# Hernandez v. Saul

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 22, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408898

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 22, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
NATALIE HERNANDEZ, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:19-CV-1263
Plaintiff )
)
v. )
) (ARBUCKLE, M.J.)
ANDREW SAUL, )
Defendant )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Natalie Hernandez, an adult individual who resides within the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, seeks judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and
XVI of the Social Security Act. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §405(g) and 42 U.S.C. §1383(c)(3).
This matter has been referred to me upon consent of the parties pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After
reviewing the parties’ briefs, the Commissioner’s final decision, and the relevant
portions of the certified administrative transcript, I find the Commissioner's final
decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, Commissioner’s final

decision is AFFIRMED.
Page 1 of 36
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 14, 2016, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for disability

insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. (Admin. Tr. 17). In these applications, Plaintiff alleged she
became disabled as of April 1, 1976, but later amended her alleged onset date to
April 9, 2016. (Admin. Tr. 36). As of her amended alleged onset date, Plaintiff was

forty-six years old. She alleged she was disabled due to the following conditions:
anxiety, depression, migraines, high blood pressure, and history of seizures.
(Admin. Tr. 206). Plaintiff alleges that the combination of these conditions affects

her ability to lift, bend, stand, reach, walk, kneel, climb stairs, see, remember,
understand, following instructions, and get along with others. (Admin. Tr. 236).
Plaintiff has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English.
(Admin. Tr. 25).

On January 7, 2017, Plaintiff’s applications were denied at the initial level of
administrative review. (Admin. Tr. 17). On January 12, 2017, Plaintiff requested
an administrative hearing. Id.

On March 5, 2018, Plaintiff, assisted by her counsel, appeared and testified
during a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Scott M. Staller (the “ALJ”).
(Admin. Tr. 32). On June 8, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s
applications for benefits. (Admin. Tr. 26). On July 20, 2018, Plaintiff requested
Page 2 of 36
review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council of the Office of Disability
Adjudication and Review (“Appeals Council”). (Admin. Tr. 159).

On July 21, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review.
(Admin. Tr. 9).
On July 22, 2019, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint. (Doc.

1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ’s decision denying the
applications is not supported by substantial evidence, and improperly applies the
relevant law and regulations. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13). As relief, Plaintiff requests that the
Court award benefits, or in the alternative remand this matter for a new

administrative hearing. (Doc. 1, ¶ 14).
On September 24, 2019, the Commissioner filed an Answer. (Doc. 7). In the
Answer, the Commissioner maintains that the decision holding that Plaintiff is not

entitled to disability insurance benefits was made in accordance with the law and
regulations and is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 7, ¶ 9). Along with her
Answer, the Commissioner filed a certified transcript of the administrative record.
(Doc. 8 et seq).

Plaintiff’s Brief (Doc. 11), the Commissioner’s Brief (Doc. 12), and
Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 13) have been filed. This matter is now ripe for decision.

Page 3 of 36
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REVIEW – THE ROLE OF THIS COURT
When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s

application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the question of whether
the findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in
the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3); Johnson v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533,
536 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable
amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,
565 (1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but
more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A
single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores

countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence.
Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). But in an adequately
developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the

weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] from being supported by
substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620
(1966).
Page 4 of 36
“In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v. Barnhart, 304

F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). The question before this Court, therefore, is
not whether Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the Commissioner’s finding that
Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based

upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-
02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that
an ALJ’s errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.”) (alterations
omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The

Secretary’s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application
of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir.
1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F.

Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review of all legal issues . . . .”).
B. STANDARDS GOVERNING THE ALJ’S APPLICATION OF THE FIVE-STEP
SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS
To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a
claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A);
Page 5 of 36
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); 20 C.F.R. §
416.905(a).1 To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or

mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any
other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); 20 C.F.R. §

416.905(a). To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant
must show that he or she contributed to the insurance program, is under retirement
age, and became disabled prior to the date on which he or she was last insured. 42
U.S.C. § 423(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131(a).

In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a
five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a). Under this process, the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether

the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has
a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a
listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant
work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or

1 Throughout this Report, I cite to the version of the administrative rulings and
regulations that were in effect on the date the Commissioner’s final decision was
issued. In this case, the ALJ’s decision, which serves as the final decision of the
Commissioner, was issued on June 8, 2018.
Page 6 of 36
her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).

Between steps three and four, the ALJ must also assess a claimant’s RFC.
RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able to do despite the
limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e); 20 C.F.R. §
416.945(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe impairments

identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2);
20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(2).
At steps one through four, the claimant bears the initial burden of

demonstrating the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents
him or her in engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. 2 U.S.C. §
423(d)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) by
reference); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a); Mason, 994 F.2d at

1064. Once this burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the
Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant number in the
national economy that the claimant could perform that are consistent with the

Page 7 of 36
claimant’s age, education, work experience and RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(b)(3);
20 C.F.R. § 416.912(b)(3); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.

The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive
requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the
ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination.

Thus, to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence standard,
the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of
the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981).
Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate which

evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for rejecting
certain evidence. Id. at 706-707. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in his
decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for

his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F. 3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999).
IV. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff raises the following issues in her brief:
(1) Substantial Evidence does not support the ALJ’s evaluation of the
opinion evidence; and
(2) The ALJ’s multiple errors with symptom evaluation compel reversal.
(Doc. 11, p. 1).

Page 8 of 36
A. THE ALJ’S DECISION DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATIONS
In his June 2018 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status

requirement of Title II of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2021.
(Admin. Tr. 19). Then, Plaintiff’s applications were evaluated at steps one through
five of the sequential evaluation process.
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial

gainful activity at any point between April 9, 2016 (Plaintiff’s amended alleged
onset date) and June 8, 2018 (the date the ALJ decision was issued) (“the relevant
period”). (Admin. Tr. 19). At step two, the ALJ found that, during the relevant

period, Plaintiff had the following medically determinable severe impairment(s):
bipolar disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. (Admin. Tr. 19). The ALJ also
found that Plaintiff has the following medically determinable non-severe
impairments: hypertension, back pain, foot pain, bilateral soft tissue hand masses,

and gallstones. (Admin. Tr. 20-21). At step three, the ALJ found that, during the
relevant period, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed in

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Admin. Tr. 21).
Between steps three and four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ
found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff retained the RFC to engage in all

Page 9 of 36
ranges of work work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.967
except that:

Claimant is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple 1-2
step instructions and make judgments on simple work-related
decisions; could occasionally interact with coworkers, supervisors,
and the public in a routine work setting; and is limited to occasional
decision-making and occasional changes in a routine work setting.
(Admin. Tr. 22).
At step four, the ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff could
not engage in her past relevant work. (Admin. Tr. 25). At step five, the ALJ found
that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education and work experience, Plaintiff could
engage in other work that existed in the national economy. Id. To support his
conclusion, the ALJ relied on testimony given by a vocational expert during
Plaintiff’s administrative hearing and cited the following three (3) representative
occupations: Bench Assembler (DOT #706.684-022); Packing Line Worker (DOT

#753.687-038); Production Solderer (DOT #813.684-022). (Admin. Tr. 25-26).
B. WHETHER THE ALJ PROPERLY EVALUATED CRNP CANAL’S OPINION
ABOUT PLAINTIFF’S MENTAL LIMITATIONS
In this case, several sources provided opinions about the limitations resulting
from Plaintiff’s mental impairments, including: treating psychiatrist Raymond
Johnson, M.D. (“Dr. Johnson”); Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner Stephanie

Canal (“CRNP Canal”); consultative examiner Tommy Davis, Ph.D. (“Dr. Davis”);
Page 10 of 36
and State agency psychological consultant Alex Siegel, Ph.D (“Dr. Siegel”).
Plaintiff’s first argument pertains to the ALJ’s evaluation of CRNP Canal’s

opinion.
On February 19, 2018, CRNP Canal completed a fill-in-the-blank/check-box
“Mental Impairment Questionnaire.” (Admin. Tr. 815-823). In Section II of that

Questionnaire, CRNP Canal was asked to answer a series of questions about
Plaintiff’s ability to do work-related activities on a day to day basis in a regular
work setting. CRNP Canal assessed that Plaintiff would be unable to satisfactorily
perform the following activities: remembering work-like procedures; maintaining

attention for a two-hour segment; sustaining an ordinary routine without special
supervision; working in coordination with or proximity to others without being
unduly distracted; completing a normal workday and workweek without

interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; performing at a consistent
pace without an unreasonable number of rest periods; accepting instructions and
responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors; responding appropriately to
changes in a routine work setting; dealing with normal work stress; and being

aware of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions. Id. In the same
questionnaire, CRNP Canal assessed that Plaintiff would be expected to be less
than 80% as efficient when compared to an average worker, and that Plaintiff

Page 11 of 36
would be expected to miss approximately four days of work per month due to her
impairments or treatment. Id.

The ALJ gave “little” weight to the opinion of CRNP Canal. In doing so he
explained:
As for the remainder of the opinion evidence, the undersigned gives
little weight to the February 2018 opinion of Stephanie B. Canal,
indicating the claimant as unable to perform a great number of work-
related functional activities satisfactorily; as expected to be less than
80 percent efficient as an average worker; and as likely to be absent
from work more than 4 days a month due to her impairments or
medical treatments (Exhibit 23F). The opinion’s narrative explanation
refers to symptoms and clinical findings that are not reflected in the
claimant’s treatment records and describes potential side effects to
medications that the claimant specifically denied suffering.
Additionally, the degree of limitation is inconsistent with the
claimant’s admissions to her providers in the record regarding the
efficacy of her medications and treatments and is further inconsistent
with the claimant’s grossly normal mental status examination
findings.
(Admin. Tr. 24).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s evaluation of CRNP Canal’s opinion is
improper for three reasons: (1) the ALJ did not give adequate consideration to the
opinion under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2); (2) the
ALJ erred by characterizing Plaintiff’s mental status examinations as “grossly
normal”; and (3) the ALJ was required to recontact CRNP Canal for clarification. I
will address each argument below.
Page 12 of 36
1. Whether CRNP Canal’s Opinion is Entitled to Greater Weight
under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) and 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(c)(2)
With respect to her first argument, Plaintiff contends:
the ALJ failed to evaluate Ms. Canal’s opinion in accordance with the
checklist of factors that C.F.R. 404.1527 (d) provides. Here, many of
these consideration favor crediting Ms. Canal’s opinion: Ms. Canal is
a nurse practitioner practicing out of Youth Advocate Programs,
where Hernandez received care since December 2016. (Tr. 547-80)
See 404.1527(c)(2)(“Generally, we give more weight to medical
opinions from your treating sources, since these sources are likely to
be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed,
longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s) and may bring a
unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained
from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of
individual examinations, such as consultative examination or brief
hospitalizations.”).
(Doc. 11, pp. 10-11).
The Commissioner responds:
Deciding what weight to accord to various medical source opinions is
reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927;
Social Security Ruling (SSR) 06-3p, 2006 WL 2329939. The
Commissioner classifies medical source opinions into two categories
“acceptable medical sources” and “other sources;” a nurse practitioner
is an “other source.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513, 416.913. Only acceptable
medical sources can be “treating sources” within the meaning of the
Commissioner’s regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 416.902; SSR
06-3p. Thus, Nurse Practitioner Canal is neither an acceptable medical
source, nor a treating source within the meaning of the
Commissioner’s regulations.
Page 13 of 36
(Doc. 12, pp. 7-8).2
I construe Plaintiff’s argument as alleging that the ALJ erred by failing to

accord CRNP Canal’s opinion weight under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) and
416.927(c)(2)—the only specific provision cited by Plaintiff in her argument. This
provision of the regulations is commonly referred to as the “treating physician
rule” and states as follows:

(c) How we weigh medical opinions. Regardless of its source, we will
evaluate every medical opinion we receive. Unless we give a treating
source's medical opinion controlling weight under paragraph (c)(2) of
this section, we consider all of the following factors in deciding the
weight we give to any medical opinion.
. . . .
(2) Treatment relationship. Generally, we give more weight to
medical opinions from your treating sources, since these
sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to
provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the
medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective
medical findings alone or from reports of individual
examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief
hospitalizations. If we find that a treating source's medical
opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of your
impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your case
record, we will give it controlling weight. When we do not give

2 I note that SSR 06-03p was rescinded and was not relied upon by the ALJ when
the final decision was issued in this case. Revisions to Rules Regarding the
Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 FR 5844-01, 5845 (Jan. 18, 2017). In its place,
the Social Security Administration “added regulatory test in 404.1527(f) and
416.927(f) about how to consider and articulate the consideration of opinions by
medical sources who are not acceptable medical sources. Id. at 5844
Page 14 of 36
the treating source's medical opinion controlling weight, we
apply the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(2)(i) and (c)(2)(ii) of
this section, as well as the factors in paragraphs (c)(3) through
(c)(6) of this section in determining the weight to give the
medical opinion. We will always give good reasons in our
notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your
treating source's medical opinion.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (emphasis added); see also 20 C.F.R. 416.927(c)(2)
(same). In this context, the term “treating source” means “your own acceptable
medical source who provides you, or has provided you, with medical treatment or
evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with you.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2) (emphasis added); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2) (same).
At the time the ALJ issued his decision in this case acceptable medical sources
included: licensed physicians (M.D. or D.O.); licensed psychologists; licensed
optometrists (for vision impairments only); licensed podiatrist (for foot and ankle
only); and qualified speech-language pathologists. Licensed advanced practice

nurses are not considered to be acceptable medical sources unless the application
was filed on or after March 27, 2017. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)(7); 20 C.F.R. §
416.902(a)(7). The applications in this case were filed on June 14, 2016. Therefore,

CRNP Canal’s opinion is not, as a matter of law, entitled to controlling weight
under the treating physician rule.
2. Whether the ALJ Improperly Characterized the Mental Status
Examination Findings as “Grossly Normal”
Page 15 of 36
With respect to her second argument, Plaintiff contends:
contrary to the ALJ’s finding, Ms. Canal’s opinion was consistent
with the record: Supportive signs and symptoms include depressed
mood, social isolation, excessive sleep, little interest in doing things,
low motivation, history of verbal and physical abuse, panic attacks,
helplessness, sleep disturbances, discomfort around crowds, fatigue,
appetite disturbance and trouble concentrating. (Tr. 638, 647, 651,
668, 676, 683, 685) Ms. Canal’s opinion is also consistent with the
opinions of treating psychiatrist Dr. Johnson: During a psychiatric
evaluation in January 2017, Hernandez complaint of anxiety. (Tr. 572-
73) Examining psychiatrist R. Johnson, MD diagnosed major
depressive disorder and PTSD. (Tr. 577) In a letter dated January 12,
2017, R. Johnson MD noted that Hernandez was unable to maintain
employment due to depression and panic attacks. (Tr. 446) Given Ms.
Canal’s longitudinal treatment history with Hernandez and the
consistency of his opinion with the medical evidence—the ALJ erred
in failing to afford Ms. Canal’s opinion great weight.
(Doc. 11, pp. 11-12).
The Commissioner responds:
The ALJ further discounted Ms. Canal’s opinions because they were
inconsistent with mental status examinations (Tr. 24). Indeed, Dr.
Johnson observed on mental status examination that Plaintiff [sic]
speech was normal in rate, volume, articulation, and coherence (Tr.
575, 632). He observed that Plaintiff retained normal thought
processes with no hallucinations, delusions, preoccupations with
violence, homicidal or suicidal ideation or obsessions (Tr. 575-76,
632-33). He observed that Plaintiff maintained intact judgment and
insight (Tr. 576, 633). Dr. Johnson observed that Plaintiff was
oriented to person, place, and time (Tr. 576-77). He observed that
Plaintiff displayed intact recent and remote memory, attention and
concentration, and general knowledge (Tr. 577). He observed that
Plaintiff’s affect was full range and appropriate to content (Tr. 577).
Similarly, Dr. Davis observed on his mental status examination that
although Plaintiff’s affected [sic] was restricted and her mood was
Page 16 of 36
anxious, her posture and motor behavior were normal and Plaintiff’s
eye contact was appropriate (Tr. 408). Dr. Davis observed that
Plaintiff’s speech was fluent and clear and her expressive and
receptive language was adequate (Tr. 408). He observed that Plaintiff
displayed only mildly impaired attention, concentration, and recent
and remote memory skills (Tr. 408). Although Dr. Davis found that
Plaintiff’s cognitive functioning was below average to average with
limited general fund of information, he concluded that Plaintiff still
retained fair insight and judgment (Tr. 409).
(Doc. 12, pp. 9-10).
In her argument, Plaintiff cites to several records to support her position that
the ALJ inaccurately characterized her mental status examinations as “grossly
normal.” The first three records cited by Plaintiff are therapy notes from January
13, 2017, July 13, 2017, and October 17, 2017. (Admin. Tr. 638, 647, 651).
Although these notes provide insight as to the progress made by Plaintiff in
treatment, they do not provide objective mental status examinations. Therefore,
these records do not undermine the ALJ’s characterization of Plaintiff’s mental
status examination findings as “grossly normal.”
On November 16, 2016, Plaintiff was examined by behavioral health after
being assessed with a score of 23 on a Patient Health Questionnaire for Depression
(“PHQ-9”).3 Psychologist Charles Goins recorded the following assessment:

3 A PHQ-9 score of 23 corresponds with severe depression. PHQ-9 Questionnaire
for Depression Scoring and Interpretation Guide,
https://www.med.umich.edu/1info/FHP/practiceguides/depress/score.pdf (last
Page 17 of 36
Natalie was referred to BH for consult due to PHQ9 score of 23. She
denied SI, Intent, or plan. Hopelessness was denied. Natalie reported
her history of depression and anxiety. Reported symptoms included
low motivation, depressed mood, sleep problems, fatigue, inconsistent
appetite, low self esteem, low concentration, discomfort around
crowds, and sluggish movement. Identified stressors included death of
father this summer, chronic medical issues, conflict with housemate,
recent move from NY, inability to work due to medical issues,
unemployment, finances. Natalie denied any history of self harm and
she denied any history of participating in IP psychiatric treatment,
outpatient mental health therapy. Substance abuse issues were denied.
She reported that she was prescribed sertraline by her previous pcp
but Natalie stopped taking it as she believed that it made her
nauseated. Natalie acknowledged that she experienced verbal abuse
by housemate but denied safety concerns and declined support today
for finding emergency housing/shelter options. Help booklet provided.
She reported that she received significant support from her adult
children and Natalie reported that she would contact crisis if
experiencing unsafe thoughts or urges.
(Admin. Tr. 685).
On December 22, 2016, Plaintiff presented for a behavioral health follow up.
(Admin. Tr. 683). Psychologist Charles Goins recorded the following assessment:
Natalie retuned to BH for follow up. PHQ9 score was 23 and she
denied SI, HI, intent, or plan. Hopelessness was denied. Natalie
reported that injection had resulted in reduction in pain levels (rated as
7) and increased mobility. Sleep problems continue to have negative
impact on daily functioning. When to CMU and was given psychiatry
appt for Youth Advocate for 1/12 at 1:30pm. She has a therapy appt at
Youth Advocate for next Tues 12/27. Natalie has increased time spent
outside by attending Church and connecting with female peer who

visited 2/7/2020). Any score above 14 “warrants treatment for depression, using
antidepressant, psychotherapy and/or a combination of treatment. Id.

Page 18 of 36
gave her a ride. She identified a book store in her area that she would
like to go to read. Natalie developed plan to attend Church Saturday.
BH praised Natalie for her active and successful efforts at managing
her treatment/recovery process. She has ample food due to attending
food bank. She reported that she had gained some degree of friendship
with the female companion of housemate that she had friction with.
Natalie shared that she was reluctant to follow through with CMU
worker developed plan for her to go to shelter in order to be moved
onto the list for housing. She reported her improved self esteem at
being better able to complete ADL’s as desired. She accepted praise
for the gains in her appearance and active input to discussion. No BH
follow up will be scheduled due to scheduled transition to specialized
outpatient services.
(Admin. Tr. 683). On January 12, 2017, Plaintiff was examined by Psychologist
Raymond Johnson, Ph.D. (Admin. Tr. 575-77). Dr. Johnson noted the following
findings on mental status examination: normal speech; normal thought processes;
no suicidal or homicidal ideation; intact judgment; orientation to person, place, and
time; intact recent and remote memory; intact attention and concentration; intact
general knowledge; appropriate affect; and restricted ability to abstract. Id. Dr.
Johnson was unable to assess Plaintiff’s mood. Id. On June 6, 2017, Plaintiff was
examined during a routine medical appointment. (Admin. Tr. 676). The treatment
note from that examination suggests that Plaintiff reported anxiety and sleep
disturbances. Id. The only objective finding related to Plaintiff’s mental
impairments, however, is that Plaintiff was oriented to time, place, and person. Id.
On October 4, 2017, Plaintiff sought medical treatment for abdominal pain.
Page 19 of 36
(Admin. Tr. 667). The treatment note from that examination documents a score of
16 on the Patient Health Questionnaire for Depression. (Admin. Tr. 668).4

Reviewing this evidence, I find that the ALJ did not mischaracterize
Plaintiff’s mental status examination findings when he described as “grossly
normal.” Accordingly, I find that the ALJ’s decision to discount CRNP Canal’s

opinion on that basis is supported by substantial evidence.
3. Whether the ALJ was Required to Recontact CRNP Canal for
Clarification
With respect to her third argument, Plaintiff contends:
if the ALJ was unable to discern how Ms. Canal’s opinion was
supported, given that the record contained Ms. Canal’s treatment
records, the ALJ should have recontacted Ms. Canal to contain further
explanation of the opinion. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 669 (7th
Cir. 2004), quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir.
1996)(“If the ALJ though he needed to know the basis of [medical]
opinions in order to evaluate them, he had a duty to conduct an
appropriate inquiry, for example, by subpoenaing the physicians or
submitting further questions to them.”).
(Doc. 11, pp. 10-12).
The Commissioner responds:
Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ should have re-contacted Ms. Canal
to obtain further explanation of her opinions (Pl.’s Br. at 11). The ALJ
was under no such obligation. Effective March 26, 2012, the
Commissioner revised the regulations on recontacting medical

4 A PHQ-9 score between 15 and 19 is indicative of moderately severe depression.
PHQ-9 Questionnaire for Depression Scoring and Interpretation Guide,
https://www.med.umich.edu/1info/FHP/practiceguides/depress/score.pdf (last
visited 2/7/2020).
Page 20 of 36
sources, and eliminated 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(e)(1), 416.912(e)(1).
See Buckner v. Astrue, 2012 WL 5392255, at *11, n.4 (W.D. Pa. Nov.
5, 2012). Prior to this amendment, the regulations stated that medical
sources must be recontacted when “the report from [the] medical
source contains a conflict or ambiguity that must be resolved, the
report does not contain all the necessary information, or does not
appear to be based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(e)(1), 416.912(e)(1)
(2011). The regulations controlling at the time of the ALJ’s decision
explain that “if any of the evidence in your case record, including any
medical opinion(s) and prior administrative medical findings, is
inconsistent, we will consider the relevant evidence and see if we can
determine whether you are disabled based on the evidence we have.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(b)(1); 416.920b(b)(1). In other words, the
ALJ was entitled to reply on the evidence that he had to determine
whether Plaintiff was disabled, and was not required to recontact any
medical source. The revised governing regulation further explain [sic]
that an ALJ “may” recontact a medical source. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520b(b)(2)(i), 416.920b(b)(2)(i) (emphasis added). Under the
controlling regulations, there is never an obligation to recontact a
medical source. Accordingly, under the governing regulation in effect
at the time of Plaintiff’s decision, the ALJ was under no obligation to
recontact Ms. Canal.
(Doc. 12, pp. 10-11).
The regulations on this subject explain that, after the ALJ reviews all of the
evidence, he or she makes findings about what that evidence shows. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520b; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b. If the ALJ cannot make a determination because
the evidence in the record is incomplete or inconsistent the ALJ may take the
following actions:
(1) If any of the evidence in your case record, including any medical
opinion(s) and prior administrative medical findings, is inconsistent,
Page 21 of 36
we will consider the relevant evidence and see if we can determine
whether you are disabled based on the evidence we have.
(2) If the evidence is consistent but we have insufficient evidence to
determine whether you are disabled, or if after considering the
evidence we determine we cannot reach a conclusion about whether
you are disabled, we will determine the best way to resolve the
inconsistency or insufficiency. The action(s) we take will depend on
the nature of the inconsistency or insufficiency. We will try to resolve
the inconsistency or insufficiency by taking any one or more of the
actions listed in paragraphs (b)(2)(i) through (b)(2)(iv) of this section.
We might not take all of the actions listed below. We will consider
any additional evidence we receive together with the evidence we
already have.
(i) We may recontact your medical source. We may choose not
to seek additional evidence or clarification from a medical
source if we know from experience that the source either cannot
or will not provide the necessary evidence. If we obtain medical
evidence over the telephone, we will send the telephone report
to the source for review, signature, and return;
(ii) We may request additional existing evidence;
(iii) We may ask you to undergo a consultative examination at
our expense (see §§ 416.917 through 416.919a); or
(iv) We may ask you or others for more information.
(3) When there are inconsistencies in the evidence that we cannot
resolve or when, despite efforts to obtain additional evidence, the
evidence is insufficient to determine whether you are disabled, we
will make a determination or decision based on the evidence we have.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(b); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b(b). The evidentiary record in this
case includes over 500 pages of medical records, opinions by four sources, along
with statements by Plaintiff about her limitations and day-to-day functioning.
Page 22 of 36
Although this evidence undoubtedly contains inconsistencies, the shortcomings in
the opinions submitted by CRNP Canal do not make this record (as a whole)

insufficient. Because the record as a whole was sufficient for the ALJ to reach a
conclusion, remand is not required. See Grier v. Berryhill, No. 18-386, 2019 WL
2870728, at *10 (D. Del. July 3, 2019) (citing Campell v. Colvin, 2016 WL

4503341, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2016) (“An ALJ may only consider
recontacting a treating physician, where the evidence is consistent but there is
insufficient evidence to determine whether a claimant is disabled or after weighing
the evidence the ALJ cannot reach a conclusion about whether a claimant is

disabled. The ALJ, however, is not obligated to do so.”)). Accordingly, I am not
persuaded that remand is required so that the ALJ can recontact CRNP Canal.
C. WHETHER THE ALJ PROPERLY EVALUATED PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENTS
ABOUT HER SYMPTOMS
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s
statements about her mental health related symptoms and limitations, including

allegations about mood, mania and social interaction. In an adult function report
form completed by Plaintiff, and received by the Social Security Administration on
August 22, 2016, Plaintiff was asked to answer a series of questions about her

symptoms and limitations. On that form, Plaintiff reported that she: has anxiety
and can’t be around too many people; cries for no reason; has days where she can’t
Page 23 of 36
get out of bed and doesn’t want to shower due to depression; just wants to be left
alone; does not engage in any social activities; has problems getting along with

family, friends, neighbors and others because “they just annoying”; and was fired
from one job because she didn’t get along with her boss. (Admin. Tr. 233-240).
During the administrative hearing, Plaintiff made the following statements

about these symptoms:
Q Why do you claim that you can no longer work?
A Well, I have—I get panics [sic] attacks. I get—I have a
situation that I have—on my feet. I have severe depression
where I’m always most of the time depressed. And I have other
health issues like I get severe migraines and high blood
pressure.
. . . .
Q . . . How often do you get panic attacks?
A I get them like twice a week. I try to have them under control
with my medication
Q And do you know why you get the panic attacks?
A Well, I –sometimes I get them because I—there is a lot of
arguments in the house.
. . . .
Q And how does your depression affect you?
A It affects my—sorry, I’m nervous. It affects my thoughts and
communication.
. . . .
Q Do you take your medications regularly as prescribed?
Page 24 of 36
A Yes.
Q Do they relieve your symptoms?
A They relieve, yes.
. . . .

Q Do you have any problems getting along with other people?
A No.
. . . .
Q Do you have any thoughts of harming other people?
A No, never.
. . . .
Q Okay. But the panic attacks, how long do they last when you
get them?
A Like a good fifteen minutes.
Q And how does it feel when you get a panic attack?
A Oh, my gosh, I feel like my heart is going to come out my
mouth, and I start shaking. I am short of breath.
Q Do you—are panic attacks and anxiety attacks the same thing
for you?
A I believe so.
Q Okay. And what do you do to try and make a panic attack go
away once it starts? Do you have any techniques or things that
you do?
A Yeah, I try in my breathing, like my therapist tells me.
Q And the medications that you take, how are they helping with
your panic attacks?
Page 25 of 36
A They help me pretty much.
Q Okay.
A They ease me down a little bit.
Q What do you mean by that? Do they change the number of them
that you have?
A They like—I drink them, and it takes a little bit but it slowly
brings me down from my anxiety, little by little.
Q So you—not only do you do the breathing, you take the
medication when you get a panic attack?
A Yes, I do.
Q Okay. Do you get crying spells?
A Yes, I do.
Q How often?
A Most of the time, I’m—how often is like three or our times a
day.
Q Do you know what triggers one? Do you know what a trigger is
for your crying spells?
A I think a lot—
Q Is there a thought that, or certain things that trigger them?
A Yes, I live with other people, and they constantly having
problems, and I just with I had my own so I can be able to be in
peace. I’m sorry.
. . . .
Q Do you have mood swings?
A Yeah.
Page 26 of 36
Q What moods do you have mood swings of? What do they swing
between?
A Sometimes I can be okay, and then next I can be irritated,
agitated.
Q And do you get flashbacks?
A Yes.
Q How often do you get them?
A I get them like maybe twice a week.
Q Do you know what triggers a flashback for you?
A Thinking too much. I can get a lot of nightmares at night too.
. . . .
Q And do you have any idea how long a flashback lasts for you?

A I have no idea. I just—it’s in—like an instant flashback, and I
just try to distract myself.
Q What—how do you feel after a flashback’s over?
A I don’t—I feel a little nervous—
Q How long—
A --agitated.
Q Okay. How long does that last after you have a flashback?
A Like 10 minutes.
(Admin. Tr. 41-53).
In his decision, the ALJ found that although “the claimant’s medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged
Page 27 of 36
symptoms. . . the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical

evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Admin. Tr. 22-23). The ALJ
explained:
The medical evidence does not support the allegations regarding the
intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of the claimant’s
impairments. Though the record shows the claimant suffers from
mental health impairments, her impairments are not established until 7
months after her alleged onset date. Additionally, the claimant’s
treatment notes show that her mood and mania symptoms are well-
controlled with medications and that her medications do not cause any
adverse side-effects. Moreover, the claimant’s mental status
examinations reveal little evidence of any significant impairment in
attention, concentration, or memory as alleged by the claimant. The
claimant’s examination records further show she interacts
appropriately and clearly despite her alleged social anxiety. The
medical evidence does not support the claimant’s allegations.
(Admin. Tr. 24).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s statements about her
symptoms is flawed for three reasons: (1) the ALJ applied a clear and convincing
evidence standard instead of the required preponderance of the evidence standard;
(2) the ALJ improperly found that a doctor’s observation that Plaintiff’s condition
was “controlled with medication” supported the conclusion that Plaintiff could

Page 28 of 36
work; and (3) the ALJ improperly relied on his own lay opinion to discount the
opinion of CRNP Canal.5

1. Whether the ALJ Applied the Wrong Evidentiary Standard in
Evaluating Plaintiff’s Statements about her Symptoms
With respect to her contention that the ALJ applied the wrong evidentiary
standard, Plaintiff argues:
In evaluating Hernandez’s symptoms, the ALJ stated that her
allegations were “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence
and other evidence in the record”. (Tr. 22, 23) The “not entirely
consistent” standard implies that the ALJ used a clear and convincing
evidence standard. But, and ALJ must decide a case based upon a
preponderance of the evidence standard. Moreover, the ALJ’s
decision contains no discussion of which allegations he found
consistent with the record. The ALJ’s symptom evaluation violates
SSR 16-3p which states that ALJs will consider the consistency of a
claimant’s allegations with the medical and other evidence, but it does
not mandate that the claimant’s allegations be completely consistent
with the record. See SSR 16-3p (“In determining whether an
individual is disabled, we consider all of the individual’s symptoms,
including pain, and the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably
be accepted as consistent with the objective medical and other
evidence in the individual’s record”) (emphasis added).
(Doc. 11, pp. 12-13).
Although the Commissioner generally responded that the ALJ’s evaluation
of Plaintiff’s statements about her symptoms was correct, the Commissioner did
not address Plaintiff’s allegation that the ALJ applied the wrong evidentiary

5 I note that the second and third arguments in Plaintiff’s “symptom evaluation”
section do not relate to the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s testimony about her
symptoms. Instead, they appear to address the evaluation of medical opinion
evidence.
Page 29 of 36
standard when evaluating Plaintiff’s statements about her symptoms. Nonetheless,
I am not persuaded that the ALJ’s use of the phrase “not entirely consistent with

the medical evidence and other evidence in the record,” suggests that the ALJ
applied a clear and convincing evidence standard.
The Commissioner’s regulations define “symptoms” as the claimant’s own

description of his or her impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(1); 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.902(i); SSR 96-4p, 1996 WL 374187. A symptom, however, is not a
medically determinable impairment, and no symptom by itself can establish the
existence of such an impairment. SSR 96-4p, 1996 WL 374187. The ALJ is not

only permitted, but also required, to evaluate the credibility of a claimant’s
statements about all symptoms alleged and must decide whether and to what extent
a claimant’s description of his or her impairments may be deemed credible. In

many cases, this determination has a significant impact upon the outcome of a
claimant’s application, because the ALJ need only account for those symptoms –
and the resulting limitations – that are credibly established when formulating his or
her RFC assessment. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554. To facilitate this difficult

analysis, the Commissioner has devised a two-step process that must be undertaken
by the ALJ to evaluate a claimant’s statements about his or her symptoms.
First, the ALJ must consider whether there is an underlying medically

determinable impairment that can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and
Page 30 of 36
laboratory diagnostic techniques that could reasonably be expected to produce the
symptom alleged. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(b). If there is no

medically determinable impairment that could reasonably produce the symptom
alleged, the symptom cannot be found to affect the claimant’s ability to do basic
work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(b); SSR 96-4p,

1996 WL 374187; SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029.
Second, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects
of the symptoms which can be reasonably attributed to a medically determinable
impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(1). Symptoms

will be determined to reduce a claimant’s functional capacity only to the extent that
the alleged limitations and restrictions “can reasonably be accepted as consistent
with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1529(c)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(4). However, an ALJ will not reject
statements about the intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of a symptom solely
because it is not substantiated by objective evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3);
20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3). Instead, the ALJ will evaluate the extent to which any

unsubstantiated symptoms can be credited based on the following factors: the
claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the
claimant’s pain or other symptoms; any factor that precipitates or aggravates the

claimant’s pain or other symptoms; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects
Page 31 of 36
of any medication the claimant takes or has taken to alleviate his or her pain or
other symptoms; any treatment, other than medication, the claimant receives or has

received for relief of his or her pain or other symptoms; any measures the claimant
uses or has used to relieve his or her pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on
your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.); and

any other factors concerning functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or
other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3).
An ALJ’s findings based on the credibility of a claimant are to be accorded
great weight and deference, since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a

witness’s demeanor and credibility. Frazier v. Apfel, No. 99-CV-715, 2000 WL
288246, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2000) (quoting Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997)). An ALJ is not free to discount a claimant’s

statements about his or her symptoms or limitations for no reason or for the wrong
reason. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554.
As noted above, the Commissioner’s regulations merely require that a
claimant’s symptoms be “reasonably”—as opposed to entirely—consistent with

objective medical evidence to be credited. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ applied the
wrong standard based on his use of popular boilerplate “not entirely consistent”
language. Nonetheless, I am not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that use of this

boilerplate phrase requires remand in this case. Similar arguments involving bad
Page 32 of 36
boilerplate have been raised in this court, and in others across the country. Courts
have generally concluded that the use of “bad boilerplate” in an ALJ’s evaluation

of a claimant’s statements does not automatically undermine or discredit an ALJ’s
ultimate conclusion. Ronald B. v. Saul, No. 18-CV-5881, 2019 WL 3778070 at *5
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2018). This type of error is harmless so long as the ALJ points

to information that justifies his or her conclusion. Id. Although the ALJ’s decision
in Ronald B. was ultimately remanded because the ALJ’s “explanation failed to
build an ‘accurate and logical bridge’ between the evidence and her conclusions,”
that certainly is not the case here. As quoted in section IV.C.1. of this Opinion, the

ALJ relied on the unremarkable findings by clinicians on mental status
examination, the effectiveness of Plaintiff’s medications, and Plaintiff’s
demonstrated ability to interact with others in a clinical setting to discount her

testimony that her impairments cause crippling social anxiety, as well as frequent
uncontrolled mood swing, panic attacks, and anxiety attacks that would prevent her
from working. Accordingly, I find that the ALJ’s use of bad boilerplate in his
credibility assessment does not require remand in this case.

2. Whether the ALJ Improperly Inferred that Plaintiff’s stability
on medication meant that Plaintiff could work, and Improperly
Relied on his own Lay Opinion to Discount CRNP Canal’s
Assessment
Page 33 of 36
Plaintiff’s second and third arguments in the “Symptom Evaluation” section
of her brief do not appear to relate to symptom evaluation. Instead, they both

address the ALJ’s evaluation of medical opinion evidence. As such, I will address
them together. Specifically, Plaintiff argues:
the ALJ noted that treatment notes show that Hernandez’s mood and
mania were well-controlled with medication. (Tr. 24) However, the
ALJ failed to note that having a controlled condition does not mean
that the claimant is not disabled. See Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310,
319 (3d Cir. 2000) (the Court found that a doctor’s observations that a
patient is “stable and well controlled with medication” during
treatment did not support the medical conclusion that the patient could
return to work.)
the ALJ remarked that the examination records show that Hernandez
interacted appropriately and clearly despite her alleged social anxiety.
(Tr. 24) But, the ALJ impermissibly substituted his lay opinion for the
opinion of treating source Ms. Canal who was specifically tasked with
evaluating Hernandez’s ability to interact with others, not her ability
to be polite to a doctor. Here, the ALJ cited no medical evidence
whatsoever and relied on anecdotal evidence to reject Ms. Canal’s
opinion. This is relevant because Hernandez complained of social
isolation. (Tr. 638, 647, 651)
As the ALJ provided no reasonable basis for discounting Hernandez’s
allegations, his decision must be reversed.
(Doc. 11, pp. 11-14).
Although the Commissioner generally responded that the ALJ’s evaluation
of Plaintiff’s statements about her symptoms was correct and addressed other
arguments related to the evaluation of CRNP Canal’s opinion, the Commissioner
did not address Plaintiff’s allegations.
Page 34 of 36
In support of her “second” and “third” arguments, Plaintiff relies on Morales
v. Apfel, 225 F.3d, 310 (3d Cir. 2000). In Morales, the record included opinions by

one nontreating psychologist (Dr. Jaffe), one nontreating psychiatrist (Dr. Linder),
one treating psychiatrist (Dr. Erro), and two nonexamining psychologists (Dr.
Barrett and Dr. Brennan). The opinions by Dr. Jaffe, Dr. Linder, and Dr. Erro

included significantly more serious mental limitations than the opinions of Dr.
Barrett and Dr. Brennan. Also significant in this case, Dr. Jaffe noted he suspected
the claimant of malingering, but that malingering was a symptom of one of the
claimant’s diagnosed mental conditions. The ALJ in Morales accepted the opinions

of Dr. Barrett and Dr. Brennan, and rejected all others based on the ALJ’s own
impression that the claimant was “manipulative, unmotivated, and possibly
malingering,” and that the claimant’s IQ scores did not “comport with claimant

appearance and demeanor.” Id. at 314. The Third Circuit held that the ALJ’s
rejection of the opinions by Dr. Jaffe, Dr. Linder, and Dr. Erro was not supported
by substantial evidence because the ALJ’s refusal to credit these opinions was not
based on objective evidence, and instead was merely based on the ALJ’s own

“amorphous impressions.” Id. at 318. After concluding that these opinions were
improperly rejected, the Third Circuit remanded because “the ALJ did not give
proper consideration to the opinions of Dr. Erro, Dr. Jaffe, and Dr. Lindner, all of

which present counterveiling [sic] evidence to the Brennan/Barrett evaluation.” Id.
Page 35 of 36
at 319. Unlike in Morales, the ALJ in this case cited to evidence in the record
including Plaintiff’s mental health treatment records and the opinions of doctors

Davis (Ex. 4F) and Siegel (Exs. 1A, 2A) (whose opinions he accorded great
weight) before concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Accordingly, I am not
persuaded that remand is required under Morales.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s request for the award of benefits, or
in the alternative a new administrative hearing is DENIED as follows:
(1) The final decision of the Commissioner should be AFFIRMED.

(2) Final judgment should be issued in favor of Andrew Saul,
Commissioner of Social Security.
(3) An appropriate order shall issue.
Date: June 22, 2020 BY THE COURT
s/William I. Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408898. Public record. Not legal advice.