# Lee-Chima v. Hughes

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · July 11, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411927

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 11, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411927

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that prisoner-plaintiff did not have a property interest in his prison job
- explaining that, to assert a cognizable Fifth Amendment claim, defendants must be “federal actors”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KASHEYON LEE-CHIMA, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-2349

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

K. HUGHES, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Kasheyon Lee-Chima, an inmate in state custody who was
formerly confined at the State Correctional Institution in Waymart,
Pennsylvania (SCI Waymart), filed the above-captioned civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.1 Lee-Chima also asserts various state-law
claims. Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
amended complaint. (Doc. 38). For the reasons set forth below, the Court
will Grant in part and Deny in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

1 Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional
wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of
substantive rights; it serves as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise
protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85
(2002).
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
Lee-Chima’s allegations are lengthy and detailed. His claims,

however, revolve around several distinct events that he alleges occurred in
April 2019. First, Lee-Chima avers that on April 4, 2019, he was physically
assaulted by three correctional officers. (Doc. 34 ¶¶ 1, 10-15, 17-18). He

claims that—for no penological reason—defendants K. Hughes and C.O.
McHugh shoved and pinned him against a wall and then repeatedly struck
and punched him all over his body. (Id. ¶¶ 10-15, 17-18). He further alleges
that, at some point during the physical assault, defendant C.O. Van Burren

witnessed the beating, failed to intervene, and then joined in the attack. (Id.
¶¶ 13-15, 17). Additionally, Lee-Chima asserts that Hughes sexually
assaulted him following the physical abuse by “groping/fondling [his]

buttocks.” (Id. ¶ 18).
Lee-Chima contends that he was then wrongfully placed in disciplinary
segregation in the Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU) based on an intentionally
falsified misconduct report. (Id. ¶¶ 19-23). He alleges this misconduct (which

was filed by Hughes and charged Lee-Chima with acting as the aggressor
by attempting to assault Hughes, McHugh, and Van Burren) was fabricated
to cover up the physical assault, (id. ¶ 23), and that he was subsequently

denied procedural due process during the misconduct hearing by defendant
C.J. McKeown, (id. ¶¶ 28-36, 44, 48, 50, 54, 59, 63-64, 70-73, 76-77).
Specifically, Lee-Chima claims that McKeown wrongfully (1) denied his

request to present eyewitness testimony to support his case, and (2) refused
to allow him to review the surveillance video footage from the incident or to
admit that video footage into evidence. (Id. ¶¶ 32-35). Lee-Chima avers that

he was not released from the RHU until July 3, 2019, spending 90 days in
disciplinary segregation for a misconduct he did not commit. (Id. ¶ 76). He
further asserts that, due to this false misconduct and procedurally flawed
hearing process, he was sanctioned to the “termination/removal” of his

prison job and lost wages in the amount of $48.48. (Doc. 34 at 38).2
The final incident that Lee-Chima appears to complain of allegedly
occurred on April 5, 2019. (See Doc. 34 ¶¶ 24-26). He asserts that

correctional officers wrongfully “removed and destroyed” his personal
property (“primarily . . . food”) that he values at $31.12. (Id. ¶ 25; Doc. 34 at
38-39).

2 Lee-Chima’s amended complaint was docketed in a manner where the
pages are out of order and occasionally upside down. Accordingly, when no
paragraph number is given in the amended complaint, the Court will cite to
the handwritten page numbers Lee-Chima provides rather than the
electronically stamped CM/ECF docket page numbers that appear at the top
of the page.
From these three incidents, Lee-Chima attempts to assert a bevy of
federal and state-law claims against the four named Defendants. As best the

Court can ascertain, he brings Section 1983 claims under the Eighth
Amendment for excessive force, failure to protect (or failure to intervene),
and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. (See Doc. 34 at 3, 37).

He also asserts Fourteenth Amendment claims for denial of procedural due
process related to the misconduct proceedings, deprivation of personal
property without due process, and violation of his equal protection rights.
(See id.).3 As for state-law claims, Lee-Chima seems to assert claims

sounding in assault, battery, and false imprisonment. (See id. at 3-4, 37).
Defendants move to dismiss Lee-Chima’s amended complaint in its
entirety. (See Doc. 38). That motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW - MOTION TO DISMISS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

3 Lee-Chima also invokes the Fifth Amendment for some of his due process
claims, but that constitutional provision is reserved for claims involving
federal—not state—actors. See Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789,
800 (3d. Cir. 2001) (explaining that, to assert a cognizable Fifth Amendment
claim, defendants must be “federal actors”); Dunbar v. Barone, 487 F. App’x
721, 725 n.3 (3d Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential) (same).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “accept all factual allegations as true,
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and

determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the
plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,

231 (3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual
allegations are not required, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[L]abels and conclusions” are
not enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and a court “is not bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (citation
omitted).

In resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court must “conduct a two-part
analysis.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. First, it must separate the factual
elements from the legal elements and disregard the legal conclusions. Id. at

210-11. Second, it must “determine whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for
relief.” Id. at 211 (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants take issue with nearly every claim that Lee-Chima asserts

in his amended complaint. The Court, therefore, will assess the sufficiency
of each claim in turn.
A. Eighth Amendment Claims
Lee-Chima alleges Eighth Amendment violations sounding in

excessive force, failure to protect (or failure to intervene), and deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs. Only the last of these claims lacks
sufficient factual allegations.

1. Excessive Force
In a Section 1983 claim for excessive force, the “pivotal inquiry” is
whether “force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Ricks v. Shover,

891 F.3d 468, 480 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641,
649 (3d Cir. 2002)). The factors analyzed when making this inquiry include:
“(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the

need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury
inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as
reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of facts known to

them; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful
response.” Id. (quoting Smith, 293 F.3d at 649).
Defendants do not take issue with any of the elements of Lee-Chima’s

excessive force claim against Hughes, McHugh, and Van Burren. His
allegations of being beaten while restrained and without a penological
purpose clearly satisfy the pleading requirements for stating an excessive
force claim. Instead, Defendants argue that Lee-Chima has failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies with respect to this claim.
The problem with Defendants’ argument is that failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is an affirmative defense rather than a pleading

requirement, and necessarily will require a factual determination that goes
beyond the complaint. See Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 208, 211
(3d Cir. 2018). The Court, therefore, cannot grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on
this basis. Although Defendants are free to raise such an affirmative defense

through a motion for summary judgment, Lee-Chima’s extensive and well-
documented grievance history, (see generally Doc. 34; Doc. 34-1), creates
a formidable barrier to his excessive force claims being decided solely on an

administrative exhaustion basis.
2. Failure to Protect, Failure to Intervene
To establish an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against a

prison official, the inmate must show that “(1) he was incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official was
deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to [the prisoner’s] health and

safety, and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference caused [the prisoner]
harm.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other
grounds by Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020). In this context,
deliberate indifference is a subjective standard; that is, “the prison official-

defendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to
inmate safety.” Id. (quoting Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d
Cir. 2001)). Actual knowledge or awareness of a substantial risk to an

inmate’s safety can be proven “in the usual ways, including inference from
circumstantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).
This Eighth Amendment claim against Van Burren appears to be the
only Section 1983 claim that Defendants leave unchallenged. Nevertheless,

because Lee-Chima uses language in his amended complaint that implicates
a failure-to-intervene claim and argues for its inclusion in his brief in
opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (see Doc. 48 at 10-13), the
Court will address its sufficiency.4

Lee-Chima alleges that Van Burren witnessed Hughes and McHugh
physically assaulting him in a defenseless position but failed to take any
action to intervene. This type of allegation has long been held to state an

Eighth Amendment violation. See Mensinger, 293 F.3d at 650-51 (holding
that “a corrections officer’s failure to intervene in a beating can be the basis
of liability for an Eighth Amendment violation under §1983 if the corrections
officer had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply refused to do

so”). Lee-Chima’s allegations, taken as true, demonstrate that there was
ample opportunity for Van Burren to intervene. Lee-Chima claims that he
was physically assaulted in two different places and that Van Burren

replaced one of the assailants when the assault continued in a new location.
Consequently, Lee-Chima’s failure-to-intervene claim against Van Burren
can proceed.
3. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishments on prisoners. See Farmer v.

4 Lee-Chima’s claim against Van Burren appears to fit better under the rubric
of a “failure-to-intervene” claim, and thus the Court will construe it as such.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In the context of prison medical care,
the Eighth Amendment “requires prison officials to provide basic medical

treatment” to incarcerated individuals. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197
(3d Cir. 1999). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate
indifference regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate

(1) “a serious medical need,” and (2) “acts or omissions by prison officials
that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cnty.
Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). A serious medical need is
“one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one

that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834
F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by
intentional refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed
provision of medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed
medical treatment, and denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting

in unnecessary suffering or risk of injury. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d
64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346). Deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard, requiring a

showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted). Claims sounding in mere medical
negligence will not suffice. Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

Defendants again do not challenge Lee-Chima’s medical deliberate
indifference claim based on its elements. Instead, they argue that Lee-Chima
has failed to allege that any of the named Defendants had any personal

involvement in the purportedly deficient medical care. (See Doc. 39 at 18-
19). Defendants are correct.
It is well established that, for Section 1983 claims, a plaintiff must plead
the requisite personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. See

Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Lee-
Chima does not provide any plausible allegations that Defendants—who are
not medical providers or healthcare administrators—had any involvement in

his medical care or purported lack thereof.
Lee-Chima argues, in his sur-reply, that medical staff failed to timely
treat him “under the direction of Defendants Hughes and McHugh,” and
baldly claims that there was a “conspiracy” by Defendants to cover up the

assault. (Doc. 55 at 19-20). There are two deficiencies with Lee-Chima’s
argument. First, it is well settled that a plaintiff cannot amend his pleadings
through a brief in opposition to a motion to dismiss. See Frederico v. Home

Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v.
PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988)). Second, even if these
assertions appeared in his amended complaint, which they do not, such

conclusory allegations regarding a conspiracy cannot meet the pleading
requirements of Twombly and Iqbal. The Court, therefore, must dismiss Lee-
Chima’s claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Lee-Chima asserts three varieties of alleged Fourteenth Amendment
violations. He claims that his procedural due process rights were infringed
throughout the misconduct proceedings, that he was deprived of his personal

property without due process of law, and that his equal protection rights were
violated. Defendants challenge each claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
1. Procedural Due Process

To plausibly state a Section 1983 claim for infringement of procedural
due process rights, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an
individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him

did not provide ‘due process of law.’” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d
225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d
Cir. 2000)). Notably, “inmates are generally not entitled to procedural due

process in prison disciplinary hearings because the sanctions resulting from
those hearings do not usually affect a protected liberty interest.” Burns v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2011).

Defendants contend that Lee-Chima’s 90-days’ disciplinary
segregation in the RHU does not amount to an “atypical and significant
hardship” such that a liberty interest would be implicated. They further

contend that the process Lee-Chima received satisfies the Fourteenth
Amendment’s requirements in the context of a prison disciplinary
proceeding. The Court need only address Defendants’ first argument.
It has long been held that disciplinary segregation alone generally does

not rise to the level of an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” See Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 484, 486 (1995). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has repeatedly held that disciplinary segregation for periods much
longer than that which Lee-Chima experienced does not rise to the level of
an atypical and significant hardship. See Mensinger, 293 F.3d at 654 (seven
months); Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2002) (135 days);

Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 705-07 (3d Cir. 1997) (fifteen months);
Dunbar, 487 F. App’x at 725 (540 days). Thus, Lee-Chima’s 90-day
placement in the RHU, without more, does not implicate a liberty interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment, so his procedural due process claim must
be dismissed.

That Lee-Chima also lost his prison job does not affect this
determination. There is no independent liberty or property interest in a prison
job arising from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 629, 630 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Burns,
642 F.3d at 171 (explaining that prisoner-plaintiff did not have a property
interest in his prison job). Nor does the loss of prison employment implicate
an atypical and significant hardship such that there would be a deprivation

of a state-created liberty interest. See Presbury v. Wenerowicz, 472 F. App’x
100, 101 (3d Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential). Moreover, the cases upon which
Lee-Chima relies concern revocation of good time credits, a liberty interest

that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment but not implicated in his
case. (See Doc. 48 at 13-15 (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons,
487 F.3d 808 (2007))).
2. Deprivation of Property Without Due Process
Lee-Chima appears to raise a claim that he was deprived of his

personal property by state actors without due process of law.5 Such claims
are cognizable in Section 1983 actions, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
533 (1984), but are difficult to establish. That is primarily because a due

process property-deprivation claim will not lie when “adequate state post-
deprivation remedies are available.” Id. In other words, even if an inmate is
negligently or intentionally deprived of personal property by a state actor,
there is no constitutional violation if the state provides “a meaningful post

deprivation remedy for the loss.” Id. & n.14.
Lee-Chima’s amended complaint is silent as to whether adequate state
post-deprivation remedies exist for the alleged confiscation and destruction

of his personal property, but the Court notes that state tort law likely provides
a remedy for claims like those he is asserting. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§8522(a), (b)(3) (waiving state statutory sovereign immunity for negligent
acts related to the “care, custody or control of personal property in the

5 Defendants attack this claim on the basis that it purports to invoke the
Takings Clause, (see Doc. 39 at 20-21), but the Court finds that a claim of
deprivation of property without due process is a more appropriate fit for Lee-
Chima’s allegations. Lee-Chima, in his surreply, echoes this sentiment. (See
Doc. 55 at 22).
possession or control of Commonwealth parties”); see also Cruz v. SCI-SMR
Dietary Servs., 566 F. App’x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential)

(noting that district court correctly dismissed Fourteenth Amendment due
process property-deprivation claim due to existence of state post-deprivation
remedies). The Third Circuit has also held that the prison grievance process

constitutes an adequate post-deprivation remedy for claims like those
asserted here, even if the plaintiff disagrees with the results. See Tillman v.
Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000).
Consequently, the Court must dismiss Lee-Chima’s Fourteenth Amendment

property deprivation claim, because adequate state post-deprivation
remedies exist for this alleged $31.12 loss, even if Lee-Chima did not avail
himself of those remedies.

3. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. To state a Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection claim, a prisoner must allege “that he was
treated differently than other similarly situated inmates, and that this different
treatment was the result of intentional discrimination based on his

membership in a protected class[.]” Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d
286, 305 (3d Cir. 2016). An equal protection claim can also be asserted
under a “class of one” theory, whereby a plaintiff alleges that a state actor

intentionally treated him differently than others who are similarly situated
“and there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Phillips, 515
F.3d at 243 (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564

(2000)).
Lee-Chima contends that he was discriminated against by Hughes
based on his race and sexual orientation.6 (See Doc. 34 ¶¶ 7, 18). It appears
that he is claiming that the verbal harassment, abuse, and threats from

Hughes on April 4, 2019, constituted the discriminatory conduct to which he
was subjected. (See id. ¶ 8). The problem for Lee-Chima is that verbal
harassment on a single occasion does not implicate a constitutional violation.

See DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Standing alone,
simple verbal harassment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment,
deprive a prisoner of a protected liberty interest or deny a prisoner equal
protection of the laws.”), abrogated on other grounds by Savory v. Cannon,

947 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2020). Moreover, as Defendants point out, Lee-

6 Lee-Chima, however, never identifies his race or sexual orientation in his
amended complaint. In his surreply, he states that he is “Latinx” and
homosexual. (Doc. 55 at 27).
Chima’s amended complaint does not allege that he was treated differently
than other similarly situated prisoners. For these reasons, Lee-Chima’s

equal protection claim must be dismissed.
C. State-Law Claims
Lee-Chima also asserts several state-law intentional torts against

Defendants. Although not well developed, the claims appear to be assault,
battery, and false imprisonment. These claims are barred by state statutory
sovereign immunity.
Commonwealth parties acting within the scope of their employment

generally are immune from suit except when immunity is explicitly waived.
See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. §2310; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§8521, 8522(a).
Pennsylvania’s General Assembly has carved out certain limited exceptions

from its grant of sovereign immunity to Commonwealth actors. See generally
42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§8521, 8522. Section 8522(b) of Title 42 of the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes provides ten narrow categories7 where
the state has waived its sovereign immunity for claims involving negligent

7 The ten exceptions set forth in 42 PA. CONST. STAT. §8522(b) concern: (1)
vehicle liability; (2) medical-professional liability; (3) care, custody or control
of personal property; (4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and
sidewalks; (5) potholes and other dangerous conditions; (6) care, custody or
control of animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8) National Guard activities; (9)
toxoids and vaccines; and (10) sexual abuse.
conduct by Commonwealth parties. See id. §8522(a), (b). This statutory
immunity applies to both negligent and intentional torts committed by

Commonwealth actors. See La Frankie v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992).
Lee-Chima’s claims against Defendants—who are state actors and

were working for the Commonwealth when the alleged incidents occurred—
do not fall into any of the enumerated exceptions provided by Section
8522(b). Accordingly, his state-law claims of assault, battery, and false
imprisonment are barred by state statutory sovereign immunity.

D. Official Capacity Claims
Finally, although not addressed by Defendants, Lee-Chima’s claims
against Defendants in their official capacities, (see Doc. 34 at 6), must be

dismissed because they are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (mandating that “the court shall
dismiss” a case at any time if the court determines that it “fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted”).

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents
federal courts from entertaining lawsuits—by United States citizens or
citizens of foreign states—brought against a state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI;

Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1997); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). This immunity from private suit extends to
state agencies as well as state officials acting in their official capacity,

because such lawsuits are essentially civil actions “against the State itself.”
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). States may waive
this immunity if they choose, but Pennsylvania has explicitly not waived its

immunity with respect to claims brought under Section 1983. See 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. §8521(b); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d
Cir. 2020); Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 & n.5 (3d
Cir. 2010) (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §8521(b)). There are two exceptions to

the Eleventh Amendment’s bar to private suits against nonconsenting states:
(1) “Congress may abrogate a state’s immunity” and (2) “parties may sue
state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief.” Wheeling &

Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998)
(citing, inter alia, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
Lee-Chima does seek injunctive relief in his amended complaint, (see
Doc. 34 at 40-41), but he either requests retroactive injunctive relief or

injunctive relief that does not involve remediation of violations of federal law.
Lee-Chima seeks expungement of the misconduct from his record and a
lowering of his custody level, which is retroactive injunctive relief. He also

seeks “immediate release on Parole” and an order that Defendants begin
paying damages within 30 days of successful resolution of his claims. (See
id. at 41). Such remedies are not the type of prospective injunctive relief

contemplated for official capacity claims against state officers. Rather, to
meet the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity, the injunctive relief sought must be “to remedy an ongoing violation

of federal law.” M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 344
F.3d 335, 345 (3d Cir. 2003).8

V. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a pro se civil rights complaint is
vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief, the district court
must permit a curative amendment unless granting leave to amend would be

inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d
Cir. 2002).
Here, it is clear from the facts alleged in the amended complaint that
any further attempt to amend would be futile as to the following claims:

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process; Fourteenth Amendment

8 The Court additionally notes that, as to Lee-Chima’s request for “immediate
release” on parole, such a request sounds in habeas corpus rather than a
Section 1983 remedy.
deprivation of property without due process of law; state-law intentional torts
of assault, battery, and false imprisonment; and the official capacity claims

against all Defendants. Thus, the Court will dismiss these claims with
prejudice.
If able, Lee-Chima will be granted leave to amend his claims of Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection. If Lee-Chima chooses to file a second
amended complaint in conformity with this Memorandum, it should be a
stand-alone document, complete in itself and without reference to any

previous pleadings. The complaint should set forth all Lee-Chima’s claims
(except those dismissed with prejudice) in short, concise, and plain
statements, and in sequentially numbered paragraphs. It should, among

other things, name proper defendants, specify the offending actions taken
by a particular defendant, be signed, and indicate the nature of the relief
sought.
If Lee-Chima chooses not to amend his pleadings a second time, his

case will proceed on the following claims: (1) Eighth Amendment excessive
force against Hughes, McHugh, and Van Burren in their individual capacities;
and (2) Eighth Amendment failure-to-intervene against Van Burren in her

individual capacity.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will Grant in part and Deny

in part Defendants’ motion (Doc. 38) to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court will also dismiss with prejudice Lee-
Chima’s official capacity claims against all Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Leave to amend will be granted,
albeit in a limited fashion. A separate Order shall issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge

DATE: July 11, 2022
20-2349-01

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411927. Public record. Not legal advice.