# Brown v. City of Shamokin Police Department

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · July 5, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411917

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 5, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CAROL BROWN,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:21-CV-01992
Plaintiff,

v. (MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

CITY OF SHAMOKIN POLICE
DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

CAROL BROWN,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:22-CV-00207

v.
(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)
SHAMOKIN POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court are two related cases that arose out of a series of events
pertaining to pro se Plaintiff Carol Brown’s (“Brown”) interactions with Defendant Shamokin
Police Department. Brown v. City of Shamokin Police Dept., No. 4:21-CV-01992 (M.D. Pa. Oct.
28, 2021), ECF No. 2 (“Brown 1”); Brown v. Shamokin Police Dept., No. 4:22-CV-00270 (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 11, 2022), ECF No. 1 (“Brown 2”). Both the above-captioned cases are before the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. For the following reasons, the above-captioned
cases shall be consolidated into Civil Action No. 4:21-CV-01992. Additionally, having
conducted the statutorily mandated screening of Brown’s complaint filed in Brown 2 (“Brown
2 complaint”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court finds that the Brown 2
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Brown 2 Doc. 1).
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The above-captioned cases arose out of a series of events pertaining to a noise

complaint at Brown’s home. (Brown 1 Doc. 2, at 5; Brown 2 Doc. 1, at 1-2). Brown alleges that
Shamokin Police department failed to respond to her calls, but responded to calls made by
her neighbors. (Brown 1 Doc. 2, at 5; Brown 2 Doc. 1, at 1-2). On October 28, 2021, Brown
initiated Brown 1 with the filing of a complaint against the City of Shamokin Police
Department and request to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York. (Brown 1 Doc. 1; Brown 1 Doc. 2). On December 6, 2021,
Brown 1 was electronically transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. (Brown 1 Doc. 4). On December 16, 2021, the Court granted Brown’s

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and found that her complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. (Brown 1 Doc. 6; Brown 1 Doc. 7, at 9). The Court ordered
Brown to file an amended complaint on or before January 15, 2022. (Brown 1 Doc. 7, at 9).
After failing to timely file her amended complaint, on February 7, 2022, the Court ordered
Brown to show cause as to why she failed to file an amended complaint or, alternatively, file
an amended complaint by February 24, 2022. (Brown 1 Doc. 9, at 2). On February 11, 2022,
Brown initiated Brown 2 with the filing of the Brown 2 complaint against Shamokin Police
Department and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.1 (Brown 2 Doc. 1; Brown 2
Doc. 2).
II. DISCUSSION
A. SUA SPONTE CONSOLIDATION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 provides that a court may consolidate actions

arising out of a common question of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). To facilitate the
administration of justice, district courts are afforded broad power to consolidate actions,
whether on motion of a party or sua sponte. Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc.,
339 F.2d 673, 675 (3d Cir.1964). In considering consolidation, “the court must balance the
savings of time and effort gained through consolidation against the prejudice, inconvenience,
or expense that it might cause.” Demchak Partners Ltd. P'ship v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC.,
No. 13-2289, 2014 WL 4955259, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Sept.30, 2014).
“[A] threshold requirement for consolidation is whether there exists a common
question of law or fact.” Russell v. United States, No. 1:12-CV-0407, 2012 WL 2792239, at *2

(M.D. Pa. July 9, 2012) (citing In re Consol. Parlodel Litig., 182 F.R.D. 441, 444 (D.N.J. 1998)).
The decision to consolidate cases with common issues of fact or law is still within the
discretion of the court so long as “consolidation would facilitate the administration of justice.”
See Russell, 2012 WL 2792239, at *2 (quoting Waste Distillation Tech., Inc. v. Pan Am. Res., Inc.,
775 F. Supp. 759, 761 (D. Del. 1991)); see also Gambino v. Warden, FCI-Schuylkill, No. 19-0249,
2019 WL 2005627, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2019). “[T]he court must balance the saving of

1 As the above captioned cases shall be consolidated into Brown 1, and the Court
granted Brown’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed in Brown 1 on December
16, 2021, the Court will strike Brown’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed in
Brown 2 as MOOT. (Brown 1 Doc. 6; Brown 2 Doc. 2).
time and effort gained through consolidation against the prejudice, inconvenience, or expense
that it might cause.” Gambino, 2019 WL 2005627, at *1; see also Mincy v. Chimielewski, No.
1:05-cv-0292, 2006 WL 1997457, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 2006) (citing Bernardi v. City of
Scranton, 101 F.R.D. 411, 413 (M.D. Pa. 1983)); Russell, 2012 WL 2792239, at *2.

These two actions involve parallel facts and parties, are presided over by the same
Judge, and are in similar procedural postures. (Brown 1; Brown 2). The cases rely upon
identical theories of recovery based on “misconduct [and] discrimination” arising out of
Brown’s interactions with the Shamokin Police Department and their alleged disparate
treatment of her compared to her neighbors. (Brown 1 Doc. 2, at 2, 5; Brown 2 Doc. 1, at 1-2).
In addition, the ultimate disposition of both cases will likely involve the same legal principles
as they allege the same causes of action. (Brown 1 Doc. 2, at 2; Brown 2 Doc. 1, at 1). The two
actions involve the same plaintiff, who proceeds pro se, and the same defendant. (Brown 1 Doc.
2, at 3-4; Brown 2 Doc. 1, at 1). Additionally, both cases are currently assigned to Chief

Magistrate Judge Mehalchick. (Brown 1; Brown 2); see Averhart v. Comm. Workers of Am., 688 F.
App’x, 158, 161 (3d Cir. 2017). Finally, the two cases are in similar procedural postures as a
complaint has been filed in both cases but has not yet been served and both complaints fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See infra; (Brown 1 Doc. 2; Brown 1 Doc. 7, at
9; Brown 2 Doc. 1); see Galicki v. New Jersey, No. 14-1319(WHW)(CLW), 2014 WL 4105441,
at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2014) (consolidating two cases “given that both actions are still in their
relative infancy and have nearly identical procedural postures”).
Due to the multitude of similarities between the cases, the parties would not be
prejudiced, inconvenienced, or forced to incur unnecessary expense if the cases were

consolidated. See Gambino, 2019 WL 2005627, at *1. Additionally, the Court would save time
and effort in deciding the substantially similar cases as one. See Gambino, 2019 WL 2005627,
at *1. Thus, the factors balance in favor of the consolidation of the two cases. See Averhart,
688 F. App’x, at 161 (determining that cases were “consolidated into one action by the
District Court” when they “proceeded in the same forum and in front of the same judge; the

plaintiff represented himself in both cases; and there was a great deal of overlap in the
defendants and claims”).
The Court is satisfied that the above-captioned actions share common questions of law
and fact, and that consolidation would facilitate the efficient administration of justice. The
Court concludes that judicial economy is best served by litigating these actions together.
Accordingly, the Court orders that the cases be consolidated for all purposes.
B. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2)(B)(II) REVIEW OF THE BROWN 2 COMPLAINT
1. Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court is statutorily required to review the
complaint of a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis prior to service of process. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); see generally Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587–89 (W.D.
Pa. 2008) (summarizing prisoner litigation screening procedures and standards). In
performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard
applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move
to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first
take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions
which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the
complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal
claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well

as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court
may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should
“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff
must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal
conclusions’ . . . .” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need the
court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. St. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to
a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals
Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in
the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d
1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for

which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v.
President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading
requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded
complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right
to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a
cause of action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt,

839 F.3d at 347 (citing Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule
8(a) requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally
construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully
pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”
and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed
that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must
permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson
v. Mayview St. Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

2. Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 8
At the onset, the Shamokin Police Department is not a “person” for purposes of §
1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (Brown 2 Doc. 1, at 1). It is well-settled that “[s]ection 1983
imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives
another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005).
Section 1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for
the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” Shuman, 422 F.3d at 146. To
establish a claim under § 1983, Brown must establish a deprivation of a federally protected
right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

Woloszyn v. Cty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
In Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that local
governments are “persons” and are subject to suit under § 1983. Following Monell, courts have
concluded that a police department is a sub-unit of the local government and, as such, is
merely a vehicle through which the municipality fulfills its policing functions. See e.g., Johnson
v. City of Erie, Pa., 834 F. Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D. Pa. 1993). Thus, while a municipality may
be liable under § 1983, a police department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not.
See e.g., Terrell v. City of Harrisburg Police Dept., 549 F. Supp. 2d 671, 686 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (“It

is well-settled that police departments operated by municipalities are not ‘persons’ amenable
to suit under § 1983”); Holland v. Pocono Regional Police Dept., No. 3:13-CV-1406, 2013 WL
3973080, at *13 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013) (citing cases holding that a police department is not
a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and, therefore, is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action),
report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 3973080, at *1; Golya v. Golya, No. 3:05-CV-0100,

2007 WL 2301085, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2007). Following this authority, the Shamokin
Police Department is not a proper defendant in this action.
To the extent that Brown intended to name the City of Shamokin itself as a defendant,
the complaint nevertheless fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A
municipality cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory
of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. To state a claim against a municipality, the
plaintiff must allege that the violation of his rights was caused either by a policy or custom of
the municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Berg v. City of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir.
2000). This custom must be so “widespread as to have the force of law.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs

of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). A plaintiff must further “allege that a ‘policy
or custom’ of [the defendant] was the ‘moving force’ behind the [constitutional] violation.
Grayson, 293 F.3d at 107 (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 404). Here, Brown has claimed that police
officers failed to address her complaints but responded to her neighbors’ complaints regarding
her radio and possession of a knife. (Brown 2 Doc. 1, at 1-2). To satisfy the “moving force”
requirement, Brown must allege that the City of Shamokin, based on a policy or custom,
deliberately violated her constitutional rights. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 107. Brown fails to allege
any facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that a policy or custom resulted in a
violation of her constitutional rights.

Additionally, the Brown 2 complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Brown 2 Doc. 1). A complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
“Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1); Scibelli v.
Lebanon Cty., 219 F. App’x 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Dismissal under Rule 8 is proper when a

complaint “le[aves] the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed
constituted [a cause of action].” Binsack v. Lackawanna Cty. Prison, 438 F. App’x 158, 160 (3d
Cir. 2011).
While the undersigned must construe the complaint liberally due to Brown’s status as
a pro se litigant, the Brown 2 complaint fails to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8.
(Brown 2 Doc. 1). Although Brown outlines a set of facts, it is unclear what constitutional
rights she is attempting to invoke. (Brown 2 Doc. 1, at 1-2). Additionally, the facts alleged are
unclear and do not provide a factual storyline, nor are there any cognizable corresponding
legal arguments. (Brown 2 Doc. 1, at 1-2). The Brown 2 complaint does not provide “concise

and direct” allegations sufficient to surmise how Defendant Shamokin Police Department’s
actions infringed upon Brown’s rights. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1); Scibelli, 219 F. App’x at
222. Brown must assert a claim sufficient enough to “give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
factual allegations presented in the Brown 2 complaint lack a specific connection to an alleged
wrongdoing and are not sufficient to provide the Defendant with knowledge as to the charges
against it. (Brown 2 Doc. 1, at 1-2).
Overall, the Shamokin Police Department is not a proper defendant in this action and
the Brown 2 complaint does not provide any meaningful opportunity for the Defendant to

decipher or answer Brown’s allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Because Brown alleges
unclear information and does not provide clear claims, it is arduous to discern what she is
asserting. (Brown 2 Doc. 1, at 1-2). Brown must adhere to Rule 8 by limiting her complaint to
concise allegations of specific conduct that she believes violated her constitutional rights. See
Scibelli, 219 F. App’x 221 at 222.

III. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure
to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment
would be inequitable or futile. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. Further, “[a] district court has
‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend.’” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales
Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 564 F. App'x 672, 673 (3d Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting
Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Keeping in mind that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed” the Court
will grant Brown leave to file an amended complaint in an effort to allow her to bring a federal

cause of action. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. Brown must “file a single,
unified, legible complaint setting forth factual allegations and legal claims [against the proper
defendants] in a manner that could be reviewed by the Court and, if necessary, answered by
the Defendants.” See Himchak v. Dye, No. 1:14-CV-2394, 2016 WL 1743056, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
Apr. 68, 2016). The amended complaint must consist of concise and direct statements alleging
which civil rights were violated, and the specific acts that established each violation. Mere
speculation is insufficient. Brown is advised to follow each claim with a corresponding good-
faith request for relief. The “amended complaint must be complete in all respects. It must be
a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the

complaint already filed.” Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. The above-captioned cases are consolidated for all purposes;
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to consolidate the case docketed as Civil Action No.
4:22-CV-00207 into the case docketed as Civil Action No. 4:21-CV-01992;

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE the case docketed as Civil Action No.
4:22-CV-00270;

4. All future documents filed in this consolidated case shall be filed as Civil Action
No. 4:21-CV-01992;

5. The Court grants Brown leave to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days
from the date of the Order filed concurrently with this Memorandum, on or before
Monday, August 1, 2022; and

6. Brown’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is STRUCK as MOOT.
(Brown 2 Doc. 2).

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: July 5, 2022 BY THE COURT:
s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411917. Public record. Not legal advice.
