# Carter, III v. Klemm

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · May 2, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411682

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 2, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411682

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that prisoners are not a suspect class
- holding that while states may not be held liable for money damages under RLUIPA, municipalities and counties may

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HAROLD SANFORD CARTER III, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-1923
:
Plaintiff : (Judge Conner)
:
v. :
:
ULLI KLEMM, DARRELL WIREMAN, :
JILL J. SPYKER, :
:
Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Harold Sanford Carter III (“Carter”) commenced this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was denied the right to practice his
religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). (Doc. 1). The sole
remaining defendant is Darrell Wireman, former Chaplaincy Program Director
at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania (“SCI-
Huntingdon”). Defendant Wireman moves for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. 32). We will grant defendant’s motion
and enter judgment in his favor.
I. Factual Background & Procedural History1
The claims giving rise to this action stem from Carter’s incarceration at SCI-
Huntingdon.2 (Doc. 34 ¶ 1). Named as defendants were Ulli Klemm, Jill Spyker,

and Darrell Wireman. (Id. ¶ 2). Defendants previously filed a partial motion to
dismiss based on lack of sufficient personal involvement and failure to state a claim
with respect to all claims related to participation in a Wiccan study group, access to
Wiccan foundational texts, access to a quartz crystal and a Thor’s hammer, and
access to Wiccan broadcast video. (Id. ¶ 3). On August 25, 2021, the motion was
granted, the forementioned claims were dismissed, and defendants Klemm and

Spyker were dismissed from this action. (Id.)
On October 12, 2021, defendant Wireman filed an answer to the complaint.
(Id. ¶ 4). Carter alleges that defendant Wireman violated his right to practice his

1 Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise
statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving
party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1.
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of
material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving
party’s statement and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. Unless otherwise
noted, the factual background herein derives from defendant’s Rule 56.1 statement
of material facts. (Doc. 34). Carter did not file a response to defendant’s statement
of material facts. The court accordingly deems the facts set forth by defendant
Wireman to be undisputed. See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1; see also Doc. 36 ¶ 2
(advising Carter that failure to file a responsive statement of material facts would
result in the facts set forth in defendant’s statement of material facts being deemed
admitted).

2 Carter is no longer incarcerated. (See Doc. 26).
Wicca religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and RLUIPA.
(Id. ¶ 5). For relief, Carter seeks monetary damages. (Id. ¶ 6).

On August 13, 2018, Carter submitted a Religious Accommodation Request
seeking “apples, pears, pork, and ginger tea[] to celebrate my wiccan sabbat [sic] of
Yule on December 21st (Holy day feast).” (Id. ¶ 10). Defendant Wireman
interviewed Carter with respect to this accommodation request. (Id. ¶ 11). On
September 24, 2018, defendant Wireman completed a Religious Accommodation
Evaluation Form wherein it was recommended that Carter’s request be denied
based on security reasons and the lack of an organized Pagan group at SCI-

Huntingdon. (Id. ¶ 12). Pursuant to DC-ADM 819 (Religious Activities Procedures
Manual), Carter’s accommodation request was reviewed by the Religious
Accommodation Review Committee (“RARC”) on December 3, 2018. (Id. ¶ 13). The
RARC upheld the recommended denial of Carter’s accommodation request because
there was no Pagan-Wiccan group meeting at SCI-Huntingdon at that time, as
required by Department policy for the observance of religious holy day feasts. (Id. ¶
14). However, by way of accommodation, Carter was advised that the Department

ensures that pork is served in December to coincide with Yule. (Id. ¶ 15). He was
further advised that he could take fresh fruit from mainline meals to celebrate Yule
in his cell. (Id.) Carter was also informed that he may purchase tea from the
commissary or request that the commissary consider adding ginger tea to the list of
available items. (Id. ¶ 16).
In 2018, Food Service Departments statewide were to ensure that one of the
two times that pork was served to the inmate population during the month of

December coincided with Yule, namely on December 21, 2018. (Id. ¶ 17). Pork and
an apple were to be served on December 21 via a menu swap with December 22nd.
(Id. ¶ 18). SCI-Huntingdon ultimately served pork and an apple to coincide with
Yule on December 22, 2018. (Id. ¶ 19). Jewish inmates observed Hanukkah in 2018,
as there was an established Jewish group meeting; however, all of the religious
foods they requested were not accommodated. (Id. ¶ 20).
Defendant Wireman now moves for summary judgment. (Docs. 32, 33).

Carter failed to respond to defendant’s motion and the time for responding has now
passed.3 Therefore, the motion is deemed unopposed and ripe for resolution.
II. Legal Standard
Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that do
not present a “genuine issue as to any material fact” and for which a jury trial
would be an empty and unnecessary formality. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The
burden of proof is upon the non-moving party to come forth with “affirmative

evidence, beyond the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief.
Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F.Supp.2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); FED. R. CIV. P.
56(e); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). This evidence

3 Carter was directed to file a brief in opposition to defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and was admonished that failure to file an opposition brief
would result in defendant’s motion being deemed unopposed. (Doc. 36 (citing M.D.
PA. LOCAL RULE OF COURT 7.6)).
must be adequate, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the non-
moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-57 (1986);

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986); see
also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), (e). Only if this threshold is met may the cause of action
proceed. Pappas, 331 F.Supp.2d at 315.
III. Discussion
A. Constitutional Claims
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers private citizens a
cause of action for violations of federal law by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . .

Id.; see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95
F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
“the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects a state actor who has committed
a constitutional violation if the plaintiff’s rights were not “clearly established” when
the individual acted. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244-45 (2009). “Qualified
immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials

from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.” Id. at 231. “Thus, so long as an official reasonably believes that his
conduct complies with the law, qualified immunity will shield that official from
liability.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Pearson, 555
U.S. at 244). The burden to establish qualified immunity rests with the defendant
claiming its protection. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 142 n.15 (3d Cir.
2001).

A qualified immunity determination involves a two-pronged inquiry: (1)
whether a constitutional or federal right has been violated; and (2) whether that
right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (permitting

federal courts to exercise discretion in deciding which of the two Saucier prongs
should be addressed first). In addressing Carter’s First and Fourteenth
Amendment claims, we only reach the first prong of the qualified immunity
analysis.
1. First Amendment
Carter challenges a policy at SCI-Huntingdon as being violative of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The First Amendment provides, inter

alia, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ” U.S. CONST. amend. 1. It offers
protection for a wide variety of expressive activities, which are lessened, but not
extinguished, in the prison context, where legitimate penological interests must be

considered in assessing the constitutionality of official conduct. Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Although prisoners must be afforded “reasonable
opportunities” to exercise the religious freedoms guaranteed by the First
Amendment, see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972), imprisonment
necessarily results in restrictions on some constitutional rights, including the First
Amendment right to the free exercise of religion, see O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342, 348-49 (1987). Only beliefs which are both sincerely held and religious in

nature are entitled to constitutional protection. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215-19 (1972); Dehart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Africa v.
Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (3d Cir. 1981) (identifying three indicia of
religion as (1) attempting to address “fundamental and ultimate questions having to
do with deep and imponderable matters,” (2) being “comprehensive in nature,”
consisting of a “belief system” rather than “isolated teachings,” and (3) recognizing
the “presence of certain formal and external signs” such as the clergy and

observance of holidays). Defendant does not appear to dispute that Carter’s
sincerely held religious beliefs are entitled to constitutional protection.
Once it is established that the individual has a belief that is “both sincerely
held and religious in nature,” the United States Supreme Court’s Turner v. Safley
test must be applied to determine whether the curtailment at issue is reasonably
related to penological interests. DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51. “[Turner] directs courts to
assess the overall reasonableness of such regulations by weighing four factors.
‘First, there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation

and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it,’ and this
connection must not be ‘so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.’
Second, a court must consider whether inmates retain alternative means of
exercising the circumscribed right. Third, a court must take into account the costs
that accommodating the right would impose on other inmates, guards, and prison
resources generally. And fourth, a court must consider whether there are
alternatives to the regulation that ‘fully accommodate[ ] the prisoner’s rights at de

minimis cost to valid penological interests.’” DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51, quoting
Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).
“The objective is to determine whether the regulation is reasonable given the
prison administrators’ penological concerns and the inmate’s interest in engaging
in the constitutionally protected activity.” Id. at 59.
The most important prong of the Turner analysis requires a rational
connection between the policy and the legitimate governmental interest that

justifies it. Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 372 (3d Cir. 2003). “According to Turner,
a regulation will be sustained unless ‘the logical connection between the regulation
and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.’”
Id., citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. “‘[T]he burden is not on the state to prove the
validity of the challenged prison regulation but instead is on the inmate to disprove
it.” Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2003).
With respect to the first Turner factor, defendant contends that the policy of
which Carter complains is rationally related to legitimate penological goals. As set

forth in the statement of material facts, supra, the policy is in place for reasons
which are rationally related to valid legitimate correctional interests such as
security concerns and the lack of an organized Wiccan-Pagan group at SCI-
Huntingdon. (Doc. 34 ¶¶ 12-14). This uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that
the policy and practices challenged by Carter are rationally related to valid
legitimate penological interests. The first Turner factor weighs in favor of
defendant.

As to the second factor, it is undisputed that SCI-Huntingdon timely
provided Carter with a Yule compliant meal by ensuring that pork and an apple
were served, providing fresh fruit in the mainline meals, and offering tea from the
commissary, and that SCI-Huntingdon permitted prayer in Carter’s cell. (Doc. 34 ¶¶
15-19). Carter does not dispute that SCI-Huntingdon provided him with these
opportunities to practice his religion. (See Doc. 35-3 at 6). The second Turner also
factor weighs in favor of defendant. See Williams, 343 F.3d at 219.

With respect to the third factor, defendant has articulated the impact that
accommodation of Carter’s requests, beyond the accommodations already in place,
would have on prison guards, other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources generally. (Doc. 33 at 8-9; Doc. 34 ¶ 12). Specifically, accommodating
Carter’s special requests would foster favoritism and result in increased prison
costs. This factor weighs in favor of defendant Wireman.
Finally, “the [fourth factor] inquiry is whether there are alternatives that
would impose only ‘de minimis cost to valid penological interests.’” Fraise v.

Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 520 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 91). The
record demonstrates that SCI-Huntingdon provides religious accommodations to its
inmates. It also shows that additional alternatives cannot be provided at a de
minimis cost, monetary, or otherwise. There is evidence that providing a specific
Yule feast would increase costs and would jeopardize staff and inmate security and
the orderly administration and operation of the prison.
The party adverse to summary judgment must raise “more than a mere

scintilla of evidence in its favor” in order to overcome a summary judgment motion
and cannot survive by relying on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or
mere suspicions. Williams, 891 F.2d at 460. Carter has wholly failed to meet this
burden in that he neglected to oppose defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Despite his failure to oppose the motion, it is clear on the record that SCI-
Huntingdon took Carter’s request for religious accommodation seriously and made
a good faith effort to accommodate Carter’s rights within the constraints of

appropriate and reasonable institutional security concerns. Defendant Wireman is
therefore entitled to an entry of summary judgment on Carter’s First Amendment
claim. Because Carter failed to establish a First Amendment violation, defendant
Wireman is entitled to qualified immunity.
2. Fourteenth Amendment
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that
no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws,” which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
Thus, to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must allege
that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; and (b) he was treated differently from
similarly situated inmates. See id. Where the plaintiff does not claim membership
in a protected class, he must allege arbitrary and intentional discrimination to state
an equal protection claim. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564

(2000). The plaintiff must state facts showing that: “(1) the defendant treated him
differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and
(3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Hill v. Borough of
Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006). Prison inmates are not members of a
protected class. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001)
(stating that prisoners are not a suspect class).
Carter asserts that members of other religious groups, specifically Jewish

inmates, were provided certain food items during Hanukkah in 2018. This claim
without merit. Any inmate seeking an accommodation must follow the procedures
set forth in DC-ADM 819. (Doc. 34 ¶ 13). Carter’s request received the same
method of review and evaluation by the prison staff and the RARC. Carter’s
affiliation with a particular faith group was not the reason for the denial of his
requests. Rather, the denial was based on security reasons and the lack of an
established Pagan-Wiccan group meeting at SCI-Huntingdon, as required by
Department policy. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 14). Further, the uncontroverted evidence

establishes that while Jewish inmates were permitted to celebrate Hanukkah in
2018, because there was an established group meeting, their specific religious foods
were not accommodated. (Doc. 34 ¶ 20; Doc. 35-4 at 2). Accordingly, the court will
grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Carter’s
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim.
B. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of

2000 (“RLUIPA”) provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o government shall impose a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to
an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,”
unless the government establishes that the burden furthers “a compelling interest,”
and does so by the “least restrictive means.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). RLUIPA
defines “religious exercise” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A);

see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005). Although Congress intended
that RLUIPA be construed “in favor of broad protection of religious exercise,” see
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g), Congress also “anticipated that courts would apply the Act’s
standard with ‘due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail
administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain
good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and
limited resources.’” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723. Congress indicated that in the event an
inmate’s request for religious accommodation would “become excessive, impose

unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the effective
functioning of an institution, the facility would be free to resist the imposition.” Id.
at 726.
1. Monetary Damages
a. Individual Liability
Carter cannot recover monetary damages against defendant Wireman in his
individual capacity under RLUIPA. It is well-settled that RLUIPA does not permit

an action for damages of any sort against state officials in their individual
capacities. See Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2012). Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment will be granted in this regard.
b. Official Capacity
Conversely, Carter can proceed against defendant Wireman in his official
capacity. See Kelley Bey v. Keen, No. 13-CV-1942, 2014 WL 3563475, at *13 (M.D.
Pa. July 17, 2014) (holding that official capacity RLUIPA claims against county

officials was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment which only applies to states
(citing Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, Miss., 697 F.3d 279, 289-90 (5th
Cir. 2012) (holding that while states may not be held liable for money damages
under RLUIPA, municipalities and counties may)).
Under RLUIPA, the plaintiff must show that his religious exercise has been
burdened substantially by the challenged conduct. Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d
272, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2007). “[A] substantial burden exists where: (1) a follower is
forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting

benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one of
the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; or (2) the government puts
substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior to violate
his beliefs.” Id. at 280. The plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that a
prison institution’s policy or official practice has substantially burdened the
inmate’s religious practice. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 360 (2015). If the plaintiff
shows that prison administrators’ actions or inactions have imposed a substantial

burden on the exercise of his religion, the burden shifts to the prison administrator
to establish that the challenged conduct furthers a compelling governmental
interest and that it is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Id. at
362.
The initial burden falls on Carter to demonstrate that SCI-Huntingdon’s
policy has substantially burdened the practice of his religion. As set forth above,
Carter has failed to establish any substantial or undue burden on his exercise of

religious beliefs. Moreover, Carter has failed to oppose defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, and he presents nothing beyond the mere allegata of his
pleadings. Nor can we discern any such burden from the record before us. Carter
was able to pray and conduct religious rituals in his cell and was provided a Yule
compliant meal. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of defendant Wireman is
appropriate.
IV. Conclusion

We will grant defendant’s motion (Doc. 32) for summary judgment in its
entirety. An appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: May 2, 2022

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411682. Public record. Not legal advice.