# Cannon v. Jamison

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · January 2, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10414079

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 2, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10414079

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that a federal inmate’s petition is actionable under Section 2241, where the inmate attacks the term of his custody by challenging the manner in which the BOP is computing his federal sentence
- explaining that “the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time credits”
- holding, in the immigration context, that “there would be no due process violation in the absence of prejudice”
- stating that Section 2241 “allows a federal prisoner to challenge the ‘execution’ of his sentence in habeas”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BRADFORD CANNON, :
Petitioner :
: No. 1:22-cv-01038
v. :
: (Judge Rambo)
J.L. JAMISON, :
Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the Court is pro se Petitioner Bradford Cannon (“Petitioner”)’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
2241 (“Section 2241”). (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner challenges his disciplinary
proceedings, which resulted in, inter alia, the loss of good-conduct time. (Id.) For
the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Petitioner’s Section 2241 petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”),
is currently serving a two-hundred and forty (240) month sentence imposed by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York “for participating
in racketeering enterprise and conspiracy to violate federal narcotics laws.” (Doc.
No. 8-1 at 1, ¶ 3.) Petitioner entered BOP custody on February 22, 2018 (id. at 5),
and his projected release date is March 20, 2027 (id. at 1, ¶ 3; id. at 5).1

1 According to the BOP’s Inmate Locator, however, Petitioner’s current release date
is March 20, 2026. The BOP’s Inmate Locator is available at the following address:
The facts underlying the imposition of the disciplinary sanctions against
Petitioner are as follows. On February 29, 2020, Petitioner was issued Incident

Report Number 3372071 (“Incident Report”), charging him with a violation of
Prohibited Act Code 108—Possession, Manufacture, or Introduction of Hazardous
Tool. (Id. at 43.) The BOP’s prohibited acts are set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 541.3,

which, in turn, describes Code 108 as follows: “Possession, manufacture,
introduction, or loss of a hazardous tool (tools most likely to be used in an escape or
escape attempt or to serve as weapons capable of doing serious bodily harm to
others; or those hazardous to institutional security or personal safety; e.g., hack-saw

blade, body armor, maps, handmade rope, or other escape paraphernalia, portable
telephone, pager, or other electronic device). See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3 (Table 1, 108)
(emphasis added).

The Incident Report describes Petitioner’s violation of Code 108 as follows:
On 2/29/2020, I, Officer J. Johnson was posted as the East
Compound OIC. While walking the 2nd floor of Unit 5751 between
rooms 218 and 219, I instructed inmate Cannon, Bradford
Registration Number 38036-054 to submit to a search[, and] he
complied. While using the Garrett Pro-Pointer 2 metal detector serial
number 56104403, as I scanned inmate Cannon’s right pocket, the
metal detector signaled for something metallic. I gave inmate
Cannon a direct order to remove what was in his pocket[,] which is
when he attempted to run from me but ran into an unidentified inmate
and fell to the floor. Upon landing on the floor[,] inmate Cannon
willingly submitted to hand restraints which were applied and a black

https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.
in color Samsung smartphone was retrieved from his right pocket. It
should be noted no force was used during this process.

(Doc. No. 8-1 at 43 (noting that staff became aware of this incident at 8:45 p.m.))
On that same date, at 9:30 p.m., Lieutenant W. Decker (“Decker”) delivered a copy
of the Incident Report to Petitioner. (Id.) The Incident Report was then referred to
the Unit Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”) for further disposition. (Id.)
Correctional Counselor J. Dixon (“Dixon”) served as the UDC Chairman. (Id.

at 43, 44.) Dixon advised Petitioner of his rights and acknowledged that he
understood those rights. (Id. at 43, 45.) Petitioner declined to make a statement at
that time. (Id.) Due to the “seriousness” of the Incident Report, Petitioner’s
“repetitive behavior[,]” and to allow for greater sanctions than what the UDC can

impose, the UDC referred the Incident Report to the Disciplinary Hearing Officer
(“DHO”) for a hearing. (Id. at 43.)
On April 15, 2020, Petitioner appeared before L. Reynolds, the DHO. (Id. at

45.) The DHO reviewed Petitioner’s rights with him, and Petitioner stated that he
understood those rights. (Id. at 47.) Although Petitioner requested that two (2)
witnesses provide testimony on his behalf, he waived his right to a staff
representative,2 and he did not present any written documentation as evidence or

2 Although Petitioner initially requested a staff representative, the DHO’s report
reflects that Petitioner ultimately waived this right per his signature on the “BP
A0294 form.” (Doc. No. 8-1 at 45, 47.)
assert any procedural issues during the hearing. (Id. at 45, 47.) In addition,
Petitioner elected not to make a statement during his hearing, but he denied the

charged violation of Prohibited Act Code 108. (Id. at 45.) As for Petitioner’s
witnesses, Inmate Jimmie Young declined to testify, and Inmate Kevin Foye testified
that he did not witness any occurrence on the second floor of Unit 5751 between

Petitioner and “any officers on 2-29-2020 at 8:45 PM.” (Id.)3
Based upon the greater weight of the evidence, the DHO ultimately found that
Petitioner committed a violation of Prohibited Act Code 108. (Id.) The DHO based
this finding on the reporting officer’s written account of the underlying incident, the

documentary evidence (i.e., the photograph depicting the black Samsung cell phone
found in Petitioner’s possession), the testimony from his witnesses (i.e., Foye and
Young), and Petitioner’s denial of the charged violation. (Id.) The DHO also based

this finding on the fact that Petitioner was unable to provide the DHO with any
evidence that would refute the charged violation or that would otherwise corroborate
his denial thereof. (Id. at 48.)
As a result of these findings, the DHO sanctioned Petitioner with a

disallowance of forty-one (41) days of good-conduct time, sixty (60) days

3 There is no indication in the DHO’s report that Inmate Kevin Foye was located at
or near “rooms 218 and 219” at the time of Petitioner’s infraction, and Petitioner
does not appear to argue otherwise.
disciplinary segregation, and three-hundred and sixty (65) days loss of visiting
privileges. (Id.) The DHO explained the reasoning for these sanctions as follows:

The action/behavior on the part of [an inmate in] [p]ossessing a
hazardous tool significantly threatens the health, safety, and welfare
of not only himself, but of all persons, whether another inmate or any
other person [is] involved in the act. This will not be tolerated. Past
evidence has shown that disruptive conduct has led to serious
damage to the institution, as well as serious injury to staff and
inmates involved and not involved in the disruptive conduct. The
sanctions imposed by the DHO were taken to inform the inmate that
he will be held responsible for his actions/behaviors at all times.

[In addition,] [t]he DHO considered your continued disruptive
behavior, also your unwillingness NOT TO ACCEPT full
responsibility for your actions, and the seriousness of this particular
prohibited act infraction. The fact [that] there is a zero tolerance for
inmates to possesses hazardous tools in a Correctional Setting, and
the fact [that] this is your second Greatest Severity (100 level)
incident report committed in the 24 month time period for
REPEATED PROHIBITED ACTS WITHIN THE SAME
SEVERITY LEVEL. Your last Greatest Severity incident report was
committed on January 4, 2020[, which] was an unfavorable factor
when determining your sanctions for this prohibited act. Clearly
previous sanctions have not deterred you from engaging in this type
of disruptive behavior[;] therefore[,] the DHO imposed slightly
higher sanctions. You should be aware of the fact [that,] if this
behavior continues[,] the DHO will consider significant progressive
sanctions in accordance with P.S. 5270.09[.]

(Id.)
As noted in the DHO’s report, Petitioner was advised of the DHO’s findings,
the specific evidence relied upon, the sanctions imposed, and the reasons for those
sanctions. (Id.) Petitioner was also advised of his right to appeal the DHO’s
decision, and he was provided with a copy of the DHO’s decision. (Id.) It appears
that, after receiving a copy of the DHO’s decision, Petitioner began pursuing his
administrative remedies. See, e.g., (id. at 49–57).

On July 5, 2022, while Petitioner was incarcerated at Federal Correctional
Institution Allenwood (“FCI Allenwood”) in White Deer, Pennsylvania, he
commenced the above-captioned action by filing his Section 2241 petition (Doc. No.

1), along with various exhibits (Doc. No. 1-1). Petitioner asserts several grounds in
his petition. He asserts due process violations in connection with his disciplinary
proceedings for the Incident Report (Doc. No. 1 at 7–8), and he challenges the BOP’s
labeling of him as a “public safety factor[,]” which—in turn—prevents him from

being sent to a “camp” (id. at 7). For relief, Petitioner requests that the Incident
Report be expunged, his privileges be restored, and his security classification be
dropped to “low” security. (Id. at 8.)

On September 13, 2022, after Petitioner paid the requisite filing fee (Doc. Nos.
2, 4), the Court deemed his Section 2241 petition filed, directed service of the
petition on Respondent (i.e., the Warden at FCI Allenwood), and directed
Respondent to respond to the allegations contained in the petition within twenty (20)

days. (Doc. No. 6.) On October 3, 2022, Respondent filed a response. (Doc. No.
8.) As reflected by the Court’s docket, Petitioner has not filed a reply, and the time
period for doing so has long since expired. Thus, the instant Section 2241 petition is
ripe for the Court’s resolution. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny
the petition.

II. DISCUSSION
A. “Public Safety Factor” Claim
Generally speaking, Section 2241 confers federal jurisdiction over a habeas

petition that has been filed by a federal inmate who challenges “not the validity but
the execution of his sentence.” See Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir.
2012) (citations and footnote omitted); Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d
235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that Section 2241 “allows a federal prisoner to

challenge the ‘execution’ of his sentence in habeas”). While “the precise meaning
of ‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy[,]” see id. at 242, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit (“Third Circuit”) has defined this phrase to mean “put

into effect” or “carry out.” See id. at 243 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
As a result, a federal inmate may challenge conduct undertaken by the BOP
that affects the duration of the inmate’s custody. See, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921

F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that a federal inmate’s petition is actionable
under Section 2241, where the inmate attacks the term of his custody by challenging
the manner in which the BOP is computing his federal sentence). A federal inmate

may also challenge BOP conduct that “conflict[s] with express statements in the
applicable sentencing judgment.” See, e.g., Cardona, 681 F.3d at 536–37 (providing
that a federal inmate’s petition is actionable under Section 2241, where the inmate

attacks the execution of his sentence by showing that the BOP acted in a way that is
“inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the [inmate’s] sentencing
judgment”).

As discussed above, Petitioner claims that the BOP has labeled him as a
“public safety factor” which, in turn, has prevented him from being sent to a “camp.”
(Doc. No. 1 at 7.) Petitioner further claims that, when he raised this issue with the
BOP, he received a response stating, “you are doing time for your 1998 conviction

which allows us to place a [p]ublic safety factor on you and it will not be removed.”
(Id.) Accordingly, Petitioner’s Section 2241 petition appears to challenge the BOP’s
application of the public safety factor to him. See (id.).

A public safety factor “is relevant factual information regarding the inmate’s
current offense, sentence, criminal history, or institutional behavior that requires
additional security measures to be employed to ensure the safety and protection of
the public.” See Merchenthaler v. United States, No. 19-cv-00471, 2020 WL

1244471, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2020). However, the Third Circuit has
concluded—albeit in a non-precedential opinion—that “claims concerning the
determination of [a petitioner’s] custody level do not lie at the ‘core of habeas’ and,

therefore, are not cognizable in a [Section] 2241 petition.” See Levi v. Ebbert, 353
F. App’x 681, 682 (3d Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (quoting Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d
532, 542–44 (3d Cir. 2002)). This is because such claims do not concern “the fact

or length of [a petitioner’s] sentence or confinement.” See id. (citing Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)).
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s habeas claim concerning the

BOP’s application of the public safety factor. See, e.g., id. at 681–82 (affirming
district court’s order denying petitioner’s Section 2241 petition, which challenged
his custody classification and requested that he be transferred to a prison camp or
low-security prison, because such challenges are not cognizable in a Section 2241

petition); Briley v. Warden Fort Dix FCI, 703 F. App’x 69, 71 (3d Cir. 2017)
(unpublished) (concluding that the Section 2241 petitioner’s claim challenging the
BOP’s assignment of a public safety factor to his security classification was not

cognizable under Section 2241 because his claim did not challenge the fact, duration,
or execution of his sentence); Hribick v. Warden Fort Dix FCI, 695 F. App’x 25,
25–26 (3d Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (concluding the same).
B. Due Process Claims

In addition, Petitioner’s Section 2241 petition asserts due process challenges
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution based upon allegations
concerning his disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in, inter alia, a loss of good

conduct time. (Doc. No. 1.) At the outset, the Court notes that Petitioner’s due
process challenges are properly brought pursuant to the provisions of Section 2241.
See, e.g., Barden, 921 F.2d at 478–79 (finding that a federal inmate’s petition is

actionable under Section 2241, where the inmate attacks the term of his custody by
challenging the manner in which the BOP is computing his federal sentence); Queen,
530 F.3d at 254 n.2 (noting that a challenge to a disciplinary action resulting in the

loss of good-conduct time is properly brought pursuant to Section 2241, because
“the action could affect the duration of the petitioner’s sentence” (citations omitted)).
That said, the Court turns to the governing legal standard.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person

shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” See
U.S. Const. amend. V. Prisoners have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
good-conduct time. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-57 (1974).

However, “while prisoners retain certain basic constitutional rights, including the
protections of the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause, prison disciplinary hearings are not part
of criminal prosecution, and inmates’ rights at such hearings may be curtailed by the
demands and realities of the prison environment.” See Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d

1396, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56.)
In Wolff, the United States Supreme Court set forth the due process
protections that prisoners are entitled to “when prison officials seek to deprive them

of good-time credits[.]” See Burns v. PA Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 171-72 (3d
Cir. 2011). Those protections require: (1) an impartial decision-making body; (2)
written notice of the charges, which must be given to the prisoner no less than

twenty-four (24) hours before his appearance at the disciplinary hearing so that he
can marshal the facts and prepare a defense; (3) the opportunity “to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence in his defense when to do so will not be unduly

hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals;” and (4) a written statement
by the fact finder as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary
action. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–71. Additionally, the United States Supreme
Court has explained that, where an illiterate prisoner is involved or where the

complexity of the issue makes it unlikely that the prisoner will be able to collect and
present the evidence that is necessary for an adequate command of the case, the
prisoner “should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or if that is forbidden, to

have adequate substitute aid in the form of help from the staff or from a sufficiently
competent [prisoner] designated by the staff.” See id. at 570.
Where, as here, a prisoner challenges a disciplinary proceeding that deprived
him of good-time credits, “the requirements of due process are satisfied if some

evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke [such]
credits.” See Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S.
445, 455 (1985). In other words, “[t]his standard is met if there was some evidence

from which the conclusion of the [disciplinary board] could be deduced[.]” See id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, determining “whether this
standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent

assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” See id.
Rather, “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that
could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” See id. at 455–56

(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has declined to embrace “a more stringent
evidentiary standard as a constitutional requirement.” See id. at 456. And, in
declining to do so, the Supreme Court has explained as follows:

Prison disciplinary proceedings take place in a highly charged
atmosphere, and prison administrators must often act swiftly on the
basis of evidence that might be insufficient in less exigent
circumstances. See Wolff, 418 U.S., at 562–563[.] The fundamental
fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require
courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some
basis in fact. Revocation of good time credits is not comparable to a
criminal conviction, id. at 556[,] and neither the amount of evidence
necessary to support such a conviction, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), nor any other
standard greater than some evidence applies in this context.

See id.

Having set forth the governing legal standard, the Court turns to Petitioner’s
instant habeas claims.
1. The Incident Report and the UDC
Petitioner asserts that there is a discrepancy between the first and second page

of the Incident Report (i.e., Doc. No. 1-1 at 1, 2), concerning the exact time at which
the UDC took action with respect to the charged violation. (Doc. No. 1 at 7 (arguing
that the first page identifies the time as 7:30 a.m., and the second page identifies the

time at 9:30 a.m.).) The Court, having reviewed Petitioner’s claim, is unpersuaded
as the Court sees no such discrepancy and, if anything, observes that the handwritten
times on the first and second page of the Incident Report are, simply, difficult to
read.

Even assuming arguendo, however, that there is such a discrepancy between
the first and second page of the Incident Report, the Court fails to see the merit of
this claim. For instance, Petitioner does not argue, and the evidence of record does

not suggest, that he did not receive a decision from the UDC or that he suffered any
prejudice concerning the exact time at which the UDC made its decision. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 380–81 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding, in the
immigration context, that “there would be no due process violation in the absence of

prejudice”); Gross v. Warden, USP Canaan, 720 F. App’x 94, 96 (3d Cir. 2017)
(unpublished) (explaining, in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings that
“due process is not violated absent a showing of prejudice” (citation omitted)). In

addition, regardless of the exact time at which the UDC made its decision, the
evidence of record demonstrates that Petitioner received a decision from the UDC
and that the UDC advised him of his rights concerning the charged violation. (Doc.

No. 1-1 at 1, 2.) In addition, the evidence of record demonstrates that Petitioner did
not appear before the DHO until April 15, 2020 and, thus, Petitioner had ample time
following the UDC’s decision to prepare for his hearing.

Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s
claim that there is a discrepancy between the first and second page of the Incident
Report, concerning the exact time at which the UDC took action with respect to
Petitioner’s charged violation, is without merit. As a result, this claim will be

denied.4
2. The DHO
Next, Petitioner claims that the DHO’s findings are inconsistent with the

contents of the Incident Report. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.) More specifically, Petitioner
claims that the Incident Report states that the hazardous tool (i.e., the cell phone)
was found “between rooms 218 and 219” and retrieved from his “right pocket,”

4 The Court briefly notes that the second page of the Incident Report identifies
Petitioner as “Cannon, Andrew” as opposed to “Cannon, Bradford.” (Doc. No. 1-1
at 2.) Although the second page of the Incident Report does not contain Petitioner’s
correct first name, it contains Petitioner’s correct last name, as well as his correct
BOP registration number (i.e., 38036-054). In addition, the first page of the Incident
Report, which is the main page of document, correctly identifies Petitioner as
“Cannon, Bradford[,]” and includes his correct BOP registration number. (Id. at 1.)
whereas, the DHO’s report states that the phone was found in his “hand in [his]
assigned room/cell[.]” (Id.); see also (Doc. No. 1-1 at 5).

The Court, having reviewed Petitioner’s claim, acknowledges that, in this
particular section of the DHO’s report, the DHO could have been more careful in
his/her use of the word “hand” as opposed to “pocket” and in his/her use of the word

“assigned room/cell” as opposed to in “between rooms 218 and 219[.]” See (id.).
However, the Court also observes that the DHO’s report expressly acknowledges,
and explicitly incorporates into his/her report, the reporting officer’s written account
of the charged violation, which establishes that the cell phone was found in

Petitioner’s “right pocket” on the “2nd floor of Unit 5751 between rooms 218 and
219” (id. at 5). In addition to making this observation, the Court finds that, when
the DHO’s report is read as a whole, it is indeed consistent with the reporting

officer’s written account and investigation, the documentary evidence submitted to
the DHO during the hearing, and the witnesses’ testimony. (Id. at 5–6.)
Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s
claim that the DHO’s findings are inconsistent with the contents of the Incident

Report is without merit. The Court will, therefore, deny this claim.
3. Administrative Appeals Process
Finally, Petitioner claims that the Incident Report and “the process in which

it has been handled should be very questionable.” (Id. at 8.) In support, Petitioner
seems to suggest that, during his administrative appeals process, he received a
response indicating that his appeal from the DHO’s decision had been partially

granted. (Id.) Petitioner has submitted that response into the record. (Doc. No. 1-1
at 9.) That response is dated January 19, 2021, and it provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
A review of your appeal reveals questions concerning the
disciplinary process. Accordingly, this disciplinary action is being
remanded for further review and rehearing, if necessary. You will
be notified of the date and time of any further proceedings. After
further proceedings, you may appeal again to this office, if you
desire. To the extent above, your appeal is partially granted.

(Id.) In connection with this response, Petitioner argues that when (5) months went
by without receiving any notice that his “rights and privileges” had been restored,
he started “inquireing [sic] to the administration[,]” and he received a memorandum
instructing him to file a new administrative remedy appeal. (Id. at 8.) Petitioner has
also submitted that memorandum into the record. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 10.) It is dated
July 13, 2021, and it states, in pertinent part, as follows:
I am requesting that you accept this filing for inmate Cannon
Bradford, Reg. No. 38036-054, for Administrative Remedy id
number 1035909-R2. Inmate Cannon was not notified that he was
required to submit a new Administrative Remedy appeal until today
July 13, 2021.
(Id. at 10.) Petitioner argues that he did not receive this memorandum until after he
had already filed his first appeal. (Doc. No. 1 at 8.)
At the outset, the Court notes that it is unclear what happened after Petitioner’s

appeal was partially granted. The Court also notes, however, that the appeal response
did not require a new hearing or restoration of Petitioner’s privileges. Rather, it
simply explained that the “disciplinary action [was] remanded for further review and

rehearing, if necessary.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 9 (emphasis added).) The Court finds
that such an appeal response, in itself, does not give rise to due process violation. In
addition, the Court has conducted an independent and thorough review of the record
in this matter and finds that the requirements of due process were satisfied here.

More specifically, the evidence of record establishes that Petitioner received
advance notice of the charged violation against him when Decker delivered a copy
of the Incident Report to Petitioner on February 29, 2020, at 9:30 p.m. (Doc. No. 1-

1 at 1, 3.) In addition, during the subsequent UDC proceedings, Petitioner was
advised of his rights and acknowledged that he understood those rights. (Id. at 1.)
Petitioner then appeared for his DHO hearing on April 15, 2020, and thus had about
forty-five (45) days to marshal the facts and prepare a defense for his hearing. (Id.

at 3.) At the hearing, Petitioner was advised of his rights, and he was given the
opportunity to make a statement and to present witnesses and documentary evidence
in his defense. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner was also provided a copy of the DHO’s written
report, which sets forth the evidence relied upon, the sanctions imposed, and the
reasons for those sanctions. (Id. at 5.) Petitioner makes no argument, and the record

does not suggest, that the DHO was personally or affirmatively involved in the
underlying incident (i.e., the search and confiscation of the hazardous tool) or any
other part of the initial disciplinary process. And, finally, the Court notes that the

DHO’s decision was supported by “some evidence” of Petitioner possessing the cell
phone, which, in turn, is sufficient to uphold Petitioner’s disallowance of good-
conduct time. Specifically, the DHO relied upon the written account of the reporting
officer, the documentary evidence, the witnesses’ statements, and Petitioner’s denial

of the charge. Thus, the requirements of due process have been satisfied here. See
Hill, 472 U.S. at 455 (explaining that “the requirements of due process are satisfied
if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke

good time credits”).
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny the instant
Section 2241 petition. (Doc. No. 1.) An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: January 2, 2024 s/ Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10414079. Public record. Not legal advice.