# Chatmon v. Warden Rickert

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · October 17, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413783

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 17, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413783

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that Section 2241 “allows a federal prisoner to challenge the ‘execution’ of his sentence in habeas”
- finding that a federal inmate’s petition is actionable under Section 2241, where the inmate attacks the term of his custody by challenging the manner in which the BOP is computing his federal sentence
- explaining that the existence of cause turns on whether a petitioner can show that some objective, external factor impeded his efforts to comply with the BOP’s administrative remedy process
- explaining that the Third Circuit has “adhered to the exhaustion doctrine for several reasons[,]” including “administrative autonomy[, which] requires that an agency be given an opportunity to correct its own errors” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALTON CHATMON, :
Petitioner :
: No. 1:23-cv-00623
v. :
: (Judge Kane)
WARDEN RICKART, :
Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Alton Chatmon (“Petitioner”)’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Section 2241”). (Doc.
No. 1.) Petitioner seeks an order directing the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to award him
earned time credits, as required under the First Step Act of 2018. (Id.) For the reasons set forth
below, the petition will be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is serving a twenty-seven (27) month term of imprisonment imposed by the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey for conspiracy to distribute and
possession with intent to deliver butalbital and tramadol, as well as conspiracy to commit money
laundering. (Doc. No. 12-1 at 3, ¶ 3.) According to BOP documentation submitted by
Respondent, Petitioner entered BOP custody on August 2, 2022 (id. at 8), and his projected
release date, via the First Step Act, is February 11, 2024 (id. at 3, ¶ 3). However, a review of the
BOP’s inmate locator indicates that Petitioner’s projected release date is now December 28,
2023.1

1 The BOP’s inmate locator can be accessed at the following address:
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.
On April 13, 2023, while Petitioner was incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp at
Federal Correctional Institution Schuylkill (“FCI Schuylkill”) in Minersville, Pennsylvania, he
filed his Section 2241 petition. (Doc. No. 1.) Following some initial administrative matters
(Doc. Nos. 3, 6, 8), he paid the requisite filing fee (Doc. No. 9). In response to receiving

Petitioner’s petition and filing fee, the Court, inter alia, deemed the petition filed, directed
service of the petition on Respondent, and instructed Respondent to respond to the allegations in
the petition within twenty (20) days. (Doc. No. 10.)
On August 8, 2023, Respondent filed a response, asserting that the Court should dismiss
the petition because Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies before petitioning the
Court and, alternatively, because the petition is without merit since the BOP has properly applied
all of Petitioner’s earned time credits under the First Step Act. (Doc. No. 12.) As reflected by
the Court’s docket, Petitioner has not filed a reply, and the time period for doing so has passed.
Thus, the instant Section 2241 petition is ripe for the Court’s resolution.
II. DISCUSSION

Generally speaking, Section 2241 confers federal jurisdiction over a habeas petition that
has been filed by a federal inmate who challenges “not the validity but the execution of his
sentence.” See Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations and footnote
omitted); Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that
Section 2241 “allows a federal prisoner to challenge the ‘execution’ of his sentence in habeas”).
While “the precise meaning of ‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy[,]” see id. at 242, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (“Third Circuit”) has defined this phrase to mean
“put into effect” or “carry out.” See id. at 243 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As a result, a federal inmate may challenge conduct undertaken by the BOP that affects
the duration of the inmate’s custody. See, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478–79 (3d
Cir. 1990) (finding that a federal inmate’s petition is actionable under Section 2241, where the
inmate attacks the term of his custody by challenging the manner in which the BOP is computing

his federal sentence); United States v. Vidal, 647 F. App’x 59, 60 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished)
(stating that, “[b]ecause [the federal inmate’s] claim challenges the BOP’s calculation of
sentence credits, it is appropriately addressed in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
[Section] 2241” (citation omitted)).
As such, Petitioner’s claim that the BOP has incorrectly calculated his federal sentence
by denying him earned time credits under the First Step Act is properly brought pursuant to the
provisions of Section 2241. (Doc. No. 1.) However, even if properly brought pursuant to those
provisions, Petitioner was still required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his
petition in this Court. For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with Respondent that
Petitioner failed to do so with respect to his instant claim.

While there is no statutory exhaustion requirement for habeas corpus petitions brought
pursuant to Section 2241, the Third Circuit has recognized that “[f]ederal prisoners are ordinarily
required to exhaust their administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to [Section] 2241.” See Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d
Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000). Exhaustion
is required because: “(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record and apply
its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to grant the relief requested
conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the opportunity to correct their own
errors fosters administrative autonomy.” See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761–62 (citations omitted);
Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981).
However, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where these underlying
reasons for exhaustion would not be served. See id. (citations omitted); Coleman v. U.S. Parole

Comm’n, 644 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished). “For example, exhaustion may
be excused where it ‘would be futile, if the actions of the agency clearly and unambiguously
violate statutory or constitutional rights, or if the administrative procedure is clearly shown to be
inadequate to prevent irreparable harm.’” Brown v. Warden Canaan USP, 763 F. App’x 296,
297 (3d Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (quoting Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir.
1988)).
In order to exhaust administrative remedies, a federal inmate must comply with the
procedural requirements of the BOP’s administrative remedy process, which are set forth in the
Code of Federal Regulations. See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10–542.19. Under these
regulations, an inmate shall first attempt informal resolution of his complaint with staff and, if

the inmate is unable to resolve his complaint informally, he shall submit a formal, written request
on the proper form to the designated staff member. See id. §§ 542.13–542.14. If the inmate is
not satisfied with the Warden’s response, the inmate shall then submit an appeal to the Regional
Director, using the appropriate form. See id. § 542.15(a). And, finally, if the inmate is not
satisfied with the Regional Director’s response, then the inmate shall submit an appeal to the
Office of the General Counsel, located in the BOP Central Office, using the appropriate form.
See id. An inmate is not deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies until his
complaint has been pursued at all levels. See id. (explaining that an “[a]ppeal to the General
Counsel is the final administrative appeal”).
Here, the record reflects that, although Petitioner filed several administrative remedies,
only one of those remedies concerns his earned time credits under the First Step Act—i.e.,
Remedy ID Number 1156269. (Doc. No. 12-1 at 4, ¶ 5; id. at 7–9.) More specifically, the
record reflects that FCI Schuylkill received Remedy ID Number 1156269 from Petitioner on

March 31, 2023. (Id. at 12.) Respondent, the warden at FCI Schuylkill, responded to this
remedy on April 4, 2023. (Doc. No. 1 at 6.) Petitioner filed an appeal, and the Regional Office
received that appeal on April 18, 2023. (Doc. No. 12-1 at 13.) The Regional Office issued a
response to Petitioner on June 16, 2023. (Id.) Petitioner, however, did not file an appeal of that
response to the Central Office. See (id. at 11–14). In other words, Petitioner filed his Section
2241 petition in this Court prior to fully exhausting his administrative remedies with the BOP.
Petitioner concedes his failure to exhaust but argues that exhaustion should be excused
because “the Regional and Central [O]ffice responses are historically slow and unlikely to
complete before [he] should be released from prison.” (Doc. No. 1 at 2 (stating that, “[i]n other
words, if [he] were to wait for responses from the BOP before seeking the [C]ourt’s help, [he]

would still be in prison beyond the appropriately calculated date”).) The Court, however, is
unpersuaded by Petitioner’s argument, as it does not provide a basis to excuse exhaustion. See,
e.g., Greene v. Spaulding, No. 22-cv-01726, 2023 WL 3372375, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2023)
(concluding that the Section 2241 petitioner had failed to show irreparable harm as a basis for
excusing administrative exhaustion, where he argued that the denial of his claim at the
administrative level would result in him being released later than the date he would be entitled to
release if he were granted habeas relief—i.e., granted credits under the First Step Act);
Rodriguez v. Sage, No. 22-cv-02053, 2023 WL 2309781, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2023)
(explaining that “district courts within the Third Circuit have repeatedly rejected the argument
that an inmate can be excused from the exhaustion requirement simply because his projected
release date is approaching, and he may not complete his administrative appeal before the release
date” (collecting cases)); Ramirez v. Sage, No. 22-cv-00638, 2022 WL 2318693, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
June 28, 2022) (rejecting the Section 2241 petitioner’s argument that requiring him to exhaust

his administrative remedies “would subject him to irreparable harm because the delay would
result in him being incarcerated beyond the date he should be released” (citation omitted)).
Additionally, because Petitioner’s instant Section 2241 petition requests that the Court
order the BOP to apply earned time credits to his current federal sentence, the Court finds that
Petitioner must first fully exhaust this request so that BOP officials can determine whether he is
eligible for such credit. This finding is consistent with the policy underlying the exhaustion
requirement. See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761–62 (explaining that exhaustion is required because,
among other things, it provides “agencies the opportunity to correct their own errors[,]” thereby
fostering “administrative autonomy” (citations omitted)); Bradshaw, 682 F.2d at 1052
(explaining that the Third Circuit has “adhered to the exhaustion doctrine for several reasons[,]”

including “administrative autonomy[, which] requires that an agency be given an opportunity to
correct its own errors” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Thus, for all of these reasons, the Court concludes that, because Petitioner did not fully
exhaust his administrative remedies before petitioning this Court, and because no exception to
the exhaustion requirement applies here, Petitioner’s Section 2241 petition is subject to
dismissal.2

2 To the extent that the BOP’s administrative remedy process is no longer available to Petitioner,
the Court notes that he has not argued, much less shown, cause for his procedural default. That
is, Petitioner has not shown that some objective, external factor hindered his efforts to comply
with the BOP’s administrative remedy process. See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 760–62 (stating that, “if
a prisoner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies due to a procedural default and the
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the instant Section 2241
petition. (Doc. No. 1.) An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Yvette Kane
Yvette Kane, District Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania

default renders unavailable the administrative process, review of his habeas claim is barred
unless he can demonstrate cause and prejudice” (citation omitted)); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 488 (1986) (explaining that the existence of cause turns on whether a petitioner can show
that some objective, external factor impeded his efforts to comply with the BOP’s administrative
remedy process). And, because Petitioner has not shown such cause, the Court need not address
the issue of prejudice.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413783. Public record. Not legal advice.