# Williams v. Jersey Shore Area School District

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · May 17, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413186

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 17, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413186

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that district court properly “found Appellants failed to establish a claim under a state-created danger theory” as “Appellants' student-on-student bullying claims rest on the contention that it was the School District's inaction that put D.B. at an additional risk o…

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ADAM WILLIAMS and CATIESE No. 4:22-CV-00473
WILLIAMS, individually and as parents
and natural guardians of NW and KW, (Chief Judge Brann)
their minor children,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JERSEY SHORE AREA SCHOOL
DISTRICT; BRIAN T. ULMER;
STEVEN KEEN; and ELIZABETH
SEAGRAVES,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MAY 17, 2023
Cruelty among schoolchildren is undoubtedly disturbing. If my colleagues
and I had the power and ability to eradicate it from society, we would not hesitate
to do so—but we do not. Facts like those alleged in this Amended Complaint are
particularly difficult to read: black students in public school repeatedly called the
n-word and subject to racially-motivated taunting by their peers. Were it the
Court’s job to consider this issue from a sociological perspective, I would wonder
how the parents of the harassing children are allowing their children to behave in
this manner, whether they care, or whether they are condoning and encouraging it.
But such considerations are not within the purview of the Court; my
responsibility lies only in determining whether the allegations in the Amended

Complaint sufficiently state claims upon which relief can be granted against the
School District and certain actors in its employ. They do not.
While the Court regrets what the minor Plaintiffs have allegedly gone

through and appreciates how difficult the situation must be from the parents’
perspective, the law imposes a very high standard to causes of actions against
public schools and school officials for the consequences of student bullying,
racially motivated or otherwise. The Amended Complaint’s allegations do not meet

that standard. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background1

Plaintiffs Adam and Catiese Williams are the adult parents of NW and KW
(the “Minor Students”), both minors and students in the Jersey Shore Area School
District (the “School District”).2 NW and KW are biracial; their father is white and
their mother is black.3 The Amended Complaint describes a number of events that

NW and KW experienced while enrolled in the School District. For the sake of

1 As discussed below, for purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true all allegations
contained in the amended complaint. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AbbVie Inc, 976 F.3d 327,
351 (3d Cir. 2020) (in evaluating motion to dismiss court “must accept all factual allegations
as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine
whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to
relief” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2 Doc. 20 ¶¶ 1, 6.
brevity, the Court will summarize and describe the salient features of each incident
in the below chart.

Date Summary Relevant Actions Taken and
Outcome
Fall 20194 Students told NW they wanted to Plaintiffs and NW reported the
sell him on the slave stage, they incidents to school
wished they could travel back in administrators (unnamed in the
time so that they could own him Amended Complaint). Meetings
as a slave and whip him, that he were held with NW and the
only eats watermelon and drinks harassing students; Plaintiffs
Kool-Aid, referred to him as a were never contacted.
“monkey,” and told him he was
only good at sports and a fast
runner because he is black.

Fall 20205 Students told NW (a member of Plaintiffs reported to the School
the Middle School Football District’s Athletic Director, who
Team) that he was only good at investigated and told Plaintiffs
sports because he was black. “nothing was founded.” NW
switched from the freshman to
varsity football team.

March A fellow student called KW the KW reported the incident to the
20216 n-word. Middle School Principal and
Assistant Principal. Plaintiffs
and KW met with school
administrators and the harassing
student and his/her mother. The
student apologized to KW.
Administrators asked KW to be
part of an ethics committee that
never materialized. KW later
transferred schools.

4 Id. ¶¶ 29-34.
5 Id. ¶¶ 35-41.
Date Summary Relevant Actions Taken and
Outcome
Sept. and Students called NW the n-word, Plaintiffs reported the incidents
Oct. 20217 made comments about hanging to Seagraves, who discussed
NW, and made other racist them with Ulmer and Keen.
remarks. Seagraves told Plaintiffs they
could not identify the offending
students and refused to
investigate further.

Nov. 10, Students harassed NW during Plaintiffs left a phone message
20218 homeroom by making remarks for Ulmer and did not hear back.
and writing letters on the They then met with Keen and
whiteboard, which alluded to the Seagraves to discuss the
n-word. incidents. Keen asked for some
time to investigate the incident.
Adam Williams requested for
NW to be removed from the
homeroom.

Nov. 12, Another student reported Keen called Catiese Williams to
20219 harassment by a student who had say he had met with NW and
previously harassed NW. was continuing to look into the
incidents. Ulmer then called
Catiese Williams and told her
that “consequences were issued
to certain students.”

Nov. 18, Students accused NW of over- Plaintiffs and NW met with
202110 exaggerating the racist incidents Keen and Seagraves, who had
and getting others in trouble. NW fill out a discrimination
report form.

7 Id. ¶¶ 56-76.
8 Id. ¶¶ 77-93.
9 Id. ¶¶ 94-100.
Date Summary Relevant Actions Taken and
Outcome
Dec. 13, NW found the n-word carved in NW and Catiese Williams
202111 the table where he usually sat for reported the incident to Keene,
lunch. who investigated the incident by
reviewing camera footage and
interviewing students. Keen also
informed Catiese Williams that
he had the n-word removed
from the table.

Jan. 18, A student showed NW a photo of Catiese Williams reported the
202212 a Ku Klux Klan member on the incident to the School Resource
student’s phone. Officer, who told her that none
of the prior incidents had been
reported to him. The Resource
Officer documented the incident
and informed Catiese Williams
that there was “not enough to
press harassment charges”
against the student.

The Amended Complaint also attached and described the School District’s written
policies and procedures regarding racial discrimination, harassment, retaliation,
and bullying.13 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ conduct in responding to the
above-listed incidents violated those policies and procedures.14

11 Id. ¶¶ 119-138.
12 Id. ¶¶ 139-163.
13 Id. ¶¶ 15-28, Exs. A through E.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit with an original Complaint filed on March 29,

2022.15 Plaintiffs then filed the operative Amended Complaint on September 1,
2022 against Jersey Shore Area School District, Brian T. Ulmer (the Superintendent
of the School District), Steven Keen (the Principal of Jersey Shore High School),

and Elizabeth Seagraves (the Assistant Principal of Jersey Shore High School)
(Ulmer, Keen, and Seagraves collectively the “Individual Defendants”), and
Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on October 7, 2022.16 That
Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.17 For the following

reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion.
II. LAW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court dismisses a

complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Following Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly18 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,19 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’”20 In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts within the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit must follow three steps: (1) take note of the elements

15 Doc. 1.
16 Docs. 20, 23.
17 Docs. 26, 37, 41.
18 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
19 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they
are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3)

assume the veracity of all well-pleaded factual allegations and determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.21
III. ANALYSIS22

The Amended Complaint brings the following causes of action: (1) violation
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against the School District; (2)
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, against the Individual Defendants; (3) violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Procedural Due Process protections, against the
Individual Defendants; (4) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive
Due Process protections, against the School District; and (5) violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Procedural Due Process
protections, against the School District.23

21 Connelly v. Lane Construction Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
22 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims individually, i.e., on behalf of
themselves and not on behalf of the Minor Students. And Plaintiffs concede that they do not
have individual standing under Title VI. See Doc. 37 at p. 48. The Court finds Defendants’
arguments persuasive, and Plaintiffs do not meaningfully contend or set forth sufficient
arguments that they do have standing to bring individual claims. Therefore, all claims
brought by Adam and Catiese Williams in their individual capacity are dismissed without
prejudice, except for Count I (the Title VI claim), which is dismissed with prejudice. Also,
because the Court concludes that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against the
Individual Defendants, it declines to address in this opinion Defendants’ assertion that the
Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
A. Title VI Claim
Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground

of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”24 Accordingly, “Title VI prohibits
intentional discrimination based on race in any program that receives federal

funding.”25 To state a claim of racial discrimination under Title VI, a plaintiffs
must allege (1) “there is racial or national origin discrimination” and (2) “the entity
engaging in discrimination is receiving federal financial assistance.”26

As to the first element, when a claim is based upon the school’s “failure to
address a racially hostile environment,” a plaintiff “may recover for alleged
‘severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive’ harassment if the school ‘acts with
deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment.’”27 Moreover, “[t]he School

District can only be held liable for a Title VI claim of racial discrimination when
its response is ‘clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.’”28 Stated
differently, “a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘severe or pervasive’ harassment based

on the student’s race, and ‘deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment.’”29

24 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
25 Bridges ex rel. D.B. v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 644 F. App’x 172, 179 (3d Cir. 2016).
26 Moore v. Solanco Sch. Dist., 471 F. Supp. 3d 640, 655 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
27 Bridges, 644 F. App’x at 179 (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633
(1999)).
28 Id. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648).
29 L. L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ., 710 F. App’x 545, 549 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Further, “Title VI ‘prohibits only intentional discrimination’”30 and, as such,
school districts may only be held liable for instances of harassment “‘of which they

have actual knowledge.’”31 To demonstrate knowledge, a plaintiffs must allege that
the harassment was reported to an “appropriate person” who “is, at a minimum, an
official of the recipient entity with authority to take corrective action to end the
discrimination.”32 Therefore, “a school district cannot be held liable for the acts of

its teachers or staff through respondeat superior liability.”33 Even a single use of
the “n-word” is sufficiently severe to satisfy the required level of harassment
necessary to sustain a Title VI claim.34

Plaintiffs argue that the School District’s “actions and failures and refusals
to act” violated the Minor Students’ rights under Title VI.35 In response, the School
District contends that the Amended Complaint fails to plead facts demonstrating

that the School District’s response to the harassment was clearly unreasonable, or
that any District decisionmaker responded or failed to respond in a manner that

30 Moore, 471 F. Supp. 3d at 656 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001)).
31 Id. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 650).
32 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). Although Gebser
addressed a claim under Title IX rather than Title VI, “the scope of Title VI is defined in
terms nearly identical to Title IX . . . [and] Courts have consistently applied the same legal
analysis to construe Title VI and Title IX.” Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 266 F.3d
152, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted).
33 Moore, 471 F. Supp. 3d at 656.
34 L. L., 710 F. App’x at 549 (citing Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264).
knowingly caused the Minor Students to undergo further harassment.36 The Court
agrees with the School District.

The Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that the Minor Students
suffered pervasive harassment, and that the School District had actual knowledge
of the harassment. Therefore, the relevant inquiry is whether the School District’s

response violated Title VI, and the response only violated Title VI if it was clearly
unreasonable, or if decisionmakers in the School District responded or failed to
respond in a manner that knowingly caused the Minor Students to undergo further
harassment. The Court finds that the School District’s response was not clearly

unreasonable.
The School District’s collective response to the various ongoing harassment
incidents included meetings with Plaintiffs and the Minor Students, investigations

of the incidents and the offending students, disciplinary action, documentation of
incidents, and review of camera footage. While it is regrettable that this response
was apparently not sufficient to stop the bullying, there are no allegations in the
Amended Complaint indicating that the School District’s response was undertaken

with the knowledge that harassment would continue. The response may have been
inadequate to stop the bullying and it may have been disorganized, but the
allegations do not give rise to deliberate indifference under Title VI. Accordingly,

the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Count I is granted.

B. Equal Protection Claims
Counts II and V bring equal protection claims against the Individual

Defendants and the School District, respectively. The Court will first analyze the
claim against the Individual Defendants, followed by the claim against the School
District.
1. Individual Defendants

In Count II of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs argue that the Individual
Defendants violated the Minor Students’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause
by their “actions, failures and refusals” demonstrated during the alleged
incidents.37 The Individual Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently

plead facts giving rise to the conduct required for a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.38 The Court agrees with the Individual Defendants.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individuals may bring a cause of action for

damages related to the infringement of their rights under the United States
Constitution.39 In order to state a viable Section 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must
establish an underlying constitutional violation.”40 One district court has recently

recognized that “the Third Circuit has not addressed whether the [F]ourteenth

37 Doc. 20 ¶ 191.
38 Doc. 26 at pp. 31-37.
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
40 Miles v. Zech, 788 F. App’x 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271,
[A]mendment’s [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause protects students from a school’s
deliberate indifference to student-on-student harassment.”41

Absent clear guidance from the Third Circuit, the Court joins at least two
other district courts42 within this Circuit in finding persuasive the reasoning of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which has determined that

“schoolteachers, administrators, and boards of education can be held liable for race
discrimination” under the Equal Protection Clause if the plaintiff demonstrates
“deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants themselves.”43 Specifically:
to succeed on a § 1983 equal protection claim of deliberate
indifference to student-on-student racial harassment, well established
law requires a plaintiff to prove (1) that the child in question was in
fact harassed by other students based on his race; (2) that such race-
based harassment was actually known to the defendant school official;
and (3) that the defendant’s response to such harassment was so
clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances as to give
rise to a reasonable inference that the defendant himself intended for
the harassment to occur.44

The Amended Complaint’s allegations satisfy the first prong. NW and KW
were both harassed due to their race, as the factual allegations sufficiently
demonstrate and the Court has summarized above. Further, at least five of alleged

41 Dickerson v. Wallkill Valley Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 19-cv-08450, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 95584, at *10 (D.N.J. June 1, 2020).
42 See id.; George v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Millburn, 34 F. Supp. 3d 442, 460-61 (D.N.J.
2014).
43 Gant ex rel. Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 1999).
44 DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d 226, 241 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks
incidents regarding NW sufficiently plead facts satisfying the second prong.45 The
incidents alleged involving NW do not name any of the Individual Defendants and

therefore do not demonstrate that Keen, Seagraves, or Ulmer had actual knowledge
of the harassment.46
But the allegations involving both Minor Students fail to satisfy the third

prong, which requires the defendant’s response to the harassment to be “so clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable
inference that the defendant himself intended for the harassment to occur.”47
While, under different circumstances, there may exist a valid cause of action

against school officials under the Equal Protection Clause for failing to prevent
student-on-student racial harassment, Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead
such a cause of action here.

The allegations involving incidents where the Individual Defendants are
named state that, collectively, Keen, Ulmer, and Seagraves discussed the incidents
with Plaintiffs on the phone, held meetings with Plaintiffs and the Minor Students,
investigated the incidents, held offending students accountable, and removed the n-

word from the cafeteria table. While the Court regrets that the Individual
Defendants’ alleged responses to the harassment were not enough to stop it from
continuing, the actions taken by the Individual Defendants do not give rise to an

45 See incidents alleged to have taken place in September and October 2021, on November 10,
2021, November 12, 2021, November 18, 2021, and December 13, 2021
46 See Doc. 20 ¶¶ 29-34.
inference that they intended for the harassment to occur. Accordingly, the
Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count II is granted.

2. School District
In Count V of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs argue that the School
District violated the Minor Students’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause by
their “actions, failures and refusals” demonstrated during the alleged incidents, and

by maintaining a “pattern, practice, policy and custom” of “deliberate indifference:
to recognizing, investigating, and remedying racial discrimination.”48 The School
District argues that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead facts demonstrating a policy

or custom under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the standard set forth in Monell v. The New
York City Department of Social Services and its progeny.49 The Court agrees with
the School District.
It is established that when a municipal organization is named in a Section

1983 suit, that organization may only be held “liable when the alleged
constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation or decision
officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom.”50

“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish
municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy,

48 Doc. 20 ¶¶ 203-205.
49 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Doc. 26 at pp. 19-29.
50 Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citation
or edict.”51 “Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so

well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.”52 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained that “[t]o satisfy the pleading
standard, [plaintiffs] must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly
that custom or policy was.”53

An individual’s conduct implements official policy or practice under
several types of circumstances, including when (1) the individual
acted pursuant to a formal government policy or a standard operating
procedure long accepted within the government entity, (2) the
individual himself has final policy-making authority such that his
conduct represents official policy, or (3) a final policy-maker renders
the individual’s conduct official for liability purposes by having
delegated to him authority to act or speak for the government, or by
ratifying the conduct or speech after it has occurred.54

“Although a policy or custom is necessary to plead a municipal claim, it is
not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. A plaintiff must also allege that the
policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his injuries.”55 “He may do so by
demonstrating an ‘affirmative link’ between the policy or custom and the particular
constitutional violation he alleges.”56 Plaintiffs may demonstrate an affirmative
link by alleging that the municipal organization “had knowledge of similar

51 Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted).
52 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
53 McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009).
54 Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir. 2006).
55 Roman, 914 F.3d at 798.
unlawful conduct in the past, failed to take precautions against future violations,
and that its failure, at least in part, led to [the plaintiff’s] injury.”57 A plaintiff “does

not need to identify a responsible decisionmaker in [their] pleadings . . . [n]or [are
they] required to prove that the custom had the [organization’s] formal approval.”58
“The pleading requirements are different for failure-to-train claims because a
plaintiff need not allege an unconstitutional policy.”59 “Instead, [a plaintiff] must

demonstrate that [an organization’s] failure to train its employees reflects a
deliberate or conscious choice.”60 “A plaintiff sufficiently pleads deliberate
indifference by showing that (1) municipal policymakers know that employees will

confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a
history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will
frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.”61

Here, there are no allegations that the School District implemented a formal
policy promoting racial harassment and, therefore, the District may only be liable
if its decisionmakers implemented a custom or failed to adequately train its
employees to address racial discrimination in a manner that led to the Minor

Students being deprived of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs argue that the
School District failed to follow its own policies and procedures, failed to form a

57 Id. (brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted).
58 Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
59 Id.
60 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
diversity committee, and failed to meaningfully investigate the incidents.62 The
School District cites a number of cases to support its argument that public schools

do not have a constitutional duty to protect students from private actors such as
their peers; therefore, the District alleges that any allegations along that vein
regarding the School District’s actions or inaction cannot give rise to a
constitutional violation under Monell.63 The Court agrees with the School District.

No liability attaches to a Section 1983 claim unless a plaintiff also pleads the
violation of a specific constitutional right.64 And federal courts have made clear
that “a policy or custom permitting failures to stop bullying does not cause

constitutional violations”65 and that “a school’s failure to respond to reports of
bullying cannot give rise to liability under § 1983 because it is not an affirmative
act.”66 Therefore, because the Amended Complaint’s allegations do not plead a

constitutional violation, the Court need not analyze Plaintiffs’ Monell claims
further. Accordingly, the School District’s Motion to Dismiss Count V (as it relates
to equal protection) is granted.

62 Doc. 20 ¶¶ 188-192, 203-205.
63 Doc. 26 at pp. 22-25.
64 Byrne v. Springfield Sch. Dist., No. 21-3199, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197915, at *34 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 14, 2021) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
65 Byrne, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *34-35; Lansberry v. Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 356 F. Supp.
3d 486, 503 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (“[H]arm caused by student-on-student bullying is not a
constitutional harm that Monell protects against.”).
C. Procedural Due Process
To state such a claim, Plaintiffs “must allege that [the Minor Students]

[were] deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection of life, liberty, or property and that the available
procedures did not provide due process of law.”67 “Critically, the deprivation of the
protected interest must be attributable to the [School] District, not a private

actor.”68
In the matter at hand, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants’ actions, or
rather inactions, resulted in the deprivation of her access to educational benefits

and opportunities.69 It is well-established that, under Pennsylvania law, students
have “a legitimate claim of entitlement to a public education” and, therefore,
public education is an individual interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.70 Consequently, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged the denial of a

protected interest.
However, the Third Circuit has made clear that the deprivation of a private
interest must be attributable to the School District, not private actors such as other

67 Thompson v. State of Del. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth & Their Fams., 44 F.4th 188, 194
(3d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68 Monn v. Gettysburg Area Sch. Dist., 553 F. App’x 120, 123 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Phila.
Police & Fire Ass’n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156,
169 (3d Cir. 1989)).
69 Doc. 20 ¶¶ 68-70.
students.71 Plaintiffs contend that the School District failed to follow established
policies for dealing with bullying and racially-motivated harassment, “but the

determination of what process is ‘due’ is ‘not to be found in statutes . . . [but] is a
question of federal constitutional law.’”72 And the “fundamental requirement of
due process is the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.”73

In another case involving peer-on-peer bullying, a court in the Third Circuit
stated that “it would make no sense to apply these standards [of procedural due
process] in this case and suggest that [the defendant] should have provided [the

plaintiff] with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the group of boys
[who] bullied him to the extent that his education was interfered with.”74 The court
also noted that the bullied plaintiffs did have an opportunity to complain about the

bullying, even if the defendants “did not take action in response,” ultimately
finding that “the facts of this case simply do not state a claim under the procedural
due process clause.”75
The same is true here. While the Amended Complaint argues that

Defendants did not follow the School District’s policies and procedures, it is also

71 Monn, 553 F. App’x at 123 (citing Phila. Police & Fire. Ass’n for Handicapped Children,
Inc. v. City of Phila., 874 F.2d 156, 169 (3d Cir. 1989)).
72 Alderette v. Lawrence Cty. Career & Tech Ctr., No. 18-958, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213139,
at *34 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2018) (internal citations omitted).
73 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
74 Alderette, 2018 U.S. Dist. at *34.
replete with examples of Plaintiffs and the Minor Students having a dialogue with
various individuals within the School District, which included phone calls,

videoconferences, and in-person meetings. They had an opportunity to be heard in
a meaningful time and a meaningful manner; reactions to those complaints, and
any alleged action or inaction, is not relevant to the inquiry of whether the Minor

Students were afforded procedural due process. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Counts III and Count V (with respect to procedural due process) is
granted.
D. Substantive Due Process

As to Plaintiffs’ claim for a violation of the Minor Students’ substantive due
process rights, “[t]he Supreme Court has long established that ‘as a general matter,
a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not
constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.’”76 As such, a school district

generally cannot be held liable for failing to protect students from student-on-
student harassment, no matter how “unfair and unjust” the school’s response to
such harassment is.77

Nevertheless, two exceptions exist to that general rule. First, a school may
have a duty to protect against harm from third parties when the “special
relationship exception” applies—that is, “when a special relationship has been

76 Morrow, 719 F.3d at 166 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489
U.S. 189, 197 (1989)) (brackets and ellipsis omitted).
established because ‘the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there
against his will.’”78 Second, a duty may be imputed to a school where the “state-

created danger exception” applies, which occurs when “the state’s own actions
create the very danger that causes the plaintiff’s injury.”79 Neither exception
applies here.

With respect to the first exception, the Third Circuit in its en banc opinion in
Morrow v. Balaski determined that “public schools, as a general matter, do not
have a constitutional duty to protect students from private actors.”80 Consequently,
in ordinary circumstances no special relationship will exist between a school and

its students, although there remains “the possibility of a special relationship arising
between a particular school and particular students under certain unique and
narrow circumstances.”81 That is to say, a special relationship will not arise solely

from “compulsory school attendance laws and the concomitant in loco parentis
authority and discretion that schools necessarily exercise over students, or the
school’s failure to do more to protect” its students in any particular situation.82
The Amended Complaint does not allege any facts demonstrating any

unique and narrow circumstances between the School District and the Minor
Students that would give rise to a special relationship. While Plaintiffs do argue

78 Id. at 167 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 170.
81 Id. at 171.
that a special relationship exists due to Pennsylvania’s compulsory school
attendance laws, this approach was rejected by the Third Circuit in Morrow—a

point which Plaintiffs seem to concede.83 Plaintiffs’ attempts to skirt around this
fact by citing the existence of dissenting opinions in Morrow are unpersuasive.84
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to plead the existence of a special relationship

such that Defendants may be held liable for an alleged violation of the Minor
Students’ substantive due process rights.
With respect to the second exception, to adequately allege “state-created
danger,” a plaintiff must allege:

1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;

2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the
conscience;

3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that
the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts, or a
member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm
brought about by the state’s actions, as opposed to a member of the
public in general; and

4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that
created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more
vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all.85

Setting aside prongs one and three, the Amended Complaint’s allegations are
insufficient to establish the second and fourth prongs of the state-created danger

83 Doc. 37 at p. 38.
84 Id.
85 L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Bright v.
test. With regard to the second prong, “[f]or behavior by a government officer to
shock the conscience, it must be more egregious than ‘negligently inflicted harm,’

as mere negligence ‘is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due
process.’”86 “Instead, ‘only the most egregious official conduct can be said to’
meet that standard.”87 Action that is taken, as here, “after time for unhurried

judgments and careful deliberation may shock the conscience if done with
deliberate indifference.”88 In such circumstances, an official’s “actions may shock
the conscience if they reveal a conscious disregard of a great risk of serious
harm.”89

The Amended Complaint includes numerous allegations where harassment
was reported to school officials—in fact, every incident alleged in the Amended
Complaint was reported to someone.90 Various remedial actions were taken:

meetings were held; offending students were spoken to and disciplined; a written
slur was removed from the cafeteria table; footage was collected and reviewed;
interviews were conducted.91 While these remedial actions clearly fell short of
Plaintiffs’ expectations, and while they were not enough to prevent the bullying

86 Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting City of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)).
87 Id. (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846).
88 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
89 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
90 Doc. 20, throughout.
from continuing, it cannot be said that the School Districts’ actions were taken
with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience.

With respect to the fourth prong, Plaintiffs must allege “an affirmative act
that put [the Minor Students] in danger or made [them] more vulnerable to risk.”92
The Third Circuit has “explained that the line between action and inaction is not

always easily drawn,” but has noted that a plaintiff may not “simply attempt[] to
redefine clearly passive inaction as affirmative acts.”93
Plaintiffs’ allegations fall short of meeting the fourth prong of the state-
created danger exception because they do not allege that the School District took

any affirmative acts that made the Minor Students more vulnerable to harm.
Plaintiffs argue that the School District engaged in the following affirmative acts:
disbanding the diversity committee; ceasing working with local organizations to

combat racism or discrimination; providing Plaintiffs with inconsistent and
contradictory information regarding the incidents; not properly communicating
internally or adhering to policies despite assurances that they were doing so. In the
Court’s view, Plaintiffs are “attempting to redefine clearly passive inaction as

affirmative acts” in a manner that is not permitted in the Third Circuit. Essentially,
Plaintiffs’ allegations are couched in what the School District did not do—they did
not follow their policies, they did not provide accurate information, they did not

follow through to create a diversity committee—all amounting to allegations of

92 Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2017).
inaction. And in the Third Circuit, such inaction—failing to adequately respond to
the harassment—is plainly insufficient to satisfy the fourth prong.94 Morrow v.

Balaski makes that quite clear.
Because the Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege either a special
relationship or a state-created danger, the School District’s Motion to Dismiss

Count IV is granted.
E. Leave to Amend
Plaintiffs will be granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, should
they choose to do so. The Third Circuit has directed that, when a complaint is

vulnerable to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “must permit a curative
amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.”95 Our Court
of Appeals has also stated that:

[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint
after a defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds
that amendment would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform
the plaintiff that he or she has leave to amend the complaint within a
set period of time.96

With respect to futility, the Third Circuit has sanctioned denial of leave to
amend “if the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure

94 See Morrow, 719 F.3d at 178; see also Bridges, 644 F. App’x at 177-78 (concluding that
district court properly “found Appellants failed to establish a claim under a state-created
danger theory” as “Appellants' student-on-student bullying claims rest on the contention that
it was the School District's inaction that put D.B. at an additional risk of harm”).
95 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.”97 As detailed above, Plaintiffs
may plausibly state a claim for relief as to all counts that will be dismissed, with

the exception of those that they agree should be dismissed (and Plaintiffs should
consider this carefully), and any Title VI claims brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of
themselves and not the Minor Students. The factual deficiencies in Plaintiffs’

claims may be rectified by providing more concrete factual details (should they
exist) regarding the responses to, and punishments imposed for, the alleged
incidents, and to whom the various incidents were reported. Plaintiffs are advised
not to creatively attempt to re-state facts that have already been alleged. If there are

no new facts to be alleged, or to be alleged more completely, then amendment is
discouraged.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint is granted, but with leave for Plaintiffs to again amend their
complaint—with the exception of the Title VI claim asserted by Adam and Catiese
Williams in their individual capacities, which is dismissed with prejudice.

An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10413186. Public record. Not legal advice.