# Williams v. Wetzel

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · November 3, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10410742

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** November 3, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10410742

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that pro se parties “cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants”
- noting that when considering a motion to dismiss, courts may consider “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading”
- holding that the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA applies to grievance procedures “regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RONELL WILLIAMS, :
Plaintiff :
: No. 1:21-cv-114
v. :
: (Judge Rambo)
JOHN WETZEL, et al., :
Defendants :

MEMORANDUM
This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Mayer (“Mayer”)’s
motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 31) and amended motion to dismiss and/or for summary
judgment (Doc. No. 37), as well as Defendant Pepper (“Pepper”)’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. No. 34).
I. BACKGROUND
On January 21, 2021, pro se Plaintiff Ronell Williams (“Plaintiff”), who is
currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution Fayette in LaBelle,
Pennsylvania (“SCI Fayette”), initiated the above-captioned case by filing a
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants John Wetzel (“Wetzel”);
C.O. John Doe 1; Superintendent Laurel Harry (“Harry”); John Doe 2, a dentist at
SCI Camp Hill; Superintendent Mark Capozza (“Capozza”), and John Doe 3, a
dentist at SCI Fayette. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that on December 18, 2019,
he was transported from SCI Greene to SCI Camp Hill; Defendant John Doe 1 “was
on duty as a transporter” during this time. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 11.) Once Plaintiff arrived
at SCI Camp Hill, he was escorted into a holding cell, where all inmates were ordered
to strip and face the wall. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff avers that Defendant John Doe 1

“approached [him] from behind, grabbed [his] head[,] then banged [his] face against
a wall, knocking out [his] front, left tooth in the process.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff was
bleeding from the mouth and requested medical care. (Id. ¶ 16.) Defendant John

Doe 1 denied him care and ordered him to give him the tooth. (Id.) Plaintiff
complied and Defendant John Doe 1 left with the tooth. (Id.) Plaintiff “filed a
medical request slip to receive medical care days later.” (Id. ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff reported the assault to Defendant John Doe 2, and Defendant John

Doe 2 “informed Plaintiff his medical needs would get resolved at the next prison.”
(Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff avers that Defendant John Doe 2 failed to provide antibiotics,
pain relief, and a replacement tooth. (Id.) Security staff at SCI Camp Hill

interviewed Plaintiff; soon after that, Plaintiff was transferred to SCI Fayette “with
his medical issue unresolved.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff avers that Defendant John Doe
3 also failed to provide antibiotics, pain relief, and a replacement tooth. (Id. ¶ 20.)
He maintains that “[o]nly after learning of Plaintiff’s intention to file this complaint

did Defendant Doe #3 beg[i]n the process of issuing a replacement tooth.” (Id.
¶ 21.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts violations of his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. ¶¶ 22-37.) He seeks damages as well as

declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. ¶¶ 39-48.)
In a Memorandum and Order dated January 28, 2021, the Court granted
Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and screened his complaint pursuant to

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (Doc. Nos. 7, 8.) Specifically, the
Court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Wetzel and
Harry, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants John Does

1 and 2. (Doc. No. 8.) The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended
complaint with respect to these claims within thirty (30) days. (Id.) The Court also
transferred Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Capozza and John Doe 3 to the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania for further

proceedings. (Id.) The Court advised Plaintiff that if he did not file an amended
complaint, the above-captioned action would proceed as to his Eighth Amendment
claims against Defendants John Does 1 and 2.

Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint. Accordingly, in an Order dated
March 10, 2021, the Court directed Plaintiff to either provide names for Defendants
John Does 1 and 2 or submit a proposed Rule 45 subpoena, limited to discovering
the identities of Defendants John Does 1 and 2. (Doc. No. 9.) After receiving an

extension of time to do so (Doc. Nos. 10, 11), Plaintiff filed a motion for discovery
order on April 5, 2021 (Doc. No. 12). In an Order dated April 8, 2021, the Court
granted Plaintiff’s motion, directed the Clerk of Court to issue a blank but signed

subpoena form to Plaintiff, and directed Plaintiff to complete and return the
subpoena to the Clerk’s office within thirty (30) days. (Doc. No. 14.) Plaintiff
returned the subpoena on April 29, 2021, and it was forwarded to the United States

Marshals Service for service.
Prior to service of the subpoenas, Plaintiff submitted identifying information
for Defendants John Does 1 and 2. (Doc. No. 17.) He identified John Doe 1 as

Corrections Officer Mayer and John Doe 2 as dentist Larry Pepper. (Id.) In an Order
dated June 28, 2021, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to substitute these
individuals for John Does 1 and 2 and directed service of the complaint upon them.
(Doc. No. 18.) After Defendants Mayer and Pepper appeared, the Court directed

them to file their answers or other responses to Plaintiff’s complaint on or before
August 30, 2021. (Doc. No. 28.) Defendant Pepper moved for and was granted an
extension of time, until September 26, 2021, to file his response. (Doc. Nos. 29, 30

Defendant Mayer filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 31) on August 27, 2021.
He filed his brief in support on September 10, 2021. (Doc. No. 32.) Defendant
Mayer asserts that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. (Id.) In an Order entered September 13, 2021, the Court

informed the parties that, pursuant to Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.
2018), it would consider the exhaustion issue in the context of summary judgment,
and by doing so, would consider matters outside the pleadings in its role as

factfinder. (Doc. No. 33.) The Court directed Defendant Mayer to file a statement
of material facts within fourteen (14) days and directed Plaintiff to respond to the
motion within thirty (30) days of the date on which Defendant Mayer filed his

statement of material facts. (Id.) Defendant Mayer subsequently filed an amended
motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment and a statement of facts. (Doc. Nos.
37, 38.)

On September 23, 2021, Defendant Pepper filed a motion for summary
judgment in which he also raises the issue of administrative exhaustion. (Doc. No.
34.) The Court gave notice to the parties, pursuant to Paladino, in an Order dated
September 23, 2021, and directed Plaintiff to respond to Defendant Pepper’s motion

within thirty (30) days. (Doc. No. 35.) Plaintiff, however, has not filed responses
to Defendants Mayer and Pepper’s motions, and has not sought an extension of time
to do so.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must
accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences

that can be drawn from them, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). The Court’s
inquiry is guided by the standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Under Twombly and Iqbal,
pleading requirements have shifted to a “more heightened form of pleading.” See
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). To prevent dismissal,

all civil complaints must set out “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Id. The plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility
that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. As the Supreme Court

instructed in Iqbal, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has
not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

Accordingly, to determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and
Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified the
following steps a district court must take when determining the sufficiency of a

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6): (1) identify the elements a plaintiff must plead to
state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint “not
entitled” to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any “well-pleaded
factual allegations” contained in the complaint “plausibly give rise to an entitlement

to relief.” See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a

court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters
of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s
claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d

Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998
F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). A court may also consider “any ‘matters
incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice,

matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.’”
Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 5B
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d Ed.
2004)); see also Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.

2002) (noting that when considering a motion to dismiss, courts may consider
“documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no
party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading”).

In the context of pro se prisoner litigation specifically, the court must be
mindful that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,”
must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”

and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond a doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
B. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to render summary

judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute

between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material
fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed
fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome

of the case under applicable substantive law. Id. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers,
Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters
and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court
must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.

Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963
F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59
(3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may

not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. When the party
seeking summary judgment satisfies its burden under Rule 56 of identifying
evidence which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the

nonmoving party is required by Rule 56 to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories or the like in order to demonstrate specific
material facts which give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 324 (1986). The party opposing the motion “must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Electric
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). When Rule 56 shifts the
burden of production to the nonmoving party, that party must produce evidence to

show the existence of every element essential to its case which it bears the burden
of proving at trial, for “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element
of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir.
1992).
In determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the court must
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. White,

826 F.2d at 59. In doing so, the Court must accept the nonmovant’s allegations as
true and resolve any conflicts in his favor. Id. (citations omitted). However, a party
opposing a summary judgment motion must comply with Local Rule 56.1, which

specifically directs the oppositional party to submit a “statement of the material
facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required [to
be filed by the movant], as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue

to be tried”; if the nonmovant fails to do so, “[a]ll material facts set forth in the
statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted.”
L.R. 56.1. A party cannot evade these litigation responsibilities in this regard simply

by citing the fact that he is a pro se litigant. These rules apply with equal force to
all parties. See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(noting that pro se parties “cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the
same rules that apply to all other litigants”).

C. Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress for
violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The statute states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.

Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means
through which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.”
See Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). To state a cause of action
under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct complained of was

committed by persons acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct violated a
right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
III. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS1
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at SCI Fayette and was housed at SCI Camp
Hill from December 18, 2019 until March 5, 2020. (Doc. Nos. 34-2 ¶¶ 2-3; 38 ¶¶ 2-

3.) Defendant Pepper “is an oral and maxillofacial surgeon who provides treatment
in this specialty as an outside consultant to inmates of several prison facilities within
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.” (Doc. No. 34-2 ¶ 4.) All inmates

1 The Local Rules provide that in addition to the requirement that a party file a brief in opposition
to the moving party’s brief in support of its motion, “[t]he papers opposing a motion for summary
judgment shall include a separate, short and concise statement of material facts responding to the
numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement [of material facts filed by the moving party] . . . as
to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.” See M.D. Pa. L.R. 56. 1.
The Rule further requires the inclusion of references to the parts of the record that support the
statements. See id. Finally, the Rule states that the statement of material facts required to be
served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement
required to be served by the opposing party. See id. Unless otherwise noted, the background
herein is derived from the Rule 56.1 statements of facts filed by Defendants Mayer and Pepper.
(Doc. Nos. 34-2, 38.) Plaintiff has not filed responsive statements’ to Defendants’ Rule 56.1
statements of facts. Accordingly, unless otherwise noted, the Court deems the facts set forth by
Defendants to be undisputed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1; United States v.
Alberto, No. 3:18-cv-1014, 2020 WL 730316, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2020) (concluding that the
“[f]ailure to file this [responsive statement of material facts] results in admission of the moving
party’s statement of facts”).
seen by Defendant Pepper “are referred to him by other prison medical or dental
staff members.” (Id. ¶ 5.) During the time that Plaintiff was at SCI Camp Hill,

Defendant Pepper was there to treat patients on January 7, 2020, January 21, 2020,
February 4, 2020, and February 18, 2020. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant Pepper’s review of
medical records indicates that he never saw or treated Plaintiff “on these or any other

dates.” (Id.)
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ inmate grievance system is set
forth in DC-ADM 804. (Doc. Nos. 34-2 ¶ 8; 38 ¶ 4.) This policy provides “the
means for an inmate to file a written grievance for redress of complaints.” (Id.) If

an inmate is not satisfied with the response, he may appeal to the facility manager
or Superintendent. (Id.) “If this first level appeal is not satisfactory, the final appeal
is to the Chief of the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals

[(“SOIGA”)].” (Id.) “An inmate must complete this process through the final appeal
to the SOIGA as a prerequisite of filing a federal suit.” (Id.) Once SOIGA has
considered the grievance on its merits, ‘the administrative remedy has been
exhausted as to that grievance, regardless of the results of its review.” (Id.) “All

inmates are provided with a summary of the DC-ADM 804.” (Doc. Nos. 34-2 ¶ 9;
38 ¶ 5.)
“The back up to the Facility Grievance Coordinator at SCI Camp Hill searched

the Automated Inmate Grievance Tracking System for all grievances in conjunction
with he within litigation.” (Doc. Nos. 34-2 ¶ 10; 38 ¶ 6.) That search revealed that
during his time at SCI Camp Hill, Plaintiff filed two (2) grievances, “one regarding

his inmate account and the other regarding clothing issues.” (Doc. Nos. 34-2 ¶ 11;
38 ¶ 7.) Plaintiff did not file any grievances related to any “alleged encounter with
Defendant Mayer or any problem with staff.” (Doc. No. 38 ¶ 8.) Moreover, Plaintiff

did not file any grievances regarding a “treatment visit with [Defendant] Pepper
during the time he was housed at SCI Camp Hill or since that time.” (Doc. No. 34-
2 ¶ 12.) Defendant Pepper was never notified of any grievances, and he was never
served with a copy of any grievances. (Id. ¶ 7.)

IV. DISCUSSION
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner must
pursue all available avenues of relief through the applicable grievance system before

initiating a federal civil rights action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Booth v. Churner,
532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001) (“[A]n inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms
of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues.”). Section 1997e
provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under [S]ection 1983 of this title, or any other [f]ederal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion

requirement is mandatory. See Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007);
see also Booth, 532 U.S. at 742 (holding that the exhaustion requirement of the
PLRA applies to grievance procedures “regardless of the relief offered through

administrative procedures”).
The Third Circuit has further provided that there is no futility exception to
Section 1997e’s exhaustion requirement. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75-76

(3d Cir. 2000). Courts have typically required across-the-board exhaustion by
inmates seeking to pursue claims in federal court. See id. Additionally, courts have
interpreted this exhaustion requirement as including a procedural default component,
holding that inmates must fully satisfy the administrative requirements of the inmate

grievance process before proceeding with a claim in federal court. See Spruill v.
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Oriakhi v. United States, 165 F. App’x
991, 993 (3d Cir. 2006) (providing that “there appears to be unanimous circuit court

consensus that a prisoner may not fulfill the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement by
exhausting administrative remedies after the filing of the complaint in federal
court”). Courts have also concluded that inmates who fail to complete the prison
grievance process in a full and timely manner are barred from subsequently litigating

claims in federal court. See, e.g., Bolla v. Strickland, 304 F. App’x 22 (3d Cir. 2008).
This broad rule favoring full exhaustion allows for a narrowly-defined
exception; if the actions of prison officials directly caused the inmate’s procedural

default as to a grievance, the inmate will not be required to comply strictly with this
exhaustion requirement. See Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000).
However, courts also recognize a clear “reluctance to invoke equitable reasons to

excuse [an inmate’s] failure to exhaust as the statute requires.” See Davis v.
Warman, 49 F. App’x 365, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, an inmate’s failure to exhaust
will be excused only “under certain limited circumstances,” see Harris v.

Armstrong, 149 F. App’x 58, 59 (3d Cir. 2005), and an inmate may defeat a claim
of failure to exhaust only by showing “he was misled or that there was some
extraordinary reason he was prevented from complying with the statutory
mandate.” See Warman, 49 F. App’x at 368.

In the absence of competent proof that an inmate was misled by corrections
officials, or some other extraordinary circumstances warranting a departure from
strict compliance with the exhaustion requirement, courts frequently reject inmate

requests for their failure to exhaust to be excused. An inmate, therefore, may not
excuse a failure to comply with these grievance procedures in a timely manner by
simply claiming that his efforts constituted “substantial compliance” with this
statutory exhaustion requirement. See Harris, 149 F. App’x at 59. Furthermore, an

inmate may not avoid this exhaustion requirement by merely alleging that the
administrative policies were not clearly explained to him. See Warman, 49 F. App’x
at 368. Consequently, an inmate’s confusion regarding these grievances procedures

does not, alone, excuse a failure to exhaust. See Casey v. Smith, 71 F. App’x 916
(3d Cir. 2003); see also Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t
is well established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se

petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.’” (citations omitted)).
Recently, the Supreme Court considered what renders administrative
remedies unavailable to an inmate such that a failure to exhaust may be excused.

See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016). The Court noted “three kinds of
circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the books,
is not capable of use to obtain relief.” See id. at 643. First, an administrative
procedure is not available “when (despite what regulations or guidance materials

may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently
unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.” See id. Second, a procedure
is not available when it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable

of use.” See id. Finally, a procedure is unavailable when “prison administrators
thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misinterpretation, or intimidation.” See id. at 644. However, “once the defendant
has established that the inmate failed to resort to administrative remedies, the onus

falls on the inmate to show that such remedies were unavailable to him.” See Rinaldi
v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018). The Third Circuit recently
established that:

to defeat a failure-to-exhaust defense based on a misrepresentation by
prison staff, an inmate must show (1) that the misrepresentation is one
which a reasonable inmate would be entitled to rely on and sufficiently
misleading to interfere with a reasonable inmate’s use of the grievance
process, and (2) that the inmate was actually misled by the
misrepresentation.

Hardy v. Shaikh, 959 F.3d 578, 588 (3d Cir. 2020).
Defendants Mayer and Pepper maintain that they are entitled to summary
judgment because Plaintiff did not file a single grievance related to his allegations
against them. (Doc. Nos. 32 at 6-7; 36 at 10-11.) In support, Defendants have
provided a declaration from Deborah L. Alvord, the Superintendent’s Assistant at
SCI Camp Hill. (Doc. No. 32-1.) One of Ms. Alvord’s responsibilities is to serve
as the back up to the Facility Grievance Coordinator at SCI Camp Hill. (Id. at 2.)
According to her review of the Automated Inmate Grievance Tracking System,

Plaintiff filed two (2) grievances during his time at SCI Camp Hill. (Id. at 4.) “One
of the grievances was in regard to his account and the other concerned basic clothing
issues.” (Id.) Thus, the record before the Court establishes that Plaintiff never filed

a grievance regarding the claims he raises against Defendants Mayer and Pepper.
Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants’ motions and, therefore, has not refuted
the defense that he failed to properly exhaust the claims before the Court. The PLRA
requires full and proper exhaustion prior to the initiation of Plaintiff’s claims in

federal court, and this Court cannot excuse compliance with those requirements.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to suggest that the administrative
remedy procedure was rendered unavailable to him. The Court, therefore, will grant
Defendants Mayer and Pepper’s motions on the basis that Plaintiff failed to properly
exhaust his administrative remedies.

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Mayer’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No.
31) and amended motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment (Doc. No. 37), as

well as Defendant Pepper’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 34), will be
granted. An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: November 3, 2021

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10410742. Public record. Not legal advice.