# Shaeffer v. United States

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 29, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408936

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 29, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408936

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[a] petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must be filed in the district in which the petitioner is imprisoned” (citing Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004))

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :
: No. 1:18-cr-00317-YK
v. :
: (Judge Kane)
BRIAN D. SHEAFFER, :
Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is Defendant Brian D. Sheaffer (“Defendant”)’s “motion to
convert custodial sentence to home confinement with electronic monitoring.” (Doc. No. 54.)
Having been fully briefed (Doc. Nos. 55, 57, 58), Defendant’s motion is ripe for disposition. For
the reasons that follow, the Court will: (1) deny Defendant’s motion without prejudice to the
extent it seeks compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582; (2) deny Defendant’s motion
to the extent it seeks review by this Court of the BOP’s denial of Defendant’s request for
compassionate release; and (3) direct the Clerk of Court to open a corresponding civil action and
docket Defendant’s motion seeking home confinement as a motion for a petition of writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 5, 2020, the Court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment twenty-
four (24) months, following Defendant’s conviction for mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341. (Doc. No. 51.) Defendant is currently housed at the Federal Correctional Institution
Schuylkill (“FCI Schuylkill”), with a projected release date of November 16, 2021. On May 22,
2020, Defendant filed the instant motion as a result of the global COVID-19 pandemic, arguing
that he should be permitted to serve the remainder of his sentence in home confinement because
he “is 58 years old and has an underlying medical condition of poorly controlled diabetes
mellitus[] and is considered a high risk individual for exposure to COVID-19.” (Doc. No. 54 at
2.) Defendant maintains that he “is particularly vulnerable and at considerable risk if exposed to
COVID-19, and the conditions at FCI Schuylkill heighten [his] risk of serious illness[] or death.”
(Id. at 3.) In light of such concerns, Defendant previously submitted a counseled letter to the
Warden of FCI Schuylkill requesting release from custody, which reads, in pertinent part, as

follows:
I write to urge you to release my client, Brian Sheaffer (# 76568-067) to home
confinement immediately, pursuant to the directive issued by Attorney General
William Barr.

Mr. Sheaffer is 58 years old, and thus is extremely vulnerable to severe illness and
possible death from COVID-19 if exposed. Moreover, Mr. Sheaffer was
diagnosed with diabetes in 2018, which places him at a heightened risk of severe
illness if exposed to COVID-19. . . . Allowing Mr. Sheaffer to be placed on home
confinement significantly decreases his risk of serious illness, and decreases the
risk of spread of COVID-19.

. . .

If released on home confinement, Mr. Sheaffer would go immediately to his long-
time home . . . . There, Mr. Sheaffer would be able to follow CDC guidelines for
self-quarantine and social distancing practices. Attorney General Barr has
recognized the risk of spread within the prison systems and has expanded
authority to release inmates to home confinement, even if they are not near their
release date. Mr. Sheaffer is part of the vulnerable community with the potential
of suffering serious illness if he becomes exposed to the virus.

(Doc. No. 54-2 at 1-2) (footnotes omitted).
Subsequent to counsel sending this letter, Defendant filed the instant motion on May 22,
2020, asserting that more than thirty (30) days had passed since his letter was sent to the Warden.
(Doc. No. 54 at 3.) The Warden eventually responded to Defendant’s written request on May 27,
2020, and in doing so, stated that:
This is in response to your correspondence regarding inmate SHEAFFER, Brian,
Reg. No. 76568-067, an inmate presently confined at the Schuylkill Federal
Satellite Camp. Specifically, you have requested Mr. Sheaffer be considered for
direct home confinement as a result of the recent pandemic spread of the Novel
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19). Further, you indicated he is in a high-risk
category for serious illness or death from COVID-19, as he has been diagnosed
with diabetes.

The BOP is taking extraordinary measures to contain the spread of the
Coronavirus and treat any affected inmates. We recognize that you, like all of us,
have legitimate concerns and fears about the spread and effects of the virus.
Currently, section 12003(b) (2) of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act (“CARES Act”) grants discretion to the BOP to place inmates on
home confinement for a longer term under 18 U.S.C. 3624(c) (2). The BOP’s
discretion is guided by criteria listed in memoranda from the Attorney General.

According to Mr. Sheaffer’s most recent medical review, he is currently stable
with a good prognosis. Mr. Sheaffer is currently able to independently adapt to
activities of daily living and is able to perform self-maintenance activities in a
correctional environment.

As you are aware, this disease is considered a pandemic, affecting us worldwide
and, as such, there is no area without risk of contracting this disease. It should be·
noted at this time, FCI Schuylkill does not have any confirmed COVID-19 staff or
inmate cases. Additionally, Mr. Sheaffer has not served fifty percent of his
sentence and his intended release residence is located in an area which has a
significant level of COVID-19 infection as per CDC statistics.

Accordingly, your request for direct home confinement for Mr. Sheaffer is denied.

(Doc. No. 57-1 at 1-2.) While Defendant’s request to the Warden and the response from the
Warden address home confinement, the instant motion appears to request both home
confinement and compassionate release. (Doc. No. 54.) Accordingly, the Court addresses the
motion as it pertains to both requests herein.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Compassionate Release
Section 603(b) of the First Step Act modified 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which allows a
court to modify a sentence where extraordinary and compelling reasons justify a sentence
reduction. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018). As
amended by the First Step Act, the relevant statutory provision reads, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(c) Modification of an imposed term of imprisonment.—The [C]ourt may not
modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—

(1) in any case—

(A) the [C]ourt, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant
has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure
of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s
behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a
request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is
earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose
a term of probation or supervised release with or without
conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the
original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors
set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, if it finds that—

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
“The First Step Act applies the same statutory requirements to a defendant’s motion for
compassionate release as previously applied, and still apply, to motions by the Director [of the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)]: ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ must warrant the reduction,
the [C]ourt must consider the § 3553(a) factors, and the reduction must be ‘consistent’ with any
‘applicable’ policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Beck,
No. 1:13-cr-186, 2019 WL 2716506, at *5 (M.D.N.C. June 28, 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). The statute itself does not define “extraordinary and compelling reasons”;
however, the United States Sentencing Commission is authorized to promulgate a definition.
See United States v. Handerhan, No. 1:10-cr-00298, 2019 WL 1437903, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 1,
2019) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)). Application Note 1 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
Section 1B1.13 defines “extraordinary and compelling reasons” as follows:
1. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons. – Provided the defendant meets the
requirements of subdivision (2), extraordinary and compelling reasons exist under
any of the circumstances set forth below:

(A) Medical Condition of the Defendant. –

(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious
and advanced illness with an end of life trajectory). A specific
prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a
specific time period) is not required. Examples include metastatic
solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage
organ disease, and advanced dementia.

(ii) The defendant is –

(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,

(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive
impairment, or

(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health
because of the aging process,

that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-
care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or
she is not expected to recover.

(B) Age of the Defendant. – The defendant (i) is at least 65 years old; (ii)
is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because
of the aging process; and (iii) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of
his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.

(C) Family Circumstances. –

(i) The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s
minor child or minor children.

(ii) The incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered
partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver
for the spouse or registered partner.
(D) Other Reasons. – As determined by the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, there exists in the defendant’s case an extraordinary and
compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons
described in subdivisions (A) through (C).

USSG, § 1B1.13 n.1.
Although the First Step Act allows defendants to petition a court for compassionate
release, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) still imposes a requirement that defendants fully exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Specifically, a defendant must “exhaust[] all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the
Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf” or, in the alternative, must wait
for “the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s
facility, whichever is earlier.” See id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that, despite
the unique concerns posed by COVID-19, defendants seeking compassionate release must still
comply with this requirement and, therefore, exhaust their administrative remedies before
seeking compassionate release from the Court. See United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 595 (3d
Cir. 2020) (noting that defendants “must at least ask the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to [file a
motion] on their behalf and give BOP thirty days to respond”). Numerous other courts have
similarly denied motions for compassionate release for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. See, e.g., United States v. Zywotko, No. 2:19-cr-113, 2020 WL 1492900, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 27, 2020) (denying motion for compassionate release for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies); United States v. Garza, No. 18 -cr-1745, 2020 WL 1485782, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2020) (same); United States v. Eberhart, No. 13-cr-00313, 2020 WL
1450745, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2020) (same).
B. Home Confinement
The BOP “maintains the discretion to determine whether to transfer an inmate
to home confinement.” See United States v. Pressley, No. 07-cr-974, 2009 WL 1687501, at *1
(D.N.J. June 15, 2009) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)). “Section 602 of the First Step
Act, . . . codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2), ‘allows the [BOP] to place a prisoner in home
confinement for the shorter of 10 percent of the term of imprisonment of that prisoner or 6

months and [it] instructs BOP, to the extent practicable, to place prisoners with lower risk levels
and lower needs on home confinement for the maximum amount of time permitted under this
paragraph.’” United States v. Cruz, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2020 WL 1904476, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr.
17, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v.
Carr, Nos. 18-cv-1681-WJM, 16-cr-054-WJM-1, 2020 WL 1815910, *1 (D. Co. April 10,
2020)). “The CARES Act in turn then provides that if the Attorney General finds that
emergency conditions will materially affect the functioning of the BOP, as he did on April 3,
2020 [as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic], the BOP Director may increase the maximum
amount of time that a prisoner may spend in home confinement under the first sentence of 18

U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2).” Id. Courts evaluating motions for release to home confinement as a result
of COVID-19, however, have also treated such motions as motions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 because they challenge the nature or length of one’s confinement. See, e.g., United
States v. Ashby, No. 3:20-cv-0789, 2020 WL 2494679, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 14, 2020)
(remarking that there is “[n]o doubt that a habeas petition under § 2241 is the proper vehicle for
an inmate to challenge ‘the fact or length of confinement’ . . . or the ‘execution’ of his
confinement” (internal citations omitted)). “When a petitioner seeks immediate release from
custody, the sole federal remedy lies in habeas corpus.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Camacho Lopez v. Lowe, ___ F.3d ___, 2020 WL 1689874, *8 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 7,
2020)).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant’s Request for Compassionate Release
1. Arguments of the Parties
In support of his motion—which he styles as a “motion to convert custodial sentence to
home confinement with electronic monitoring” (Doc. No. 54)—Defendant cites the statutory
provision governing compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. § 3582, for the general proposition that
the Court “may modify a term of imprisonment if ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant
such a reduction’” (Doc. No. 55 at 2) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). According to
Defendant, his letter to the Warden suffices to permit him to satisfy the exhaustion requirement

(id.), and the possibility of a COVID-19 outbreak at his place of incarceration warrants granting
him relief (id. at 5-10). Specifically, Defendant cites factors that cause COVID-19 to spread
easily in a prison environment, and states that he: “is at serious risk if he is exposed to COVID-
19”; “is not likely to reoffend”; is incarcerated due to a non-violent offense; and “is willing to
adhere to any home confinement conditions” imposed by the Court. (Id. at 10.)
In opposition, the Government argues that Defendant’s motion should be denied as to his
request for compassionate release because “Defendant failed to request compassionate release
from the BOP, and therefore, because of his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court
is without authority to consider the present request.” (Doc. No. 57 at 1.) The Government states
that while Defendant asks “this Court to convert his sentence to home confinement pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), i.e.[,] the compassionate release statute . . . [t]his provision requires
[] Defendant to first pursue compassionate release through the BOP, which [] Defendant failed to
do.” (Id. at 19.) The Government further posits that this statutory provision “does not authorize
a sentencing court to convert a sentence from incarceration to home confinement.” (Id.)1 As to
the requirement of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for purposes of compassionate
release, the Government states that one “must satisfy the procedural requirements for review”
before the Court may examine whether such circumstances are present (id. at 21), stating that in

this case, “Defendant has asked this Court to provide immediate release to home confinement via
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), even though [he] has failed to properly request relief from the
BOP[,]” which compels the conclusion that Defendant’s motion should be denied for lack of
exhaustion in light of precedent indicating that exhaustion may not be excused (id. at 25).2
In reply, Defendant argues that the Government’s position regarding the exhaustion
requirement for compassionate release is inaccurate because, although his request to the Warden
“did not contain statutory language[,] . . . [o]ther [c]ourts, when discussing whether or not a
defendant must resubmit a request to update the COVID-19 requirement, have noted that ‘the
reasons presented to the warden [need not] mirror those presented to the district court.’” (Doc.

No. 58 at 2-3) (citing United States v. Brown, No. 4:05-cr-00227-1, 2020 WL 2091802, at 3
(S.D. Iowa Apr. 29, 2020)).3 More specifically, Defendant states that:

1 The Court addresses the Government’s other related arguments in the portion of this
Memorandum pertaining to Defendant’s request for home confinement infra.
2 The Government also asserts that, should the Court reach the merits of Defendant’s request for
compassionate release, the request should be denied because Defendant has not demonstrated
that “extraordinary and compelling” reasons warrant release and the relevant Section 3553(a)
factors do not weigh in favor of granting Defendant’s request. (Doc. No. 57 at 25-26.) In light
of the Court’s conclusion regarding exhaustion, however, the Court will not address the merits of
Defendant’s request for compassionate release at this time.
3 The Court observes that a significant portion of Defendant’s reply brief is devoted to whether
Defendant has satisfied the requirement that his motion be filed either after the BOP’s denial of
his request or thirty (30) days after the Warden’s receipt of the request, whichever is earlier.
(Doc. No. 58 at 1-2.) The Court declines to address the merits of such an argument herein
because, as illustrated by the Government in its opposing brief, after the instant motion was filed,
The Statute does not require that it be cited in the request to the Warden. The
letter sent to the Warden (attached to Mr. Sheaffer’s original Motion (Doc. 54))
was clear in the request to release Mr. Sheaffer due to the pandemic. The
Government is splitting hairs and trying to confuse the issue when it asserts that
the request did not specifically mention the phrase “compassionate release.” The
request to the Warden was more than sufficient to satisfy the statutory
requirement.

(Id. at 3.) Defendant also reiterates the arguments advanced in his earlier brief regarding the risk
to inmates at FCI Schuylkill posed by the pandemic, stating that “[t]he conditions at FCI
Schuylkill absolutely place [him] in imminent risk of serious bodily harm or death.” (Id.)
2. Whether Defendant’s Request for Compassionate Release Should Be
Granted

Upon review of the record in accordance with the applicable legal standard, the Court
will deny the portion of Defendant’s motion seeking compassionate release without prejudice to
Defendant’s ability to renew this request after properly exhausting his administrative remedies.
As explained previously, Defendant’s request to the Warden pertained only to home
confinement, as demonstrated by the text of the letter and the Warden’s response. (Doc. Nos.
54-2, 57-1.) Accordingly, the record before this Court does not include a determination by the
BOP specifically as to compassionate release. (Doc. No. 57-1.) While Defendant asserts in his
briefing that his request to the Warden omitted only “statutory language” pertaining to
compassionate release (Doc. No. 58 at 2-3), Defendant fails to address the fact that his request to
the Warden did not reference or concern compassionate release at all (Doc. No. 58). In light of
the authority described above emphasizing the importance of the exhaustion requirement—
particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic—the Court finds it proper to deny
Defendant’s motion without prejudice as it pertains to compassionate release for lack of

the Warden issued a response denying Defendant’s request, thus obviating the need for any
discussion of whether Defendant meets the thirty (30)-day requirement noted supra.
exhaustion. See Raia, 954 F.3d at 597 (emphasizing the importance of the BOP’s role in
evaluating a request for compassionate release in the context of COVID-19); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Davis, No. 7:17-cr-1, 2020 WL 261461, at *1 (E.D. Ky. May 22, 2020)
(distinguishing between a request for home confinement with the Court following such a request
to the BOP and a request for compassionate release); United States v. Darcy, No. 1:17-cr-00036,

2020 WL 2573251, at *3 (W.D.N.C. May 21, 2020) (stating that the relevant communications
cited by the defendant “relate to the Defendant's request for a release to home confinement under
the CARES Act, not to a request for compassionate release pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)[,]” and
that, as a result, “[t]here is nothing in the record before this Court to indicate that the [d]efendant
has submitted a request for compassionate release to the warden of his [BOP] facility or that he
has otherwise exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to BOP’s failure to bring such
a motion on his behalf”). Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion as to
compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582 without prejudice for failure to exhaust.
B. Defendant’s Request for Home Confinement

1. Arguments of the Parties
As to his request for home confinement, Defendant makes largely the same arguments
advanced in support of his request for compassionate release. (Doc. No. 55.) In opposition, the
Government states that Defendant’s request that this Court order home confinement lacks merit
because “[t]his Court lacks authority to override the BOP’s discretionary decision” as to home
confinement. (Doc. No. 57 at 27.) The Government states that because Defendant’s request for
home confinement “seeks to alter only the place of his confinement, not the actual term of
incarceration, only [the] BOP may grant or deny his request[,]” and “[n]othing about the CARES
Act changes this exclusive authority.” (Id. at 27.) According to the Government, therefore,
because the determination as to home confinement “is committed exclusively to the BOP’s
determination,” Defendant is not entitled to the requested relief. (Id. at 29.) Defendant’s reply
brief does not appear to address these points specifically, but, rather, takes issue with the BOP’s
denial from a substantive standpoint by asserting primarily that he is suitable for home
confinement in light of his non-violent history and heightened vulnerability with respect to

COVID-19. (Doc. No. 58 at 4-6.)
2. Whether Defendant’s Request for Home Confinement Should Be
Granted

Upon review of Defendant’s motion, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, the
Court will deny the portion of Defendant’s motion that seeks review of the BOP’s denial of his
request for home confinement and construe Defendant’s motion as a motion filed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. As an initial matter, it is well settled that the determination as to an inmate’s
eligibility for home confinement lies in the discretion of the BOP. See, Pressley, 2009 WL
1687501, at *1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)); see also Cordaro v. Finley, No. 3:10-cr-75, 2020
WL 2020 WL 2084960, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2020) (stating that “the jurisdiction of [a home
confinement] determination [under the CARES Act] is with the Director of the [BOP]” (first and
second alterations in original) (quoting Cruz, 2020 WL 1904476, at *4)). As evidenced by the
recitation of Defendant’s arguments supra, Defendant ultimately takes issue with the fact that the
Warden denied his request for home confinement (Doc. Nos. 55, 58), and Defendant offers no
authority to contradict that cited by the Government in support of its view that the BOP’s
determination is not judicially reviewable (Doc. No. 58). Accordingly, the Court will deny
Defendant’s motion to the extent it seeks review of the BOP’s home confinement determination
by this Court.
The Court notes, however, that in the context of motions seeking home confinement as a
result of COVID-19 and its potential to spread widely in a prison setting, many courts have
construed such motions as those filed pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in light of the manner in which
they challenge one’s confinement. See United States v. Moore-Brown, No. 3:17-cr-129, 2020
WL 2306855, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 8, 2020) (synthesizing authority in support of the proposition

that “that emergency petitions for release, based on COVID-19 are properly construed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241” given that through such a motion, one “seeks relief affecting how his
sentence is executed, i.e., serving his sentence in home confinement as opposed to confinement
in prison to which he was sentenced” (citing United States v. Serfass, No. 3:15-cr-39, 2020 WL
1874126 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2020))). In the instant case, the Court finds such a construction
appropriate in light of the existing authority where courts have evaluated motions for home
confinement in criminal cases using this approach. See, e.g., id. Accordingly, the Court will
direct the Clerk of Court to open a new civil action in which Defendant’s motion will be deemed
a motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.4

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will: (1) deny Defendant’s motion (Doc. No. 54)
without prejudice to the extent it seeks compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582;
(2) deny Defendant’s motion to the extent it seeks review by this Court of the BOP’s denial of

4 The Court also notes, however, that neither party appears to have addressed the applicability of
28 U.S.C. § 2241, and, consequently, out of an abundance of caution, will direct briefing on
Defendant’s request for relief under Section 2241 prior to disposing of the motion. In addition,
the Court notes that venue for this civil action properly lies in this district because Defendant is
incarcerated at FCI Schuylkill, which is located within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. See
United States v. Figueroa, 349 F. App’x 727, 730 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that “[a] petition
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must be filed in the district in which the petitioner is
imprisoned” (citing Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004))).
Defendant’s request for compassionate release; and (3) direct the Clerk of Court to open a
corresponding civil action and docket Defendant’s motion seeking home confinement as a
motion for a petition of writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to be briefed by the
parties in accordance with a separate Order that shall issue in said civil action. An appropriate
Order follows.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408936. Public record. Not legal advice.