# Williams v. Pennsylvania State University

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · October 11, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413766

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 11, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413766

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that “[a] statute is not facially unconstitutional unless ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’”
- applying standard to Title VII claim
- holding that a plaintiff could not survive summary judgment on a Title VII claim where “no reasonable person could have believed” there was a Title VII violation
- observing that “temporal proximity merely provides an evidentiary basis from which to prove an element of causation”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KAYLA WILLIAMS, No. 4:20-CV-00298

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)
v.
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE
UNIVERSITY; LAUREN
LANGFORD; KAREN FELDBAUM;
and YVONNE GAUDELIUS,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

OCTOBER 11, 2023
Modern universities are behemoths; educational department stores spread
across multiple campuses, combining undergraduate colleges, graduate schools,
professional schools, online courses, and research institutions. These institutions
have largely displaced—or acquired—smaller colleges guided by more narrow
missions. Defendant The Pennsylvania State University epitomizes this evolution.
A far cry from its humble beginnings as an agricultural college, Penn State counts
nearly 90,000 students on its rolls, with over half of those at its University Park
campus.1 As schools have grown to the size of small cities, so have the

1 Student Enrollment, Penn State (Fall 2022), available at https://datadigest.psu.edu/student-
administrative institutions within them. American universities maintain police
forces, formalized codes of conduct akin to criminal codes, and pseudo judicial

institutions which hear and rule on disputes between those on campus and conduct
code violations.
Few individuals are more familiar with these features of the modern university

and how they interact with their municipal counterparts than Plaintiff Kayla
Williams. As a freshman, Williams accused another Penn State student of rape, and
alleges that Penn State declined to sanction the accused because she criticized the
University’s handling of the case. Later, Williams accused a professor of racial bias

and alleges he subsequently retaliated against her for levying those accusations.
Finally, a few credits short of graduation, Williams herself was accused of
harassment and assault, leading to her suspension from Penn State. Williams alleges

that, in those proceedings, she was deprived of due process.
There is much less to Williams’ claims than meets the eye. Dissatisfaction
with adverse academic or disciplinary decisions does not give rise to a legally
cognizable harm. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Williams filed her eight-count First Amended Complaint on April 27, 2020,

against Defendants The Pennsylvania State University, Brandon Prawdzik, Lauren
Langford, Karen Feldbaum, and Yvonne Gaudelius.2 On September 4, 2020, the
Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss3 with regard to Counts V and VI.4

Remaining for disposition are Williams’ Title VI retaliation (Count I) and
discrimination (Count IV) claims, Due Process claims (Counts II and III), and First
Amendment Claims (Counts VII and VIII).5 Defendants have filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment as to each remaining claim,6 which is fully briefed by the parties

and now ripe for disposition.7
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment
is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” As

expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
summary judgment is required where a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case” on an issue that
the “party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”8 Material facts are those “that could

2 Am. Compl., Doc. 18. Williams subsequently voluntarily dismissed Prawdzik. Doc. 28.
3 Mot. to Dismiss Doc. 22.
4 Mot. to Dismiss Order, Doc. 33.
5 See Am. Compl.; Williams Opp., Doc. 92 at 5 (describing Williams’ three “classes” of claims).
6 Mot. Summ. J., Doc. 77.
7 Defs.’ Br. Supp. Summ. J. (“MSJ Br.”), Doc. 84; Williams’ Br. Opp. Summ. J. (“Opp.”), Doc.
92; Defs.’ Reply Supp. Summ. J. (“Reply”), Doc. 100.
alter the outcome” of the litigation, “and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence exists
from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the

burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”9
The party requesting summary judgment bears the initial burden of supporting
its motion with evidence from the record.10 When the movant properly supports its

motion, the nonmoving party must then show the need for a trial by setting forth
“genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved by only a finder of fact because
they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”11 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit explains that the nonmoving party will not withstand

summary judgment if all it has are “assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere
suspicions.”12 Instead, it must “identify those facts of record which would contradict
the facts identified by the movant.”13

In assessing “whether there is evidence upon which a jury can properly
proceed to find a verdict for the [nonmoving] party,”14 the Court “must view the
facts and evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.”15 Moreover, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of

9 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern
Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).
10 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
11 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
12 Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010).
13 Port Auth. Of N.Y. and N.J. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1988)).
14 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252 (quoting Schuylkill & Dauphin Imp. Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S.
422, 448 (1871)).
fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule
56(c),” the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”16

Finally, although “the court need consider only the cited materials, . . . it may
consider other materials in the record.”17
B. Local Rule 56.1

Local Rule 56.1 requires all motions for summary judgment to be
“accompanied by a separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in
numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine
issue to be tried.” The party opposing summary judgment must then include with its

papers an answer to the movant’s statement of facts in which it identifies, in
corresponding numbered paragraphs, those material facts which the nonmovant
contends there is a genuine issue to be tried.18 “Statements of material facts in

support of, or in opposition to, a motion shall include references to the parts of the
record that support the statements.”19 Material facts in the movant’s statement “will
be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served
by the opposing party.”20

1. Statement of Additional Material Facts

16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613-14 (3d
Cir. 2018).
17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
18 LR 56.1.
19 Id.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants submitted a 327
paragraph Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.21 Williams’ answer to

Defendant’s Statement of Facts responded to each paragraph and included 107
paragraphs of “Additional Material Facts.”22 Defendants subsequently filed a motion
asking the Court to either strike or allow Defendants to respond to Williams’
Statement of Additional Material Facts.23

Defendants argue that the Court should not exercise its discretion to depart
from the requirements of Rule 56.1 because (1) Williams’ AMF asserts facts without
record support, and (2) Defendants would be prejudiced because they will not have

the opportunity to address these inaccuracies.24 These concerns are somewhat
undermined by Defendants having taken the initiative to preemptively submit the
response—in which they address Williams’ purportedly unsupported assertions—
that they ask permission to file.25 Williams submitted a single paragraph response,

arguing that Defendants’ position would preclude her from “point[ing] to sufficient
facts on which a jury could find” in her favor, instead forcing her to rely on

21 Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts (“SMF”), Doc. 77-2.
22 Williams’ Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts (“RSOF”), Doc. 93 at 1-25, ¶¶ 1-327;
Williams’ Additional Material Facts (“AMF”), Doc. 93 at 25-38, ¶¶ 1-107.
23 Mot. to Strike, Doc. 101. Defendants filed as an exhibit the response that they ask the Court to
allow them to file. Defs.’ Resp. to Williams’ Additional Material Facts (“RAF”), Doc. 101-2.
24 See Mot. to Strike, Section V.A.
25 See Alcantara v. Aerotek, Inc., 2018 WL 3007528, *12 (M.D. Pa. June 15, 2018), aff’d 765 F.
App’x 692 (3d Cir. 2019) (considering statement of additional facts where movant filed a
response to those facts with the reply). Defendants attempt to distinguish Alcantara on the
grounds that they filed their response separate from their reply brief. Mot. to Strike at 7 n.3.
This is a distinction without a difference. The Court now has the RAF; therefore, Defendants
Defendant’s “false narrative.”26 In reply, Defendants reiterate their argument that
Rule 56.1 does not permit Williams to file her own Additional Material Facts, and

assert that it is Williams who is presenting the false narrative.27
As an initial matter, the Court assures the parties that it is not persuaded by
the rhetorical flourish of their counterpart. Though counsel may think of themselves

as modern day Daniel Websters, no amount of yarn spinning in a Statement of
Material Facts will move the Court beyond the bounds of “ordinary range of thought
and feeling.”28 If the parties agree on a fact, the Court will accept the fact as stated.
If they do not, the Court will look to the parts of the record cited by each party and

make its own determination. No more, no less. Williams could have denied each of
the SMF’s paragraphs with citations to the record, and that would have been
sufficient to obviate any concerns of a false narrative.

Courts in this District have repeatedly held that “Local Rule 56.1 does not
permit a non-moving party to file an additional statement of material facts that does
not respond to the moving party’s statement.”29 Instead, Rule 56.1 “requires the

26 Mot. to Strike Opp., Doc. 103.
27 Mot. to Strike Reply, Doc. 104, at 2.
28 Burack, Thomas S., Wax Wick, and Flame: Performing Daniel Webster’s Peroration from the
Dartmouth College Case, 18 U.N.H. L. Rev. 3, 3-4 (2019) (describing Webster’s peroration as
“so moving that it brought Chief Justice John Marshall to tears.”).
29 Evans v. Kaye, 2021 WL 5416282, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2021) (citing Holt v. Pennsylvania,
2021 WL 3511104, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2021); Farmer v. Decker, 353 F. Supp. 3d 342,
347 n.1 (M.D. Pa. 2019); Barber v. Subway, 131 F. Supp. 3d 321, 322 n.1 (M.D. Pa. 2015));
accord Patra v. Pennsylvania Sys. of Higher Educ., 2019 WL 4861444, at *1 n.8 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 30, 2019); Sash v. Hogsten, 2009 WL 249649, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2009); Carson v.
Aurand, 2019 WL 2569447, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Pa. June 20, 2019); Dreibelbis v. Young, 2007
nonmoving party’s statement of facts to respond to the numbered paragraphs set
forth in the moving party’s statement, and to ‘include references to the parts of the

record that support the statements.’”30 Where the non-movant fails to abide by these
requirements of Rule 56.1, the movant’s uncontroverted statements of fact may be
deemed admitted.31 Ultimately, “the proper sanction for violating Rule 56.1 is within
the district court’s discretion.”32

In determining the proper sanction, the Court is mindful of Rule 56.1’s
purpose: to “structure a party’s summary judgment legal and factual theory into a
format that permits and facilitates the court’s direct and accurate consideration to the

motion.”33 The movant’s statement and the non-movant’s response should enable
“the court to identify contested facts expeditiously.”34 Given that Defendants’ “short
and concise statement of the material facts”35 consists of 327 paragraphs over nearly

100 pages, the Court is skeptical that even strict adherence to the requirements of

30 Landmesser v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 982 F. Supp. 2d 408, 413 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting
LR. 56.1).
31 Id. (citing LR. 56.1); see also Conn v. Bull, 307 F. App’x 631, 633 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding
district court’s decision to deem facts admitted under Local Rule 56.1).
32 Hickey v. Merritt-Scully, 2021 WL 949448, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2021) (citing Weitzner v.
Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 614 (3d Cir. 2018)).
33 Park, 2011 WL 1831708, at *3 (quoting Hartshorn v. Throop Borough, 2009 WL 761270, at
*3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2009)).
34 See id. at *3 (quoting Pinegar v. Shinseki, 2009 WL 1324125, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 12, 2009)).
Rule 56.1 by Williams would make a material difference in the expedience with
which the Court is able to identify the contested facts.36

Practically, disregarding Williams’ AMF would make it impossible for the
Court to evaluate her arguments opposing summary judgment. Williams’ opposition
brief contains dozens of citations to the AMF.37 Excising those citations and

references would render much of Williams’ opposition unintelligible, likely
resulting in a waiver of her arguments.38 Though I would prefer that Williams paid
more heed to the Rules of this Court, waiver of her opportunity to defend her claims
on the merits is too harsh a sanction. Nor is requiring Williams to redraft her RSOF

in accordance with Rule 56.1 a viable option. Given how intertwined Williams’
AMF is with her opposition, both her RSOF and opposition would need to be largely
rewritten. Allowing Williams to correct her filings would reward her for failing to

adhere to the Court’s Rules by giving her the opportunity to consider and respond to
Defendants’ filings.39

36 Defendants and Williams insist that the other is to blame for the voluminous nature of the
parties’ summary judgment filings. Reply 1. This is one dispute the Court will abstain from
weighing in on.
37 See generally Opp.
38 See Diodato v. Wells Fargo Ins. Svcs., USA, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 541 at 556-57 (M.D. Pa. 2014)
(collecting cases observing that failure to offer a response to a movant’s summary judgment
arguments constitutes an abandonment of claims left undefended).
39 The Court notes that this would not be an issue had Defendants not preemptively filed their
RAF. Generally, litigants seeking permission from a court to submit a filing should wait until
permission is granted to do so. There may be the rare circumstance where it is necessary to
seek forgiveness rather than permission from a court, but it is not the case here. Defendants
would have been better served by allowing the Court to consider their request before filing, let
alone spending considerable resources drafting, a 54-page RAF. Nonetheless, the Court
As Defendants note, many of Williams’ Additional Facts are (procedurally
improper) responses to Defendants’ SMF or commentary and argument that belongs

in briefing.40 Therefore, the Court will consider Williams’ AMF in conjunction with
her RSOF and her opposition brief. 41 This does not mean, however, that the Court
will do so uncritically and accept at face value statements in the AMF, or the parties’

briefings generally, which contain “mischaracterizations” or “facts that are not
supported by the record.”42 Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ request that
the Court to strike Williams’ statement of Additional Material Facts. The Court will
consider the entirety of the parties’ filings, including Defendants’ RAF.43

2. Failure to Respond to Material Facts
Defendants also argue that Williams “failed to properly respond to many of
the facts in the Defendants’ SMF.”44 The Court agrees. Williams’ objection to nearly

100 paragraphs in the SMF on the basis that they do not posit “a material fact to any
claim or defense” is nonresponsive and those facts are deemed admitted.45 So to are

confronted with only uncertain and imperfect options. Therefore, the Court will limit the fallout
from Williams’ error accordingly.
40 See RAF ¶ 1 n.1 (observing that, in many of the paragraphs in her AMF, Williams cites to
Defendant’s SMF).
41 See Alcantara, 2018 3007528, at *13 (allowing additional statements where they permitted the
nonmovant to resent all of the evidence they believed would rebut the motion for summary
judgment).
42 Cf. Mot. to Strike 11, 12.
43 As Defendants have already filed their response, their request for leave to file that response is
denied as moot.
44 Reply 3.
45 See Weizner, 909 F.3d at 613 (“Where an opposing party fails to object in its answer, those
the facts to which Williams has various, generalized evidentiary objections. “While
summary judgment is generally subject to the rules of evidence, ‘general objections

such as characterizing the evidence as hearsay, will not suffice’ to raise a proper
evidentiary objection.”46 Williams’ bare citations to the Rules of Evidence47 and
conclusory statements—i.e. that portions of the SMF are hearsay,48 “confuse the
issues,”49 or “were made without personal knowledge,”50—are insufficient to raise

legitimate objections. Williams also lodges numerous baseless objections under
Rule 106, complaining that she need not respond to paragraphs in the SMF without
considering the entire document.51 Rule 106 requires the introduction of an entire

document “that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” Williams does
not explain why it would be unfair to only consider the cited portions in her
objections. Even if she did, the entire documents are on the record.52

that if these facts are truly immaterial, then Williams will not be prejudiced by their being
deemed admitted.
46 See Chambers v. York Cnty. Prison, 2021 WL 1212532, at *1 n.2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2021)
(quoting United States v. Sandini, 803 F.2d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 1986)).
47 E.g., RSOF ¶¶ 31-34, 47-54, 121-126, 254-55.
48 E.g., RSOF ¶¶ 33-34, 201-207 (objecting under Fed. R. Evid. 802).
49 RSOF ¶ 22.
50 RSOF ¶ 24.
51 E.g., RSOF ¶¶ 46-54, 119, 121-26, 254-55 (objecting to SMF on basis that entire document
should be considered); see also Williams Dep., Ex. 1, Doc. 80-2 at 104:18-105:2 (objecting to
question regarding email between Williams and Prawdzik on the basis that the entire email
thread should be considered).
52 Compare RSOF ¶¶ 47-54 (objecting under Rule 106 that “the entire code should be used,
including the Special Protocols for crimes of violence”) with Ex. 23, Doc. 78-11, at 27-29
(Special Protocols for Crimes of Violence); compare RSOF ¶ 121-26 (objecting that “the entire
Williams also makes several similarly deficient spoliation arguments related
to Penn State’s failure to preserve Williams’ student emails. For its part, Penn State

admits that Williams’ emails were automatically deleted by a “routine IT function”
when Williams’ emails were deleted once her status in the University’s systems was
changed to reflect her suspension. Penn State’s “duty to preserve potentially relevant

evidence is an affirmative obligation that [it] may not shirk” and it is no defense that
Penn State “inadvertently failed to place a ‘litigation hold’ or ‘off switch’ on its
document retention policy to stop the destruction of that evidence.”53 However,
sanctions for spoliation are not automatic, and Williams’ conclusory arguments that

she is entitled to adverse inferences are insufficient.54 Nor is Williams entitled to an
adverse inference based on her unsupported belief that documents which were
produced are unreliable or altered.55

Finally, Williams’ conclusory statements that certain issues are “not
undisputed because [they are] issue[s] of credibility for the jury” are similarly
deficient.56 Though the Court may not make credibility determinations in evaluating

53 Mosaid Technologies Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 339 (D.N.J.
2004).
54 See Bozic v. City of Washington, Pa., 912 F. Supp. 2d 257, 271-72 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (collecting
cases discussing four-factor test for determining what, if any, sanctions are appropriate where
a party has spoliated evidence)
55 Carty v. Steem Monsters Corp., 2022 WL 17083645, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2022).
56 E.g., RSOF ¶¶ 98-101, 127-129. These objections are also often contradictory of Williams’
own position. For example, Williams objects to the statement of fact that “Prawdzik . . .
reminded Plaintiff that he still needed documentation for her absences” on the grounds that it
is an issue of credibility. SMF ¶ 100; RSOF ¶ 100. But Williams complains that Prawdzik did
a motion for summary judgment, Williams’ conclusory statements that certain
paragraphs of the SMF are issues of credibility do not make them so.57

To the extent that Williams does raise cognizable objections or supports her
denials with citations to the record, the Court will address those accordingly. As to
the balance of the SMF, the Court deems those facts admitted.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND58
Williams’ claims relate to four distinct timelines and series of events that
overlap during the latter half of 2019 and into 2020. For clarity, the Court describes
the four relevant timelines independently.

A. Penn State Title IX Investigation of Williams’ Rape Allegations
On January 17, 2017, Williams awoke at the apartment of fellow Penn State
Student A.A. and called 911 to report that she had been sexually assaulted the night
before.59 Ferguson Township Police officers responded to the scene and talked to

A.A. and D.W., another Penn State Student, who reported that they had consensual
sexual intercourse with Williams the prior night.60 Williams was transported to
Mount Nittany Medical Center where she underwent a sexual assault examination.61

Williams may disagree with how Prawdzik characterizes the interaction, but that is not at issue
in SMF paragraph 100.
57 Conlon v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 2014 WL 5843421, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2014).
58 Citations to numbered exhibits refer to Defendants’ exhibits filed in support of their motion
for summary judgment. Citations to RSOF exhibits and AMF exhibits refer to exhibits filed by
Williams in support of those respective documents.
59 SOF ¶ 4
60 SOF ¶¶ 5-6.
The Ferguson Police notified the University Police of Williams’ allegations the next
day.62 On January 20, Katharina Matic of the University’s Office of Sexual

Misconduct Prevention and Response (“OSMPR”) emailed Williams to invite her to
meet with the Office and to provide Williams with resources and procedural
options.63 Williams initially responded, but did not reply to a follow up on January
23.64 On March 13, 2017, Matic followed up informing Williams that they would

close the matter, but maintain the record if she would like to proceed in the future.65
She also advised Williams that evidence, including text messages, could be lost with
the passage of time.66 In October 2017, Williams advised OSMPR that she wanted

to proceed with a Title IX investigation.67 Over the next six months, Title IX
Coordinator and Investigator Chris Harris investigated Williams’ claims.68 It was
discovered that D.W. had withdrawn from the University, so the Title IX case

proceeded as to A.A. alone.69 Over the course of the investigation, Harris
interviewed ten witnesses, including D.W. and Williams, attempted to interview
A.A. who refused to participate.70 Harris also considered other evidence, though he
was unable to review records such as text messages and video evidence that the

62 SOF ¶ 9.
63 SOF ¶ 10.
64 SOF ¶ 11.
65 SOF ¶ 12.
66 Id.
67 SOF ¶ 15.
68 SOF ¶¶ 16-21.
69 SOF ¶ 25.
Ferguson Township Police Department declined to share with Penn State.71 Harris
issued his report on April 3, 2018.72

On April 5, 2018, Williams tweeted a picture of A.A. captioned:
His name is [A.A.] and he’s one of the rapists that still walks freely on
campus bc PSU keeps dragging out the investigation after a year plus!!!
The other one’s name is [D.W.] but I don’t know what he looks like…73
The same day, she also Tweeted:
While we’re on the topic, let’s also talk about how Penn State hides and
undermines just how bad rape on this campus actually is and how much
rapists are[] condoned no matter the amount of evidence!! !!74
The next day, Lisa Powers, Senior Director of the Office of Strategic
Communications reached out to Danny Shaha, Assistant Vice President, Student
Rights & Responsibilities, regarding Williams’ Tweets, asking if there were any
criminal or conduct proceedings ongoing related to her allegations.75 Shaha and
Harris exchanged emails regarding the Tweets.76 Williams was provided with the
Title IX investigation packet by the Office of Student Conduct on May 11, 2018.77

The University Decision Panel (“UDP”) convened a hearing against A.A. on May
18, 2018, during which Williams participated by phone and A.A. participated in

71 SOF ¶¶ 18-21.
72 SOF ¶ 26.
73 Ex. 14, Doc. 80-10.
74 Ex. 15, Doc. 80-11 at 74. Williams’ Tweet read that “rapists aren’t condoned no matter the
amount of evidence” which appears to be a typo.
75 RSOF Ex., Doc. 94-30.
76 Id., AMF Ex., Doc. 96-51.
person.78 The UDP issued its decision, finding A.A. not responsible, the same day.79
Williams submitted an appeal of the decision on May 31, which was denied on June

11, 2018. In the meantime, Harris had reviewed the process applied in the case and
told Williams that he “believe[d] the Office of Student Conduct, the Title IX decision
panel, and the subsequent appeals process were all managed appropriately,
consistent with established University policies and procedures.”80 Harris further

advised Williams that, if she felt her rights were violated and that University
procedures were improperly applied, she could file an external complaint with the
U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights.81

B. Prawdzik’s Class and Williams’ Title VI Complaint
During the Fall 2019 semester, Williams was enrolled in an English 202A
advanced writing course taught by Dr. Brandon Prawdzik.82 Prawdzik maintained

an attendance policy which stated that “a student whose absences are excessive ‘may
run the risk of receiving a lower or failing grade,’ regardless of his or her
performance in the class.”83 Further, Prawdzik would only excuse absences
“according to legitimate documentation.”84

78 SOF ¶¶ 30-31.
79 Ex. 17, Doc. 80-12.
80 Ex. 21, Doc. 70-9, at 17.
81 Id. at 18.
82 SOF ¶ 81.
83 SOF ¶ 83.
As part of the class, students were required to write a research paper.85
Williams chose to write her research paper about racism and discussed the topic with

Prawdzik early in the semester.86 Williams subsequently emailed Prawdzik “to say
thank you for helping [her] figure out a set research question!”87 Throughout
September and October, Williams missed several classes and had not provided
Prawdzik with any documentation excusing her absences.88 On October 14, 2019,

Williams attended Prawdzik’s class and Prawdzik approached her regarding the
missing documentation.89 Prawdzik’s attempt to discuss Williams’ absences in
earshot of others in the class upset Williams.90 The pair went into the hallway where

the situation escalated, leading Prawdzik to dismiss Williams from class.91
Following this incident, Williams filed a discrimination complaint against Prawdzik
with the University Affirmative Action Office (“AAO”).92

After class on October 14, 2019, Prawdzik emailed Gregg Rogers, a director
of the Program in Writing and Rhetoric, seeking advice on how to handle the
situation with Williams going forward.93 In the email, Prawdzik said that Williams
“has shown anger in class and in person” and “has also been antagonist[ic] in a forum

85 SOF ¶¶ 82, 88.
86 SOF ¶ 89.
87 SOF ¶ 91.
88 SOF ¶¶ 93-101.
89 SOF ¶ 100; see also AMF ¶¶ 27-29.
90 SOF ¶ 101; AMF ¶ 28.
91 SOF ¶ 102-104; AMF ¶ 30-32.
92 SOF ¶ 107.
post, in which she labelled a student’s comments racist.”94 He described the incident
during class that day and said that he was “uncomfortable about this student being

in my classroom and very uncomfortable about the accusations [of racism] that she
was shouting at me.”95 The next day, Prawdzik emailed Williams and told her that
she could return to class provided that there would be “no further disruption of class”
and she “maintain a professional relationship with the professor and other students.96

He also notes that, because she is ”not registered with the Office of Student
Disability” “none of the eight recorded absences is excused.”97 He tells her that if
she is unwilling to agree to these conditions, he will refer her to the Directors of the

Program in Writing and Rhetoric, Rogers and Cheryl Glenn.98 Williams responds
that she has “already filed a discrimination report against” Prawdzik “so we will be
dealing with it that way” and that it was Prawdzik who created the distraction by
asking about her personal issues during class.99

That evening, Williams sent a follow up email insisting that she was absent
“maybe 3-5 times, but NOT 8” and that she had “NEVER been a class distraction
and didn’t have any problems with any students in the class except the RACIST

comments one student made at the VERY beginning of the semester.”100 Further,

94 Ex. 47, Doc. 78-21, at 689.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 691.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 692.
she accuses Prawdzik of “treat[ing her] differently” after she chose her “Racism
topic for the course trying to convince me that minorities are partly at fault for racism

and structural racism etc.”101 She concludes by asking Prawdzik why he found it
necessary to start talking about her “personal situation” in class and to explain how
she is a “class distraction.”102 She follows up with a third email on October 21, 2019,
asking if he plans on answering her questions.103 On October 22, Prawdzik responds

by reiterating his stance from his October 15 email, again referring her to Glenn and
Rogers and telling Williams that he “do[es] not feel comfortable having [Williams]
in class until this matter is mediated by a third party.”104 Williams replies that day

with three successive emails, effectively repeating her position from her earlier
emails.105
Dr. Suzanne Adair, the Associate Vice President for Affirmative Action,
investigated Williams’ complaint.106 As part of the investigation, she interviewed

Williams, Prawdzik, and two other students in Williams’ class.107 Adair interviewed
Williams on October 25.108 Williams reiterated that she became upset after Prawdzik
asked her about her absences in front of the rest of the class.109 Williams also tells

101 Id.
102 Id. at 693.
103 Id. at 693.
104 Id.
105 See id. at 694-96.
106 SMF ¶ 118; RSOF ¶ 118.
107 Id.
108 Ex. 59, Doc. 78-33.
Adair that Prawdzik told her that minorities were responsible for racism and
mentioned the discussion board posts about racism from earlier in the semester.110

Adair then interviewed Prawdzik on November 1.111 Prawdzik tells Adair
about the discussion board post when Williams accused a student of “post[ing] a
racist comment” and his meeting with Williams regarding her research topic in

which he says Williams misconstrued his words, accusing him of “saying black
people are responsible for racism.”112 He admits that, in hindsight, he could have
approached Williams differently regarding her absences, but maintains that it was
Williams who escalated the situation.113 Prawdzik says that he asked if she wanted

to discuss the issue outside of the classroom when he noticed that she was “fuming”
and that, once they left the room, she immediately attacked him for “discriminating
against her” and being “racist to her.”114 At this point, Prawdzik says he told
Williams she needs to leave class.115 Instead, he says that she returned the class and

yells to the other students that they need to report Prawdzik for discriminating
against her.116 Prawdzik further detailed the conditions he set out for Williams to
return to class and expressed his concern that he needs a third party involved because

110 Id.
111 Ex. 61, Doc. 78-35.
112 Id. at 1.
113 Id. at 2.
114 Id.
115 Id.
he does not think he can “grade her and have it be perceived as fair.”117 He also notes
that “[s]he likely can’t pass the class at this point—it’s a done deal given how much

she’s missed. She’d have to do a lot of work to get back up to speed. If he was her
advisor, he’d suggest she drop the course.”118 On November 21, Adair interviewed
two students in Williams’ class regarding the October 14 incident and those students
corroborated Prawdzik’s version of events.119

On December 1, 2019, Adair notified both Prawdzik and Williams that she
had concluded there was no evidence to substantiate Williams’ complaint.120 Adair
told Williams that she “should follow any instructions provided by the instructor

regarding your involvement in the course going forward”121 and advised Prawdzik
of the same.122 On December 16, 2019, Williams emailed Prawdzik that her “advisor
will be in communication with you regarding completing your class first thing
tomorrow.”123 On December 18, 2019, Tauheddah Alexander, a case manager in

Student Care & Advocacy, reached out to Prawdzik via email copying Williams
regarding “the necessary steps Ms. Williams will need to take to complete the
course,” asking him to confirm a list of outstanding assignments.124 Prawdzik

117 Id.
118 Id. at 3.
119 Ex. 62, Doc. 78-36.
120 Ex. 47, Doc. 78-21, at 31; Ex. 63, Doc. 78-37.
121 Ex. 63, Doc. 78-37.
122 Ex. 47, Doc. 78-21, at 31.
123 AMF Ex., Doc. 96-25.
responded that the list of assignments in Alexander’s email “does not remotely
approach the steps that Kayla Williams would, in theory, need to complete to receive

credit for the course.”125 He notes that list excludes four assignments that “constitute
70% of the total grade.”126 Prawdzik also states that Williams “missed eleven classes
as of 10-21-2019” which “warrants a failing grade.”127 He also says that she was “far

behind and did not seem to know what we were doing as of 10-14-2019 . . . it is my
conclusion that she has already earned an F for the course.”128
Prawdzik then makes clear that he will have no active role in Williams
completing the course:

Instead of completing the class, Kayla Williams filed an Affirmative
Action complaint against me after first accusing me of disability
discrimination (she had declared no disability with Disability Services).
I have expressed to Dean Suzanne Adair my outrage about this
complaint, which I have consistently seen as fallacious and malicious.
The complaint was dismissed after evidence—including interviews
with students who were present on 10-14 and during the semester—
showed that Kayla Williams had been judiciously treated and served by
her instructor: that no policies had been compromised.
Because I was suddenly faced with false and malicious accusations
related to racial bias, I could not and cannot assess her work. I refuse to
assess any of Kayla Williams’ work, for fear that I will be treated
maliciously and subject to further false accusations.
As such, were she to complete the course, the English Department
would need to pay someone to assess the work. That matter would need
to be taken up with the English Department.

125 Id. at 83.
126 Id.
127 Id.
As such, Kayla Williams will not be able to complete the course with
me facilitating it. She has too much damaged the trust between
professor and student to make that possible.
My stance is that Kayla Williams has received an F for the course and
that grade is final. I am willing to change my stance if I receive
instructions to do so from an administrator with the authority to give
them. But again, I will not assess this student’s work. 129
Williams responded “This is not how this is about to go. YOU caused that
class disruption Prawdzik. You will come up with a way that I can complete this
class and I will be in contact with others.”130 She also accuses Prawdzik of lying
regarding the number of absences.131 Prawdzik then asks Alexander to “[p]lease do
what you can to keep this student from harassing me. My next step is to contact
Student Conduct.”132 Alexander then thanked Prawdzik for the “detail[ed]
clarification” and said that “[n]o further email correspondence between you and Ms.

Williams will be necessary at this time.”133 Alexander tells Williams to “please share
with me any further comments or concerns you may have.”134 Williams responds by
sending a reply to everyone on the thread, including Prawdzik, saying there is “no
reason [she] shouldn’t be able to make up that course” and then, addressing Prawdzik

specifically: “I had every right to file that report on you after you violated my privacy
in[ front] of the whole class for NO reason.”135

129 Id.
130 Id. at 82.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 81.
134 Id.
Adair subsequently reached out to the English Department Head who
informed her that “Kayla hasn’t completed 70% of the work for the ENG 202

course” and that it “would be very hard to . . . complete the course now, even with a
deferred grade.”136 Adair ultimately concluded that the only options would be for
Williams “to retro[actively] drop the course and take it in the spring online (or find

another course to substitute) or hope that this isn’t actually a requirement so she
doesn’t have to retake the course at all.”137 Adair subsequently informed Williams
that it was not possible for her to receive a deferred grade and make up the work.138
As a result, Williams’ final grade for Prawdzik’s class was an “F.”139

C. Dr. Yarwood’s Class and Williams’ Title VI Complaint140
During the Spring 2020 semester, Williams was enrolled in a Psychology
course taught by Dr. Michelle Yarwood.141 Yarwood utilized an online quiz tool to
create multiple choice quizzes for the class.142 Each quiz consisted of ten questions

which were pulled from a larger pool of questions.143 The tool would automatically
grade the quizzes.144 On two separate occasions, there was an error with the tool

136 Ex. 64, Doc. 78-38, at 140.
137 Id.
138 SOF ¶ 138.
139 SOF ¶ 136.
140 Williams asserts that each of the SOF paragraphs regarding Yarwood’s class are immaterial.
141 SOF ¶ 139.
142 SOF ¶ 141.
143 Id.
which resulted in incorrect grading of certain questions.145 Williams was not
impacted by either of these grading issues because the error was either rectified prior

to her taking the quiz, or her quiz did not contain one of the questions that had been
incorrectly graded.146
Williams insisted that her grades for these quizzes, as well as other
assignments, had been improperly calculated.147 Williams accused Yarwood of using

a “stricter rubric” to grade Williams’ assignments and submitted an Affirmative
Action complaint against Yarwood.148 Williams subsequently dropped Yarwood’s
class.149

D. Penn State Investigation and Subsequent Suspension of Williams
for Harassment and Assault

On October 18, 2019, the University issued an Administrative Directive to
Williams, instructing her to have no contact with her roommate, A.B., following an
incident days earlier.150 A.B. alleged that Williams harassed and threatened her and
used A.B.’s personal information without permission.151 In particular, A.B. claimed
that, on October 14, Williams physically threatened her while A.B. was Facetiming
with her mother.152 On October 28, 2019, Williams was involved in a separate

145 SOF ¶¶ 147, 155.
146 SOF ¶¶ 147-152; 155.
147 SOF ¶¶ 163-165.
148 SOF ¶¶ 168.
149 SOF ¶ 176.
150 SOF ¶¶ 198-99.
151 SOF ¶ 201.
incident in which she struck a Lyft driver, John Petrulich, in the head.153 Petrulich
called the police and Williams was cited by the Patton Township Police for

harassment with physical contact.154 Williams would eventually be convicted of
harassment in relation to this incident following a summary trial.155 The conviction
was upheld on appeal.156

Lauren Langford, Assistant Director, Office of Student Conduct, initially
reached out to Williams to schedule a time to meet regarding A.B’s complaint on
November 21, 2019.157 Williams advised Langford that she would be accompanied
by an advisor and that they would not be available to meet until after Christmas.158

Langford responded that she would be “happy to find a time to meet that works for
you and your advisor when you return after break.”159
On December 19, 2019, Petrulich submitted a complaint to Penn State
regarding the Lyft incident.160 The complaint was forwarded to the Associate Dean

for Undergraduate Studies in the College of Health and Human Development,
Dennis Shea, who subsequently submitted a formal incident report and Behavioral
Threat Management Team Referral Form to the University.161 Shea emailed

153 SOF ¶ 207.
154 SOF ¶ 210.
155 SOF ¶ 214.
156 Id.
157 Ex. 134, Doc. 80-38, at 3506-07.
158 Id. at 3504-05.
159 Id. at 3504.
160 SOF ¶ 215.
Langford and others regarding the incident, stating that “this one incident may
warrant suspension, but of course, any investigation and the conduct process can

ferret that out.”162
On January 9, 2020, Langford reached out to Williams to “find time to meet”
and Williams responded, copying individuals from the Office of Student Affairs,

that she would not meet until the “Office of Student Conduct formally responds to
the lists of questions I gave them regarding recent situations and how they have
charged me.”163 On January 13, Danny Shaha from the Office of Student Affairs
responded:

As I have shared before, we have responded to your questions,
repeatedly. However, I’m happy to talk with you about any remaining
concerns you have. Please let me know if you would like to speak with
me.
Regardless, you will need to respond to the Office of Student Conduct
regarding the more recent allegations of misconduct. I have instructed
them to move forward as they normally would. If you choose not to
participate in that process, they will move forward without your
participation. Of course, it would be beneficial for you to participate,
but that is entirely up to you.164
Williams responded on the January 15, insisting that she would not be meeting
with anyone until questions “regarding charging [Williams] in recent situations are
answered.”165 The same day, Langford sent Williams a letter notifying her that a

162 SOF ¶ 222.
163 Ex. 134, Doc. 80-38, at 3503.
164 Id. at 3502.
conduct conversation had been scheduled for January 21 at 3:00 P.M..166 The letter
advised her that she “may contact the Office of Student Conduct at in [sic] advance

of this meeting to reschedule” if she would be unable to attend due to an academic
conflict.167
At 6:13 a.m. on January 21, Williams emailed an individual in the Affirmative

Action Office asking for a meeting to discuss a discrimination complaint she filed
the previous day.168 At 8:29 a.m., Langford emailed Williams to remind her of her
conduct conversation scheduled for that afternoon.169 Then, at 10:35 a.m. Williams
was admitted to the Emergency Department at the Mount Nittany Medical Center

where she tested negative for the flu, was advised to follow up with a primary care
physician or student health services, and subsequently discharged at 12:08.170
Williams did not show up for her 3:00 p.m. conduct conversation. Instead, she sent
an email to Dr. Adair at 3:03 p.m. asking for a meeting as soon as possible.171 She

also later sent an email to Dr. Yarwood, saying that she “was the sick girl in the back
of your classroom” during class on January 21.172 Yarwood’s class took place from
3:05 p.m.-4:20 p.m.. The parties seem to agree that it is unlikely Williams actually

166 Ex. 140, Doc. 79-29.
167 Id.
168 Ex. 68, Doc. 78-42, at 573.
169 Ex. 142, Doc. 80-39 at 3528.
170 Ex. 146, Doc. 80-41 at 157-8, 160, 166-67.
171 Ex. 68, Doc. 78-42, at 572.
attended class that day173 and, for her part Williams notes that there was a conflict
with the originally scheduled conduct conversation, despite Langford noting it had

been scheduled “[a]fter a review of [Williams’] class schedule.”174 However,
Williams apparently did not advise Langford that the time was “not possible because
of an academic conflict.”175

At 4:04 p.m., Langford sent Williams a letter advising her that, as she had
missed her conduct conversation scheduled for that day, it had been rescheduled for
January 24 at 11:00 a.m..176 Williams again said that neither her or her advisor would
attend any meeting until she received answers to her questions.177 Langford advised

Williams that all of her questions had been answered in a January 16 email, and that
the conduct conversation scheduled for January 24 “is a mandatory appointment
[and i]f you choose not to attend the meeting, the conduct process will move forward
without you.178

That is precisely what happened.179 The meeting went on in Williams’
absence, and Langford recommended Williams be sanctioned for “harming or
attempting to harm another” and “harassment by communication.”180 On January 27,

173 SMF ¶ 245 n.25; RSOF ¶ 245.
174 RSOF ¶ 246; Ex. 70, Doc. 78-44 at 1.
175 Cf. Ex. 140, Doc. 79-29.
176 Ex. 147, Doc. 79-33; Ex. 16, Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ RFAs, Doc. 78-6, Resp. No. 14.
177 Ex. 149, Doc. 80-42.
178 Id.
179 Ex. 16, Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ RFAs, Resp. No. 15.
Langford advised Williams that, if she did not respond to the charges by 5:00 p.m.
on January 30, 2020, the charges and sanctions would go into effect.181 Williams did

not respond, and was subsequently informed on January 31 that the sanctions,
suspension through August 17, 2020 and a requirement that Williams satisfactorily
complete counseling, went into effect.182 At 7:41 p.m. on January 31, after sending

emails in which Williams refused to accept the suspension and complaining that she
had been charged with no proof,183 Williams asserted, for the first time, that she had
missed the conduct conversation because she was sick.184
On February 3, 2020, Langford offered Williams a second opportunity to

submit the Conference Summary Form and contest the charges, which Williams did
on February 5.185 On February 23, 2020, Williams was sent a notice of a University
Conduct Board (“UCB”) hearing regarding the charges relating to the A.B. and

Petrulich incidents scheduled for February 21.186 Leading up to the hearing,
Langford reached out to A.B. and Petrulich to invite them to participate in the
hearing, but both declined.187 Williams filed the instant lawsuit on February 19, and
Penn State was served with the suit the following day.188 Following a hearing on

181 Id. at 546.
182 Ex. 153, Doc. 79-38; SMF ¶¶ 258-59; RSOF ¶¶ 258-59.
183 See Ex. 154, Doc. 80-43.
184 Ex. 156, Doc. 80-44 at 3514.
185 SOF ¶¶ 266, 272.
186 SOF ¶ 274.
187 SOF ¶¶ 278-86, 295.
February 21,189 the UCB decided to suspend Williams in a written opinion issued on
February 28.190 Williams’ suspension was upheld following an appeal.191

IV. Title VI Retaliation
To establish a retaliation claim under Title VI, Williams “must show that she
(1) engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) suffered an adverse action at

the hands of a public official, and (3) her constitutionally protected conduct was a
substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action.”192 Opposition to conduct that
a complainant reasonably believes constitutes unlawful discrimination is a protected
activity under Title VI.193 The final two elements are satisfied where the adverse

action suffered is material194 and because of opposition to unlawful
discrimination.195 The parties do not dispute that Williams’ failing grade in
Prawdzik’s class is a materially adverse action.196 The questions then are (1) whether

189 SOF ¶¶ 297-300.
190 SOF ¶ 317.
191 SOF ¶ 325.
192 Williams v. Pennridge Sch. Dist., 782 F. App’x 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Watson v.
Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d
Cir. 1997); Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2003)). Courts apply the same
standard for claims brought under Title VI, Title IX, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id.; Katchur v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 354 F. Supp. 3d 655, 669 (E.D.
Pa. 2019).
193 See Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 2008)
(applying standard to Title VII claim). Cf. Ke v. Drexel Univ., 645 F. App’x 161, 165 (3d Cir.
2016) (affirming dismissal of Title VI and § 1981 claims where plaintiff “d[id] not claim he
was retaliated against because he complained of racial discrimination”) (citing Jackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 183 (2005)).
194 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
195 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 184.
196 Opp. 7; see also MSJ Br. 59 (arguing that Williams “cannot show any causal link between the
alleged adverse action (her receipt of an ‘F’ grade in Prawdzik’s class) and the protected
Williams engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, and (2) if so, did Prawdzik
retaliate because of it.

A. Protected Conduct
Penn State argues that Williams “did not engage in protected activity” because
“the undisputed facts demonstrate that [Williams] did not have an objective,

reasonable, good faith belief that the alleged action by Prawdzik was
discriminatory.”197 Williams counters that Penn State misstates the law, arguing that,
while courts have recognized that the elements for retaliation are the same under
Title VI, Title IX, and § 1981, it does not follow that the evidentiary burdens for

those elements are similarly interchangeable.198 She suggests that it is sufficient that
her complaint to Penn State’s Affirmative Action Office was facially about racial
discrimination, so arguments regarding whether she had a good faith belief that she
was being discriminated against are a red herring.199 Instead, Williams says that the

inquiry as to whether a complainant has an objectively reasonable belief that they
are engaging in protected conduct relates to whether the complaint is one that, on its
face, falls within the relevant statute.200 Penn State observes, and the Court agrees,

that to accept Williams’ argument would be to hold that a frivolous complaint would
constitute protected activity under Title VI.201 It is not sufficient that Williams

197 MSJ Br. 54.
198 Opp. 10 n.2.
199 Id. at 7.
200 See id. at 9.
purported to bring a complaint alleging racial discrimination; she must “show that
[s]he had a reasonable good faith belief that the practice [s]he opposed was unlawful

under Title VI.”202
Turning to the substance of Williams’ complaint against Prawdzik, Penn State
insists that “no reasonable person could objectively understand [Prawdzik’s]
conduct to constitute unlawful racial discrimination.”203 Williams responds that

Penn State is misapplying the summary judgment standard and shifting the goal
posts by focusing on whether Prawdzik discriminated against Williams rather than
whether he retaliated against her.204 As discussed above, whether Williams

reasonably believed that Prawdzik unlawfully discriminated against her is the first
step in the inquiry. Retaliating against a student for filing frivolous complaints may
be inadvisable, but it would not support a Title VI claim. Therefore, the substance
of her complaint is not “irrelevant to the claim at issue here.”205

Though the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to Williams,
it is Williams’ burden to show that she had “a reasonable good faith belief that the
practice [s]he opposed was unlawful under Title VI.”206 It is clear from the record

202 Ke v. Drexel Univ., 2015 WL 5316492, at *38 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2015), aff’d 645 F. App’x 161
(3d Cir. 2016); accord Peters, 327 F.3d at 321; Morales v. NYS Dep’t of Labor 865 F. Supp.
2d 220, 252 (N.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d 530 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2013). See also Clark Cnty. Sch.
Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (holding that a plaintiff could not survive summary
judgment on a Title VII claim where “no reasonable person could have believed” there was a
Title VII violation).
203 MSJ Br. 56.
204 See Opp. 10-11.
205 Contra Opp. 11.
that Williams was motivated to file her complaint with the University Affirmative
Action Office because she was angry that Prawdzik “start[ed] to discuss [Williams’]

personal information”207 “in[ ]front of the whole class.”208 Though it may be
improper for Prawdzik to discuss Williams’ personal medical issues or related
absences in a classroom, to the extent that Williams’ complaint to the Affirmative

Action Office was based on this misstep by Prawdzik it is not a complaint of racial
discrimination, and therefore not protected conduct under Title VI. However, that
alone is not enough to sink Williams’ claim. In her complaint to the Affirmative
Action Office, Williams says that the October 14, 2019 incident was just the last

straw in a long chain of abuses she had suffered at the hands of Prawdzik.209
Williams says that Prawdzik had treated her differently ever since she chose racism
as the topic for a research project.210 She claimed that Prawdzik had tried to talk her

out of her choice by saying “minorities are partly at fault for the racism [minorities]

207 Ex. 52, Doc. 78-26, .at 106.
208 See Opp. 11, n.4 (arguing that a reasonable juror could conclude that, had Prawdzik “been
more mindful October 14, 2019” Williams would not have filed her report); Ex. 51, Doc. 78-
25, at 2; Ex. 55, Doc. 78-29, at 1 (“I had every right to file that report on you after you violated
my privacy in[ front] of the whole class for NO reason.”); Williams Dep. 124:11-15 (Williams
testifying that, after Prawdzik asked her to leave class, she said “I didn’t even do anything. . . .
You just violated my whole privacy in front of the whole class, and you are telling me I have
to go because of what you did.”), 125:3-4 (Williams testifying that she told Prawdzik she would
be “filing an affirmative action report” after he called 911); 125:7-8 (testifying that she filed
the report after leaving class), 129:22-130:4 (Williams testifying that she would “not return[]
to class where the professor . . . disrespected me [and] embarrassed me in front of 25 people.
For no reason let them know I had mental health issues.”), 132:18-22 (“ . . . you can’t just bully
a student and disrespect her and violate her in front of the whole class and expect her to return
to class and continue as your student.”).
209 Ex. 51, Doc. 78-25 at 1.
experience” and “for no advancements being made when it comes to structural
racism.”211

Prawdzik offers a different version of events. He insists that he “steered Kayla
in the direction of a paper about race because that’s what she wanted to do.”212 Rather
than dissuade her during office hours, Prawdzik says he “helped her organize her

literature review” and “printed out documents to give her on this paper about race,
and she thanked me for it.”213 In response, Williams e-mailed Prawdzik on
September 9, 2019:
I also wanted to say thank you for helping me figure out a set research
question! I was going between the 2 topics all weekend and was driving
myself crazy about it trying to figure out a good research question that
would work for this specific project, so thank you so much.214

211 Id.; see also AMF ¶¶ 14-18; Williams Dep. 98:1-6 (“Actually, whenever I picked a topic of
race, after that class [Prawzdik] held me back for an hour and a half, and explained to me why
I should pick a different topic. And how stigmatized groups, or however you may want to say
it, is basically responsible for the racism we experience.”), 98:11-14 (“. . . I picked my own
topic of racism. Prawzdik did not like that. And he was doing everything to convince me that
racism is minorities’ issues.”)
212 SMF ¶¶ 88-90; Prawdzik Dep. 43:18-20.
213 SMF ¶¶ 89-92; AMF ¶¶ 89-92; Prawdzik Dep. at 43:22-24. Williams’ objection to SMF
paragraph 89 that the evidence does not support the fact that the conversation occurred on a
particular day is not well taken. See AMF ¶ 89. The emails Williams cites do not indicate “a
meeting regarding [Williams’ research] topic also occurred at the end of September.” Id.
Instead, they simply say Williams “planned on talking to [Prawdzik] after class” on September
27, 2019. Ex. 47, Doc. 78-21, at 74. That e-mail does not say that a meeting actually occurred,
and the subsequent email exchange suggests that it did not. Id. at 75-77. Also, the emails cited
by Defendants indicate that there was a meeting at some point either on or before September
9, 2019, which is an email that everyone agrees did happen. See SMF ¶¶ 88-89; AMF ¶¶ 88-
89.
Prawdzik responded “I’m glad that you feel good about your research topic!
It’s clearly one that will sustain your interest and produce meaningful insight.”215

Williams and Prawdzik continued to discuss the research proposal and other
assignments into October.216 They also discuss Williams’ attendance and need to
provide Prawdzik with the necessary documentation so that he may excuse her
absences.217 The tenor of these emails is objectively cordial at worst; there is no

suggestion of any disagreement between the two prior to October 14.218
When confronted with documentary evidence undermining her complaints of
racial animus during her deposition, Williams suggested Prawdzik was “super nice

in emails” despite being “super rude” when she would meet with him in person.219
Unfortunately for Williams, she “cannot defeat [a] Motion for Summary Judgment
by relying solely on [her] self-serving deposition testimony to create genuine issues
of material fact.”220 Williams does not cite to any evidence other than her own

215 Id.
216 See generally id. at 674-99.
217 Id. 685-89.
218 See generally id. at 6-21.
219 Williams Dep. 105:12-15. This testimony followed a lengthy exchange in which she appeared
to baselessly dispute the authenticity of the emails. Id. at 99:19-105:8. Her self-serving
statements that the documents at issue are altered or incomplete are insufficient to withstand a
motion for summary judgment. See Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2018)
(self-serving testimony insufficient to challenge authenticity of documents). Further, Williams
has subsequently admitted to the content of the emails. RSOF ¶¶ 91-92.
The Court also notes that it is not clear Williams and Prawdzik ever met outside of class other
than the initial meeting to discuss her research topic. Neither party cites to any evidence in the
record, nor has the Court found any on its own review, of any subsequent meeting.
220 Johnson v. MetLife Bank, N.A., 883 F. Supp. 2d 542, 549 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing Gonzalez v.
Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2012); Irving v. Chester Water
testimony that Prawdzik ever “tried to convince Williams not to write her research
paper about racism” or that “minorities were at fault for the racism they

experience.”221
Instead, Williams points to an interaction on an online discussion post where
“Prawdzik took it upon himself to defend” another student against Williams’
suggestions that their comment “seems racist.”222 Williams took issue with another

student who, discussing a research article about “racial microaggressions,” put
quotation marks around the phrase “stigmatized groups” and used the phrase “the
effects [minorities] suffer from d[ue] to their ethnicity and place in the world.”223

First, Prawdzik said that he was “certain that [student] put ‘stigmatized groups’ in
quotation groups because [student] is referring to language used by the researchers
in the quote that [student] includes.”224 Second, he highlights that the student had

used the phrase “their place in the world” in the context of minorities being “kept
within ‘their place.’”225
Not only was Prawdzik doing his job as a professor when he “inserted
himself”226 in the discussion, his comments and critique of Williams’ suggestion that

the student’s comments were racist were objectively reasonable. Using quotation

221 Cf. Opp. 12-13.
222 Id. at 13.
223 Id.; see also Ex. 47, Doc. 78-21, at 672.
224 Ex. 47, Doc. 78-21, at 672.
225 Id.
marks when quoting the language of a source is just that, nothing more. The sentence
from which Williams pulls the offending language notes that the study’s authors’

“compassion and understanding” for stigmatized groups.227 Even assuming a
reasonable juror could find that this is evidence of racial bias, the question is whether
Williams believed it was so when she filed her complaint. Williams does not mention
this incident in the complaint filed with the Affirmative Action Office.228

As Williams bears the burden of proof to show that she had a reasonable, good
faith belief that she was engaging in protected conduct,229 Penn State need only to
show “that there is an absence of evidence to support [Williams’] case.”230 Here,

Penn State has met that burden and then some, providing uncontroverted evidence
in the form of Williams’ emails, undermining Williams’ claim that Prawdzik had
unlawfully discriminated against her. Williams Title VI discrimination claim cannot

survive “the absence of facts of record which would contradict the facts identified
by” Penn State.231
B. Retaliation
If Williams had a reasonable, good faith belief that her October 14 complaint

constituted protected conduct, she would still need to show that the adverse action,
receiving a failing grade in Prawdzik’s class, was in reaction to her complaint. Penn

227 Ex. 47, Doc. 78-21, at 672.
228 Ex. 51, Doc. 78-25; Ex. 51, Doc. 78-26.
229 Ke, 2015 WL 5316492, at *38.
230 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
State argues that Williams “received an ‘F’ in Prawdzik’s class on merit” because
she “was absent from an excessive number of classes,” “and she completed only a

small fraction of the required course work.232 Williams, echoing Penn State’s
arguments discussed above, says that Prawdzik’s testimony that Williams failed his
class on merit is insufficient at summary judgment.233 Further, Williams argues that

Penn State “essentially ignores” key moments in the sequence of events between the
October 14 classroom incident and Williams receiving a failing grade.234 Penn State
replies that no amount of “mental gymnastics” can “rebut the undisputed fact that
Plaintiff received an ‘F’ in Prawdzik’s class on merit.”235

“Because retaliation is almost never subject to proof by direct evidence” a
plaintiff will generally have to “rely on circumstantial evidence to prove a retaliatory
motive.”236 Williams can satisfy her burden “with evidence of either (1) an unusually

suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly
retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism with timing that suggests a causal
link.”237 “Race discrimination claims under Title VI based upon circumstantial
evidence are analyzed using the burden-shifting framework developed by the

232 MSJ Br. 61.
233 Opp. 13-14.
234 Id. at 14.
235 Reply 9-10.
236 Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016).
Supreme Court in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green.”238 The McDonnell-Douglas
framework calls for a three-step, burden-shifting analysis: (1) Williams must first

establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) then Penn State must clearly set
forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse decision; (3) then
Williams must show that the legitimate reasons offered by Penn State were not its
true reasons, but were a pretext of discrimination.239

1. Williams’ Title VI Complaint
Defendants point to Prawdzik’s October 15, 2019 email as
evidence that, despite the incident the day before, he remained willing to have her in

class.240 Williams concedes that a “reasonable jury could conclude that, despite all
the class Williams allegedly missed, Prawdzik was nonetheless willing to work with
Williams if she would capitulate to him.”241 Williams does not explain how agreeing

to his conditions that she act respectfully and professionally would constitute
capitulating to Prawdzik. Ultimately, Williams decided to “deal with” the issue
through the process initiated by her complaint filed with the Affirmative Action
Office.242

238 Davis v. Quaker Valley Sch. Dist., 2016 WL 912297, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2016) (citing
411 U.S. 792 (1973); Gazarox ex re. Gazarov v. Diocese of Erie., 80 F. App’x 202, 204-205
(3d Cir. 2003)).
239 Id. at *10 (citing McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 804; Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)).
240 MSJ Br. 61.
241 Opp. 14.
Williams points to Prawdzik’s comment in his email to Rogers that Williams
had “labelled a student’s comments racist” as evidence of Prawdzik’s retaliatory

intent.243 She says that a reasonable jury could find that Prawdzik “purposefully
misquoted Williams to discredit her Affirmative Action report against him.”244 This
overstates the difference between Williams’ comment to the other student—“Your
wording is very slick but seems racist”245—and what Prawdzik said in his email over

a month later.246 Further, in an October 15 email to Prawdzik, Williams herself
explicitly characterized the student’s comment as racist.247 Though litigants and
courts have long struggled to define what is meant by “reasonable jury,” accepting

Williams’ argument here would require such an expansive definition as to render the
standard meaningless.
At the very least, no reasonable jury could find that, at this point, Penn State

or Prawdzik had retaliated against Williams. She had not yet failed the class, and
Prawdzik’s willingness to have her in class immediately following her filing the
complaint indicates that he had not yet decided to fail Williams.
2. Williams’ Failing Grade

243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Ex. 47, Doc. 78-21 at 672.
246 Cf. id. at 702 (email to Prawdzik in which Williams says she “didn’t have any problems with
any students in the class except the RACIST comments one student made”).
Penn State argues that Williams received an F “on merit” because she failed
to complete the lion’s share of the coursework and accrued an excessive number of

absences.248 Williams argues that Prawdzik’s failure to contact her following Dr.
Adair’s email on December 1, 2019 could lead a reasonable jury to “conclude that
Prawdzik disobeyed orders, in order to put Williams further behind regarding

missing class (which, again, he kicked her out of pending her acceptance of his
conditions).”249 Williams also argues that Prawdzik’s statement that he would not
assess her work “[b]ecause [he] was suddenly faced with false and malicious
accusations” is an admission that he gave her a failing grade because of her

complaint.250 In support of this argument, Williams says that Prawdzik’s comment
that Williams “was far behind the class and did not seem to know what we were
doing as of 10-14-19 . . . it is my conclusion that she has already earned an F for the
course.”251 Contrasting this with Prawdzik’s email on October 15 in which he tells

Williams she can return to class, she argues Prawdzik’s “December 19 comment that
Williams earned an F as of October 14’ when ‘instead of completing the class’ she
‘filed an Affirmative Action complaint against me’ and ‘because’ he was ‘suddenly

faced with accusations related to racial bias’ he refused to grade any of her work,
[s]he was getting an ‘F’ and the ‘F’ was ‘final.’”252

248 MSJ Br. 63-65.
249 Opp. 15.
250 Id. at 16.
251 Id. at 3.
The Court disagrees with Williams that a reasonable jury could find that
Prawdzik “disobeyed orders” when he “did not contact Williams” following Adair’s

December 1 email. Not only does this argument rest on a tortured reading of the
email, Williams does not cite to any evidence in the record that Adair had the
authority to “order” Prawdzik to contact Williams. Further, Williams herself

acknowledges that Prawdzik had already given her instructions regarding
completing the class when he sent her an email telling her that she could return if
she treated others professionally and did not disrupt class.253 Instead, Williams
admits that she was unwilling to “capitulate” to Prawdzik’s conditions.254 Just like

any student, Williams was not entitled to return to class or otherwise complete the
coursework on her own terms.255
Nor is there any evidence that Williams herself reached out to Prawdzik—or

anybody else—regarding how to complete the coursework until her December 16,
2019 email.256 She never reached out to Glenn or Rogers, despite Prawdzik referring
her to them as early as October 15. Williams regularly communicated with Adair
after she filed her complaint, but never inquired about her options for the rest of the

253 Cf. Opp. 15 (asserting that Prawdzik “kicked her out of class pending her acceptance of his
conditions”).
254 Id. at 14.
255 See Ex. 63, 78-37 (email from Adair to Williams stating that Williams “should follow any
instructions provided by the instructor regarding your involvement in the course going
forward”). During her deposition, Williams insisted that this email was altered or inauthentic
and that Adair had sent her an email saying “something along the lines of Prawdzik is going to
give you an alternative to complete this course.” Williams Dep. 158:10-162:15.
semester.257 At the time Williams filed her complaint with the Affirmative Action
Office, she had missed a number of classes258 and was well behind on the required

coursework.259 Prawdzik told Williams on October 2, almost two weeks before she
filed her complaint, that he was worried that she would “drift into crisis regarding
work for this course.”260 Further, on December 19 Prawdzik did not say, as Williams
suggests, that “Williams earned an F as of October 14.”261 Rather, he said, “[g]iven

the fact that she was so far behind the class and did not seem to know what we were
doing as of 10-14-2019 . . . she has already earned a failing grade.”262 Alexander
emailed Prawdzik to inquire about “the necessary steps Ms. Williams will need to

take to complete the course.”263 Prawdzik’s response is that there are no such steps,
because she was well behind on October 14, she has done nothing in the interim, and
now the semester is over. Whether Williams would fail the class was not dependent

257 See generally Ex. 120, Doc. 79-18 (emails thread between Adair and Williams from October
17, 2019 to October 21, 2019).
258 See Ex. 62, 78-36 (Adair notes from interview with student who said that “Kayla had not been
to class except for about 3-4 times in a 3x/week semester”); Ex. 47 at 686-699 (emails from
Williams apologizing for missing three classes during the week of September 30); SOF ¶ 97
(observing that Williams had been absent eight times as of October 14, 2019). Williams objects
to SOF paragraph 97 on the grounds that Prawdzik did not always keep track of attendance.
ROSF ¶ 97; see also id. ¶ 86 (citing Adair’s notes from her interview with Prawdzik). The
evidence Williams cites in support shows that, if anything, he had undercounted Williams’
absences. See Doc. 94-3 (Adair’s notes that Prawdzik “takes attendance vi[a] Canvas but
sometimes forgets to do it. 21 days total so far, he took attendance for 14 and she missed 8 of
those”).
259 SOF ¶ 96. Williams objects that her standing in the class of October 14 “is not a material fact
to any claim or defense.” RSOF ¶ 96.
260 Ex. 47, Doc. 78-21 at 687.
261 Opp. 16.
262 Ex. 55, Doc. 78-29, at 83.
on whether Williams could complete the coursework; she had already failed because
that was impossible.264

Arguing otherwise, Williams makes too much of Prawdzik’s comment that
“Williams could ‘in theory’ complete the work.”265 The relevant inquiry is whether
Williams could have actually completed the coursework in practice,266 and a

reasonable jury would understand Prawdzik’s comment to mean that she could
not.267 In the absence of any evidence to suggest Williams could have completed a
semester’s worth of work after the semester had already ended,268 any reasonable
jury would reach the same conclusion as Dr. Adair: Williams’ only option for

passing the class would be to take it again the next semester.269 Whether Williams
could have completed the coursework and passed Prawdzik’s class “in theory” may

264 Id. at 83. Williams effectively admits as much, when she testifies that Prawdzik should have
“come up with an alternative to let me complete” the course. Williams Dep. 163:23-24.
265 Opp. 16.
266 See LaGatta v. Penn. Cyber Charter Sch., 2012 WL 393423, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb 6, 2012)
(discussing earlier order granting summary judgment where plaintiff “failed to produce
sufficient evidence to support” an explanation that was plausible “in theory”); Baker v. Office
Depot., Inc., 115 F. App’x 574, 576 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing that though “in theory, it is
possible to render . . . claim timely,” plaintiff presented no evidence in support of that theory
and therefore affirming grant of summary judgment where there was no genuine factual issue
for trial).
267 See “In theory,” Oxford English Dictionary (Online Ed.) (accessed Sept. 15, 2023) (defining
the phrase “in theory” via comparison to definition of the phrase “in practice”); supra n.264
(Williams admitting she could not have completed the coursework).
268 See ROSF Ex., Doc. 94-9, at 13 (schedule for Prawdzik’s class identifying December 11, 2019
as the final class); Williams Dep. 168:5-12 (Williams testifying that the semester was over “or
close to ending”).
269 See Ex. 64, Doc. 78-38, at 140; Ex. 68, Doc. 78-42, at 571-72 (email from Adair to Williams,
advising her that she “spoke with the English Department head at the end of the fall semester
to determine whether there was any possibility for you to be issued a deferred grade and make
up the work for the course and was informed that due to the amount of work you missed,
be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, but summary judgment is the time for
facts, and Williams offers none.270 Penn State has met its burden to set forth a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason that Prawdzik failed Williams.271 Williams has
not met her burden to show that those reasons were mere pretext.272 Williams cannot
simply ignore the fact that she was in danger of failing Prawdzik’s class before she

made her complaint273 and that she made no effort to avoid that outcome
afterwards.274
V. Title VI Discrimination
Williams also brings a claim for Title VI discrimination against Penn State on

the basis that Dr. Yarwood discriminated against her when Yarwood “refused to
correct” grading errors relating to two assignments.275 To succeed on this claim,

270 During her testimony in which she claimed that the December 1 email from Adair to Prawdzik
was altered, Williams testified at her deposition that “Dr. Adair told Prawdzik in an email he
was to come up with an alternative for me to complete the course.” Williams Dep. 166:4-9.
There is no evidence, other than Williams’ testimony, of such an email or directive.
271 Davis, 2016 WL 912297, at *10.
272 Id.
273 See Williams v. City Univ. of New York, 2014 WL 4207112, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2014)
(holding that “an inference of retaliatory intent simply cannot be inferred” when a student was
already on notice that they were unlikely to receive a high grade in a class prior to a Title VI
complaint).
274 The Court recognizes that Williams did not feel comfortable returning to Prawdzik’s class after
October 14. See Ex. 59, Doc. 78-59 (notes from Adair’s interview of Williams stating that she
is missing class and embarrassed by what Prawdzik did). However, Williams does not argue,
nor does the record indicate, that she had been “constructively discharged” from Prawdzik’s
class. Elliott v. Delaware State Univ., 879 F. Supp. 2d 438, 448 (D. Del. 2012). To establish
constructive discharge, Williams would have to show that “acts committed contemporaneously
or after the protected activity” made her continued participation in class “objectively
intolerable.” Id. at 448-49. Other than Prawdzik imposing objectively tolerable conditions for
Williams’ return to class, she does not allege that he did anything at all that would have
impacted her participation in class after she filed her complaint.
Williams must show that she, as a member of a protected class at a state university,
suffered an adverse action under circumstances that give rise to an inference of

discrimination.276 Williams claims that Yarwood’s failure to correct her grade on
two online quizzes, as she had done for non-black students, was discriminatory.277
However, the record shows that Williams was not impacted by any grading errors.

Each online quiz was created from a database of questions, so each student received
different sets of questions in different orders.278 In both quizzes at issue, there was a
grading error resulting in correct answers being marked incorrect.279 However,
Williams was not impacted because, as to the first quiz, she completed the quiz after

the error was discovered and corrected, and, as to the second, did not receive a
question that had a grading error.280 Regarding other assignments, there is no
evidence in the record to support Williams’ claims that Yarwood used a “stricter
rubric” 281 to grade Williams’ assignments or otherwise evaluated her coursework

differently than she did for non-black students.
Rather than offer any argument or evidence in support of her claim, Williams
avers that each SMF paragraph relating to this claim is “not a material fact to any

276 David v. Neumann Univ., 187 F. Supp. 3d 554, 561 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
277 Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 220-223.
278 SMF ¶ 141.
279 SMF ¶¶ 147, 155.
280 SMF ¶¶ 144-163.
claim or defense”282 and does not offer any defense in her opposition brief.283
Therefore, Williams has abandoned her Title VI discrimination claim.284

VI. Williams’ Due Process Claims
In Count II, Williams claims that her Due Process rights were violated when
Penn State “unfairly deviated from its own policy.”285 Williams’s alleges that she

was denied due process because 1) Defendants refused to reschedule her conduct
conversation until she was no longer ill and could attend a conduct conversation
meeting;286 2) she was not provided notice of the alleged violations of the Code of
Conduct;287 3) she was not permitted to speak to her advisor during her hearing;288

and 4) she was not permitted to cross-examine witnesses.289
In the alternative, Williams claims in Count III that Penn State’s policies and
procedures were constitutionally deficient on their face because they “allow[] a

hearing panel to make credibility assessments of accusing witnesses who do not
appear before it, and who cannot be questioned or cross examined,”290 and “fail[] to
establish a proper procedure to account for reasonable excuses for an accused student
missing a scheduled conduct conversation meeting.”291 In her opposition to summary

282 RSOF ¶¶ 139-180.
283 See generally Opp.
284 Diodato, 44 F Supp. 3d at 556-57 (collecting cases).
285 Am. Compl. ¶ 176.
286 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 176, 178-80.
287 Id. ¶¶ 177, 182-87.
288 Id. ¶¶ 188-91.
289 Id. ¶¶ 192-95.
290 Am. Compl. ¶ 209.
judgment, she also argues that Penn State’s “‘notice’ to accused students as to their
allegedly violative conduct is insufficient.”292

In general, “[d]ue process is a ‘flexible concept and the process due in any
situation is to be determined by weighing: (1) the private interests at stake; (2) the
governmental interests at stake; and (3) the fairness and reliability of the existing

procedures and the probable value, if any, of any additional procedural
safeguards.’”293 Though the “Due Process Clause protects students during
disciplinary hearings at public institutions . . . there is not a specific format these
proceedings have to follow, so long as the university provides sufficient protections

to comply with due process.”294 “‘[T]he fundamental requirement is the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful matter’ by ‘an impartial
decision maker.’”295 The timing and content of the notice and the nature of the

hearing “depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests
involved” and “longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school
term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures.”296
A. Penn State’s Policies are Facially Valid

292 Opp. 18.
293 Fraser v. Penn. State Univ., --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2023 WL 1805209, at *8 (M.D. Pa. 2023)
(quoting Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1989)).
294 Id. (citing Phat Van Le v. Univ. of Medicine & Dentistry of N.J., 379 F. App’x 171, 174 (3d
Cir. 2010); Sill v. Penn. State. Univ., 462 F.2d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 1972)).
295 Id. (quoting Park v. Temple Univ., 757 F. App’x 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2018)).
296 Doe v. Penn. State Univ., 336 F. Supp. 3d 441, 447-48 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting Goss v. Lopez,
As Count II claims that Defendants unfairly deviated from Penn State policy,
the Court begins with Williams’ claim that Penn State’s policies themselves are

facially unconstitutional.297 As an initial matter, the Court notes that Williams has
not introduced any evidence of any pattern or practice of these purported
violations.298 Instead, Williams relies on the alleged due process violations she

herself suffered. Even assuming that Williams was deprived of due process, discrete
violations are not sufficient to establish a policy.299 In the absence of such evidence,
the Court’s analysis of Penn State’s policies is largely limited to the published Code
of Conduct.

1. Policies Regarding Rescheduling Hearings
The Constitution does not categorically require “sick students to be allowed
to reschedule their conduct conference once they are better.”300 Though “illness

could no doubt adversely affect the right to be heard in a ‘meaningful manner,’” that
alone is not enough to create a due process violation.301 Due process does not require
that a student, even one who “faces a long term suspension,” “be physically present

297 Even if they are, Williams still needs to show that she was deprived of due process because of
the allegedly deficient policy. Moeck v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 983 F. Supp. 2d 516, 524
(M.D. Pa. 2013). Therefore, the Court’s finding that Williams was not denied due process,
discussed infra, is sufficient to dismiss Count III.
298 Moeck, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
299 Id.
300 Opp. 20.
301 See Qi Lang Chen v. Atty Gen. of U.S., 314 F. App’x 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding
finding by the Board of Immigration Appeals that there was not a due process violation where
alien facing deportation had received treatment in the emergency room the night before
because alien failed to produce evidence showing extent of illness or that illness prevented him
at [her] disciplinary hearing.”302 “In other words, physical absence from a hearing is
not an automatic constitutional deficiency; whether a person is able to physically

attend [her] disciplinary hearing only matters insofar as it affects [her] right to be
heard.”303 Penn State’s policy regarding hearings permits a respondent to “submit a
response to charges prior to the hearing” and that, if a respondent does not appear,

“all available evidence will be reviewed by the hearing authority.”304 Whether
Williams should have been permitted to reschedule a hearing so she could attend is
an issue that will be addressed in greater detail below. But the lack of an explicit
policy permitting sick students to reschedule a conduct hearing does not render Penn

State’s policies so unfair or unreliable as to be constitutionally deficient.305

302 Uzoechi v. Wilson, 2018 WL 2416113, at *9 (D. Md. May 29, 2018), aff’d 735 F. App’x 65
(4th Cir. 2018).
303 Id.
304 Ex. 22, Doc. 78-11, at 22.
305 See Keles v. Bender, 2022 WL 840311, at *3 (3d Cir. 2022) (observing that the Due Process
Clause requires only “rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings of
misconduct and arbitrary exclusion” prior to dismissing a student for disciplinary reasons)
2. Cross Examination Policy
As the Court observed in its memorandum opinion regarding Defendants’

motion to dismiss, “the right to confront witnesses, and the right to cross examine
witnesses generally have not been deemed necessary elements of due process of
law.”306 However, the Court also noted that there is a narrow exception where the
credibility of the witness is material to the decisionmaker’s finding.307 Based on the

Williams’ complaint in which she alleged that this was such a case, the Court denied
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count III and permitted discovery.308 Penn State’s
policy regarding disciplinary hearings provides that “[t]he Respondent, hearing

authority, and University Presenter will be allowed to ask questions of all witnesses
who participate in the hearing.”309 Williams argues that this is insufficient, because
“there is no mechanism for an accused student to question a witness who does not
appear at a hearing.”310

Penn State cannot force a witness to participate in a hearing. It does not have
subpoena power, it cannot hold witnesses in contempt, and it cannot issue warrants
to secure the appearance of noncooperative witnesses. Even if Penn State created a

policy that said Williams could cross-examine a non-appearing witness, it would
have no authority to enforce it. This does not mean that Penn State could hide behind

306 MTD Op., Doc. 32 at 20.
307 Id.
308 Id. at 20-21.
309 Ex. 23 at 22; AMF ¶ 77; RAF ¶ 77.
this lack of authority to sanction students based on third-party testimony alone. But
in the absence of evidence of a pattern or practice of doing so, Penn State’s policies

are not facially deficient because they do not include a provision that only applies in
exceptional cases, and that could not be enforced in any case.311
3. Notice
“Notice is one of the most basic requirements of due process.”312 The Code of

Conduct provides that, if a case manager recommends charges and sanctions, a
respondent “may take three days business days to decide whether to accept the
charge(s) and sanction(s), to contest the charge(s), or request a sanction review when

appropriate.”313
If the respondent contests the charge(s) (i.e., denies responsibility for
the alleged violation(s)), the matter will be referred to a hearing. The
hearing will take place as soon as reasonably possible, but not sooner
than five (5) business days after the respondent has been notified of the
charge(s), unless the respondent waives the five-day notice and the
University can accommodate a shortened timeframe.314
Williams argues that this policy is insufficient because it “only requires an
accused student to be informed of the specific portion of the Code of Conduct they

311 See Khouzam v. Atty Gen. of U.S., 549 F.3d 235, 259 (3d Cir. 2008) (observing that “[a] statute
is not facially unconstitutional unless ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid.’”) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). That Penn
State’s Conduct Code is not a statute further militates against finding it facially
unconstitutional. See Sill, 462 F.2d at 467 (observing that “codes of conduct prescribed for
students by educational institutions are not required to satisfy the same standards” for clarity
as criminal statutes).
312 Furey v. Temple Univ., 884 F. Supp. 2d 223, 250 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at
581).
313 Ex. 23, Doc. 78-11, at 20.
are being charged with violating.”315 “The term ‘charge’ is defined as an
identification of the Code of Conduct section(s) that the respondent is alleged to

have violated.”316 While oral notice is sufficient for a short suspension, formal
written notice, identifying the charged violations and possible penalties, is required
for lengthier suspension.317 Where a student is threatened with expulsion, the notice

“should include the specific charges and the grounds, which, if proven, justify
expulsion.”318
Williams’ suspension was for the remainder of the Spring 2020 semester,
which is not a short suspension, but also not expulsion. She was entitled to notice of

the violation and the possible penalty, which is what the Code provides for, and, as
discussed below, what she received. There may be a colorable argument that the
policy is deficient to the extent that it does not explicitly provide students faced with

expulsion notice of the facts supporting the charges. However, that potential defect
is not implicated here because Williams was not facing expulsion.319

315 Opp. 25.
316 Ex. 23, Doc. 78-11, at 3.
317 Furey, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 250 (citing Flaim v. Med. College of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 635 (6th
Cir. 2005)).
318 Id. (citing Palmer, 868 F.2d at 94) (emphasis added).
319 The Court notes that the Code does provide for conduct conversations, during which the facts
supporting the charges would be discussed. See Ex. 23, Doc. 78-11, at 18-20. Therefore, a
student facing expulsion would likely have constructive notice of the grounds for the charges,
and failure to include that information in a formal written notice may not unfairly prejudice
the student. As discussed below, that is effectively the case here; Williams was aware of the
grounds for the charges. So, even if Williams were entitled to written notice of the grounds for
B. Williams’ Due Process Rights Were Not Violated
Though Penn State’s policies for conduct hearings are not facially

unconstitutional, that has little bearing on the issue of whether Williams herself was
afforded due process. Williams may have suffered a due process violation unrelated
to any Penn State policy. Alternatively, Penn State may have unfairly deviated from

its policies. However, “failure to follow [Penn State] polic[y] is not, in itself, a
violation of due process.”320 “So long as the procedural protections actually provided
were sufficient and fairly administered, due process is satisfied.”321
Central to Williams’ argument that Penn State unfairly violated its policies is

whether the charged conduct was a “crime of violence” as defined by the Code of
Conduct, and therefore subject to the Code’s Special Protocols for Crimes of
Violence. As Williams notes, a “crime of violence” is “any alleged behavior that

may involve a crime of violence as defined in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title
34, Appendix A.”322 This includes:
(b) Simple Assault. An unlawful physical attack by one person upon
another where neither the offender displays a weapon, nor the victim
suffers obvious severe or aggravated bodily injury involving apparent
broken bones, loss of teeth, possible internal injury, severe laceration,
or loss of consciousness.
(c) Intimidation. To unlawfully place another person in reasonable fear
of bodily harm through use of threatening words or other conduct, or

320 Lee, 379 F. App’x at 175.
321 Id.
both, but without displaying a weapon or subjecting the victim to
physical attack.323
The incident with the Lyft driver falls squarely within the definition of Simple
Assault.324 The definition of Harassment in the Code of Conduct is broader than that
in Appendix A, as it is not limited to placing “another person in reasonable fear of

bodily harm.” The Code prohibits conduct “sufficiently severe or pervasive such that
it threatens or substantially interferes with an individual’s employment, education or
access to University programs, activities or opportunities and such conduct would

detrimentally affect a person under the same circumstances.”325 Nevertheless, a
reasonable juror could conclude that A.B.’s allegations that Williams “physically
threatened her” fall within the definition of intimidation under Appendix A.326
Therefore, under Penn State policy, Williams was entitled to the procedures

provided for by the Special Protocols.
1. Conduct Conversation
A “conduct conversation” is defined by the Code of Conduct as “an informal

meeting intended to allow the case manager to explain the conduct process and

323 Assault Offenses, 34 C.F.R. Pt. 99, App. A.
324 See MSJ Br. 76 (observing that the Code of Conduct “in simple terms . . . prohibit[s] harming
or threatening to harm another person”).
325 Ex. 23, Doc. 78-11, at 12.
326 See SOF ¶¶ 201-204, 295; A.B. Incident Report, Ex. 122, Doc. 80-30 at 2461-62. The Court
emphasizes that, while Harassment and Intimidation are objectively not as serious as sexual
assault, see supra, that does not preclude it from being in the same category of offenses as
defined by Penn State. The Court’s finding here is accordingly limited to that context, which
discuss an alleged incident with the respondent to determine appropriate next
steps.”327 It is not, as Williams characterizes it, a “pre-deprivation hearing.”328

Williams advances two arguments regarding Lauren Langford’s failure to
reschedule her conduct conversation: (1) a conduct conversation was mandatory
under Penn State policy, and the failure to provide her with one was an unfair

deviation from that policy; and (2) the failure to allow Williams to reschedule her
conduct conversation when she was sick was a due process violation.
i. Deviation from Policy
Williams observes that both the Conduct Procedures and the Special Protocols

state that “a conduct conversation will take place with the respondent,” but that only
the Conduct Procedures provides that, “should the respondent not appear, then the
meeting will take place in their absence.”329 Williams suggests that this means her

attendance at a conduct conversation was mandatory in her case.330 This
interpretation of the Special Protocols would permit a respondent to completely
forestall any hearing for serious misconduct by simply refusing to attend a conduct
conversation. Langford repeatedly tried to schedule a conduct conversation,

specifically advising her that it was mandatory, and Williams repeatedly refused to

327 Ex. 23, Doc, 78-11, at 3.
328 See Opp. 20-21.
329 Opp. 32.
attend.331 The Court will not interpret the Code of Conduct as requiring Penn State
to abandon disciplinary proceedings for students who refuse to participate.

ii. Failure to Reschedule
Langford cannot be faulted for failing to reschedule the conduct conversation
until Williams was no longer sick when Williams had not informed anybody that she

was sick or requested it to be rescheduled. Further, even if Langford had known
Williams was sick, and had failed to reschedule a hearing, that alone is not a violation
of due process.332 But Williams’ claim fails for a more fundamental reason: the
conduct conversation was not a deprivation hearing. Due process requires that

Williams have notice and a hearing prior to a deprivation. The letter sent by Langford
on January 27, 2020, which Williams failed to return by the deadline, specifically
allows her to “contest the charge(s) and request a Hearing.”333 It was only after she
failed to do so that the charges and sanctions went into effect.334

2. Cross Examination of Complainants
The parties advance a number of distinct and overlapping arguments
regarding whether, and if so, to what extent Williams was entitled to cross examine

either or both of the complainants in her case, A.B. and the Lyft driver, Petrulich.
As an initial matter, the Court finds that the charges against Williams were

331 See Ex. 149, Doc. 80-42.
332 Chen, 314 F. App’x at 415-16.
333 Ex. 151, Doc. 79-36, at 548.
334 The Court also notes that Williams does not address her repeated refusals to attend a conduct
sufficiently serious, and the credibility of the complainants was sufficiently material
to trigger a right to cross-examination. Penn State argues that Williams’ claims

regarding her suspension for assaulting Petrulich are barred by her criminal
conviction for that offense and that this is sufficient to uphold Williams’ suspension
because either of the charges against her could support the suspension. On the first

point, the Court agrees, but finds that a reasonable jury could conclude Williams
would have received a lighter suspension if sanctioned for only one of the charges
against her. Therefore, the Court must then determine whether Williams was entitled
to cross examine A.B. Williams argues that both Penn State policy and due process

require that she be given the opportunity to do so. Again, the Court agrees on the
first point, but finds that, under the circumstances, Williams was provided with
sufficient due process.

i. Credibility and Cross-Examination
Though due process does not ordinarily require the right to cross-examination
in the university context, where the university’s determination turns on the
credibility of witnesses not subject to cross-examination due process issues can arise.

When that right is triggered is an issue of some debate. In Doe v. University of
Sciences,335 the Third Circuit held that “the basic elements of federal procedural

335 961 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020). Though University of Sciences was a private university, and
therefore not subject to the Constitution’s due process guarantees, the Third Circuit noted that
the due process requirements in Goss were consistent with those required under Pennsylvania
fairness in a Title IX sexual-misconduct proceeding include a real, meaningful
hearing and, when credibility determinations are at issue, the opportunity for cross-

examination of witnesses.”336 However, cross-examination is “unnecessary when the
university’s decision did not rely on any testimonial evidence at all.”337
It is unsettled whether this requirement applies to other cases of misconduct.

The Third Circuit noted that sexual misconduct cases are unique “because the
consequences are potentially dire and permanent: ‘a finding of responsibility for a
sexual offense can have a lasting impact on a student’s personal life, in addition to
h[er] educational and employment opportunities, especially when the disciplinary

action involves a long-term suspension.”338
Defendants argue that Williams “was accused of serious misconduct, but
objectively not conduct equivalent to sexual assault” and that her suspension “for
just a semester” was not sufficiently long term.339 There is no bright line for what

constitutes a “long term” suspension, but the Court finds that a suspension that
results in the loss of a semester’s tuition, grades, and credits is sufficiently long
term.340 Williams’ return to Penn State was also conditioned on her satisfactorily

participating in counseling at her expense. Sexual assault may be unique among

336 Id. at 215 (citing Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 663-64 (7th Cir. 2019); Doe v. Baum,
903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018)).
337 Baum, 903 F.3d at 583-84.
338 Univ. of Sciences, 961 F.3d at 213 (quoting Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 600 (6th Cir.
2018).
339 MSJ. Br. at 98-99.
violations of university codes of conduct for carrying “potentially dire and
permanent” consequences, but it is not alone in that regard.341 Williams’ own

situation—facing suspension for an assault that was unrelated to her role as a student
at Penn State—demonstrates this.342 The reasoning for requiring cross-examination
in cases of sexual assault applies with equal force to other crimes of violence.343

Penn State “acknowledges” the Court’s motion to dismiss opinion holding
that “‘the absence of the opportunity to cross examine in [a] case that hinged on
witness credibility . . . does not pass Constitutional muster.’”344 Penn State argues
that cross-examination was not required here because “the panel did not rely solely

rely on one person’s word against another—rather, the panel also expressly relied
on documentary evidence supporting the charges.”345 Penn State misunderstands
both this Court’s earlier opinion and the precedent on which it relied. Penn State

argues that “Doe v. University of Cincinnati is distinguishable because, in that case,
the school’s conduct finding relied solely on written statements of the accuser to
investigators and the institution ‘proffered no other evidence to sustain the

341 Univ. of Sciences, 961 F.3d at 213.
342 Cf. Univ. of Sciences, 961 F.3d at 213 (observing that sexual assault is a serious offense because
it can have a lasting effect on educational
343 See Sanctioning Guidelines, Ex. 24 at 3930 (defining a major violation of the “Harming or
Attempting to Harm Another” charge code).
The Court notes that crimes involving sexual misconduct lend themselves to “he said/she said”
issues of credibility that are perhaps less prevalent in other crimes of violence. See Baum, 903
F.3d at 583-84. However, this is not a good argument for rejecting the reasoning for requiring
cross-examination in those cases in cases of other crimes of violence that also hinge on
credibility.
344 MSJ Br. 95 (quoting MTD Op. at 21).
University’s findings and sanctions apart from . . . hearsay statements.”346 This
reading of University of Cincinnati is inconsistent with that of the Sixth Circuit,

which later clarified that “if credibility is in dispute and material to the outcome, due
process requires cross-examination.”347
Penn State concedes that the University Conduct Board made credibility

determinations and that the UCB relied on the written testimony of A.B. and
Petrulich at least in part.348 In its report, the UCB concluded:
Given all the available testimony (oral and written) and using the,
“preponderance of evidence” standard of proof, in the end the members
of the UCB unanimously concluded that Ms. Williams is not as credible
as [A.B.] and Mr. Petrulich. The latter two individuals, and Mr.
Petrulich in particular, provide a much more coherent and consistent
account of events. . . . In addition, the UCB found it improbable that
[A.B.]’s mother would leave her home in Colorado on a moment’s
notice to (i) help her daughter move out of the apartment shared with
Ms. Williams and (ii) to contact the police about the threats her
daughter had received if [A.B.] had made up the accusations against
Ms. Williams. When it comes to the altercation between Ms. Williams
and Mr. Petrulich, the UCB found it improbable that Mr. Petrulich
would call the police while being video-recorded by security cameras
and observed by eye witnesses if he had been the aggressive party.
Having established sufficient credibility on the part of the
complainants, the UCB unanimously concluded that the charges were
indeed appropriate and that Ms. Williams was responsible for both.349

346 Id. at 97 (quoting Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 401 (6th Cir. 2017)).
347 See Baum, 903 F.3d at 584 (emphasis added) (observing that this holding is consistent with its
prior holding in University of Cincinnati). See also Furey, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 251-52 (observing
that cross-examination is essential where credibility is of sufficient “importance” or a witness’
testimony is “determinative”) (citations removed).
348 MSJ Br. 95-96.
Reading the UCB’s report in the light most favorable to Williams, the UCB
found A.B. credible on the strength of A.B.’s mother’s belief that A.B. was credible.

That A.B.’s mother traveled from Colorado to Pennsylvania and contacted the police
is evidence that she believed her daughter. This credibility hearsay, for lack of a
better term, is not sufficient to show that A.B.’s credibility was immaterial to the
UCB’s decision.350

As discussed above, Penn State’s arguments that it “lacks subpoena power
and cannot force witnesses to attend a disciplinary hearing” are well taken.351
However, the unavailability or unwillingness of witnesses to testify is not a

circumstance unique to the university context.352 The Court is not persuaded Penn
State’s slippery slope argument that requiring cross-examination would be “unjust,
and problematic for the maintenance of discipline in our institutions of higher

education, if respondents in school disciplinary proceedings could escape liability
by traumatizing or threatening retaliation against their victims.”353 Penn State could
still sanction a respondent based on other evidence. If a witness fails to appear
because of threats by the respondent, those statements could still be admitted.354 But

350 The UCB Report explains that the Board also considered other evidence in evaluating
Williams’ and A.B.’s credibility. See generally id. However, because the Court is obliged to
read the Report in the light most favorable to Williams, it only considers the evidence that the
UCB specifically says it relied on in making its credibility determination.
351 MSJ. Br. at 99.
352 See Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(2) (rule regarding testimony of unavailable witnesses).
353 MSJ Br. 100.
354 See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) (allowing statements by witness where party intentionally,
if due process requires that Williams have an opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses, then Penn State must provide some mechanism affording her the

opportunity to do so such as, for instance, allowing questions to be submitted to the
witness through the hearing authority.355
ii. Assault of Petrulich

As to Petrulich, the Court finds that Williams’ conviction in the Magisterial
District Court of Washington County, Pennsylvania to the charge of Harassment356
precludes her argument that she did not violate the Code of Conduct’s prohibition
on “harming or attempting to harm another.”357 Williams was not denied due process

by not being permitted to cross-examine Petrulich when she was in fact guilty of
violating a substantially similar criminal statute. The Court finds persuasive Penn
State’s arguments that Williams’ claims are barred by the Supreme Court’s holding
in Heck v. Humphrey.358 Under Heck, a “district court must consider whether a

judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of [her]

Evidence do not apply; the admission of statements by unavailable witnesses need not be
sufficient to meet the requirements of the Rules.
355 See Code of Conduct, Ex. 23 at 28 (provision of the Special Protocols for Crimes of Violence
providing for questions by the respondent to be posed to the complainant through the hearing
authority); Univ. of Sciences, 961 F.3d 203 (holding that the university was required to allow
cross-examination but declining to prescribe the exact method by which a college or university
must implement such procedures).
356 See Ex. 30, Doc. 78-13.
357 Compare 18 Pa. C.S. § 2709(a)(1) with Ex. 24, Doc. 78-12 at 3930 (Sanctioning Guidelines
defining “Charge Code” “Harming or Attempting to Harm Another”); see also MSJ Br. 76
(chart comparing offenses).
conviction or sentence.”359 Williams’ tortured argument that she is challenging the
policy that prohibited her from cross-examining Petrulich, but not her conviction for

assaulting Petrulich, is unavailing.360 She does not have an unqualified right to cross-
examine Petrulich. To the extent that she has such a right, it is to provide her the
opportunity to challenge the charges against her. Having been criminally convicted

of effectively the same offense, Williams cannot collaterally attack the UCB hearing,
a proceeding with a lower standard of proof and less formal due process rights.361
In support of its argument that, even if Williams’ suffered a due process
violation regarding one of the charges, either is sufficient to provide for the

recommended sanctions, Penn State cites the UCB’s Rationale for the Sanctions:
Once responsibility was established, the UCB was made aware of the
various sanctions that had already been assigned to Ms. Williams for
the same categories of the University’s Code of Conduct, plus
additional charges pertaining to use of marijuana. As such, the UCB
unanimously concluded that both violations of the code were major
violations. Once established the severity, [sic] the UCB unanimously
decided that a separation was in order, while making sure that Ms.
Williams continues to receive appropriate counseling. The length of
separation was deemed to be the very minimum that should be
assigned.362
The recommended punishment for “major” violations is “suspension to
expulsion.”363 The Sanctioning Guidelines further note that these recommendations

359 Id. at 487.
360 Cf. Opp. 38.
361 See Ex. 179, Doc. 80-54, at 4 (noting that the UCB applied the preponderance of the evidence
standard).
362 Ex. 179, Doc. 80-54 at 4.
“assum[e] a student has no prior violations.”364 With regard to the Petrulich incident,
Danny Shaha, the Assistant Vice President noted that, given Williams’ history, “this

one incident may warrant suspension.”365
Though these facts strongly suggest that Williams may have been suspended
for the Spring 2020 semester based on the Petrulich incident (and her history) alone,

they do not compel that conclusion. The UCB’s findings do not state that either
violation on its own would warrant a semester long suspension. That the UCB noted
a suspension for the Spring 2020 semester was the “very minimum,” also suggests
it is likely that the Petrulich incident alone could have supported the same

suspension. But a reasonable jury could find otherwise. Suspensions can range
anywhere from a few days, as in Goss v. Lopez,366 to years. If the Court were to
uphold the suspension based on the Petrulich incident alone, it would be holding that

either (1) the A.B. incident had no impact on the UCB’s decision, or (2) Williams
would not have received the “very minimum” suspension for the Petrulich incident
had the UCB not found sanctions appropriate for the A.B. incident. The UCB’s
report precludes the first conclusion, and the Court cannot step into the shoes of the

UCB and compel the second.

364 Id. at 3928.
365 Ex. 138, Doc. 79-27 at 1555.
iii. Harassment of A.B.
The Court must then determine whether Williams had the right to cross-

examine A.B. and, if so, what form of cross-examination is appropriate. As noted
above, a reasonable juror could find that the charge of harassment against A.B. is a
“crime of violence” under the Code of Conduct, and therefore the hearing on that

charge is subject to the Special Protocols for Crimes of Violence, which provide that
“[q]uestions by . . . the respondent . . . may be posed to the [complainant].”367 It is
undisputed that Williams did not pose questions to A.B. in this manner. She argues
that this is a deviation from the policy.368 She also argues that she should have been

allowed to ask questions of witnesses who “participated” in the hearing by
submitting written statements in accordance with the Special Protocols.369
For the alleged deviation from the policy to constitute a due process violation,

Williams would first need to show that she relied on the policy and suffered because
of Penn State’s violation.370 Langford sent Williams a link to the policies, and
Williams clearly reviewed them because she cited other provisions in subsequent
objections.371 Yet in her numerous requests and queries of Langford regarding the

hearing, Williams never inquired about submitting written questions to the UCB for

367 Ex. 23, Doc. 78-11, at 28.
368 Opp. 33.
369 Id. at 34-35; see also Ex. 23, Doc. 78-11, at 28 (“The respondent . . . will be allowed to ask
questions of all witnesses who choose to participate in the hearing process.”).
370 Park, 757 F. App’x at 107.
A.B. or any other witnesses, or if A.B. would attend the hearing.372 She did send
Langford a statement in which she responded to various allegations made by A.B.

in the incident report A.B. filed on October 17, 2019.373 She had the opportunity
during the hearing to respond to the allegations in A.B.’s report, as well as a report
Williams’ friend filed against A.B..374 She submitted rebuttal evidence that was
considered by the UCB.375 Williams does not cite any, nor has the Court found any

evidence that Williams “relied” on the Special Protocols to her detriment, nor has
she argued how adherence to the Special Protocols would have yielded a different
outcome.

So, the question becomes whether Williams had any right to cross-examine
A.B. independent of University policy. Penn State argues that Williams had “the
opportunity to, and did, challenge A.B.’s incident report and written statement with
[her] own testimony and exhibits.”376 Williams responds that the opportunity to

“‘question’ the various pieces of paper used against her” is not sufficient to satisfy
her right to “question her accusers.”377

372 See generally Ex. 160, Doc. 79-43.
373 See Ex. 181, Doc. 80-56.
374 See generally Ex. 184, Doc. 80-57, at 27:00-1:00:00; see also Ex. 176, Doc. 80-52, at 2418-19
(Williams’ friend B.K. discussing statement with Langford).
375 SOF ¶¶ 296-298; RSOF ¶¶ 296-298; Ex. 180, Doc. 80-55.
376 MSJ Br. 85.
In Mathews v. Eldridge,378 the Supreme Court set out a three-factor balancing
test to determine what process is due: “1) the private interests at stake; 2) the

governmental interests at stake, including the governmental function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens entailed by additional or substitute
requirements; and 3) the fairness and reliability of the existing procedures and the
probable value, if any, of any additional or substitute procedural safeguards.”379 As

to the first factor, the Court has already found that Williams’ private interests are
significant. The consequences of a suspension that results in a lost semester’s grades,
credits, and tuition, and the attendant reputational harm and loss of educational and

occupational opportunities are far more dire than a short-term suspension which
would allow a student to complete the term.380 However, even “major” harassment
of a roommate is less serious a charge than one of physical or sexual assault. These

factors weigh in favor of more formal due process protections, but not as formal as
in cases of more serious allegations. The interests of universities under the second
factor are well established: "maintaining safety on its campus and within its student

378 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
379 Furey, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 247 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35).
Williams suggests that the Court should conduct a Mathews analysis regarding each alleged
due process violation. See Opp. 19. The Court notes that it is unnecessary to do so where prior
courts have already addressed substantially similar issues and provide sufficient guidance.
380 Penn State has argued that the harassment charge could have supported the punishment that
Williams received independently. Though the Court has found that it did not, there is no
evidence in the record that shows how the punishment may have been allocated between the
body [as well as] a strong interest in allocating resources to best achieve its
educational mission and the educational component of its disciplinary process.”381

As to the third factor, the Court considers the alleged violation—the lack of
live cross-examination—in the context of the process that was used and the available
alternatives.382 The Court begins by noting that the Third Circuit has not required
live cross-examination, even in the most serious of cases.383 The Court finds that

several factors of the process in Williams’ case further militate against the need for
more formal cross-examination.
First, while A.B.’s credibility was material, her testimony was not the sole

evidence against Williams.384 Second, the Office of Student Conduct had already
found that there was sufficient evidence to issue a no-contact order against
Williams.385 Third, Williams was provided with A.B.’s statement, and had the

opportunity to respond directly, as well as provide her own evidence and witnesses.
Fourth, Langford did make a good faith effort to secure A.B.’s attendance at the
hearing.386 Fifth, the UCB found Williams herself to be not credible based on her
own testimony, which was often contradicted by other, non-testimonial, evidence.387

381 Id. (collecting cases).
382 Id.
383 Nkrumah v. Univ. of Pittsburgh - of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 2022 WL 1062303,
at *10 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2022) (collecting cases).
384 Ex. 179, Doc. 80-54, at 3-4.
385 Ex. 123, Doc. 80-31.
386 See Ex. 168, Doc. 80-49.
Sixth, A.B. decided not to attend the hearing because she feared Williams would
retaliate against her. This concern is well founded, considering that the evidence

presented at the hearing by Williams supports A.B.’s claims that she continues to
deal with fallout from Williams’ use of her personal information and shows that
Williams had attempted to pressure another individual who lived with both A.B. and
Williams into making a statement on Williams’ behalf.388 The Court finds that it is

appropriate for the UCB to admit and consider A.B.’s statements in such
circumstances.
Further, the Court finds that the process afforded to Williams was more than

sufficient considering the available alternatives. As discussed above, Penn State
cannot force A.B. to attend the hearing. Nor did Williams attempt to submit
questions for A.B. to answer in lieu of her absence.389 Though there may be cases

where the inability to provide for more formal cross-examination of witnesses
precludes sanctioning a student, this is not such a case.
3. Ability to Speak with Advisor
Williams alleges that she was not able to “quietly confer with” her advisor

during her hearing, in contravention of Penn State policy.390 She argues that
Defendants’ position—that right to counsel has generally not been deemed a

388 Ex. 179, Doc. 80-54, at 3-4.
389 The Court notes that Penn State also cannot force A.B. to answer these questions. But that
issue is not implicated here because Williams failed to submit any questions, despite being
aware of the Special Protocols.
necessary element of due process in a university context—is non-responsive,
because her claim is one for unfair deviation.391 Again, though the Court must

evaluate the record in the light most favorable to Williams, she still must put
sufficient evidence into the record in support of the issues on which she bears the
burden of proof.392 Therefore, it is not Penn State’s burden to show why a failure to

allow her to quietly confer with her advisor was not an unfair deviation; it is
Williams who must point to some evidence in the record (or other authority) that
shows it was. She has not done so, therefore the Court cannot find that any failure to
permit her to confer quietly with her advisor during the hearing constitutes a due

process violation.
On the contrary, in her response to Defendants’ Statement of Facts, Williams
suggests it is immaterial whether she was permitted to review information with her
advisor “even in a separate room” and that she declined that opportunity.393 It cannot

be the case that Williams “substantially suffered” because she was denied the
opportunity to confer with her advisor if the fact of whether she was offered, and in
fact denied that opportunity is immaterial. Further, Williams did have the

opportunity to quietly confer with her advisor. At the outset of the hearing, it was
explained to Williams’ advisor that he could “[q]uietly advise Kayla in a manner
that doesn’t disrupt the normal flow of the hearing and consult with Kayla during

391 Id.
392 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
breaks.”394 The UCB also offered to allow Williams to take a break on multiple
occasions.395 Williams cannot claim a due process violation for the failure to provide

her opportunities to speak to her advisor if those opportunities were in fact given and
she turned them down.
4. Notice

On its own, the Conference Summary Form sent to Williams by Lauren
Langford on January 24, 2020 provides sufficient notice as it identifies the incidents,
the violations, and the potential sanctions.396 Williams argues that she was not
provided sufficient notice because the notice came too late after the incident giving

rise to the proceedings.397 Williams says that she was told that there would be a no
conduct charge for the complaint filed by A.B. in October 2019, 398 and then l

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413766. Public record. Not legal advice.