# Martinez v. Ransom

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · January 19, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411241

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 19, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411241

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that only “available” remedies must be exhausted

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EDGAR MARTINEZ, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20-CV-1826
:
Plaintiff : (Judge Conner)1
:
v. :
:
KEVIN RANSOM, DR. SCOTT :
PRINCE, and LEA MARTIN, :
:
Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Edgar Martinez, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution in
Dallas, Pennsylvania (SCI Dallas), filed this pro se action asserting constitutional
tort claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and medical malpractice under Pennsylvania law.
Martinez alleges Section 1983 claims for Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs against SCI Dallas’s superintendent, one of its doctors, and
its healthcare administrator. Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on Martinez’s constitutional claims. For the
reasons that follow, we will grant defendants’ Rule 56 motions.

1 This case was previously assigned to the Honorable John E. Jones III. It
was transferred to the undersigned shortly after Judge Jones’ retirement from the
federal bench on August 1, 2021.
I. Factual Background2
Martinez’s claims are grounded in the medical care he received at SCI Dallas
in 2019 and the first half of 2020. (See generally Doc. 1-23; Doc. 24 ¶ 3). He contends

that defendants Lea Martin—a healthcare administrator—and Dr. Scott Prince
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (Doc. 1-2 ¶¶ 20, 29, 30, 42,
43, 46-48). He further alleges that superintendent Kevin Ransom is liable under
Section 1983 because Ransom was aware of this constitutionally deficient medical
treatment and took no corrective action. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 34, 37-39). It appears that
Martinez also seeks to pursue state-law medical malpractice claims against Martin
and Dr. Prince in his complaint, although the pleadings in this regard are

undeveloped. (See id. ¶ 3 (stating that Martinez “is asserting a professional liability
claim against” Dr. Prince); Doc. 1-3 at 6, 7 (certificates of merit for Martin and Dr.

2 Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise
statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving
party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1.
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of
material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving
party’s statement and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. Unless otherwise
noted, the factual background herein derives from the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements
of material facts. (Docs. 19, 24, 26). To the extent the parties’ statements are
undisputed or supported by uncontroverted record evidence, the court cites
directly to the Rule 56.1 statements. Martinez has only responded to the Rule 56.1
statement filed by Martin and Ransom. (See Doc. 26). Accordingly, Dr. Prince’s
Rule 56.1 statement, (Doc. 24), will be deemed admitted unless plainly contradicted
by the record. See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1.

3 Martinez verified his complaint under penalty of perjury. (Doc. 1-2 at 9).
Prince for professional liability action as required by PA. R. CIV. P. 1042.3(a)); see
also Doc. 29 at 2 ¶ 3).
The Rule 56 record establishes the following facts. At all times relevant to the

instant lawsuit, Martinez has been incarcerated at SCI Dallas. (See generally Doc.
1-2). Martinez has suffered from back-related medical issues for more than 15
years. (Doc. 1-2 ¶ 5; Doc. 19 ¶ 1). The acute medical problems that underlie the
instant litigation began around mid-2019. (Doc. 24 ¶ 11).
On July 19, 2019, Martinez complained to nursing staff of significant right
lower abdominal pain and right-sided back pain, as well as nausea. (Id.) He was
treated by medical staff and underwent a urinalysis, which revealed the presence of

blood in his urine. (Id.) Martinez was given a differential diagnosis of a kidney
stone, admitted to the infirmary for observation, and prescribed Tylenol for his
pain. (Id.) That same day, medical staff ordered a kidney, ureter, and bladder
(KUB) x-ray to assess Martinez for possible kidney stones, scheduling the test for
July 22. (Id. ¶ 13).
The following day, Martinez reported that he was doing better and not

experiencing any acute discomfort. (Id. ¶ 14). Nurses continued to monitor him
that day until he was released back to his housing unit. (Id. ¶ 15). As planned, on
July 22, Martinez underwent the KUB x-ray, which showed essentially normal
results. (Id. ¶ 16). The radiologist recommended an ultrasound or CT scan if
problems persisted or if there was concern for kidney stones. (Id.)
Martinez’s right flank pain continued, and he was seen again by medical staff
on July 25. (Id. ¶ 17). During this sick call, Martinez was informed that his KUB x-
ray results were negative for kidney stones, but a dipstick urinalysis indicated that

he still had blood in his urine. (Id.) Medical staff explained that an ultrasound
would be ordered and Martinez was instructed to return for care as needed or if his
symptoms worsened. (Id.; Doc. 24-1 at 56). Authorization for a July 30 KUB
ultrasound was requested that same day, which Dr. Prince promptly approved.
(Doc. 24 ¶ 18).
On July 29, Martinez was seen by nursing staff for similar complaints of right
back and abdomen pain. (Id. ¶ 19). The next day, as scheduled, he underwent the

scheduled KUB ultrasound, which showed bilateral hydronephrosis and suspected
right renal stones. (Id. ¶ 21; Doc. 24-1 at 103).
On August 7, during a sick call for unrelated eye and hand issues, Martinez
inquired about the results of the July 30 ultrasound. (Doc. 24 ¶ 22). He was told
that the test showed bilateral hydronephrosis and possible right kidney stones, and
that next steps would be discussed with Dr. Prince. (Id.) Two days later, medical

staff requested authorization for an August 28 CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis,
which Dr. Prince and another doctor approved that same day. (Doc. 24-1 at 85).
The August 28 CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis was performed as
scheduled and showed that Martinez had two small renal cysts and a 4-millimeter
bladder calculus (or stone) near the “ureterovesical junction” (UVJ),4 but no kidney
stones. (Doc. 24 ¶ 24; Doc. 24-1 at 101). The next day, Dr. Prince saw Martinez for a
follow-up appointment and informed him of the test results, in particular that he

had a bladder stone at the UVJ that Dr. Prince believed would pass on its own.
(Doc. 24 ¶ 25). Dr. Prince instructed Martinez to report any persistence of pain
beyond another month and also noted that Martinez’s degenerative disc disease
may be contributing to the flank pain. (Id.)
The next time Martinez reported kidney symptoms was during a sick call on
November 8, 2019. (Id. ¶ 28). Martinez expressed worsening, intermittent kidney
pain over the preceding three to four months but was unsure if he had passed the

UVJ stone. (Id.) A dipstick urinalysis during this visit was unremarkable. (Id.)
The attending physician assistant prescribed Motrin as needed, noting that
Martinez’s flank pain may have a muscular component. (Id.)
Martinez was next seen by medical staff on March 23, 2020. (Id. ¶ 29). During
this sick-call visit, he complained of continuing dull, intermittent pain in his
bilateral kidney region. (Id.; Doc. 24-1 at 27). A dipstick urinalysis showed no blood

or infection. (Doc. 24-1 at 28). The attending physician assistant recommended
using Tylenol for pain and notified Martinez that his lipids were elevated. (Doc. 24
¶ 29). The physician assistant also ordered a follow-up KUB x-ray and lipid panel,
and further requested a consult for an on-site renal and bladder ultrasound. (Id.

4 The ureterovesical junction is located where the ureter, draining urine from
the kidney, connects to the bladder. See https://www.chop.edu/conditions-
diseases/ureterovesical-junction-uvj-obstruction (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
¶ 30). Dr. Prince approved the ultrasound approximately 11 minutes later. (Doc.
24-1 at 83).
The KUB x-ray was performed on March 26 and again was essentially

normal. (Doc. 24 ¶ 31). The ultrasound on March 31, however, showed an enlarged
prostate, moderate postvoid residual bladder volume, mild bilateral hydronephrosis
that was worse in the left kidney, but no evidence of stones. (Id. ¶ 32).
On April 6, SCI Dallas medical staff reviewed Martinez’s lab work, which
showed continued elevated lipids. (Id. ¶ 33; Doc. 24-1 at 26). Martinez was seen on
April 10 at his cell, at which time the nurse practitioner relayed her concerns about
his elevated cholesterol levels and the concomitant cardiovascular risks, strongly

recommending that Martinez begin statin therapy. (Doc. 24-1 at 23-24). Martinez
expressed disinterest in his lipid levels, remarking that he could not “care less”
about his cholesterol, declining to take statin medication, and laughing at the nurse
practitioner’s health warnings. (Doc. 24-1 at 23-24). Martinez was then provided a
“release from responsibility for medical treatment” regarding his refusal to treat his
elevated lipids. (Id. at 25). Because SCI Dallas was on lockdown, he was not able to

physically sign the form, but did provide verbal acknowledgment of his refusal for
this treatment. (Id.)
Martinez next treated for kidney pain on a May 6, 2020 sick call. (Doc. 24
¶ 36). He saw Dr. Prince, who noted that Martinez denied “any dysuria, hesitancy,
frequency, [or] nocturia,” but was more concerned with the flank pain he was
experiencing. (Doc. 24-1 at 19). Dr. Prince performed this sick-call visit on
Martinez’s housing block due to the lockdown at SCI Dallas for the Covid-19
pandemic. (Id.) Dr. Prince prescribed ibuprofen for pain and Flomax for “BPH”
(benign prostatic hyperplasia), noting that Martinez would need a digital rectal

exam when the lockdown at SCI Dallas ended. (Id.; Doc. 24 ¶ 36).
Martinez filed two grievances related to his 2019 and early 2020 medical care,
both of which were denied. (See Doc. 21-5 at 2; Doc. 21-9 at 2). He then filed suit in
the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, on August 16, 2020.5
(Doc. 1-2). Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). (See Doc. 1 ¶ 4). Defendants now move for summary judgment. (Docs.
18, 22). They seek judgment as matter of law as to all federal claims asserted

against them, but do not discuss the state-law medical malpractice claims. (See
generally Docs. 18, 18-1, 20, 22, 22-1, 23, 28). The Rule 56 motions are ripe for
disposition.
II. Legal Standard
Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that do
not present a “genuine issue as to any material fact” and for which a jury trial

would be an empty and unnecessary formality. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The
burden of proof is on the non-moving party to come forth with “affirmative
evidence, beyond the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief.
Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); FED. R. CIV. P.

5 The complaint is time stamped as filed on August 26, 2020, (see Doc. 1-2 at
2), but Martinez dated, signed, and verified his complaint on August 16, 2020, (see
id. at 8-9).
56(e); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). This evidence
must be adequate, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the non-
moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-57 (1986);

Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986); see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), (e). Only if this threshold is met may the cause of action
proceed. Pappas, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
III. Discussion
Defendants contend that Martinez cannot carry his Rule 56 burden on any of
his constitutional tort claims. Martin and Ransom raise a bevy of reasons why the
claims against them fail as a matter of law, including lack of personal involvement,

qualified immunity, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, statute of
limitations, and failure to show deliberate indifference. (See Doc. 20 at 2). Dr.
Prince focuses on the merits of the Eighth Amendment medical care claim, arguing
that the undisputed facts demonstrate that he was not deliberately indifferent.
(Doc. 23 at 4-17). We find that Martinez’s Section 1983 claims fail for several
reasons.

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq.,
requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before suing prison
officials for alleged constitutional violations. See id. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake, 578
U.S. 632, 639, 642 (2016) (explaining that only “available” remedies must be
exhausted). Proper exhaustion is mandatory, even if the inmate is seeking relief—
like monetary damages—that cannot be granted by the administrative system. See
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). The exhaustion process a prisoner must
follow is governed by the contours of the prison grievance system in effect where

the inmate is incarcerated. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); see also
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91.
Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections (DOC) employs a three-step
grievance process that must be completed to properly exhaust administrative
remedies in most cases. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002);
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP’T OF CORR., INMATE GRIEVANCE SYS., Policy No. DC-
ADM 804 (May 1, 2015) (hereinafter “DC-ADM 804”). If informal resolution

attempts do not resolve the problem, the first step is to file a written grievance
(using form DC-804, Part 1) with the Facility Grievance Coordinator within 15
working days after “the event upon which the claim is based.” DC-ADM 804
§ 1(A)(3)-(5). An adverse decision by the grievance coordinator may be appealed to
the Facility Manager within 15 working days of the initial-review response or
rejection. Id. § 2(A)(1). Finally, the decision of the Facility Manager may be

appealed to “Final Review” with the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and
Appeals (SOIGA), and again must be submitted within 15 working days of the date
of the Facility Manager’s decision. Id. § 2(B)(1).
The DOC has specific requirements for grievances submitted by inmates.
Those requirements include, among other things, that the grievance “be legible
[and] understandable”; “include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim” as
well as “the date, approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave rise to the
grievance”; that the prisoner “identify individuals directly involved in the event(s)”;
and that the grievance include “the specific relief sought,” including “compensation

or other legal relief normally available from a court.” Id. § 1(A)(11).
Martinez filed three grievances related to his medical treatment at SCI
Dallas. (See Doc. 21-6 at 2-3). The first grievance—number 724223—was filed in
March 2018. (See Doc. 21-6 at 2; Doc. 1-2 at 11-17). None of the allegations in
Martinez’s complaint reference this grievance or the healthcare issues complained
of therein; rather, the earliest date of wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint is
2019. (See generally Doc. 1-2 at 2-8). In this grievance, Martinez complained that,

inter alia, he waited four days for a sick-call response and a “Ms. Loretta” did not
properly address his concerns of stomach pain and allergies. (Doc. 21-4 at 9). None
of the defendants in this lawsuit are named in the grievance, nor did any named
defendant take part in the review or appeal process. (See generally Doc. 21-4).
Martinez fully exhausted grievance number 724223 to the SOIGA, but again, it is
irrelevant to the claims and defendants in this litigation.

Martinez next filed grievance number 819297 on August 14, 2019. (Doc. 21-9
at 4). He complained that, after being seen by SCI Dallas medical staff for chronic
pain, the staff ordered x-rays, an ultrasound, and a CT scan. (Id.) He further
asserted that he had been told that Dr. Prince would contact him after the testing to
inform him of a diagnosis, but that he was never contacted. (Id.) After waiting for
“days” and suffering from pain, he put in a sick-call request, and during the sick-
call visit was told that the ultrasound showed that he had kidney stones and blood
in his urine. (Id.) He additionally claimed that he was waiting to see Dr. Prince,
had not yet been seen by him, and that an unidentified nurse had “forgot about”

him. (Id.) Martinez alleged that he was “being subjected to medical mal-practice at
the hands of the Heath Care staff” and by Martin, and he sought treatment and
monetary damages. (Id.)
Initial review of this grievance was conducted by grievance officer “S. Miller”
on September 5, 2019. (Id. at 2-3). Miller denied Martinez’s grievance, explaining
that he had contacted Martin, who had informed him that Martinez was seen by
medical staff approximately one week after the ultrasound and CT Scan. (Id.) The

grievance officer further noted that Martinez was seen by Dr. Prince on August 29,
2019, one day after the CT Scan was completed, and had been informed of the test
results. (Id.) Martinez did not appeal this initial denial. (See Doc. 21-8 ¶¶ 6-7; Doc.
27 at 9).
Finally, Martinez filed grievance number 862879 on April 12, 2020. (Doc. 1-2
¶ 17; Doc. 1-2 at 19). In this grievance, he complained that an unidentified doctor

had told him in November 2019 that an x-ray would be ordered, but this x-ray had
not been completed until March 2020 after Martinez complained that he was still
waiting for the study. (Doc. 1-2 at 19). He further alleged that, after it was
performed, he had been “waiting for 14 day[s] for the results” of the x-ray, had not
been able to sleep because of the pain, and had not been prescribed “a single pain
killer.” (Id.) According to Martinez, these issues reflected “negligence” in his
medical care. (Id.)
Martin was assigned as the grievance coordinator for review of this

grievance. (See id. at 20). In her April 30, 2020 initial grievance response, Martin
explained that the KUB x-ray was performed on March 26, 2020, showed essentially
normal results, and thus required no follow up. (Id.) She further noted that
Martinez saw an SCI Dallas medical provider on April 10, 2020—two days before
filing the grievance under review—but did not inquire about the KUB x-ray results.
(Id.) Martin finished her grievance denial by stating, “If you are still having
discomfort or would like to discuss your x-ray, you can sign up for sick call if you

choose to do so.” (Id.)
Martinez appealed the first-level denial to the Facility Manager—defendant
Ransom. (See id. at 26). Ransom upheld the denial and addressed the additional
concerns raised in the appeal regarding medical treatment that postdated
Martinez’s initial April 12 grievance. (Id.) Martinez’s final appeal to the SOIGA was
dismissed on procedural grounds on July 16, 2020, for failure to submit legible

copies of both his initial grievance and his written appeal to final review. (Id. at 27).
Two conclusions can be drawn from this grievance history. First, Martinez
never identified Ransom in any of his grievances as committing an act or omission
that potentially violated the Eighth Amendment. Ransom’s only involvement in the
grievance process was in his role as Facility Manager for the second-level grievance
review. Investigating and denying a grievance appeal that alleges inadequate care
by medical staff is not equivalent to being deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s
serious medical needs. See Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 925 (3d Cir.
2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner’s claims against certain

defendants were “properly dismissed” because the allegations against them
“merely assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance process”). Martinez
is not excused from administratively exhausting claims against Ransom—as
required by the PLRA—simply because Ransom is the prison superintendent or
Facility Manager who denied relief under DC-ADM 804.
Second, Martinez never exhausted any grievance against Martin. His first
grievance (number 724223) identified only a “Ms. Loretta” as providing deficient

care. And, as noted above, it is irrelevant to the claims in this case. Martinez’s
second grievance (number 819297) did name Martin, but this grievance denial was
not appealed to the Facility Manager, let alone to the SOIGA. His third grievance
(number 862879) named only an unidentified doctor—presumably Dr. Prince—and
did not mention or involve Martin. The omission of Martin is further confirmed by
the fact that she was assigned as the grievance officer for initial review, which

would have been prohibited under DC-ADM 804 if the grievance were leveled at or
somehow involved Martin. See DC-ADM 804 § 1(C)(3) (“The staff member who
serves as the Grievance Officer shall not be directly involved in or named as the
subject of the grievance[.]” (emphasis omitted)).
Martinez has not provided any basis to excuse his failure to exhaust
administrative remedies against Martin and Ransom. Consequently, summary
judgment must be granted in these defendants’ favor on the procedurally defaulted
Section 1983 claims against them. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 222, 230 (3d
Cir. 2004).

B. Eighth Amendment Medical Deliberate Indifference
Even if Martinez had not procedurally defaulted his Eighth Amendment
claims against Martin and Ransom, the claims fail on the merits. In fact, Martinez’s
constitutional tort claims fail on the merits as to all three defendants.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishments on prisoners. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth

Amendment “requires prison officials to provide basic medical treatment” to
incarcerated individuals. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). To
establish an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference regarding
inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) “a serious medical need,”
and (2) “acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to
that need.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).

A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro,
834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).
Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional
refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of
medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,
and denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in unnecessary suffering
or risk of injury. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting

Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346). Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an
exacting standard, requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted). Claims sounding
in mere medical negligence will not suffice. Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.
None of the defendants dispute that Martinez has serious medical needs.
Instead, they maintain that he has failed to establish deliberate indifference to those
needs.

We begin with Ransom. Notably, Ransom’s only connection to Martinez’s
medical treatment stems from his denial of Martinez’s first appeal in grievance
number 862879. But involvement in the grievance process alone does not give rise
to Section 1983 liability. See Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp. 3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa.
2015) (collecting cases); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006)
(nonprecedential); Alexander, 144 F. App’x at 925. Martinez counters that Ransom

should be held accountable under a theory of supervisory liability. He argues that
Ransom was made aware—through the grievance appeal process—of the
“substantial risk of harm” Martinez faced “based upon the inadequate medical
treatment and mis-diagnosis of his serious medical condition” and failed to act.
(Doc. 27 at 4). The problem with this argument is that it is not supported by any
evidence.
As previously noted, only one grievance relevant to the case at bar was
appealed to Ransom. Ransom’s well-reasoned and comprehensive response bears
repeating in full:

I have reviewed the above-noted grievance, the Grievance
Officer’s response and your subsequent appeal of said grievance. My
decision is as follows: CHCA Martin was assigned as grievance officer
and has adequately addressed your grievance concerns[,] providing
you with information regarding your medical treatment. [The] Record
indicates you were seen by Dr. Prince at [1:55 p.m.] on 5/6/20, there is
no record you were seen on 5/16/20. Regarding your assertion that the
grievance officer said you didn’t have any abnormal labs, but the
ultrasound stated you had abnormal labs: Ms. Martin stated you were
seen for abnormal labs. Medical confirmed an ultrasound and labs are
two different tests. Medical also confirmed the abnormal labs and the
KUB were not related and not in conjunction with one another.
Concerning Health Care officials did not do what they were suppose[d]
to do during September 2019: these issues were addressed in grievance
819297. Any grievance issue that has been or is currently being
addressed will not be re-addressed in a subsequent grievance. I would
suggest you sign up for sick call to speak with a medical professional to
discuss any issues you may have. I find your grievance to be without
merit; therefore, I uphold the initial response. Your request for
monetary relief is denied. No inmate shall be punished, retaliated
against, or otherwise harmed for use of the grievance system.

(Doc. 21-5 at 7). In no way does this response evince deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs. Rather, it demonstrates that Ransom fully investigated
Martinez’s claims, spoke with Martin (the healthcare administrator) about the test
results at issue, discussed with the medical department Martinez’s additional
concerns, and suggested that Martinez sign up for sick call to speak with medical
staff if he was still having issues. Martinez does not cite any other record evidence
to support his claim against Ransom, (see Doc. 27 at 4-5, 10-11), and thus his
assertion of supervisory liability is meritless.
Martinez’s Eighth Amendment claim against Martin is equally without merit.
It is undisputed that Martin is not a medical provider, but rather a healthcare
administrator. (See Doc. 1-2 ¶¶ 19-20). Again, the only evidence to which Martinez

cites regarding an alleged basis for supervisory liability is the grievance process.
(See Doc. 27 at 4-5, 10-11). However, neither Martin’s grievance responses nor the
rest of the Rule 56 record demonstrates deliberate indifference.
Martinez named Martin in grievance number 819297. Yet, in Martinez’s own
words, he never appealed this grievance denial because “in [his] eye the matter was
corrected.” (Doc. 27 at 9). In grievance number 862879, Martin was assigned as the
grievance officer. In her response, she explained the results of the March 26, 2020

KUB x-ray and that when test results are normal, no follow up is required. She also
offered Martinez the option of signing up for sick call to discuss the x-ray if he
desired. There is no deliberate indifference reflected in the relevant grievances.
The record also contradicts Martinez’s claims of deliberate indifference
against Martin. There is simply no evidence that Martin ever ignored a request
from Martinez, failed to respond to a grievance, failed to investigate a healthcare-

related issue brought to her attention, or committed any other act or omission
evincing deliberate indifference to Martinez’s serious medical needs. Martinez
argues that a jury should determine whether Martin was deliberately indifferent,
but he is mistaken. At the Rule 56 stage, he must proffer evidence sufficient to
demonstrate that a jury reasonably could find in his favor such that there is a need
for trial. See Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252) (alteration in original). Martinez has not done so.
We turn to the final defendant, Dr. Prince. Martinez has not responded in

any way to Dr. Prince’s motion for summary judgment. Dr. Prince argues that the
record clearly shows that there was no deliberate indifference to Martinez’s medical
needs. We agree.
We need not repeat the lengthy recitation of Martinez’s relevant medical
treatment at SCI Dallas. See supra, Section I. The gravamen of Martinez’s claim
against Dr. Prince is that Dr. Prince failed to communicate, and act on, the results
of the testing Martinez underwent in late 2019 and early 2020 for his kidney and

bladder issues. (See Doc. 1-2 ¶¶ 6-16, 29, 35, 46-48). This assertion is belied by the
record. Martinez’s medical records show that Dr. Prince promptly approved
requests for diagnostic studies, prescribed medication and further testing to treat
Martinez’s ailments, and communicated test results to Martinez either on his own
volition or when prompted by Martinez’s sick-call requests. The records likewise
demonstrate that Martinez was seen by multiple other SCI Dallas medical staff

during this time who also treated Martinez and responded to his concerns.
There was a period—from November 2019 to March 2020—where the medical
records reflect an absence of treatment for kidney and bladder issues. Martinez
contends that this lack of treatment and failure to communicate demonstrates
negligence on the part of SCI Dallas’s medical department, although he has not
proffered any evidence that he was suffering from symptoms during this time or
requested treatment and was ignored. Even when viewing the facts in a light most
favorable to Martinez—and as he himself described the situation in his grievances,
(see Doc. 1-2 at 19; Doc. 21-9 at 4)—this alleged absence of proactive medical

management and communication infers only potential negligence, not deliberate
indifference. And a showing of possible medical negligence is insufficient for an
Eighth Amendment claim. Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. We thus find that the factual
record is devoid of evidence of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” by Dr.
Prince. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
We make one additional observation. In his June 4, 2021 deposition,
Martinez voiced complaints regarding continuing and new medical issues that

occurred in late 2020 and early 2021. (See Doc. 21-2, Martinez Dep. 13:20-15:9,
17:13-18:15, 35:5-11; see also Doc. 24 ¶¶ 39-53). However, Martinez filed the instant
lawsuit in August 2020. At no time thereafter did he amend his complaint or file a
supplemental complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d).
Consequently, any issue regarding medical care (or lack thereof) that postdates the
filing of his complaint is irrelevant to this lawsuit.

In sum, Martinez has not carried his Rule 56 burden to proffer evidence of
deliberate indifference by any named defendant. Without such evidence, no jury
reasonably could find in his favor, so we must grant defendants’ motions for
summary judgment on Martinez’s Eighth Amendment claims. See Daniels, 776
F.3d at 192.
C. Medical Malpractice
Martinez never delineates his state-law claims of medical malpractice,
although his intent to do so is explicit. (See Doc. 1-2 ¶ 3 (stating that Martinez “is

asserting a professional liability claim against” Dr. Prince); Doc. 1-3 at 6, 7
(certificates of merit for Martin and Dr. Prince for professional liability action as
required by PA. R. CIV. P. 1042.3(a)); see also Doc. 29 at 2 ¶ 3). Defendants do not
address these claims in their Rule 56 motions or briefing. Because we must grant
summary judgment in defendants’ favor on the Section 1983 claims over which we
have original jurisdiction, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Martinez’s remaining state-law claims of medical negligence. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3).
IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will grant defendants’ motions (Docs. 18, 22)
for summary judgment with respect to Martinez’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
We decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: January 19, 2022

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10411241. Public record. Not legal advice.