# Amy Jo Schaefer v. Shawnee Holding, Inc. d/b/a Shawnee Inn & Golf Resort

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · March 15, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411441

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 15, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411441

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “case law does not restrict the retaliatory conduct ‘only to retaliation for refusing direct sexual propositions’”
- declining to dismiss IIED claim alleging retaliation “for complaining about sexual harassment”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JANE DOE 1, et al.,

Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-cv-01037

v. (SAPORITO, M.J.)

SHAWNEE HOLDING, INC. d/b/a
SHAWNEE INN & GOLF RESORT,
et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM
This action was commenced when the plaintiffs, Jane Doe 1 (“Doe
1”) and Jane Doe 2 (“Doe 2”), appearing through counsel, filed their
complaint on June 11, 2021. (Doc. 1.) The plaintiffs are a same-sex
married couple. In their complaint, they allege that Doe 1 was subjected
to hostile work environment sexual harassment over the course of several
years while she was employed at the Shawnee Inn & Golf Resort
(“Shawnee”) as a graphic designer and web administrator, mostly
involving her direct supervisor, Jeromy Wo. The plaintiffs further allege
that Doe 1 complained, on multiple occasions, to human resources and to
Shawnee’s general manager, but she was then subjected to retaliation.
Ultimately, she alleges that she was forced to resign as a result of the
hostile work environment sexual harassment and the retaliation.

The complaint is divided into seven counts. In Counts I, II, and III,
Doe 1 asserts federal claims against her former employer, Shawnee, for
hostile work environment sexual harassment, discriminatory discharge,

and retaliatory discharge, arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In Counts IV and V, Doe 1
asserts state-law claims against her former supervisor, Wo, for hostile

work environment sexual harassment and retaliation on an aiding-and-
abetting or accomplice theory of liability, arising under the Pennsylvania
Human Rights Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq.1 In

Count VI, Doe 1 asserts a state-law tort claim against Wo for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Finally, in Count VII, Doe 2 asserts a
state-law tort claim against Wo for loss of consortium.

The case is now before us on two motions. The plaintiffs have moved
for leave to proceed anonymously in this action. (Doc. 3.) Meanwhile, the

1 We note that, although Title VII does not permit for individual
liability, the PHRA permits an individual supervisory employee to be
held liable for his own direct acts of discrimination or for his failure to
take action to prevent further discrimination by an employee under his
supervision. See Slater v. Susquehanna Cty., 613 F. Supp. 2d 653, 669–
70 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
defendants have moved for partial dismissal of the complaint and for a

more definite statement. (Doc. 11.) Both motions are fully briefed and
ripe for decision.
I. MOTION TO PROCEED ANONYMOUSLY
The plaintiffs filed their complaint under the pseudonyms “Jane

Doe 1” and “Jane Doe 2.” A few days after filing the complaint, they
moved for leave to proceed anonymously.
“[P]roceeding under a fictitious name is an unusual measure

reserved for exceptional cases.” Doe v. Ind. Black Expo, Inc., 923 F. Supp.
137, 139 (S.D. Ind. 1996). As the Third Circuit has observed:

One of the essential qualities of a Court of Justice is
that its proceedings should be public. Rule 10(a)
requires parties to a lawsuit to identify themselves in
their respective pleadings. Courts have explained that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) illustrates the
principle that judicial proceedings, civil as well as
criminal, are to be conducted in public. Identifying the
parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of
publicness. . . . A plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym runs
afoul of the public’s common law right of access to
judicial proceedings.
While not expressly permitted under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 10(a), in exceptional cases courts have
allowed a party to proceed anonymously. That a
plaintiff may suffer embarrassment or economic harm
is not enough. Instead, a plaintiff must show both (1) a
fear of severe harm, and (2) that the fear of severe harm
is reasonable. . . . When a litigant sufficiently alleges
that he or she has a reasonable fear of severe harm
from litigating without a pseudonym, courts of appeals
are in agreement that district courts should balance a
plaintiff’s interests and fear against the public’s strong
interest in an open litigation process.
Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations, internal
quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
In Megless, the Third Circuit set forth “a non-exhaustive list of
factors to be weighed both in favor of anonymity and also factors that
favor the traditional rule of openness.” Id. at 409. The factors in favor of

anonymity include:
(1) the extent to which the identity of the litigant has
been kept confidential; (2) the bases upon which
disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and the
substantiality of these bases; (3) the magnitude of the
public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the
litigant’s identity; (4) whether, because of the purely
legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there
is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the
litigant’s identities; (5) the undesirability of an
outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party and
attributable to his refusal to pursue the case at the
price of being publicly identified; and (6) whether the
party seeking to sue pseudonymously has illegitimate
ulterior motives.
Id. (quoting another source). The factors militating against anonymity
include:
(1) the universal level of public interest in access to the
identities of litigants; (2) whether, because of the
subject matter of this litigation, the status of the
litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a
particularly strong interest in knowing the litigant’s
identities, beyond the public’s interest which is
normally obtained; and (3) whether the opposition to
pseudonym by counsel, the public, or the press is
illegitimately motivated.
Id. (quoting another source). “The Megless factors require a fact-specific,
case-by-case analysis.” Doe v. Coll. of N.J., 997 F.3d 489, 495 (3d Cir.
2021).
Applying these factors to the instant case, we conclude that the
motion should be denied, as the balance of factors does not favor
anonymity.
First, the plaintiffs have kept the facts and nature of this case and
their claims to themselves, including in particular Doe 1’s mental health

status and related treatment. Doe 1 necessarily disclosed her identity
and the facts underlying her employment claims to the Pennsylvania
Human Rights Commission for investigation of her administrative

complaint—a mandatory prerequisite to litigation under Title VII and
the PHRA—but that limited disclosure for non-public investigatory
proceedings is not inconsistent with maintaining confidentiality. Cf. Holt
v. Pennsylvania, Civil Action No. 10-5510, 2014 WL 2880376, at *16 (E.D.

Pa. June 25, 2014) (characterizing PHRC complaint as confidential and
non-public information). The defendants direct our attention to news
articles regarding this lawsuit, but those stories appear to be gleaned

from the public filings in this litigation, which do not reveal the plaintiffs’
identities. This factor weighs in favor of anonymity.
Second, the plaintiffs state that they fear potential physical

violence or other backlash that they might experience from unknown
persons if their names are attached to publicly available court records
highlighting their homosexuality, and that they fear the possible stigma

associated with being identified as homosexual or as an individual
suffering from a mental illness, particularly in the context of seeking
future employment opportunities. These generalized fears are entirely

speculative—the plaintiffs have articulated no specific threats or any
particular basis for their concerns. With respect to the stigma of
homosexuality, the plaintiffs’ concern further appears to be overstated

based on their otherwise uninhibited openness about their same-sex
marital status. As the defendants note, the plaintiffs are legally married,
they openly disclose their marital status on social media, and they are
the joint owners of record of their marital home. With respect to the

stigma of mental illness, we find nothing in the allegations of the
complaint to distinguish the emotional and mental harm suffered by Doe
1 in this case from that involved in a typical hostile workplace sexual

harassment case. This factor weighs against anonymity.
Third, there is minimal public interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of the plaintiffs’ names. The plaintiffs argue that a ruling

by this court denying their motion may deter other persons suffering from
mental illness or experiencing harassment based on sexual orientation
from suing to vindicate their rights. But, again, we see little to

distinguish the facts alleged here from the typical hostile workplace
sexual harassment case, involving emotional and mental injury as a
matter of course. Moreover, the plaintiffs are not closeted homosexuals

forced to choose between vindicating their rights or being unwillingly
outed, but an openly gay married couple contending with workplace
sexual harassment and its collateral effects in a fashion typical to these

cases, regardless of the employee’s sexual orientation. This factor weighs
against anonymity.
Fourth, the claims here are not purely legal claims, and thus the
public’s interest cannot be said to be “atypically weak.” Across the board,

the plaintiffs’ various claims are all fact-intensive. This factor weighs
against anonymity.
Fifth, the plaintiffs suggest that denial of this motion might cause

them to abandon this lawsuit, sacrificing potentially valid claims to
preserve their anonymity. While this outcome, particularly in this
context of enforcing federal and state anti-discrimination laws, would be

undesirable to the public interest, the plaintiffs’ stated intention on this
point is far from unequivocal. This factor weighs in favor of anonymity,
but not strongly.

Sixth, there is no evidence or allegation that the plaintiffs have an
illegal or ulterior motive for pursuing their claims against the defendants
anonymously. This factor weighs in favor of anonymity.

Turning then to the factors militating against anonymity, first “we
must acknowledge the thumb on the scale that is the universal interest
in favor of open judicial proceedings.” Megless, 654 F.3d at 411. None of

the parties to this case is a public figure, and the subject matter of this
case does not implicate any stronger public interest beyond that which
normally obtains in a civil action, but we take note of the defendant
employer’s high profile—locally at least—as a large recreational and

hospitality business. Finally, there is no evidence or allegation to suggest
that the defendants oppose anonymity for illegal or ulterior reasons.
Accordingly, finding the balance of Megless factors weighs against

anonymity, the motion to proceed anonymously will be denied.
II. MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL
The defendants have moved to dismiss Counts VI and VII of the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Count
VI is Doe 1’s intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim;

Count VII is Doe 2’s loss of consortium claim, which is derivative of Doe
1’s IIED claim.
For a plaintiff to prevail on an IIED claim, the conduct must (1) be

intentional or reckless; (2) be extreme and outrageous; and (3) cause
severe emotional distress. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d
81, 85 (3d Cir. 1987). “[A]s a general rule, sexual harassment alone does

not rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to make out a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1487 (3d Cir. 1990). But “courts applying
Pennsylvania law have found conduct outrageous in the employment

context . . . where an employer engaged in both sexual harassment and
other retaliatory behavior against an employee.” Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the plaintiffs have alleged both sexual harassment and

subsequent retaliation. They point to a prior decision of this court,
Bowersox v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 677 F. Supp. 307 (M.D. Pa. 1988), in
which we found similar allegations sufficient to state a claim for IIED.

We find little to distinguish the facts alleged in this case from those
alleged in Bowersox—at least, none that are material at this, the
pleadings stage.

The defendants argue that Andrews, Bowersox, and other decisions
applying Pennsylvania law in this context suggest a narrower rule. They
point to a subsequent comment by the Andrews court that “[t]he extra

factor that is generally required is retaliation for turning down sexual
propositions.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1487 (emphasis added). Based on
this, the defendants argue that the only retaliation sufficient to support

a workplace IIED claim is retaliation for the rejection of sexual advances.
But this strained reading of Andrews is simply too narrow; the case law
does not restrict the retaliatory conduct only to retaliation for refusing
direct sexual propositions. See, e.g., Regan v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 36 F.

Supp. 2d 245, 251 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (declining to dismiss IIED claim
alleging retaliation “for complaining about sexual harassment”);
McLaughlin v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 1 F. Supp. 2d 476, 482–83

(E.D. Pa. 1998) (noting that “case law does not restrict the retaliatory
conduct ‘only to retaliation for refusing direct sexual propositions’”).
“Although that particular brand of retaliation may be the ‘extra factor

that is generally required,” it is not “the only ‘extra factor’ that will
suffice.” Solomon v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 94-2427, 1996 WL
20651, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 1996).

Notwithstanding the absence of a direct request or demand for a
sexual quid pro quo in this case, we find the allegations of harassment
and retaliation here sufficient to fit squarely within the scope of

actionable conduct described in Bowersox:
That a supervisor would subject his female employee to
highly offensive speech and conduct in a close working
environment and then, as a result of her negative
reaction to that conduct, make the employee’s job
impossible to perform could in the court’s opinion lead
an average member of the community to exclaim,
“Outrageous!”
Bowersox, 677 F. Supp. at 311–12.
The defendants’ request for dismissal of Doe 2’s loss-of-consortium

claim was based solely on the fact that this claim is derivative of Doe 1’s
IIED claim. Because we have found a plausible IIED claim to have been
stated and rejected the defendants’ request to dismiss that claim, the

defendants’ corresponding request for dismissal of the derivative loss-of-
consortium claim must be rejected as well.
Accordingly, the motion for partial dismissal will be denied.

III. MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
The defendants have moved for a more definite statement with
respect to the plaintiffs’ Title VII and PHRA claims, pursuant to Rule

12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, they note that
the complaint alleges only a general timeframe for Doe 1’s hostile work
environment sexual harassment and retaliation claims, which precludes

them from seeking dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds at this,
the pleadings stage.
As this court has previously stated:

Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allows a party to move for a more definite statement of
a pleading “which is so vague or ambiguous that the
party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(e). Like Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(e) must be
read in conjunction with Rule 8, which requires only a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Even after
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009),
courts have held that “[t]he class of pleadings that are
appropriate subjects for a motion under Rule 12(e) is
quite small—the pleading must be sufficiently
unintelligible for the court to be able to make out one
or more potentially viable legal theories on which the
claimant might proceed. Lapcevic v. Strive Enterprises,
Inc., No. 2:09-cv-564, 2010 WL 1816752, at *7 (W.D.
Pa. Apr. 8, 2010) (quoting Sun Co. v. Badger Design &
Constructors, 939 F. Supp. 365, 368 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
Granting a Rule 12(e) motion is appropriate only when
the pleading is “so vague or ambiguous that the
opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple
denial, in good faith, without prejudice to itself.” Sun
Co., 939 F. Supp. at 368.
Mushi v. LJ Ross Assocs., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-01300, 2021 WL
4803781, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2021); see also Schaedler v. Reading
Eagle Publ’n, Inc., 370 F.2d 795, 797–98 (3d Cir. 1967). “The basis for
granting such a motion is unintelligibility, not lack of detail.” Cobb v. Nye,
No. 4:14-cv-0865, 2014 WL 7067578, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2014)
(quoting Wood & Locker, Inc. v. Doran & Assocs., 708 F. Supp. 684, 691
(W.D. Pa. 1989)) (emphasis added). Indeed, as this court has previously
recognized in virtually identical circumstances: “A motion for a more
definite statement is not a substitute for the discovery process. . . . The
specific information which the defendant seeks in this case, namely dates
of violations, can be obtained through discovery.” Wheeler v. U.S. Postal

Serv., 120 F.R.D. 487, 488 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
Accordingly, the motion for a more definite statement will be
denied.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to proceed
anonymously (Doc. 3) and the defendants’ motion for partial dismissal
and for a more definite statement (Doc. 11) will both be denied. The

plaintiff will be directed to file an amended complaint within thirty days.
An appropriate order follows.

Dated: March 15, 2022 s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411441. Public record. Not legal advice.