# Rivera v. Superintendent of SCI-Forest

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · November 7, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413983

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** November 7, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NELSON HERNANDEZ RIVERA, No. 4:22-CV-01603

Petitioner, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

SCI-FOREST SUPERINTENDENT,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NOVEMBER 7, 2023
Petitioner Nelson Hernandez Rivera, (“Rivera”), an inmate confined in the
Forest State Correctional Institution, Marienville, Pennsylvania, files the instant
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a
sentence imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County in criminal
case CP-40-CR-0002098-2017.
For the reasons set forth below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus, which
is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, April 24, 1996 (“AEDPA”), will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts and procedural history, extracted from the Pennsylvania
Superior Court’s December 3, 2019 decision, affirming Rivera’s judgment of
sentence, are as follows:
The affidavit of probable cause and notes of testimony from the guilty
plea and sentencing hearings reveal that Appellant and Evelyn Almonte
(“Victim”), who “grew up together” and were from “the same village”
in the Dominican Republic, were in a romantic relationship, had a
daughter, and resided in Luzerne County. N.T. (Sentencing), 1/4/19, at
12-13. The affidavit of probable cause reveals that the security guard
at the Crystal Barbecue Bar observed Appellant and Victim arguing at
11:30 p.m. on March 19, 2017. At approximately 1:40 a.m. on March
20, 2017, Appellant “grabbed [Victim] by the hair” when he observed
her sitting with an unknown male. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 5/9/17,
at 1. Ten or fifteen minutes later, Victim left the bar, followed by
Appellant. Id. The security guard followed them outside and saw
Appellant “stabbing [Victim] viciously and repeatedly in the chest” . .
. “at least 15 times to vital parts of her body.” Id.; N.T. (Guilty Plea),
10/29/18, at 8. The security guard fired his gun twice, striking
Appellant once in the leg. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 5/9/17, at 2.

Appellant was charged with one count of attempted homicide and one
count of aggravated assault as a result of the stabbing. Appellant pled
guilty to attempted homicide1 on October 29, 2018, and the
Commonwealth agreed to withdraw the charge of aggravated assault.
Plea Agreement, 10/29/18, 1-3; N.T. (Guilty Plea), 10/29/18 at 3. The
trial court sentenced Appellant on January 4, 2019, to eighteen to forty
years in prison. N.T. (Sentencing), 1/4/19, at 17. Appellant filed a
post-sentence motion on January 14, 2019, which the trial court denied
on May 2, 2019. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and both
Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2

By Memorandum Opinion dated December 3, 2019, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court granted a motion to withdraw by appellate counsel and
affirmed Petitioner’s judgment of sentence.3

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§2501(a) and 901(a).
2 Doc. 17-1 at 73-75.
3 Id.
On July 9, 2020, Rivera filed a pro se motion for post-conviction collateral
relief (PCRA).4 The procedural history of Rivera’s PCRA petition is set forth by

the trial court as follows:
A pro se motion for post-conviction collateral relief was filed by
Defendant on July 9, 2020. After receiving Defendant’s motion, an
order was issued on November 16, 2020, which appointed conflict
counsel to represent him. On January 13, 2021, appointed counsel
submitted a no-merit letter and filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.
In the letter and motion, appointed counsel indicated that he reviewed
the file, communicated with Defendant and determined that Defendant
had no PCRA claim and his petition had no merit.

Following a review of Defendant’s motion, appointed counsel’s no
merit letter, motion to withdraw and an independent review of the
record established in this case, an order was issued granting appointed
counsel’s request to withdraw. A Notice of Intention to Dismiss
Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P.
907 was filed on February 3, 2021.

Although Defendant was served with a copy of the Notice of Intention
to Dismiss, he did not respond. Because Defendant’s PCRA motion
had no merit, it was dismissed on March 2, 2021. On March 16, 2021,
a Notice of Appeal which was dated March 1, 2021, and appears to be
signed by Defendant, was filed. The notice of appeal does not include
a statement that the order appealed from had been entered on the docket
and no date is provided for the order resulting in the appeal.

A Rule 1925(a) opinion was filed on May 11, 2021. This opinion
recommended that the appeal be quashed due to Defendant’s failure to
comply with Pa.R.A.P. 301(a)(1) and Pa.R.A.P. 904(d). On October
22, 2021, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania filed a non-precedential
decision which remanded the case for the filing of a supplemental Rule
1925(a) opinion. In the decision, the Superior Court determined that
Defendant was appealing the order dated March 2, 2021 even though
the notice of appeal filed by Defendant was dated March 1, 2021 which

4 Doc. 17-1 at 146.
was prior to the existence of the March 2 order and several days before
Defendant would have received the March 2 order by certified mail.

The March 2, 2021 order dismissed the motion for post-conviction
collateral relief filed by [Appellant] on July 9, 2020. In his July 9
motion, Appellant raised two issues. Defendant’s first issue was based
on the ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to challenge the
legality of sentence where the sentence imposed is beyond the statutory
maximum in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Federal Constitution and Article I Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
. . . .

The second claim made by Defendant in his motion for post-conviction
collateral relief is that he suffered a miscarriage of justice due to the
imposition of a sentence beyond the statutory maximum in violation of
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and
Article 1 Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. This allegation
appears to be filed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 9543(a)(2)(vii) in
that the sentence imposed was greater than the lawful maximum.5

On November 18, 2021, the trial court, in accordance with the Superior
Court’s remand, issued a Supplemental Opinion Pursuant to Rule 1925(a)(1),
determining that its March 2, 2021 order dismissing the motion for post-conviction
collateral relief should be affirmed based on the findings that Rivera’s guilty plea
was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered after a thorough colloquy was
completed, Rivera was sentenced within the standard range of the sentencing
guidelines and his sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum.6

5 Doc. 17-1 at 137-144.
6 Id.
In a Memorandum Opinion filed January 21, 2022, the Superior Court
affirmed, finding Rivera’s underlying counsel claim to have no arguable merit as

the sentence imposed was not greater than the lawful maximum, and Rivera’s
additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel waived, as they were raised
for the first time on appeal.7

Presently before the Court for review is Rivera’s federal petition, in which he
raises the following three grounds for review:
1. The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the Petitioner
at the top-end of the standard range of the sentencing guidelines.

2. Trial counsel and post-sentence counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to challenge the legality of sentence where
sentence imposed is beyond statutory maximum allowed in
violation of Six and Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution.

3. Defendant suffered a miscarriage of justice in that sentencing
court imposed a sentence beyond statutory maximum allowed in
violation of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution.8

For relief, Petitioner requests this Court “vacate his sentence and remand
back to the State for resentencing under Attempted Murder without the Seriously
Bodily Injury enhancement.”9

7 Doc. 17-1 at 145-150.
8 Doc. 1.
9 Id.
II. DISCUSSION
A habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the proper

mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the “fact or duration” of his confinement.10
Petitioner’s case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, April 24, 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28

U.S.C. § 2254, provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States.
...

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding....11

Section 2254 sets limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for
a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner.12 A federal court may

10 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973).
11 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
12 Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011); Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d 402, 406 (3d
Cir. 2014).
consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner only “on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”13

This limitation places a high threshold on the courts. Typically, habeas relief will
only be granted to state prisoners in those instances where the conduct of state
proceedings resulted in a “fundamental defect which inherently results in a

complete miscarriage of justice” or was completely inconsistent with rudimentary
demands of fair procedure.14
Further, a federal habeas court may not consider a petitioner’s claims of
state law violations; review is limited to issues of federal law.15

A. Merits Analysis
Under the AEDPA, federal courts reviewing a state prisoner’s application
for a writ of habeas corpus may not grant relief “with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the claim (1) “resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

13 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
14 See, e.g., Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994).
15 See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal
habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”); Pulley v.
Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984) (“A federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a
perceived error of state law.”); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 120 n.19 (1982) (“If a state
prisoner alleges no deprivation of a federal right, § 2254 is simply inapplicable.”).
proceeding.”16
“[B]ecause the purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief

functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice
systems, and not as a means of error correction,”17 “[t]his is a difficult to meet and
highly deferential standard . . . which demands that state-court decisions be given

the benefit of the doubt.”18 Here, the burden is on Hernandez Rivera to prove
entitlement to the writ.19
A decision is “contrary to” federal law if “the state court applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or “if the state

court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision
of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme
Court] precedent.”20 “[A] state court decision reflects an ‘unreasonable application

of such law’ only ‘where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree
that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court’s precedents,’ a
standard the Supreme Court has advised is ‘difficult to meet’ because it was ‘meant
to be.’ [Harrison v.] Richter, 562 U.S. 86, [ ] 102, 131 S.Ct. 770. As the Supreme

Court has cautioned, an ‘unreasonable application of federal law is different from

16 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
17 Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted),
18 Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
19 Id.
20 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).
an incorrect application of federal law,’ Richter, 562 U.S. at 101, 131 S.Ct. 770
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495), and whether we ‘conclude[ ]

in [our] independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly’ is irrelevant, as AEDPA sets a
higher bar. Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495.”21 A decision is based on

an “unreasonable determination of the facts” if the state court’s factual findings are
objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented to the state court.22
Finally, Section 2254(e) provides that “[i]n a proceeding instituted by an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue shall be presumed to
be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The clearly established ineffective assistance of counsel standard as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States is as follows:
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are “governed by the familiar
two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).” Shelton v. Carroll, 464 F.3d 423,
438 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123
S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)). For AEDPA purposes, the
Strickland test qualifies as “clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, 120
S.Ct. 1495. Under Strickland, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate

21 Mathias v. Superintendent Frackville, SCI, 876 F.3d 462, 476 (3d Cir. 2017).
22 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
that: (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s error, the result would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687,
104 S.Ct. 2052. For the deficient performance prong, “[t]he proper
measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This review
is deferential:

A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,
to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s
perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in
making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance....

Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052

Not every “error by counsel, even if professionally
unreasonable, ... warrant[s] setting aside the judgment of a
criminal proceeding.” Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “Even if a
defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were
unreasonable, ... the defendant must show that they actually
had an adverse effect on the defense”; in other words, the
habeas petitioner must show that he was prejudiced by
counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694,
104 S.Ct. 2052.

In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the ultimate
focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding.... In every case the court should be concerned with whether
... the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a
breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to
produce just results.” Id. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052.23

When the state court has decided the claim on the merits, “[t]he question ‘is
not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination’ under the
Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether that determination was
unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.’ ”24 “And, because the Strickland
standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably
determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.”25

The Superior Court stated that the proper standard governing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims is as follows:
In order to overcome that presumption, “a PCRA petitioner must plead
and prove that: (1) the legal claim underlying the ineffectiveness claim
has arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or inaction lacked any
reasonable basis designed to effectuate petitioner’s interest; and (3)
counsel’s action or inaction resulted in prejudice to petitioner.”
Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 618 (Pa. 2015).

In determining whether counsel had a reasonable basis, the issue is not
“whether there were other more logical courses of action which counsel
could have pursued[,]” but “whether counsel’s decisions had any
reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. Bardo, 105 A.3d 678, 684 (Pa.
2014) (citations omitted). If it is a matter of strategy, we will not find a
lack of reasonable basis unless “an alternative not chosen offered a
potential for success substantially greater than the course actually
pursued.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311-12 (Pa. 2014). In
order to demonstrate prejudice, “a petitioner must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s actions or inactions, the

23 Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2010).
24 Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S.
465, 473 (2007)).
25 Id.
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Mason, supra at
389. All three prongs of the test must be satisfied in order for a
petitioner to be entitled to relief. Id.26

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has specifically
held that the very ineffectiveness assistance of counsel test relied upon by the
Superior Court in this matter is not contrary to the Supreme Court’s Strickland
standard.27 Therefore, this Court finds that the Superior Court’s decision is not
contrary to Strickland.
Petitioner also raises three claims for relief that all relate to an
unconstitutionally excessive sentence; namely that the state court abused its

discretion when sentencing Petitioner, trial and post-sentence counsel failed to
object to or raise the issue of the unconstitutional sentence and, as a result of the
alleged unconstitutionally excessive sentence, Petitioner has suffered a miscarriage

of justice.
Generally, sentencing is a matter of state criminal procedure, which does not
fall within the purview of federal habeas review.28 “[A] federal court will not
normally review a state sentencing determination which, as here, falls within the

statutory limit.”29 A criminal sentence violates the Constitution only when it is

26 Commonwealth v. Diaz, 1965 EDA 2019 at 5-6, 237 A.3d 436, 2020 WL 2200741 (Pa.
Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum).
27 See Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 204 (3d Cir. 2000).
28 See Jones v. Superintendent, 725 F.2d 40, 43 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991).
29 Gleason v. Welborn, 42 F.3d 1107, 1112 (7th Cir. 1994).
extreme and “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.30 As the Supreme Court of
the United States has counseled, “outside the context of capital punishment,

successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences will be
exceedingly rare.”31
In affirming the PCRA court’s denial of post-conviction relief, the Superior

Court rejected this claim on its merits as follows:
A review of the record shows that the underlying claim (i.e., sentence
imposed is illegal because it is beyond the statutory maximum) is of no
merit. Appellant was convicted of attempted murder resulting in
serious bodily injury. The statutory maximum sentence for attempted
homicide with serious bodily injury is 40 years. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
1102(c). Appellant’s sentence of 216 months to 480 months, therefore,
does not exceed the statutory maximum. See also PCRA Opinion,
11/18/21, at 4.

Because Appellant’s underlying claim has no arguable merit, we do not
need to address the other ineffective assistance prongs. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Ly, 980 A.2d 61, 74 (2009) (“A failure to satisfy any
of the prongs of the [Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (1987)]
test required rejection of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel). Accordingly, no relief is due to Appellant on his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.

Appellant next raises the very same claim, i.e., sentence imposed is
illegal because it is beyond the statutory maximum, as a challenge
under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vii), which permits a claim under the
PCRA that “the imposition of a sentence [was] greater than the lawful
maximum.” As noted above, however, the sentence imposed here was
not greater than the lawful maximum. Accordingly, the instant claim
does not fare any better than the previous one.32

30 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010).
31 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289–90 (1983) (brackets omitted).
32 Doc. 17-1 at 169-170.
This federal habeas court may not grant relief unless I determine that the
state appellate court’s decision on the merits was an unreasonable application of

Solem, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Based
on the record before the Superior Court, there is nothing to suggest that the
Superior Court applied Solem v. Helm to the facts of this claim in an objectively

unreasonable manner, nor is there anything to suggest an unreasonable
determination of the facts by the state court. Petitioner’s sentence with respect to
the offense of Criminal Attempt (1st Degree Murder) where the victim suffers
serious bodily injury fell within the statutory limits established by the Pennsylvania

General Assembly.33
Here, Petitioner has failed to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of
sentencing counsel because the Superior Court expressly determined that his claim

of illegal sentence was without merit.34 This Court finds that counsel’s decision to
not object to a meritless claim and PCRA counsel’s35 decision to forego raising a

33 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(c).
34 As to Petitioner’s claim that the sentencing judge abused his discretion by sentencing
Petitioner at the high end of the sentencing guideline range, a that court’s sentencing
discretion is not cognizable in a federal habeas petition. Jones v. Superintendent of Rahway
State Prison, 725 F.2d 40, 42–43 (3d Cir. 1984).
35 Additionally, the Court finds that claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel are not
cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (“The ineffectiveness
or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings
shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.”); see also
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1987) (no constitutional right to counsel in
collateral post-conviction proceedings); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991)
(no constitutional right to counsel on appeal from initial collateral post-conviction
proceedings).
meritless claim did not violate professional norms.36 Counsel’s failure to object to
a meritless claim could not possibly have prejudiced Petitioner.37 Hernandez

Rivera has therefore not suffered a miscarriage of justice and is not entitled to
habeas relief on any of the three claims he raises before this Court for review.
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

“Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(‘AEDPA’), a ‘circuit justice or judge’ may issue a COA [certificate of
appealability] only if the petitioner ‘has made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.’ ”38 “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional

claims on the merits, ... the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong.”39

For the reasons set forth above, this Petitioner has not made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right or that jurists of reason would find it
debatable that Court’s assessment of the claims debatable or wrong. Accordingly,
a COA will not issue.

36 See Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Appealing losing issues ‘runs
the risk of burying good arguments ... in a verbal mound made up of strong and weak
contentions.’”) (citations omitted).
37 See Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
38 Tomlin v. Britton, 448 Fed.Appx. 224, 227 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)).
39 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will deny the petition for writ of

habeas corpus.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413983. Public record. Not legal advice.