# Hershey v. The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · September 29, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413725

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 29, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413725

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding two days unduly suggestive of causation
- affirming district court’s finding that the WPCL does not apply to public employers
- finding termination within seven days of the plaintiff invoking her FMLA leave rights to be “sufficient at the prima facie stage”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TODD HERSHEY, : Civil No. 1:21-cv-0506
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
THE PENNSYLVANIA :
DEPARTMENT OF :
TRANSPORTATION, et al., :
:
Defendants. : Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

M E M O R A N D U M
Plaintiff Todd Hershey (“Hershey”), a former employee of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDot”)
alleges that his supervisors retaliated against him in violation of the Family
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) by terminating his employment the day he returned
from medical leave and without adequate due process. Before the court is
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint. For the reasons set forth
below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND1
Hershey was employed as a diesel mechanic by PennDot for over eighteen
years (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 15-16.) As a PennDOT mechanic, Hershey’s employment was
governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between the

1 The following facts are drawn from the complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of
resolving the motion to dismiss.
Commonwealth and Council 13, American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, July 1, 2019 – June 30, 2023. (See Doc. 51-1.)2

In January 2020, Hershey informed his supervisor, Defendant Jeffrey Parks
(“Defendant Parks”), that he may need to take FMLA leave at some point to care
for his son who is frequently hospitalized for liver disease. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 19.) After

this discussion, Hershey began to experience “harassment and disparate treatment”
at work. (Id. ¶ 20.) For instance, on one occasion, his coworkers placed a pacifier
in his toolbox to insinuate that he was a “baby” for considering FMLA leave. (Id. ¶
21.) On another occasion, he was formally reprimanded by Acting Supervisor and

Union President Scott Saylor (“Saylor”) for adjusting the office thermostat in
violation of a temperature policy that had never been enforced against anyone else.
(Id. ¶¶ 22-24.) Shortly thereafter, in March 2020, several of Hershey’s coworkers

informed him that their equipment manager, Defendant Todd Strait (“Defendant
Strait”), intended to get Hershey fired by falsely alleging sexual harassment against
him. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 25.) He was also told that Defendant Strait encouraged Saylor to file
his own sexual harassment complaint against Hershey, and that Defendant Strait

2 This agreement is a matter of public record, available online at
https://www.hrm.oa.pa.gov/employee-relations/cba-md/documents/cba-afscme-2019-2023.pdf. It
is also an undisputedly authentic document, which is foundational to Hershey’s claims. (See Doc.
46, ¶¶ 108, 114, 116-19.) Exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and
undisputedly authentic documents upon which claims are based may all be considered by the
court at the motion to dismiss stage. Cf. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
and Saylor hoped that Hershey would be fired before the end of the summer. (Id.
¶¶ 26-27.) Another co-worker advised Hershey to “keep his head down and [ ]

mouth shut.” (Id. ¶ 28.)
Also in March 2020,3 Defendant Michael Rishel, the District 9 Labor
Relations Coordinator for PennDot, reprimanded Hershey for a meme that was

posted on his Facebook page, and demanded he sign a “last chance” agreement or
face termination. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 41-42.) Under that agreement, Hershey was afforded
“a Final Warning for violation of the Commonwealth and Department Workplace
Violence Policies and inappropriate behavior,” on the explicit condition that

“should [he] commit any similar infractions . . . the Department of Transportation
shall have the exclusive authority” to discipline him for such violation.4 (Doc. 51-2
at 3, ¶¶ 1-2.)

In late May, Hershey reported “the harassment and [ ] Saylor’s behavior” to
Defendant Parks, and as he made his report, other employees yelled out “rat.” (Id.
¶ 29.) Mr. Parks took no action to address the report or the name-calling, in
contravention to PennDot policies and procedures. (Id. ¶¶ 29-31.) Hershey also

reported Saylor’s and Defendant Strait’s harassment to Human Resource Officer

3 Although the Second Amended Complaint provides a date of “March 16, 2022,” the court
presumes that the referenced date is a clerical error. (See Doc. 46, ¶ 42.)

4 The “last chance” agreement is foundational to Plaintiff’s claims (see id. at ¶¶ 39, 41, 102, 103,
108, 114, 116-19), and therefore the court may consider it without converting the motion to
dismiss into one for summary judgment. In re Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1426.
Melissa Matchock (“Defendant Matchock”), who also failed to investigate in
accordance with PennDot’s policies and procedures. (Id. ¶¶ 32-34.)

In early June 2020, Hershey became sick but was nonetheless given
“excessive job duties, well outside his normal position,” and a “routine sheet of
tasks to complete and sign off on to keep track of [his] work performance.” (Id. ¶¶

35-36.) On June 8, 2020, Saylor and Defendant Parks, at the direction of Defendant
Strait, filed a false sexual harassment report against him. (Id. ¶ 38.) That same day,
Hershey took FMLA leave due to his illness, and was thereafter hospitalized for
several days. (Id. ¶ 35.)

On July 30, 2020, Hershey received a call from a human resources assistant
who informed him that they had received a fax from his physician clearing him for
“full work duties,” and therefore he would be required to use vacation time for

work he had missed since being cleared. (Id. ¶¶ 44-45.) However, prior to
receiving the call, Hershey was unaware that his physician had medically approved
his return to work. (Id.)
When Hershey returned to work the following day, Defendant Parks

immediately directed him to a meeting. (Id. ¶ 48.) At the meeting, Defendant
Rishel advised him that Saylor had filed sexual harassment allegations against him
and that they were going to conduct a disciplinary hearing.5 (Id. ¶ 48.) Hershey was
provided only two minutes to discuss the allegations with his union representative

before the hearing began. Upon its conclusion, Hershey was immediately
suspended and thereafter terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 55, 69.) At the time of his
termination, Hershey had accrued more than 1,400 hours of paid time off, sick

time, and/or vacation time, and he was denied compensation for this accumulated
leave. (Id. at ¶ 62.)
On March 22, 2021, Hershey initiated this action by filing a complaint,
which he subsequently amended on March 7, 2022. (Docs. 1, 23.) On September 7,

2022, with leave of court, Hershey filed a second amended complaint
(“complaint”), the operative pleading in this action. (Doc. 46.) Count 1 of the
complaint asserts a claim of FMLA retaliation; Count 2 asserts a claim for FMLA

interference; Count 3 asserts a violation of Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment and
Collection Law; Count 4 asserts a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and Count 5, plead in the alternative, asserts
a claim for breach of contract. (Doc. 46.) Defendants have moved to dismiss the

complaint under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). The motion has been
fully briefed and is ripe for review.

5 Hershey was not informed that this meeting was a “Loudermill hearing” or that he was entitled
to certain rights in conjunction with the hearing, including adequate notice and proper
representation. (Doc. 46 ¶¶ 50-51.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of a complaint
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or if the plaintiff lacks standing to

bring his claim. Motions brought under Rule 12(b)(1) may present either a facial or
factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. In reviewing a facial
challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the standards relevant to Rule 12(b)(6) apply. In

this regard, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true,
and the court may only consider the complaint and documents referenced in or
attached to the complaint. See Gould Electronics, Inc. v. U. S., 220 F.3d 169, 176
(3d Cir. 2000).

In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all
material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202,
205 (3d Cir. 2008). The court, however, need not accept bald assertions or
inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in
the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d

126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004), citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902,
906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual
allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather,
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Id., citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Indeed, the United

States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the

court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). See Phillips v.
Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly,
“labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action” do not suffice but, rather, the complaint “must allege facts suggestive of
[the proscribed] conduct” and that are sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim”).

III. DISCUSSION
In support of the motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Hershey (1) failed
to plausibly allege any claim under the FMLA; (2) cannot maintain a Wage
Payment and Collection Law claim against PennDot as a public employer; (3)

failed to plausibly state a claim of a violation of the 14th Amendment Due Process
Clause or Section 1983; and (4) cannot sustain a claim for breach of contract. The
court will address each of these arguments in turn.
A. FMLA Claims
In his FMLA claims, Hershey assert rights related to the FMLA’s self-care

provision, which provides eligible employees with “a total of 12 workweeks of
leave during any 12-month period ... [b]ecause of a serious health condition that
makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such

employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
Preliminarily, the court will sua sponte dismiss the FLMA claims against
PennDot, a state agency, under the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, which
bars suits against states unless the state consents to suit or Congress has validly

abrogated such immunity. To date, the General Assembly of the Commonwealth
has not waived sovereign immunity for FMLA claims,6 and the United States
Supreme Court has found that Congress did not validly abrogate states’ sovereign

immunity from suits for money damages in enacting the FMLA’s self-care
provision. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 566 U.S. 30 (2012); see

6 “[W]aiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity is found only where the state ‘voluntarily
invokes' federal jurisdiction or where the state ‘makes a clear declaration that it intends to submit
itself’ to federal jurisdiction.” Chittister v. Dep’t of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 227 (3d
Cir. 2000) (quoting College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999)). The Pennsylvania Constitution states that
“[s]uits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such
cases as the Legislature may by law direct.” Pa. Const. Art. 1 § 11. Furthermore, “it is hereby
declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the Commonwealth ... shall continue to
enjoy sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the
General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 2310. Thus, only the
General Assembly has the authority to waive Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity.
Seeney v. Pennsylvania, Dep't of Corr., SCI-Graterford, 31 F. Supp. 3d 677, 686
(E.D. Pa. 2014) (“[T]he Commonwealth did not waive its sovereign immunity to

suits for money damages under the self-care provision of the FMLA.”); Wampler
v. Pennsylvania, Dep't of Lab. & Indus., W.C.A.B., 508 F. Supp. 2d 416, 422 (M.D.
Pa. 2007) (same). As a result, PennDot is immune from suit under the FMLA self-

care provision, and the FMLA claims against it at Counts 1 and 2 will be
dismissed.
Hershey’s FMLA interference claims against the individual defendants will
also be dismissed. To establish an FMLA interference claim, the plaintiff must

allege that: (1) he was an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the defendant
was an employer subject to the FMLA's requirements; (3) the plaintiff was entitled
to FMLA leave; (4) the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant of her intention to

take FMLA leave; and, (5) the plaintiff was denied benefits to which he was
entitled under the FMLA. Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2014).
“Put more succinctly, [to] state a claim for interference, [the plaintiff] only needs
to show that he was entitled to benefits under the FMLA and that he was denied

them.’” Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119-20 (3d Cir. 2005). Although
the employee is not required to show discriminatory intent, id. at 120, “for an
interference claim to be viable, the plaintiff must show that FMLA benefits were

actually withheld.” Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir.
2017). Here, the complaint fails to plausibly allege that Hershey was denied FMLA
benefits. To the contrary, the complaint states that Hershey requested and received

nearly two months of FMLA self-care leave and that he only returned to work after
being medically cleared by his doctor. Accordingly, the complaint fails to plead the
necessary elements of an interference claim and, therefore, Count 2 of the

complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.
Turning to retaliation, to establish an FMLA retaliation claim, the complaint
must contain enough facts to plausibly suggest that the plaintiff: (1) took FMLA
leave; (2) suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that the adverse action

was causally related to his leave. Hansler v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Network, 798
F.3d 149, 158-59 (3d Cir. 2015). “To demonstrate a causal connection, a plaintiff
must generally establish either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity

between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern
of antagonism, coupled with timing to establish a causal link.” Budhun v. Reading
Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 258 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted);
see also Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 143, 146-47 (3d

Cir. 2004).
Hershey alleges that, in January 2020, several of his supervisors began to
harass him because he had considered taking FMLA leave to care for his son; that

on June 8, 2020, he began FMLA leave for his own medical issues; that also on
June 8, 2020, Defendant Parks, Defendant Strait, and Saylor colluded together to
lodge a false sexual harassment accusation against him to have him fired for

allegedly violating his “last chance” agreement; and that on July 31, 2020, his first
day back at work, he was immediately terminated by Defendant Rishel following a
sham hearing. Taking these allegations as true and viewing them in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, as the court is required to do, Hershey has
alleged both a pattern of antagonism as well as an unusually suggestive temporal
proximity between his FMLA leave and termination sufficient to demonstrate a
causal connection. See Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 258

(3d Cir. 2014) (finding close temporal proximity qualifies as unusually
suggestive); Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 307 (3d
Cir. 2012) (finding termination within seven days of the plaintiff invoking her

FMLA leave rights to be “sufficient at the prima facie stage”); Jalil v. Avdel Corp.,
873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding two days unduly suggestive of
causation). As such, the complaint sufficiently asserts a prima facie claim of
FMLA retaliation.

Thus, having found a properly asserted claim of FMLA retaliation, the court
turns to which, if any, individual defendants the claim may proceed against.
Hershey alleges that each defendant can be held individually liable because they all

exercised supervisory authority over him and either directly participated in the plan
to terminate his employment or acquiesced in it. In response, Defendants argue that
Hershey has failed to plead facts to establish that any of the individual defendants

exercised sufficient control over his employment or participated in the alleged
retaliation. (See Doc. 51 pp. 13-15.) Upon review of this issue, the court finds that
Hershey has only established a prima facie claim against Defendants Strait, Parks

and Rishel.
The FMLA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees for
asserting rights under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). As pertinent here, the
FMLA defines an “employer” as “any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the

interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer.” See Haybarger
v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 416 (3d Cir. 2012)
(analyzing 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i)-(iv)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (defining

“Covered employer”). Critically, however, FMLA liability against individuals who
are not otherwise an “employer” only exists when the specific individual defendant
is alleged to have exercised “supervisory authority over the complaining employee
and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation” while acting in the

employer’s interest. Id. To determine whether an individual supervisor has the
requisite control over an employee for purposes of FMLA liability, courts must
look to the “economic reality” of the employment situation—“examining whether

the individual supervisor carried out the functions of an employer with respect to
the employee.” See Hayberger, 667 F.3d at 417-418 (collecting cases). Relevant
factors to be considered when ascertaining the economic reality include whether

the individual defendant: “(1) had the power to hire and fire the employee, (2)
supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment,
(3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment

records.” Id. at 418 (internal quotation and alteration omitted). This assessment
“depends on the totality of the circumstances rather than ‘technical concepts of the
employment relationship” and “no one of the four factors standing alone is
dispositive.” Id. (internal quotation and alteration omitted).

Despite broadly asserting that each individual defendant had supervisory or
operational control at PennDot (see Doc. 46 ¶¶ 3-10), the complaint fails to
plausibly show that Defendants Yassmin Gramian, Thomas Prestash, David
Krammerer, Mark Yeckley, and Melissa Matchock7 exercised any control over

Hershey’s employment or were responsible in whole or in part for the alleged
retaliation. As such, the FMLA retaliation claim against these individuals will be
dismissed without prejudice. However, for purposes of the instant motion to

dismiss, the court finds that the complaint alleges sufficient facts to establish that

7 While the complaint alleges that Defendant Matchock failed to investigate Hershey’s reports of
harassment, it does not assert or even suggest that Defendant Matchock was in any way
personally involved in the alleged scheme to terminate Hershey’s employment. In addition, the
court cannot consider Defendant Matchock’s emails, attached as an exhibit to the brief in
opposition to the motion to dismiss (see Doc. 56-1), as those emails and their content were not
referenced in or attached to the complaint.
Defendants Strait, Parks, and Rishel had the requisite supervisory authority over
Hershey and that they each played a role in the alleged plan to terminate his

employment allegedly in retaliation for his invocation of FMLA rights. The
complaint avers that the three individuals were his supervisors with control over
his employment and compensation, and that they acted in concert to deliberately

harass Hershey and ultimately terminate his employment following a sham
hearing. Accordingly, the FMLA retaliation claim at Count 1 will proceed as to
these three defendants.
B. Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law Claim

In Count 3 of the complaint, Hershey alleges that when he began working
for PennDot, “it was mutually agreed upon that he was entitled to receive
accumulated paid time off (“PTO”), sick and/or vacation leave,” but that upon his

termination, PennDot denied him monetary compensation for his accrued PTO in
violation of the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (“WPCL”).
(Doc. 46, ¶¶ 9, 99) Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because
Hershey’s employment was not governed by the WPCL. The court agrees.

The WPCL provides a vehicle through which an employee may collect
wages owed to him or her from a delinquent employer. See 43 Pa.C.S. § 260.1. The
WPCL defines an employer as “every person, firm, partnership, association,

corporation, or receiver ... employing any person in this Commonwealth.” 43
Pa.C.S. § 260.2a. The WPCL, however, does not apply to public employers, such
as PennDot. See, e.g., Stump v. Richland Twp., 278 F. App’x 205, 207 (3d Cir.

2008) (affirming district court’s finding that the WPCL does not apply to public
employers); Cotner v. Yoxheimer, No. 1:07-cv-1566, 2008 WL 2680872, at *6
(M.D. Pa. July 2, 2008) (citing Gallaher v. Goldsmith, 213 F. Supp. 2d 496 (E.D.

Pa. 2002)). Accordingly, the court will dismiss Count 3 of the complaint with
prejudice.
C. 14th Amendment Due Process and Section 1983 Claim
Defendants also move to dismiss Count 4 of the complaint, which asserts a

procedural due process violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against PennDot and each
of the individual defendants. Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens
may seek redress for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state

officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive
rights,” but is merely a means through which “to vindicate violations of federal law
committed by state actors.” See Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311,
315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85

(2002)). To state a cause of action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that:
(1) the conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of
state law; and (2) the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police
Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988)).

Hershey’s procedural due process claim against PennDot pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 will be dismissed, as PennDot is not a “person” subject to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Hammonds v. Templeton, 2015 WL 106618, at *3 (W.D. Pa.

Jan. 7, 2015), aff'd sub nom (“Neither the Commonwealth nor PennDOT is a
‘person’ for purposes of § 1983, and therefore neither is amendable to suit under
the civil rights statute.”); Petsinger v. Pa. Dep't of Transp., 211 F. Supp. 2d 610,
613 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Fitzpatrick v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Transp., 40 F. Supp. 2d

631, 635 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1999); see also O'Hara v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 171 F.Supp.2d
490, 495 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (“The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived
its immunity in § 1983 civil rights cases and Congress did not abrogate state

immunity in general in enacting civil rights legislation, including § 1983.”).
Accordingly, the court will dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Defendant
PennDot at Count 3 with prejudice.
Hershey’s due process claims against the individual defendants will also be

dismissed as Hershey has not plead facts sufficient to support a claim for a
violation of his procedural due process rights. “A procedural due process claim is
subject to a two-stage inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff has a property interest

protected by procedural due process, and (2) what procedures constitute due
process of law.” Fanti v. Weinstock, 629 F. App’x 325, 330 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Schmidt v. Creedon, 639 F.3d 587, 595 (3d Cir.2011)). Defendants concede that

Hershey had a protected property interest in his employment with PennDot but
argue that PennDot met its due process obligations to him by providing an
adequate post-deprivations grievance and arbitration procedure. (Doc. 51. Pp. 12-

14.) Hershey, in turn, argues that he was deprived of his employment without
adequate notice or representation, and further, that the individual defendants
interfered with his ability to pursue a post-termination grievance.8 (Doc. 46, ¶¶
105-12; Doc. 56, pp. 13-18.) The court find’s Hershey’s arguments unavailing.

Under Third Circuit precedent, a public employee may not raise a procedural
due process claim against his employer when grievance and arbitration procedures
are in place, because the requirements of due process are satisfied, “even if the

hearing conducted by the Employer ... [was] inherently biased.” Dykes v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 68 F.3d 1564, 1571 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting
Jackson v. Temple Univ., 721 F.2d 931, 933 (3d Cir.1983)). In the instant case, the
collective bargaining agreement provided Hershey with a five-step review of

grievances and an arbitration procedure. (See Doc. 51-1, Arts. 28, 37, 38.) Hershey
complains that the individual defendants impeded his ability to pursue a grievance,

8 Many of the arguments set forth in Hershey’s brief rely on allegations that were not set forth in
the complaint and therefore cannot be considered by the court in deciding whether the complaint
adequately set forth a claim.
yet he sets forth no facts in the complaint to support this allegation. Certainly
Hershey could have filed a grievance regarding his termination, and the court finds

no basis to conclude that the procedure provided by PennDot would fail to satisfy
the due process clause. Furthermore, Hershey’s failure to pursue the procedures
available to him belies his claim that the defendant deprived him of his right to

procedural due process. See Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir.2000) (“If
there is a process on the books that appears to provide due process, the plaintiff
cannot skip that process and use the federal courts as a means to get back what he
wants.”). For these reasons, Hershey cannot state a claim for violation of his due

process rights, and the court will dismiss Count 4 with prejudice.9
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be

granted in part and denied in part as follows: Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5 will be
dismissed with prejudice, and Count 1 will be dismissed with prejudice as asserted
against PennDot and without prejudice as asserted against Defendants Prestash,
Krammerer, Yeckley, and Matchock. Count 1 may proceed against Defendants

Strait, Parks, and Rishel.

9 The court will not address Defendants’ arguments related to Plaintiff’s breach of contract
claim, as Plaintiff concedes in his brief that his common law breach of contract action is not
viable. (See Doc. 56, pp. 18-19.) Accordingly, the claim need not be addressed, and Count 5 will
also be dismissed with prejudice.
An appropriate order shall follow.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge

Dated: September 29, 2023

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413725. Public record. Not legal advice.