# Wells v. Wetzel

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · March 30, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10410145

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 30, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10410145

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that officials’ handling of prison grievance procedures does not equate to personal liability in a civil rights claim
- holding that periodic reviews by the PRC comport with minimum constitutional standards for due process

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DEMETRIOUS WELLS, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-0842

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

JOHN WETZEL, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM
I. Background
Plaintiff, an inmate confined in the State Correctional Institution,
Huntingdon, (“SCI-Huntingdon”) Pennsylvania, filed this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (Doc. 1). On April 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed an
amended complaint. (Doc. 20). Plaintiff names as Defendants John Wetzel,
Department of Corrections Secretary and the following SCI-Huntingdon
employees: Superintendent Tabb Bickell; Deputy Superintendent of Facility
Management J. Eckard; Deputy Superintendent of Centralized Services
M.C. Garman; Unit Manager B. Hollibaugh; and Captain John Doe. Id.
Plaintiff alleges he was assigned to the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU)
at SCI Huntingdon on June 18, 2009, because he had a pending capital
case. (Doc. 20, amended complaint).
Plaintiff states that he met with Defendants Eckard, Garman, and/or

Hollibaugh who were members of the Program Review Committee (PRC) but
they continually denied his release from the RHU because of his pending
capital case. Id. Plaintiff was released into general population on October 15,

2014, when the death penalty was removed from his criminal case. Id.
Plaintiff alleges his confinement in the RHU from June 2009 through October
2014 violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
For relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as

declaratory relief “declar[ing] unconstitutional and unlawful defendants’
actions in depriving plaintiff of his rights to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment when forcing plaintiff to Administrative Custody from June 2009

through October 2014 without a compelling justification and/or factual
supporting evidence to sustain plaintiff’s confinement.” Id.
By Memorandum and Order dated March 28, 2019, this Court denied
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that Plaintiff’s submissions created a

sustainable question of fact as to whether Plaintiff’s placement in the RHU
pursuant to DC-ADM 802 was appropriate in the first instance. (Docs. 48,
49)
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. (Doc. 69). The motion is fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.

For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.

II. Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to render
summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]his standard provides that the mere existence
of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement

is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence
would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Id. at

248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An
issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am.,
927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).

When determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact,
the court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v.

Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse
Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). In order to avoid summary
judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the
unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. When the party seeking

summary judgment satisfies its burden under Rule 56 of identifying evidence
which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the
nonmoving party is required by Rule 56 to go beyond his pleadings with

affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or the like in order to
demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to a genuine issue.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The party opposing the
motion “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to
the nonmoving party, that party must produce evidence to show the

existence of every element essential to its case which it bears the burden of
proving at trial, for “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d
846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).
In determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the court must

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
White, 826 F.2d at 59. In doing so, the Court must accept the nonmovant’s
allegations as true and resolve any conflicts in his favor. Id. (citations
omitted). However, a party opposing a summary judgment motion must

comply with Local Rule 56.1, which specifically directs the oppositional party
to submit a “statement of the material facts, responding to the numbered
paragraphs set forth in the statement required [to be filed by the movant], as

to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried”; if the
nonmovant fails to do so, “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement
required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted.”
L.R. 56.1. A party cannot evade these litigation responsibilities in this regard

simply by citing the fact that he is a pro se litigant. These rules apply with
equal force to all parties. See Sanders v. Beard, No. 09-CV-1384, 2010 WL
2853261, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2010) (pro se parties “are not excused

from complying with court orders and the local rules of court”); Thomas v.
Norris, No. 02-CV-01854, 2006 WL 2590488, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2006)
(pro se parties must follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

III. Statement of Undisputed Facts1
The Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office charged the Plaintiff with first

degree murder, noting at the time that the Plaintiff had previously been
convicted of another murder and of voluntary manslaughter, both of which
made him eligible for the death penalty. (Doc. 71-1 at 2, Criminal Information;
see also 18 Pa. Con. Stat. §9711(d)(11) and (12). Under former DC-ADM

802, an inmate who had a pending capital case (one where the prosecution

1 The Local Rules of Court provide that in addition to filing a brief in
opposition to the moving party’s brief in support of its motion, “[t]he papers
opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and
concise statement of material facts responding to the numbered paragraphs
set forth in the statement [of material facts filed by the moving party]...as to
which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.” M.D. Pa.
L.R. 56. 1. The Rule further requires the inclusion of references to the parts
of the record that support the statements. Id. Finally, the Rule states that the
statement of material facts required to be served by the moving party will be
deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be
served by the opposing party. See id. Unless otherwise noted, the factual
background herein is taken from Defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement of material
facts. (Doc. 71). Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendants’ statement of
facts in compliance with M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. Thus, the Court deems the facts
set forth by Defendants to be undisputed. See M.D. Pa. LR 56. 1; Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
is seeking the death penalty) was to be housed in Administrative Custody,
Level 5 Status. (Doc. 31-2 at 6, former DC-ADM 802, Section 1(A)(1)(i)).

On April 1, 2014, Plaintiff’s case was re-designated as non-capital.
(Doc. 71-2 at 2). The Plaintiff was removed from Administrative Custody,
Level 5 Status, on October 15, 2014. (Doc. 20 at 12).

During Plaintiff’s confinement in Administrative Custody, Plaintiff had
“periodic time and/or monthly appearances before PRC” and “conducted
extensive interviews with Plaintiff” to assess Plaintiff’s situation and
determine if he should be released to general population. (Doc. 20 at 7).

IV. Discussion
Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress

for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See
42 U.S.C. §1983. The statute states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.

Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means
through which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state
actors.” See Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa.
2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). To

state a cause of action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1)
the conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of
state law; and (2) the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Harvey v. Plains Twp.
Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

It is well settled that suits for damages by individuals against, inter alia,
state officers acting in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1985)

(holding that claims for damages against a state officer acting in his official
capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Chittister v. Dep’t of
Community and Economic Development, 226 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding that individuals are barred from seeking monetary damages from

state governments or state agencies). See also Bey v. Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, 98 F.Supp.2d 650, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2000) wherein
the court summarized well-established law, observing that:

[t]he Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Thus,
under the Eleventh Amendment, absent express consent by the
state in question or a clear and unequivocal waiver by Congress,
states are immune from suit in federal court. See Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).

Id.; see also Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161 (3d
Cir. 2002).
Thus, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against the Defendants in their
official capacities.
B. Personal Involvement
It is well established that personal liability under section 1983 cannot
be imposed upon a state official based on a theory of respondeat superior.
See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg
Prison Officials, 1546 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 1976). It is also well settled
in the Third Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged
constitutional deprivations is a requirement in a §1983 case and that a

complaint must allege such personal involvement. Id. Each named
defendant must be shown, through the complaint’s allegations, to have been
personally involved in the events or occurrences upon which Plaintiff’s claims
are based. Id. As the Court stated in Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,
1207 (3d Cir.1998):

A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs .... [P]ersonal involvement can
be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or
actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made
with appropriate particularity. (Citations omitted).

See also Fisher v. Matthews, 792 F.Supp.2d 745 (M.D.Pa. 2011)
(citing Rode, supra). Furthermore, merely responding to a prisoner’s
grievances is insufficient to establish personal involvement. See Alexander
v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x.924 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Brooks v. Beard,167
F.App’x. 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that a claim of inappropriate
response to an inmate’s grievances does not establish “personal
involvement on the part of . . . prison officials and administrators[]”).
Here, the Plaintiff’s sole mention of Defendant Bickell in the amended
complaint is that Defendant Bickell reviewed an appeal of the PRC’s decision
to not release the Plaintiff from administrative custody. (Doc. 20 at 9-10), ¶¶
21-23. This after-the-fact review of other individuals’ decisions does not
establish Defendant Bickell’s personal involvement, so he is entitled to

summary judgment in his favor. Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F.Supp.2d 454, 469
(M.D. Pa. 2010) (holding that officials’ handling of prison grievance
procedures does not equate to personal liability in a civil rights claim).
Likewise, Defendant Wetzel was only involved by reviewing a subsequent
appeal filed by the Plaintiff, which is also insufficient to establish his personal

involvement. (Doc. 20 at 10-11. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff claims
that Defendant Wetzel “Has the overall supervisory and responsibility to the
general control of the Pennsylvania Correctional Facilities, including ‘SCI-

Huntingdon,’” such claims amount to nothing more than an attempt to impose
supervisory liability on Defendant Wetzel, which does not rise to the level of
personal involvement. See Rizzo, supra.
Based upon an application of the above standards, Plaintiff has failed

to satisfy the personal involvement requirement standard of Rode with
respect to Defendants Bickell and Wetzel, and they are entitled to summary
judgment.

C. Eighth Amendment – Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Plaintiff claims that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment was violated by his continued placement in
administrative custody from June 2009 through October 2014. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff’s claim is not cognizable because, inter alia, he has failed
to show a serious deprivation. The Court agrees.
In order to state an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must allege both

that he has been denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”
and that this was done while the Defendants had a “sufficiently culpable state
of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, (1994). To violate the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, conditions cited
by an inmate must be “objectively, sufficiently serious [and] must result in the
denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 834

(internal citation and quotation omitted). Only “extreme deprivations” are
sufficient to make out a conditions of confinement claim. Hudson v. McMillen,
503 U.S. 1,8–9 (1992). A plaintiff must prove that the deprivation is
sufficiently serious when viewed within the context of “contemporary

standards of decency.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993).
Although a combination of confinement conditions—considered alone
constitutionally insufficient—may present an Eighth Amendment violation,

they nevertheless must cumulatively produce “the deprivation of a single,
identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise....” See Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
In applying this test, the Court acknowledges that “[t]he Constitution ...

does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
“ ‘[S]egregated confinement in solitary or maximum security is not per se
banned by the Eighth Amendment.’ ” Clifton v. Robinson, 500 F.Supp. 30,

34 (E.D. Pa. 1980), quoting Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771, 777 (8th Cir.
1979). Moreover, “the indefinite duration of the inmates’ segregation does
not render it unconstitutional.” In re Long Term Administrative Segregation

of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464, 472 (4th Cir. 1999).
The length of time that a prisoner must go without benefits is “simply one
consideration among many” in the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Hutto v.

Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978).
Here, Plaintiff complains that “[d]uring his unjustified confinement in
the ‘RHU’, plaintiff was not entitled to full access to the institution’s
commissary, showers, exercise, telephone, recreation and educational

programs.” (Doc. 20 at 6). While Plaintiff complains of not being “entitled to
full access”, he does not claim to have been completely denied access to
any of these amenities.

Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that “‘isolation from
companionship, restriction on intellectual stimulation[,] and prolonged
inactivity, inescapable accompaniments of segregated confinement, will not
render [solitary] confinement unconstitutional absent other illegitimate

deprivations.’” Washington-El v. Beard, 2010 WL 6065083, at *11 (W.D. Pa.
Dec. 16, 2010), quoting, Five Percenters, 174 F.3d at 472 (4th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 861
(4th Cir. 1975) (en banc)).2 Because Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim
regarding the conditions of his solitary confinement fails to identify any

“illegitimate” deprivation of a constitutional right, Defendants are entitled to
judgment on this claim.
D. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

To establish a Due Process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Plaintiff must first demonstrate the existence of a constitutionally protected
liberty or property interest impaired by Defendants’ actions. Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460 (1983); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). If there is

no protected interest, there is no need to determine whether the alleged
deprivation was without due process. Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 101, 116 (3d
Cir. 2000). However, if the court determines that the interest asserted is

protected by the Due Process Clause, the question then becomes what
process is due to protect it. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.
In response to Plaintiff’s due process challenge, Defendants argue that
no due process rights were violated because no liberty interest was at stake.

2 In support of his claim, Plaintiff cites a case in which the courts have
upheld Eighth Amendment claims involving nearly identical allegations by a
prisoner subjected to long-term solitary confinement; however, the period of
confinement at issue in that case was considerably longer than the time
period at issue here and, thus, makes that case markedly distinguishable
from the present case. See, Shoatz v. Wetzel, 2016 WL 595337 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 12, 2016) (22 consecutive years of solitary confinement).
Specifically, Defendants point out that long periods of confinement under
highly restrictive conditions have been held insufficient to trigger the

protections of the Due Process Clause, citing, inter alia, Griffin v. Vaughn,
112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997) (fifteen months in administrative custody), and
Diaz v. Canino, 502 Fed. Appx. 213 (3d Cir. 2012) (360 days of disciplinary

custody did not implicate a liberty interest). Additionally, Defendants note
that the Supreme Court held in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), that
“discipline in segregated confinement d[oes] not present the type of atypical,
significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty

interest.” 515 U.S. at 486. In reaching this conclusion, however, the Sandin
court “did not pronounce a per se rule.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 531
(3d Cir. 2003).

“In deciding whether a protected liberty interest exists under Sandin,
we consider the duration of the disciplinary confinement and the conditions
of that confinement in relation to other prison conditions.” Mitchell, 318 F.3d
at 531-32, citing Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000). In

applying these factors, the Third Circuit has reached differing conclusions,
“reflecting the fact-specific nature of the Sandin test.” Mitchell, 318 F.3d at
532, comparing, inter alia, Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144 (eight years in

administrative confinement, during which inmate was locked in his cell for all
but two hours per week, denied contact with his family, and prohibited him
from visiting the library or “participating in any education, vocational, or other

organization activities,” clearly implicated a protected liberty interest), with
Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002)(seven months of
disciplinary confinement did not implicate a liberty interest), and Griffin v.

Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-09 (3d Cir. 1997) (administrative custody for a
period of fifteen months with strict limits on property, visitation, and out-of-
cell activities did not implicate inmate’s due process rights).
Here, at the time this lawsuit was filed, Plaintiff had remained in solitary

confinement for a period of five years. During this time, the record suggests
that Plaintiff has been exposed to conditions comparable to those
experienced by the plaintiff in Shoats, which were found to have imposed

significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that he “has a protected
liberty interest that has been adversely affected by his indefinite segregation
in administrative custody.” Shoats, 213 F.3d at 144.

Nonetheless, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has been afforded all of
the process that he is due. Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiff,
himself, admits to having received the requisite periodic reviews by the PRC,

which is all the process that is required. See Washington-El, 2013 WL
1314528, at *9, citing Bowen v. Ryan, 248 Fed. Appx. 302, 304-05 (3d Cir.
2007) (finding that, even though 20 years of administrative custody

implicated a liberty interest, “the procedures provided by the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections satisfy the minimal standards for due process”).
See also Delker v. McCullough, 103 Fed. Appx. 694 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding

that the DOC’s periodic reviews of status provided inmate due process to
which he was entitled for continuing placement in administrative
confinement), citing Shoats, 213 F.3d at 147 (holding that periodic reviews
by the PRC comport with minimum constitutional standards for due process).

While Plaintiff disputes the efficacy of the PRC reviews, particularly
regarding his continued placement on administrative custody, Plaintiff
acknowledges having received the periodic reviews to which he is due. (Doc.

20 at 7-11). Thus, his procedural due process claim is without merit and
Defendants are entitled to judgment.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert a substantive due
process claim, he must prove that he was “deprived of a protected property

interest by arbitrary or capricious government action.” Shoatz v. Wetzel,
2016 WL 595337, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2016), citing Sameric Corp. v.
City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998). This he cannot do, as

the record demonstrates that he was placed in administrative custody, albeit
unfortunately, pursuant to former DC-ADM 802, which, at the time, mandated
administrative custody for inmates with a pending capital case. Thus, his

substantive due process claim is meritless.
E. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Plaintiff claims that “Defendants’ action in depriving Plaintiff of rights

not to be treated differently by a state actor without a compelling justification
and timely notice violated Plaintiff’s rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.” (Doc. 20 at 13). In so doing, Plaintiff essentially asserts a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, invoking the “class of one”

theory announced by the Supreme Court in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,
528 U.S. 562 (2000). According to the “class of one” theory, “a plaintiff must
allege that (1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly

situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational
basis for the difference in treatment.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d
225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006), citing Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
Plaintiff, however, has failed to show a lack of rational basis for his

removal from general population. The burden is upon the Plaintiff to negate
“any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification.” Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531

U.S. 356, 367 (2001), quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993);
Ramsgate Court Townhome Ass’n v. West Chester Borough, 313 F.3d 157,
160 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff was removed

from general population and placed in administrative custody pursuant to
DC-ADM 802, which mandated administrative custody for inmates with a
pending capital case. Thus, Plaintiff is unable to negate the rational basis

given for his placement in administrative custody and his equal protection
claim should be dismissed accordingly.
F. Injunctive/Declaratory Relief
It is well recognized that the adjudicatory power of a federal court

depends upon “the continuing existence of a live and acute controversy.”
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974). “The rule in federal cases is
that an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely

at the time the complaint is filed.” Id. at 459 n. 10 (citations omitted). “Past
exposure to illegal conduct is insufficient to sustain a present case or
controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by continuing,
present adverse effects.” Rosenberg v. Meese, 622 F.Supp. 1451, 1462

(S.D.N.Y.1985) (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)). A
prisoner’s transfer or release from prison moots his claims for injunctive or
declaratory relief since he is no longer subject to the conditions he alleges

are unconstitutional. Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206-207 (3d
Cir.1993); see also Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27 (3d Cir.1981) (“[A]
prisoner lacks standing to seek injunctive relief if he is no longer subject to

the alleged conditions he attempts to challenge.”).
In the case sub judice, it is apparent that Plaintiff made a request that
this Court “declare unconstitutional and unlawful defendants [sic] actions in

depriving plaintiff of his rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
when forcing plaintiff to administrative custody from June 2009 through
October 2014 without a compelling justification and/or factual supporting
evidence to sustain Plaintiff’s confinement.” (Doc. 20 at 14). The record

before the Court demonstrates that Plaintiff was subsequently transferred
out of administrative custody.
In light of these circumstances, there is nothing in the record to suggest

that there exists a reasonable probability of Plaintiff's return to administrative
custody in the foreseeable future. Consequently, Plaintiff's claim for
injunctive relief is moot and will be dismissed. See Fortes v. Harding, 19
F.Supp.2d 323, 326 (M.D.Pa.1998) (“Fortes’ transfer to another institution

moots any claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.”).
VI. Conclusion
Based upon the undisputed facts of record, Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment will be granted.

An appropriate order shall issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge

Dated: March 30, 2021

16-0842-02

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10410145. Public record. Not legal advice.