# Yentzer v. Potter County

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · March 28, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411528

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 28, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411528

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- describing contours of single-incident liability

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CODY YENTZER, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-1579
:
Plaintiff : (Judge Conner)
:
v. :
:
POTTER COUNTY, et al., :
:
Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Cody Yentzer commenced the above-captioned action alleging
defendants violated his civil rights during his incarceration at Potter County Jail in
June 2019. Before the court are Yentzer’s complaint, defendants’ motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint, the report of Chief Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick, and
several defense objections to that report.
I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Yentzer was incarcerated at Potter County Jail in June 2019. (See Doc. 1
¶ 10). According to the complaint, during the week of June 23, 2019, defendant
corrections officer Josh Rosenwie advised Yentzer that fellow inmate Zackary
Snyder “posed a threat to” Yentzer and that Rosenwie would not allow Yentzer and
Snyder to be in the visitation room at the same time. (See id. ¶ 11). Yentzer alleges
defendants Glenn C. Drake II and Angela Milford, the warden and deputy warden
of Potter County Jail, respectively, “were aware of the threat of violence made to
[Yentzer] by inmate Snyder and aware of compelling reasons as to why inmate
Snyder wanted to harm [Yentzer].” (See id. ¶ 12).
Yentzer alleges he was placed in the visitation room with Snyder on
June 30, 2019. (See id. ¶ 13). Yentzer raised concerns “about being placed in the

room with Snyder in light of the known threat,” but defendant correctional officer
Martin nonetheless allowed the two inmates to be in the visitation room together,
unsupervised and without a correctional officer present. (See id. ¶¶ 13-14). Snyder
directed other inmates to block the camera and door before proceeding to punch
Yentzer in the face. (See id. ¶ 15). Martin removed Snyder from the room after
the attack. (See id. ¶ 16). Yentzer suffered injuries to his face, nose, and lip—

specifically, “a swollen lip and nose bleed”—as a result of the attack. (See id. ¶¶ 17-
18). Yentzer visited with his mother after the incident, who alerted defendant
correctional officer Fry to Yentzer’s injuries and requested an ice pack. (See id.
¶ 18).
After the incident with Snyder, Yentzer returned to the general cell block.
(See id. ¶ 19). A different inmate, Skyler Shaffer, known to be a friend of Snyder,
“verbally attacked and physically threatened” Yentzer. (Id.) Correctional officer

Rosenwie witnessed the incident and ordered Shaffer to return to his cell, but did
not lock the cell door. (See id. ¶¶ 19-20). Rosenwie then left the block. (Id. ¶ 21).
Shaffer promptly exited his cell, resumed his verbal threats, and “physically
assaulted” Yentzer, causing Yentzer to temporarily lose consciousness and
suffer “severe injuries” to his head and face. (See id. ¶¶ 21-23). Yentzer alleges
correctional officer Fry was in the control room and was responsible for watching
cameras on the block at the time of the assault, but that no jail staff—correctional or
medical—intervened to stop the attack or provide medical assistance. (See id.
¶¶ 24-25).

Yentzer regained consciousness and returned to his cell. (See id. ¶ 26). He
encountered correctional officer Rosenwie, who noted his injuries and asked what
happened. (See id. ¶ 27). Yentzer alleges he was “removed to another area of the
prison but was not seen by any medical personnel,” he was not provided pain
medication, no ambulance was called, and he was instead required to wait for a
replacement officer to arrive before correctional officer Martin transported him to

the hospital. (See id. ¶¶ 28-31).
Yentzer commenced this action in September 2020, naming Drake, Milford,
Rosenwie, Martin, Fry, and Potter County as defendants. The complaint asserts
two claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: failure to protect from attack (Count I) and
denial of adequate medical care (Count II). Defendants moved to dismiss both
counts, and Judge Mehalchick issued a report recommending that we grant in part
and deny in part defendants’ motion. Defendants have lodged objections to the

report, to which Yentzer did not respond. See M.D. PA. L.R. 72.3.
II. Legal Standards
A. Review of a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
When a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,
the district court undertakes de novo review of the contested portions of the report.
See E.E.O.C. v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 99 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). We afford “reasoned consideration” to
any uncontested portions of the report before adopting them as the decision of the
court. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d at 100 (quoting Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d

874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987)).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the
dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings,
Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court conducts
a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130-31
(3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a
claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal
conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual
allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a “plausible claim

for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts “that allow[]
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. Discussion
Defendants’ motion raises a constellation of challenges to Yentzer’s

complaint. Defendants argue that Yentzer fails to state a claim against any
defendant, that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and
that Potter County is immune from Yentzer’s request for punitive damages. Judge
Mehalchick recommends we grant defendants’ motion to the extent Yentzer seeks
punitive damages against Potter County or the individual defendants sued in their
official capacities. Judge Mehalchick further recommends we grant the motion as
to Yentzer’s failure-to-protect claim against Martin and Fry regarding the Shaffer

incident, with leave to amend. Judge Mehalchick opines the complaint otherwise
adequately pleads the remaining claims—viz., a failure-to-protect claim regarding
the Snyder incident against all individual defendants; a failure-to-protect claim
regarding the Shaffer incident against all individual defendants except Martin and
Fry; a claim for denial of adequate medical care against all individual defendants;
and a municipal liability claim against Potter County regarding all three alleged
violations. We will address defendants’ unopposed objections to the report’s
recommendations seriatim.1

A. Denial of Medical Care as to Drake and Milford
Defendants Drake and Milford move to dismiss Yentzer’s claim against them
for denial of medical care on the ground that the complaint fails to allege that either
defendant knew of or was deliberately indifferent toward Yentzer’s serious medical
needs. (See Doc. 21 at 11). Yentzer concedes in his opposition brief that there are
no facts in his complaint with respect to what Drake and Milford knew and did or

failed to do—stating “we do not know if . . . Drake and Milford were consulted by
other Defendants as a result of the incidents or if they were directly responsible for
making decisions about [Yentzer’s] medical care” and suggesting these are “facts to
be explored during discovery.” (See Doc. 25 at 14). Yentzer then argues Drake and
Milford are “named as policymakers for the prison” and thus are “responsible for
the implementation of policy and procedure with respect to the handling of medical
care, particularly in emergency medical situations.” (See id.) Judge Mehalchick

1 Plaintiff has not objected to the report’s recommendation that we dismiss
the failure-to-protect claim against Martin and Fry regarding the Shaffer incident,
and we perceive no clear error in this recommendation. Defendants, for their part,
have not challenged the report’s recommendation that Yentzer’s failure-to-protect
claim against Rosenwie, Martin, and Fry regarding the Snyder incident be allowed
to proceed. Although the factual allegations in support of this claim against Fry in
particular are spare (the complaint alleges only that he was in the control room at
the time it occurred), we will adopt this unchallenged aspect of the report. Finally,
defendants do not object to the report’s determination that the complaint pleads
sufficient facts to state a failure-to-protect claim regarding the Shaffer incident as
well as a medical deliberate indifference claim against Rosenwie. We agree with
Judge Mehalchick’s conclusion in this respect and will adopt this uncontested
aspect of the report as well.
relies on these latter assertions to conclude that Yentzer states a claim against
Drake and Milford, as jail policymakers, for denial of adequate medical care. (See

Doc. 27 at 10).
We agree with defendants that this reliance was in error. It is axiomatic that
pleadings cannot be amended through briefing in opposition to a motion to dismiss.
Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Commonwealth
of Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988)). The
only facts from which the court could potentially impute knowledge to Drake and

Milford appear in Yentzer’s opposition brief. Accordingly, we will reject this aspect
of Judge Mehalchick’s report and grant defendants’ motion to dismiss the medical
deliberate indifference claim against Drake and Milford. Because the deficiencies
in this claim are purely factual, we will grant Yentzer leave to amend.
B. Failure to Protect as to Drake and Milford
Defendants Drake and Milford also move to dismiss the failure-to-protect
claim against them. (See Doc. 21 at 6-7). To plead a failure-to-protect claim,

plaintiff must allege he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm, that defendant knew of and chose to disregard—i.e., was
deliberately indifferent to—that risk, and that defendant’s indifference caused
plaintiff harm. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)), abrogated on other grounds by Mack v. Yost,
968 F.3d 311, 319 n.7 (3d Cir. 2020), as recognized in Williams v. Del. Cnty. Bd. of
Prison Inspectors, 844 F. App’x 469, 472-73 (3d Cir. 2021) (nonprecedential). To
establish an individual defendant’s liability, a plaintiff must plead the defendant’s
“personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” by “describing the defendant’s

participation in or actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.”
See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Rode
v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). Thus, supervisory defendants
like Drake or Milford cannot be held liable for conduct of subordinates on a theory
of respondeat superior. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016)
(citing Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227). Supervisory liability attaches in only one of

two ways: first, when a supervisor “established and maintained a policy, practice[,]
or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm,” and, second, when the
supervisor either “participated in, directed, or had knowledge of and acquiesced in
their subordinates’ violations.” Id. (quoting Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129 n.5).
In their motion to dismiss, Drake and Milford argue the complaint fails to
establish that they knew of or deliberately disregarded a threat to Yentzer’s safety.
(See Doc. 21 at 6-7). Judge Mehalchick concludes the complaint adequately pleads

Drake’s and Milford’s knowledge of the threat posed by Snyder, and to this extent,
we agree with the report. (See Doc. 27 at 9). Yentzer alleges Drake and Milford
“were aware of the threat of violence made to [Yentzer] by inmate Snyder and
aware of compelling reasons as to why inmate Snyder wanted to harm [Yentzer].”
(Doc. 1 ¶ 12). But we agree with defendants that the remainder of the report’s
recommendation, which would allow both failure-to-protect theories to proceed,
suffers from two defects. First, the report’s statement that Drake and Milford were
“exposed to information concerning the risk” posed by Shaffer and therefore “must
have known about it” finds no factual support in the complaint. (See Doc. 27 at 9;

cf. Doc. 1 ¶ 12 (alleging knowledge only as to “inmate Snyder”)). Second, the report
fails to address defendants’ further argument: that the complaint does not allege
any action or inaction by Drake and Milford which might constitute deliberate
indifference to either the Snyder or Shaffer threats. (See Doc. 21 at 7). Our review
of the complaint reveals that both defense assertions are correct. The complaint
simply does not allege any facts attributing actual knowledge of the Shaffer threat

to Drake or Milford. And even if it did, Yentzer alleges no facts establishing these
defendants were deliberately indifferent to the alleged threats—either by
participating in, acquiescing in, directing, or otherwise bearing responsibility for
the Snyder and Shaffer incidents. We decline to adopt the report on this ground
and will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss the failure-to-protect claims against
Drake and Milford. Because this factual deficiency too is capable of being cured,
we will dismiss the claim with leave to amend.

C. Denial of Medical Care as to Martin and Fry
Defendants next challenge the report’s recommendation that Yentzer’s
denial-of-medical-care claim be permitted to proceed against correctional officers
Fry and Martin. (See Doc. 21 at 11-13). To sufficiently plead this claim, a plaintiff
must allege both “a serious medical need” and “acts or omissions by prison officials
that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” See Natale v. Camden Cnty.
Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192,
197 (3d Cir. 1999)). A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would

easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst.
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). Deliberate indifference on the
part of prison officials may be shown by allegations of intentional refusal to provide
care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of medical treatment for
nonmedical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, or denial of reasonable
requests for treatment resulting in unnecessary suffering or risk of injury. See

Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at
346).
In their motion to dismiss, defendants contend the complaint, inter alia,
fails to allege correctional officers Fry and Martin were aware that Yentzer needed
medical treatment. (See Doc. 21 at 13). Judge Mehalchick’s report concludes that
Fry was twice placed on notice of Yentzer’s need for medical treatment: first when
Yentzer’s mother alerted him to Yentzer’s injuries after the Snyder incident, and

second when he ostensibly observed the Shaffer incident from the control room.
(See Doc. 27 at 15). We agree with Judge Mehalchick on this point; although the
complaint’s allegations are spare, they sufficiently allege Fry was made aware of
Yentzer’s injuries after each incident. We will thus overrule defendants’ objections
to the extent they argue the complaint fails to allege Fry was aware of Yentzer’s
need for medical treatment.
We agree with defendants, however, that the complaint fails to state a claim
against Martin for medical deliberate indifference. Judge Mehalchick recommends

the court permit this claim to proceed, based solely on Yentzer’s allegation that
Martin is the officer who ultimately transported him to the hospital. (See Doc. 27 at
15). Yentzer does not allege Martin observed Yentzer’s injuries before transporting
him to the hospital or otherwise was alerted to his need for medical treatment. Nor
does Yentzer allege Martin acted (or failed to act) in a manner that was deliberately
indifferent toward Yentzer’s medical needs. Accordingly, we decline to adopt the

report to this extent and will dismiss the medical deliberate indifference claim
against Martin with leave to amend.
D. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue that qualified immunity shields Drake, Milford,
Rosenwie, Martin, and Fry from Yentzer’s claims. (See Doc. 21 at 20-22). Qualified
immunity protects a state actor who has committed a constitutional violation if the
plaintiff’s rights were not “clearly established” when the individual acted. Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244-45 (2009). No liability will attach if a reasonable actor
could have believed the challenged conduct was consonant with settled law.
Id.; see Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268, 280 (3d Cir. 2006). The burden to establish
qualified immunity rests with the defendant claiming its protection. Beers-Capitol
v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d at 142 n.15 (citing Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882
F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir. 1989)).
A court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity considers a two-pronged
inquiry: whether, based on the alleged facts, a constitutional right has been violated

and, if so, whether the right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged
violation. See Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015)
(quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). We have already determined that Yentzer has
adequately alleged a constitutional violation by certain defendants in the form of a
failure-to-protect claim and a medical-deliberate indifference claim. Defendants’
qualified-immunity argument rises and falls on their assertion that the rights at

issue were not clearly established.
Judge Mehalchick’s report addresses the first prong of the qualified
immunity analysis, but does not discuss the prong challenged by defendants—
whether the rights at issue were clearly established. (See Doc. 27 at 20). For a
constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours “must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). Although earlier cases involving

“fundamentally similar” facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion
that the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a finding. Id. at
741. The Supreme Court of the United States has cautioned that courts must not
cast the right at issue too narrowly; indeed, the Court has said “‘[w]e do not require
a case directly on point’ before concluding that the law is clearly established.” See
Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). At the same time, we must take care not to define the right at
issue “at a high level of generality.” See White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 548,
552 (2017) (per curiam) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). The Supreme Court has

explained that to strike the appropriate balance, “clearly established law must be
‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” See id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
As an initial matter, we reject defendants’ argument as conclusory and
undeveloped. Defendants superficially aver they are “unaware of” precedent
clearly establishing the rights at issue, thereby passing off the necessary research

and analytical work. (See Doc. 21 at 21). It is defendants’ burden, not Yentzer’s
or the court’s, to establish that qualified immunity applies. See Beers-Capitol, 256
F.3d at 142 n.15 (citing Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 726). More problematically, however,
is that defendants define the rights at issue far too narrowly: they argue we must
look for cases mirroring the precise facts before us, “involving injuries inflicted by
two different inmates and with no correctional officers present for the incidents”
and holding specifically that “transporting an inmate who had injuries from a fist

fight to the hospital in a county vehicle rather than by ambulance would violate the
inmate’s constitutional rights.”2 (See Doc. 21 at 21). As we have already observed,
a plaintiff need not identify a case “directly on point” to surmount a qualified-

2 This latter suggestion not only defines the right at issue too narrowly, it
misreads Yentzer’s complaint: Yentzer’s concern is not merely with defendants’
choice to transport him in a county vehicle as opposed to an ambulance; it is that
defendants chose to delay his medical care by waiting until a county vehicle and
driver became available as opposed to calling an ambulance for immediate
transport. (See Doc. 1 ¶ 31).
immunity defense. See Stanton, 571 U.S. at 6 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741);
see also Williams, 848 F.3d at 570 (noting “existing precedent need not perfectly

match the circumstances of the dispute in which the question arises”). We find that
defendants have failed to meaningfully develop their qualified-immunity argument,
and we further find that development of a factual record with respect to defendants’
alleged conduct will better illuminate whether the defense applies. See Newland
v. Reehorst, 328 F. App’x 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential). We will thus
deny defendants’ motion without prejudice to their right to reraise the issue of

qualified immunity at a later stage.
E. Official-Capacity Claims Against Individual Defendants
Defendants move the court to have the official-capacity claims against the
individual defendants dismissed as duplicative of the claims against Potter County.
(See Doc. 21 at 19). Yentzer concedes this point in his opposition brief, agreeing
the claims are duplicative. (See Doc. 25 at 19). Judge Mehalchick’s report does not
address this issue and instead concludes Yentzer’s claims against the individual

defendants in their official capacities are viable to the same extent as his claims
against Potter County.3 (See Doc. 27 at 18). Because defendants’ motion was
unopposed as to this argument, and because we agree official-capacity claims

against individual municipal defendants are duplicative of claims against the
municipality itself, we will decline to adopt the report to this extent and grant
defendants’ motion to dismiss the official-capacity claims.
F. Municipal Liability
Defendants moved to dismiss all municipal liability claims against Potter
County on two grounds: specifically, that Yentzer does not allege Potter County

policymakers were on notice of a risk of deprivation of Yentzer’s rights, and that
Yentzer failed to allege sufficient facts to establish Potter County’s failure to train.
(See Doc. 21 at 15-18). Judge Mehalchick’s report construes Yentzer’s complaint
as proceeding on a “single-incident” theory of liability and opines the complaint
adequately describes the purportedly deficient policies and procedures. (See Doc.
27 at 17). The report thus concludes Yentzer has adequately alleged his municipal
liability claims. (See id.)

3 It appears the report misinterprets defendants’ argument with respect to
the official-capacity claims. The report frames the issue as implicating “qualified
immunity . . . per the Eleventh Amendment” and cites to decisional law addressing
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, but ultimately seems to conclude that
immunity does not apply because Yentzer has adequately pled a claim against
Potter County, and so likewise has adequately pled his official-capacity claims
against the individual defendants. (See Doc. 27 at 18). For purposes of clarifying
the record, we hold such immunity does not apply for a separate reason: Eleventh
Amendment immunity, which differs from qualified immunity, applies only to state
actors, not to municipal actors like defendants sub judice. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 690 n.54 (1978)); Febres v. Camden Bd. of Educ., 445 F.3d 227, 229 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)).
Defendants object on the ground that the magistrate judge’s report fails to
fully analyze the requirements for single-incident liability. (See Doc. 30 at 15). We

are constrained to agree. As a threshold matter, Yentzer provides only conclusory
and generic assertions regarding Potter County’s alleged policies. He alleges Potter
County maintained a custom, practice, or procedure of understaffing the jail, failing
to train jail staff, and failing to call an ambulance (or to permit its staff to do so) in
the event of a medical emergency. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 44, 45, 51-54). But even if these
allegations are enough to establish a deficient municipal policy—and we harbor

doubt, given their conclusory nature—the complaint is silent as to the knowledge
aspect of municipal liability. The complaint does not allege a pattern of prior
constitutional violations that would put Potter County on notice its policies were
deficient, nor does it allege facts from which we might find the need for different
policies was “so obvious” that defendants’ failure to act could be characterized as
deliberate indifference. See Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223-25
(3d Cir. 2014) (describing contours of single-incident liability). Nonetheless, this

deficiency is a factual one, and in his opposition brief to defendants’ motion to
dismiss, Yentzer articulates reasons why he believes the need for training should
have been obvious to county decisionmakers. Accordingly, while we decline to
adopt the report and will grant the motion to dismiss Yentzer’s municipal liability
claims, we will do so without prejudice and with leave to amend.
G. Punitive Damages
Lastly, defendants move to dismiss Yentzer’s request for punitive damages
against Potter County, positing that punitive damages are unavailable as a matter of

law against a municipality. (See Doc. 21 at 19-20). Yentzer concedes this point in
his opposition brief, agreeing he cannot pursue punitive damages against Potter
County. (See Doc. 25 at 19-20). Judge Mehalchick’s report recommends the claims
for punitive damages be dismissed, but the analysis appears to be grounded in an
incorrect legal premise—that it is “qualified immunity afforded per the Eleventh
Amendment” which bars the punitive damages request. (See Doc. 27 at 18). It is
not the Eleventh Amendment (which applies to states and not municipalities) but

rather Supreme Court precedent which holds punitive damages are unavailable
against municipalities like Potter County pursuant to common law principles. See
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). We will thus adopt
the report’s recommendation that the claim for punitive damages against Potter
County be dismissed, but on separate grounds.
IV. Conclusion

For all of the above reasons, we will adopt in part and decline to adopt in part
Judge Mehalchick’s report. An appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: March 28, 2022

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411528. Public record. Not legal advice.