.
Dauphin Cnty., No. 1:22-CV-1241, 2023 WL 6392735, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29,
2023). “Officials demonstrate they are entitled to qualified immunity only if they
can show that a reasonable person in their position at the relevant time could have

believed, in light of clearly established law, that their conduct comported with
recognized legal standards.” E. D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 306 (3d Cir. 2019).
Similar to her argument with respect to the favorable-termination rule of

Heck, defendant Lippincott makes only a cursory argument as to why she is
entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. After setting forth the
standards applicable to qualified immunity, defendant Lippincott argues that she is
entitled to qualified immunity because she did nothing unlawful or inconsistent

with clearly established law:
Lippincott is entitled to qualified immunity because she did
nothing unlawful, or which was inconsistent with a clearly
established law. She performed an investigation and a stakeout
of an individual alleged to be selling drugs. She received a
legal warrant based on knowledge and evidence provided to her
by two confidential informants. Lippincott executed the
warrant and rounded up the individuals present in the hotel
room. It was not her role to evaluate credibility, how Parfaite
should be charged, or even whether there was sufficient
evidence to support a prosecution. A grand jury indicted
Parfaite and the U.S. Attorney’s office handled the production
of discovery required by Brady and negotiated the plea
agreement. Nothing Lippincott did violated clearly established
law and for that reason, she is also entitled to qualified
immunity.
Doc. 111 at 13.
At the outset, we note that although defendant Lippincott suggests that she
had no role in how Parfaite should be charged, as noted above in connection with
the material facts, Parfaite has raised a genuine factual dispute about that as to the
state charges. Moreover, again Lippincott apparently construes Parfaite’s claim as
a malicious prosecution claim, which Parfaite asserts he is not bringing. And
defendant Lippincott has not addressed Parfaite’s contention that his claims focus
on the withdrawn state charges. Nor has she addressed Parfaite’s claim regarding
how the search was executed. In addition, although defendant Lippincott asserts
that the United States Attorney’s office handled the production of Brady material,
she does not address Parfaite’s contention that she had a duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the prosecution so that is could be turned over to the

defense. See doc. 118 ¶ 30; see also Yarris v. Cnty. of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 141
(3d Cir. 2006) (stating that although ‘“the Brady duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defendant applies only to a prosecutor[,]” ‘“police officers and
other state actors may be liable under § 1983 for failing to disclose exculpatory
information to the prosecutor’” (quoting Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of

Law & Public Safety–Div. of State Police, 411 F.3d 427, 442 (3d Cir. 2005)).
In sum, we cannot conclude based on defendant Lippincott’s cursory
argument regarding qualified immunity, that she has met her burden of showing

that she is entitled to summary judgment on that basis.

E. Summary and Further Proceedings.
Defendant Lippincott is entitled to summary judgment based on testimonial
immunity as to the claim based on her allegedly testifying falsely in court or before
the grand jury. But defendant Lippincott has not shown that she is entitled to

summary judgment as to any of Parfaite’s other claims.
As mentioned above, defendant Lippincott construed Parfaite’s claim as a
malicious prosecution claim. Although Parfaite asserts that he is not bringing a

malicious prosecution claim, given the unclear allegations in his second amended
complaint, we understand why defendant Lippincott construed his claims that way,
at least in part. As noted above, see supra note 5, but for Parfaite’s specific
assertion in his brief in opposition that he is not raising a malicious prosecution

claim, we too would have construed the second amended complaint as raising a
malicious prosecution claim in addition to his other claims.
Given the unclear nature of the Parfaite’s second amended complaint, we
think it fair to set a new dispositive motions deadline so that defendant Lippincott

has an opportunity to address fully and specifically Parfaite’s claims now that he
has clarified that he is not bringing a malicious prosecution claim.

VI. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, we will grant in part and deny in part defendant
Lippincott’s motion for summary judgment. We will also set a new dispositive
motions deadline. An appropriate order follows.

S/Susan E. Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10414364. Public record. Not legal advice.
