# Redclift v. Schuylkill County

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · August 31, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10412168

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 31, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10412168

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reversing dismissal of supervisory individual capacity defendants for adopting policies that they knew would cause harm
- recognizing that the failure to promulgate policies can lead to Monell liability

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SEAN REDCLIFT, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:21-CV-1866
Individually and as ADMINISTRATOR )
of the Estate of Stacy Redclift, )
Plaintiff )
v. ) (ARBUCKLE, M.J.)
)
SCHUYLKILL COUNTY ,et. al. )
Defendants )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Schuylkill County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 69)

I. INTRODUCTION
Tragically, Stacy Redclift took her own life when she was detained at the
Schuykill County Prison. Her family now brings this civil rights action against a
variety of actors, from the police officers who arrested her to prison guards, alleging
they displayed deliberate indifference to her known risk of suicide. The prison
guards, the Schuylkill County Prison Board, and Schuylkill County have now moved
to dismiss the claims against them. For the reasons that follow, I will grant the
Motion in part and deny the Motion in part.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case began on November 2, 2021, when Sean Redclift (“Plaintiff” or
Sean),1 acting individually and as the administrator of Stacy Redclift’s estate, filed

1 At times, for simplicity, I will refer to members of the Redclift family by their first
names, without intending any disrespect or undue familiarity.
a Complaint. (Doc. 1). On January 6, 2022, Plaintiff amended his complaint as of
right, and that is now the operative pleading. (Doc. 21).

In the motion to dismiss stage, I must take all facts presented in the Amended
Complaint as true. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In the early
morning of January 6, 2020, Stacy Redclift was involved in a domestic dispute with

her husband, Sean, and her son, Alexander. (Doc. 1, ¶ 45). Coledale Borough Police
Officer Matthew Jungbaer and Coledale Borough Police Officers John Doe 1 and
John Doe 2 arrived at her residence, and arrested Stacy “due to her allegedly erratic
and non-compliant behavior.” (Id. at ¶ 46). Stacy was later arraigned and released to

her mother’s house. (Id. at ¶ 47).
However, instead of staying at her mother’s house, Stacy returned to her
home, and engaged in erratic and non-compliant behavior. (Id. at ¶ 48). Officer

Jungbaer, and the two John Doe police officers responded to the Redclift home and
arrested Stacy. (Id. at ¶ 49). The officers brought Stacy to the Schuykill County
Prison (the “Prison”). (Id.). However, before she arrived, Sean and Alexander told
the officers that Stacy “had a history of mental illness, psychotic episodes, suicide

attempts/ tendencies, and psychiatric hospitalizations.” (Id. at ¶ 50). Despite this
knowledge, the officers did not communicate this information to anyone at the
Prison, including its medical providers (Id. at ¶¶ 51-52).
On January 6, 2020, at 12:11 p.m., Stacy was booked and processed at the
Prison. (Id. at ¶ 54). At 1:51 p.m., Nurse Hysock performed a medication verification

for Stacy. Nurse Hysock ordered various medications for Stacy, but failed to order
Stacy’s Paxil, a psychotropic drug. (Id. at ¶ 56).
In the early morning of January 7, 2020, Nurse Hollywood conducted a mental

health and suicide screening of Stacy. (Id. at ¶ 58). Stacy told Nurse Hollywood that
(1) she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and bipolar disorder
type two, (2) had a history of suicide attempts, (3) had a lengthy history of inpatient
psychiatric hospitalizations, (4) she was currently being cared for by a psychiatrist

for her mental health disorders, (5) that she was on medications for her medical
illnesses, and (6) that she felt like she needed to see a mental health provider at that
time. (Id. at ¶ 62).

The screening indicated that Stacy needed “further psychiatric evaluation,”
but it was never performed. (Id. at ¶ 59). Further, Nurse Hollywood incorrectly
conducted the screening because she failed to obtain information from the Coaldale
Borough Police Officers, and failed to “accurately appreciate, report, or record the

information given to her by Officer Jungbaer, John Doe Coledale Police Officer 1,
John Doe Coaldale Police Officer 2, or Ms. Redclift.” (Id. at ¶ 61). Nurse Hollywood
“reviewed and verified” Stacy’s screening and medication forms at 4:07am on

January 7, 2020. (Id. at ¶ 63).
Sometime on January 7, 2020, someone discovered that Stacy did not have
her Paxil, and Nurse Practitioner McGowan ordered it for her. (Id. at ¶¶ 64-65).

Despite it being ordered, the order was never approved and Stacy did not receive any
Paxil during her incarceration. (Id. at ¶ 65). However, Nurse Gross attempted to give
Stacy her other medications, but she refused. (Id. at ¶ 69).

Additionally, at 10 a.m., on January 7, 2020, Lt. Line received a call from
Stacy’s son, informing the Lieutenant that Stacy was calling him and Sean. (Id. at ¶¶
66-67). The son informed Lt. Line that they did not appreciate these calls and told
Lt. Lane that if Stacy did not stop calling, they would press harassment charges.

(Id.). Lt. Lane told the son that Stacy would be advised to stop calling them. (Id.).
Someone later informed Stacy of her family’s wishes. (Id.).
In the late evening of January 7, 2020, Stacy’s cellmate found her hanging by

a noose. (Id. at ¶ 71). Stacy Redclift died the next day. (Id. at ¶ 74).
Because of these actions, Plaintiff pleads nine counts against the various
defendants. As applied to this motion, Plaintiff brings a wrongful death claim and a
survival act claim against Schuylkill County, Schuylkill County Prison Board, and
sixteen prison employees.2 (“Moving Defendants”).3 Plaintiff also brings a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical care claim against

the individual defendants (all Moving Defendants besides the Prison Board and the
County). Finally, Plaintiff brings a distinct Monell claim for violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment (deliberate indifference to medical needs) against Schuykill

County and the Schuykill County Prison.
On March 14, 2022, Moving Defendants sought dismissal of the claims
against them for failing to state to claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 69).
Their Brief in Support was filed the same day. (Doc. 70). Plaintiff filed a Brief in

Opposition on April 7, 2022. (Doc. 87). Moving Defendants did not file a reply brief.
Thus, this Motion is ripe for resolution.
III. THE MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for

the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

2 CO Billie Jo Bender, CO Ryan Parker, Eugene Berdanier, Lt. Barron Line, CO
Justine Garcia, CO Robert Selgrade, CO Brian Gotshall, Lt. Thomas Hoban, Jr., CO
Kylee Rauenzahn, CO Rebecca Bergan, CO Kassandra Confer, CO Christopher
Fertig, CO William Schweikert, CO Jeffrey Moyer, Lt. Gary Keppel, and Elaine
Gilbert
3 Moving Defendants moved to include CO Billie Jo Bender and CO Ryan Parker
into their Motion to Dismiss and accompanying briefs. (Doc. 94). That Motion will
be granted.
can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the
court “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine
whether Plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the
complaint.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In review of a

motion to dismiss, a court must “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to
the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents
if the [plaintiff’s] claims are based upon these documents.” Id. at 230.
In deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted, the court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the
complaint as well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint.
Jordan v. Fox Rothchild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir.

1994). These allegations and inferences are to be construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Id. The court, however, “need not credit a complaint’s bald
assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Further, it is not proper to

“assume that the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he] has not alleged.” Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
526 (1983).
“A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the
plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. Id. To
determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the pleading regime established by

the Supreme Court, the court must engage in a three-step analysis:
First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to
state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because
they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth. Finally, where they are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Santiago v. Warminister Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 675, 679). “In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the
plaintiff’s entitlement to relief” and instead must “‘show’ such an entitlement with
its facts.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for
overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The
plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard
when the factual pleadings “allow the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts
“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, “stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

Burtch v. Millberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).
IV. DISCUSSION
Moving Defendants argue:
1. that Plaintiff failed to plead that any of the prison employees were
personally involved in a constitutional deprivation,
2. that non-medical prison employees cannot be responsible for inadequate

medical treatment, that the “Monell-like” claims against the former
Warden and a staff member are not cognizable,
3. that Plaintiff failed to properly plead a Monell claim, and

4. that the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Act does not provide
a cause of action.
I’ll discuss each in turn.
A. THE PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE PRISON GUARD DEFENDANTS

Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint “is completely
silent regarding the specific conduct or personal involvement of any County
Defendant.” (Doc. 70, p. 15). Plaintiff counters that he “alleged that all of the moving

Defendants had knowledge of numerous facts indicating that Mrs. Redclift was at
increased risk of, and was particularly vulnerable to, suicide.” (Doc. 87, p. 9). I agree
with Plaintiff, he has alleged enough against the Moving Defendants at this stage.
To state a § 1983 claim, a Plaintiff must allege that each defendant had
“personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347,

353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1988)); Clemens v. Warden SCI Greene, 290 F. Supp. 3d 388, 395 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
This includes “describing the defendant’s participation in or actual knowledge of

and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Clemens, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 395. Simply
put, “[l]iability under § 1983 is personal in nature and can only follow personal
involvement in the alleged wrongful conduct shown through specific allegations of
personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence in the challenged

practice.” Quarles v. Palakovich, 736 F. Supp. 2d 941, 949 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that:
Lt. Line; CO Garcia; CO Selgrade; CO Gotshall; Lt. Hoban; CO
Rauenzahn; CO Bergan; CO Confer; CO Fertig; CO Bender; CO
Moyer; CO Parker; Lt. Keppel; CO Schweikert, and Ms. Gilbert, all of
whom knew or had reason to know that Mrs. Redclift: (i) would likely
suffer negative psychological and emotional effects due to the mere fact
of her incarceration and confinement in prison; (ii) had a history of
mental illness; (iii) presently suffered from mental health issues; (iv)
was being prescribed medication for mental illness; (v) had been
admitted to psychiatric institutions in the past; (vi) had a history of
suicide attempts; (vii) had screened as warranting further mental
health/suicide evaluation in the Schuylkill County Prison; (viii) had felt
she needed to be seen by a mental health professional in the Schuylkill
County Prison; (ix) had had a significant change in circumstance since
her incarceration, i.e., her family support system was withdrawn; (x)
she was not administered prescribed medication; and (xi) had refused
to take medication that was administered to her. As a result thereof,
these Defendants knew or should have known that Mrs. Redclift was
particularly vulnerable to suicide and that there was a strong likelihood
that she would attempt suicide. Nonetheless, these Defendants failed to
take any action to provide Mrs. Redclift with adequate care,
supervision, medication and/or treatment, or to guard against or prevent
her from committing suicide.

(Doc. 21, ¶ 76).

Plaintiff repeats these allegations later in his Amended Complaint (Id. at ¶
170). The Court finds that Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts against the prison
officials at this stage, and that the officials have fair notice of the claims Plaintiff is
making against them. Once discovery begins, then the Court and the parties will
have a better grasp on what these individual defendants knew about Stacy and her
condition. But until then, and assuming Plaintiff’s allegations are true, the claims
against Moving Defendants must survive. See Ponzini v. Monroe Cnty., 897 F. Supp.
2d 282, 298 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (“At this preliminary stage, it would be inappropriate
for the Court to make any findings of fact or to cast doubt upon any allegations as
set forth in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.”).
B. WHETHER THE MOVING DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE
THEY ARE NOT MEDICAL PROVIDERS

Moving Defendants, in the alternative to the personal involvement argument,
contend that they cannot be held liable because “non-medical provider defendants
cannot be deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s medical condition if the inmate was
receiving treatment from the facility’s medical providers.” (Doc. 70, p. 15). Plaintiff

counters that Stacy didn’t even receive medical treatment, and regardless, Moving
Defendants cite to misinterpreted and distinguishable case law. (Doc. 87, p. 13-17).
I agree with Plaintiff.

In Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993), the Third Circuit
affirmed summary judgment for two non-medical prison defendants because:
The only allegation against either of these two defendants was that they
failed to respond to letters Durmer sent to them explaining his
predicament. Neither of these defendants, however, is a physician, and
neither can be considered deliberately indifferent simply because they
failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who
was already being treated by the prison doctor.

The Court in Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) later clarified
Durmer, noting that it’s holding can be applied to the motion to dismiss stage, and
that:
If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts (Dr. McGlaughlin and
Brown in this case), a non-medical prison official will generally be
justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands. This follows
naturally from the division of labor within a prison. Inmate health and
safety is promoted by dividing responsibility for various aspects of
inmate life among guards, administrators, physicians, and so on.
Holding a non-medical prison official liable in a case where a prisoner
was under a physician's care would strain this division of labor.
Moreover, under such a regime, non-medical officials could even have
a perverse incentive not to delegate treatment responsibility to the very
physicians most likely to be able to help prisoners, for fear of vicarious
liability.

Accordingly, we conclude that, absent a reason to believe (or actual
knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not
treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official like Gooler will not
be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of
deliberate indifference.
Thus, as noted by Plaintiff, the question here is whether Stacy was being
treated by medical professionals during her stay at the Prison. Based on a favorable

reading of the Complaint, the answer is no. Plaintiff’s “medical care” at the Prison
consisted of “influenza, suicide, mental health, drug use and medication verification
screenings,” (Doc. 21, ¶ 55), prescription orders for Stacy for drugs that were

prescribed to her by an out of prison provider prior to her incarceration, (Id. at ¶ 56),
a second mental health and suicide screening which flagged her for further
psychiatric evaluation, (Id. at ¶ 59), a review and verification of Stacy’s screening
and medication verification forms (Id. at ¶ 63), and an attempted administration of

medications. (Id. at ¶ 69). At this stage of litigation, I am satisfied that this contact
with medical professionals was not the kind of treatment contemplated by case law.
Stacy’s contact with medical providers largely consisted of health screenings, which

appear to be routine for new inmates. Indeed, Stacy was flagged for further
psychiatric treatment from a screening, but it was never provided to her. (Doc. 21, ¶
59). Additionally, the medications that were ordered for her were prescribed by out
of prison providers and Stacy was taking these medications before her incarceration.

Therefore, I reject Moving Defendant’s argument.
Finally, Moving Defendants ask me to rely on three cases that support their
proposition that any treatment from a medical professional bars claims against non-

medical prison officials: Mitchell v. Sage, No. 14-cv-905, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
155019 (M.D. Pa. July 21, 2014) report and recommendation adopted by 2014 WL
5493193 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2014); Thomas v. Zinkel, 155 F. Supp. 2d 408 (E.D. Pa.

2001); and Newton v. Reitz, No. 07-cv-1254, 2009 WL 233911 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30,
2009). However, all are distinguishable, as these cases involve plaintiffs who had
substantially more medical “treatment” than Stacy did.

In Mitchell, the plaintiff had multiple interactions with prison medical
providers who were actively treating and diagnosing him with his ailments. Mitchell,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155019, at * 9-12. In Thomas, the court dismissed the prison
guards from a Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical care claim

when the plaintiff “received a variety of tests, prescriptions, and ongoing diagnoses
from several different physicians . . . [but plaintiff] became increasingly unsatisfied
with his doctors’ refusal to order certain tests . . . .” Thomas, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 410.

Finally, in Newton, the plaintiff admits he “regularly received medical attention” and
was “prescribed medications during his incarcerations,” but “did not believe his
medical treatment was up to medical standards.” Newton, 2009 WL 233911, at * 4-
5. Thus, none of these cases are convincing to me, as these plaintiffs received

substantially more care and interaction than Stacy did during her stay at the Prison.
C. WHETHER PLAINTIFF STATED A COGNIZABLE SECTION 1983 CLAIM
AGAINST WARDEN BERDANIER AND ELAINE GILBERT

Plaintiff brings both and official and individual capacity claims against the
former Warden of Schuykill County, Warden Berdanier, and the Director of Human
Services for Schuylkill County Prison, Elaine Gilbert.4 Moving Defendants seek to
dismiss both claims. In this section, I’ll discuss why the official capacity claims will

be dismissed but the individual capacity claims will survive.
1. The Official Capacity Claims
Moving Defendants argue that the official capacity claims against Mr.

Berdanier and Ms. Gilbert should be dismissed because it is wholly duplicative as
their employer is named as a defendant in this action. (Doc. 70, p. 17). Plaintiff
counters that dismissal of the official capacity claim will “serve no laudable
purpose,” and counsels the Court to keep the claim. (Doc. 87, pp. 21-22). However,

I agree with Moving Defendants on this point.
Official-capacity suits are “only another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t. of Social Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978). In an official-capacity suit, the entity of which the
officer is an agent is the real party in interest. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
166 (1985). “There is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local
government officials, for under Monell, local government units can be sued directly

4 Based on the Amended Complaint, Ms. Gilbert was “was responsible for the overall
administration and provision of comprehensive medical services, including mental
health services, to inmates incarcerated within the Schuylkill County Prison. Ms.
Gilbert was also responsible for staffing and training of prison nursing and medical
personnel, formulating and enforcing policy/procedures regarding medical issues
and performing daily inmate evaluations among other duties.” (Doc. 21, ¶ 41).
for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.” Id. at 167 n.14. “[B]ecause official
capacity claims against an individual defendant are duplicative of claims brought

against a municipality, ‘courts sitting in the Third Circuit have dismissed defendants
sued in their official capacity when the same claims are made against the
municipality.’” Rankin v. Majikes, No. 14-cv-699, 2014 WL 6893693, at *6 (M.D.

Pa. Dec. 5, 2014) (quoting Dubas v. Olyphant Police Dep’t, No. 11-cv-1402, 2012
WL 1378694, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2012)). This is by no means a requirement,
and district courts in this circuit have declined to dismiss official capacity claims if
dismissal “will serve no laudable purpose.” Capresecco v. Jenkintown Borough, 261

F. Supp. 2d 319, 322 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
I am persuaded by the Third Circuit’s practice of routinely affirming district
court decisions that dismiss official capacity claims as duplicative. While I

acknowledge Plaintiff’s argument and reliance on Capresecco, I believe dismissing
official capacity claims serves a laudable purpose. In this case, with its numerous
claims and defendants, it will streamline case, keep a hypothetical jury focused on
the salient issues, and declutter the docket. See M.S. v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist.,

43 F. Supp. 3d 412, 419 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (“Moreover, considering the large number
of Counts and Defendants named in the complaint, the Court is persuaded that
retention of redundant official capacity claims would cause confusion and would

unnecessarily clutter the docket.”). So, the official capacity claims will be dismissed.
2. The Individual Capacity Claims
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff accuses Warden Berdanier and Ms.

Gilbert of failing to train or failing to implement appropriate policies in twenty-two
different areas. Moving Defendants argue that these “Monell style claims” are
duplicative of the claims made against their employer and that Monell claims can
only be asserted against a municipal entity.5 (Doc. 70, p. 17). However, Plaintiff is

asserting supervisory liability claims against Warden Berdanier and Ms. Gilbert.6
(Doc. 87, pp. 18-19); (Doc. 21, ¶ 161). Thus, Moving Defendants have not
adequately briefed why the supervisory liability claims should be dismissed at this

stage. The supervisory liability claims will be permitted to continue to discovery.

5 If these are true Monell claims, then yes, these claims should be dismissed because
Monell only applies to municipalities, not individuals. Lepre v. Lukus, 602 F. App’x
864, 869 n.4 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Oren v. Pa. Dep’t of Corrections, 2022 WL
710188, at *3 n.5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2022) (dismissing Monell claims asserted
against individual defendants for failure to state a claim); Moore v. Solanco Sch.
Dist., 471 F.Supp.3d 640 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“Monell liability applies only to
municipalities, not to individuals”). However, these are supervisory liability claims.

6 “A supervisor may be directly liable under the deliberate indifference test set forth
in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), if the supervisor knew or was aware of
and disregarded an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s health or safety. A plaintiff can
show this by establishing that the risk was obvious.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d
209, 225 n.17 (3d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209,
225 n.17 (3d Cir. 2017) (reversing dismissal of supervisory individual capacity
defendants for adopting policies that they knew would cause harm).
D. WHETHER PLAINTIFF STATED COGNIZABLE MONELL CLAIMS AGAINST
THE COUNTY AND THE PRISON BOARD

In Count VI of his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that the County and
the Prison Board failed to create appropriate policies to ensure the health of the
inmates and that it failed to train its employees on how to appropriately evaluate and
assess an inmate’s mental status and suicide risk. (Doc. 21, ¶¶ 182-83). Moving
Defendants assert that Plaintiff has alleged “a vague laundry list of supposed failures
in the establishment and enforcement of policies related to the prevention in inmate

suicide . . . [that] are unsupported by any factual predicate, and therefore fall
woefully short of the specificity requirement to state a Monell policy claim.” (Doc.
70, p. 19). Plaintiff counters that he adequately pled sufficient facts to support his

claims. (Doc. 87, pp. 23-27). I agree with Plaintiff, and before I discuss why, I will
discuss the pleading standards for Monell claims generally.
A municipality, like the County and the Prison Board, cannot be held liable
for the unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior.

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, “under § 1983,
local governments are responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts.’” Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.

469, 479 (1986) (emphasis in original). To state a claim against the County or the
Prison Board, Plaintiff must allege that the violation of his rights was caused either
by a policy or by a custom of the municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Berg v.
Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2000).

Municipal policies include the decisions of a government’s lawmakers and the
acts of its policymaking officials as well as municipal customs, which are acts or
practices that, even though not formally approved by an appropriate decision maker,

are so persistent and widespread as to have the force of law. Id.; Natale v. Camden
Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003). In other words, a municipality
“‘can be held responsible as an entity when the injury inflicted is permitted under its
adopted policy or custom.’” Mulholland v Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237

(3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996)).
A policy or custom can be shown in any of four ways:
(1) the existence of a formal policy, officially promulgated or adopted
by a municipality; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; or
(2) that an official or officials responsible for establishing final policy
with respect to the subject matter in question took action or made a
deliberate, specific decision that caused the alleged violation of
plaintiff's constitutional rights, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 483-84 (1986) (citation omitted); or
(3) the existence of an unlawful practice by subordinate officials so
permanent and well settled as to constitute “custom or usage” and proof
that this practice was so manifest or widespread as to imply the
constructive acquiescence of policymaking officials, City of St. Louis
v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127-30 (1989); or
(4) if liability is based on a claim of failure to train or supervise, that
“the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom...[municipal employees] came into contact.” City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
Nye v. Cumberland Cnty., No. 14-cv-713, 2016 WL 695109, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb.
19, 2016).

“To satisfy the pleading standard, [a plaintiff] must identify a custom or
policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of
York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). Additionally, there must be a direct causal
link between the policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation. City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
As to his absence of policy Monell claim, Plaintiff adequality pleaded the lack
of relevant policies and how that absence harmed him. Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.

Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that the failure to promulgate
policies can lead to Monell liability).7 Plaintiff contends that the County and the
Prison Board lack appropriate policies in a plethora of situations, including a policy:
on training its staff to assess and identify inmates with mental illness and a suicide

risk; ensuring that inmate’s required medications are being administered, and “safely
and appropriately treat[ing], manage[ing], and car[ing] for an inmate who manifests

7 In Natale, a prison had no policy or requirement “that a doctor see an inmate during
the first 72 hours of incarceration and no one was charged with determining whether
an inmate should be seen by a doctor earlier in the 72-hour period.” Id. at 584-85.
The court concluded that “the failure to establish such a policy is a ‘particular[ly]
glaring omission’ in a program of medical care,” and thus denied summary judgment
on plaintiff’s Monell claim.
risk factors for self-harm and suicide;” and ensuring that inmates with suicide risks
are not with tools they can use to kill themselves. (Doc. 21, ¶ 183). Plaintiff contends

that the lack of appropriate policies “became so wide-spread and pervasive that it
constituted a ‘custom’ that was accepted and condoned by [the Prison and the Prison
Board].” (Id. at ¶ 186).

Here, Plaintiff adequality pleaded the lack relevant policies and how that
absence harmed him. As stated above, Plaintiff pleads that the Prison and Prison
Board do not have policies, on a host of relevant policies that could have prevented
Stacy’s death. And Plaintiff contends that the absence of these policies is the direct

proximate cause of Stacy’s death. (Id. at ¶ 191). Thus, the “absence of policy”
Monell claim will survive.
Plaintiff also contends that the Prison and the Prison Board failed to train its

employees in a variety of suicide related practices. (Doc. 21, ¶ 183). To succeed on
a failure to train Monell claim, a plaintiff must “show[] that the failure amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom those employees will
come into contact.’” Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)). “Additionally,
‘the identified deficiency in a city's training program must be closely related to the
ultimate injury;’ or in other words, ‘the deficiency in training [must have] actually
caused’ the constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989)).

Here, Plaintiff has pleaded enough facts to support both of the requirements
of a “failure to train: Monell claim. Plaintiff plead that the Prison and the Prison
Board were responsible for the health and wellbeing of inmates at the Prison, (Doc.

21, ¶ 177), responsible for training its staff towards that goal, (Id. at ¶ 179), didn’t
train their staff in a variety of ways, (Id. at ¶ 183 ), knew or should have known it
would lead to harm (Id. at ¶ 182), and thus, Stacy’s death was “a highly predictable,
and even expected, consequence.” (Id. at ¶ 190). This is sufficient for Plaintiff’s

claim to continue at this stage.
E. THE WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL ACTION CLAIMS
Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim (42 Pa. C.S. §

8301) and survival action claim (42 Pa. C.S. § 8302) fail because they “do not create
independent causes of action; rather, they are derivative in the sense that the
substance of the claims derives from the injury to the decedent.” (Doc. 70, p. 18).
Plaintiff concedes that those two statutes did not create a new cause of action, but

argues that his claims should proceed, as other federal courts in the Commonwealth
have allowed those claims to proceed. (Doc. 87, pp. 27-29).
The Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Act “did not create a new

theory of liability but merely allow[s] a tort claim of the decedent to be prosecuted.”
Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F. Supp. 2d 656, 674 n.10 (W.D. Pa. 2012). So, if “no
underlying tort has been pled, there can be no wrongful-death or survival action.”

McCracken v. Fulton Cnty., No. 19-cv-1063, 2020 WL 2767577, at * 27 (M.D. Pa.
May 28, 2020). Therefore, if a plaintiff has plead successful Section 1983 claims,
then their wrongful death and survival action claims should be allowed to proceed.

See, e.g., Summers v. City of Phila., No. 17-191, 2017 WL 2734277, at * 28-29 (E.D.
Pa. June 26, 2017); Beaty v. Delaware Cnty., No. 21-cv-1617, 2021 WL 4026373,
at * 3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2021); Maldet v. Johnstown Police Dep’t, No. 19-cv-325,
2019 WL 2435869, at *7 n.7 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2019). Additionally, the

Pennsylvania Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”), codified at 42 Pa.
C.S.A. § 8541, does not shield defendants from Section 1983 wrongful death and
survival actions. DeJesus v. City of Lancaster, No. 14-cv-3437, 2015 WL 1230319,

at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2015) (allowing survival action and wrongful death suit
to continue despite defendants raising PSTCA defense); Maladet, 2019 WL
2435869, at * 14-15 (rejecting PSTCA defense in Ҥ 1983 claims brought through
Pennsylvania’s wrongful death and survival statutes” because the PSTCA has “no

force when applied to suits under the Civil Rights Act.”). And because Plaintiff has
successful plead a Section 1983 claim and plead a negligence claim not subject to
this Motion, Plaintiff’s survival action and wrongful death claims will continue.
F. AMENDMENT WOULD BE FUTILE
“[I]f a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must

permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or
futile.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). All of
Plaintiff’s claims against Moving Defendants will survive except for the official

capacity claims against Warden Berdanier and Elaine Gilbert. Amendment would be
futile towards these claims, so amendment will be denied.
V. CONCLUSION
Schuykill County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and

denied in part. An appropriate Order will issue.
Date: August 31, 2022 BY THE COURT
s/William I. Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10412168. Public record. Not legal advice.