# Hitner v. John Doe I

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 18, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408875

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 18, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408875

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that the complainant in an access to the courts claim “must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope’, and it must describe the ‘lost remedy.’”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CLINTON HITNER, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-2008
:
Plaintiff : (Judge Conner)
:
v. :
:
CORRECTIONS OFFICER :
ALSHEFSKI, et al., :
:
Defendants :

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Clinton Hitner (“Hitner”), an inmate who was housed at all relevant
times at the State Correctional Institution, Frackville, Pennsylvania (“SCI-
Frackville”), commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that
defendants denied him access to the courts in violation of his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. (Doc. 1). Named as defendants are corrections officer
Alshefski, corrections officer Berger, and captain Downs. Defendants move for
summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. 65). For
the reasons set forth below, the court will grant defendants’ motion.
I. Factual Background & Procedural History1
On March 20, 2017, Hitner was in the visiting room at SCI-Frackville
spending time with his family members. (Doc. 1 ¶ 7). While in the visiting room,

Hitner asserts that defendants Alshefski and Berger searched his cell, removed his
personal property, transported his property to the security department for
inspection, and misplaced his legal documents. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-13). Hitner contends
that defendants denied him access to the courts by misplacing his legal materials.
(Id. at ¶¶ 14-20).
On August 2, 2019, defendants conducted the deposition of Hitner regarding
the events relevant to this civil action. (Doc. 67-1, Deposition of Clinton Hitner

(“Hitner Dep.”)). Hitner testified that, “they came to my cell [while] I was on a
visit.” (Doc. 66, Statement of Material Facts, ¶ 1; Doc. 79, Counterstatement of
Material Facts, ¶ 1; Hitner Dep. 13:10, 21-22). He testified that when he came back
from his visit, “my TV . . . was basically torn – all of my property was missing.”
(Doc. 66 ¶ 2; Doc. 79 ¶ 2; Hitner Dep. 14:8-10). Hitner later learned that correctional
officers were dispatched to his housing unit and took his property. (Doc. 66 ¶ 3;

Doc. 79 ¶ 3; Hitner Dep. 14:12-14).

1 Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise
statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving
party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1.
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of
material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving
party’s statement and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. Hitner does not
dispute defendants’ statement of material facts. (See Doc. 79). Unless otherwise
noted, the factual background herein derives from the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements
of material facts. (See Docs. 66, 79).
Hitner was not present when his property was searched and was not given a
confiscation slip for his property. (Doc. 66 ¶¶ 4-5; Doc. 79 ¶¶ 4-5; Hitner Dep. 17:5-9,

23:7-11). Hitner was subsequently called to the security office to retrieve his
property. (Doc. 66 ¶ 6; Doc. 79 ¶ 6; Hitner Dep. 21:10-13). He does not remember
who was present to return his property to him at the security office. (Id.) All of
Hitner’s property was returned to him, except his legal documents. (Doc. 66 ¶¶ 7-8;
Doc. 79 ¶¶ 7-8; Hitner Dep. 19:5-6; 19:21-23). When asked whether Hitner thought
that his legal materials were accidentally misplaced, Hitner responded: “I’m not
going to rule that out.” (Hitner Dep. 21:19-21).

Hitner testified that captain Downs ordered correctional officers Alshefski
and Berger to take his property from his cell and transport it to the security office to
be searched. (Doc. 66 ¶¶ 9-11; Doc. 79 ¶¶ 9-11; Hitner Dep. 22:13-24:1). Hitner
believes that Alshefski and Berger conducted the actual search of his property and
lost his paperwork, and that Downs ordered the confiscation of his property.
(Hitner Dep. 23:21-24:22).

Hitner was never issued a “write-up” with respect to the confiscated items.
(Doc. 66 ¶ 13; Doc. 79 ¶ 13; Hitner Dep. 24:10-11). Hitner believes that captain
Downs violated policy by ordering the seizure of his property when he was not
present, without providing notice, and without giving him a chance to sign off.
(Doc. 66 ¶ 14; Doc. 79 ¶ 14; Hitner Dep. Hitner 25:4-9; 10-12). He also believes that
captain Downs violated policy by ordering Alshefski and Berger to search his cell.

(Id.)
Hitner is uncertain if defendants knew that he was filing documents in his
underlying criminal proceeding when they confiscated his property. (Doc. 66 ¶ 15;

Doc. 79 ¶ 15; Hitner Dep. 27:6-10). Hitner assumes that defendants learned about
the filings in his criminal proceeding after he filed a grievance about the matter.
(Id.)
Discovery has concluded, and defendants now move for summary judgment.
The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
II. Legal Standard
Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that

do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and for which a jury trial
would be an empty and unnecessary formality. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The burden of
proof tasks the non-moving party to come forth with “affirmative evidence, beyond
the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief. Pappas v. City of
Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The court is to view the evidence “in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s

favor.” Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). This
evidence must be adequate, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the
non-moving party on the claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-
57 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89
(1986). Only if this threshold is met may the cause of action proceed. See Pappas,
331 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
III. Discussion
A. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Hitner’s substantive due process claim is duplicative of his First Amendment
retaliation claim and is barred by the “more specific provision rule.” In adopting
the “more-specific-provision-rule” established in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 843-44 (1998), the Third Circuit noted that “[u]nder this rule, ‘if a
constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision . . . , the claim
must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not
under the rubric of substantive due process.’ United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,

272 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (clarifying prior holing in Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)).” Betts v. New Castle
Youth Development Center, 621 F.3d 249, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2010). Hitner’s First
Amendment claim is identical to his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.
Both are based on defendants’ interference with his access to the courts. Hitner’s
access to the courts claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision—the First
Amendment—and this claim must be analyzed under the “more specific provision.”

B. First Amendment Access to Courts Claim
Hitner asserts that defendants denied him access to the courts by misplacing
his legal materials. (Doc. 1). In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the Supreme
Court recognized a prisoner’s limited right of access to the courts. Prisoners are
not necessarily “capable of filing everything” but have a right of access to “attack
their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of
their confinement.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996). “The right of access to
the courts must be adequate, effective and meaningful and must be freely

exercisable without hindrance or fear of retaliation.” Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d
371, 374 (3d Cir. 1981) (internal citations omitted). Following Lewis, courts have
consistently recognized that such claims require some proof of an actual, concrete
injury, in the form of direct prejudice to the plaintiff in the pursuit of some legal
claim. See Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1997). An inmate must
demonstrate “(1) that they suffered an actual injury—that they lost a chance to
pursue a non-frivolous or arguable underlying claim; and (2) that they have no

other remedy that may be awarded as recompense for the lost claim other than in
the present denial of access suit.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)) (internal quotations
omitted).
Hitner states that his missing legal materials hindered his ability to file a
brief seeking DNA testing in his underlying criminal case. The missing legal
documents consisted of state court transcripts, court orders, and motions. (Hitner

Dep. 20:24-21:4). However, Hitner has not asserted that he actually missed any
deadlines. In fact, the docket sheets for his state court criminal action reveal that
Hitner filed his appeal brief approximately two months before he lost his legal
documents at SCI-Frackville. An examination of the state court records reveals the
following. (See Docs. 67-6, 67-7, 67-8).
On or about April 18, 2016, Hitner filed a petition for post-conviction
collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), seeking DNA

testing. (Doc. 67-6, Bucks Cnty. Docket Sheet, Criminal No. CP-09-CR-0002015-
2004). On July 7, 2016, the PCRA court denied the motion for post-conviction DNA
testing. (Id.) On July 28, 2016, Hitner filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court. (Doc. 67-7, Pennsylvania Superior Court Docket Sheet, No. 2719 EDA 2016).
On January 12, 2017, Hitner filed a brief in support of his appeal. (Id.) On May 19,
2017, the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of the petition. (Id.) On
June 15, 2017, Hitner filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court, which was denied on December 13, 2017. (Doc. 67-8, Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Docket Sheet, No. 479 MAL 2017).
Hitner’s legal documents went missing at SCI-Frackville in March 2017.
(Hitner Dep. 13:2-6). The undisputed evidence establishes that Hitner filed his
Pennsylvania Superior Court appeal brief in January 2017, prior to losing his
documents at SCI-Frackville. To the extent that Hitner believes he was unable to
sufficiently prepare his appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, his mere

“hope” that he would have been able to adequately perfect his appeal if he obtained
the missing legal documents is insufficient to meet the actual injury requirement.
(Hitner Dep. 30:23-31:2). Notably, Hitner does not state that the state courts
dismissed any of his filings for failure to file any briefs. Indeed, it is clear that
Hitner was able to make several filings from prison, and that they were received
and docketed by the state courts.
Further, Hitner has not established that he was prevented from pursuing a
nonfrivolous challenge to his conviction, especially in light of the state courts’

conclusions that “Hitner has not provided any facts alleging what DNA evidence
could possibly be discovered that would establish his innocence.” Commonwealth
v. Hitner, 2017 WL 2211392, *2-3 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citing PCRA Court Opinion,
11/18/16). Because Hitner failed to establish a basis for a legitimate challenge to his
conviction, he has not established that he was denied access to the courts. See
Bowens v. Matthews, 2019 WL 1461537, at *2 (3d Cir. 2019) (“To the extent that
Bowens described his PCRA claim at all, he did not describe it well enough to show

that it is ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable.’”); Monroe, 536 F.3d at 206 (plaintiffs’
allegations that “defendants confiscated their legal materials” and that “they lost
the opportunity to pursue attacks of their convictions and civil rights claims”
without “specify[ing] facts demonstrating that the claims were nonfrivolous” did not
state a claim).
In failing to establish actual injury or some legal loss, Hitner fails to
demonstrate that defendants’ conduct imposed a substantial impact on him. See

Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205-06 (stating that the complainant in an access to the courts
claim “must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is
‘more than mere hope’, and it must describe the ‘lost remedy.’”) (citation omitted).
Consequently, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the access to courts
claim.
C. Claims Against Defendant Downs
Hitner asserts that defendant Downs ordered Alshefski and Berger to search
his cell and did not follow prison policy, thereby violating his rights. (Hitner Dep.

25:4-12).
Individual liability can be imposed under section 1983 only if the state actor
played an “affirmative part” in the alleged misconduct and “cannot be predicated
solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347,
353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)).
“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs. . . . Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal

direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08; see
also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257 (3d Cir.
2003). Such allegations, however, must be made with appropriate particularity in
that a complaint must allege the particulars of conduct, time, place, and person
responsible. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. Alleging a mere
hypothesis that an individual defendant had personal knowledge or involvement in

depriving the plaintiff of his rights is insufficient to establish personal involvement.
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208.
It is clear that Hitner attempts to hold defendant Downs liable based on his
supervisory role. Hitner testified that he “believe[d] . . . [that captain Downs]
ordered Berger and Olshefski, gave them an order [to confiscate his property].”
(Hitner Dep. 25:4-12). It is well-established that officials may not be held liable for
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat
superior. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Accordingly, to the extent that Hitner’s
claims against defendant Downs relies on a respondeat superior theory of liability,

defendant Downs is entitled to judgment in his favor on this claim.
Hitner also appears to assert liability based on defendant Downs’ violation of
prison policy. (Hitner Dep. 25:4-12). However, a violation of an internal prison
policy does not automatically rise to the level of a constitutional violation. “[A]
prison policy manual does not have the force of law and does not rise to the level of
a constitutional violation.” Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F.Supp.2d 532, 556, n. 24 (M.D. Pa.
2008) (citing Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 154 (3d Cir.

2004)). The Third Circuit has clearly stated that “agency interpretive guidelines ‘do
not rise to the level of a regulation and do not have the effect of law.’” Mercy
Catholic Med. Ctr., 380 F.3d at 155 (citation omitted). Therefore, defendant Downs
cannot be liable simply for violating a prison policy and defendants’ motion will be
granted as to this claim. See Estrella v. Hogsten, 2007 WL 2065879 (M.D. Pa. July
16, 2007) (holding that mere failure of prison officials to follow their own regulations
alone is not a constitutional violation).

D. Qualified Immunity
Even if Hitner had stated a colorable access to the courts claim, defendants
are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity from this claim for damages. In
order to establish a civil rights claim, Hitner must show the deprivation of a right
secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States.
However, government officials performing “discretionary functions,” are insulated
from suit if their conduct did not violate a “clearly established statutory or
constitutional right[ ] of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v.

Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999).
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need
to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the

need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. It “provides ample
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “Thus, so long as an official
reasonably believes that his conduct complies with the law, qualified immunity will
shield that official from liability.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244). Although qualified immunity is generally a

question of law that should be considered at the earliest possible stage of
proceedings, a genuine dispute of material fact may preclude summary judgment
on qualified immunity. Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2009).
A qualified immunity determination involves a two-pronged inquiry: (1)
whether a constitutional or federal right has been violated; and (2) whether that
right was “clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled
in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (permitting federal courts to exercise discretion
in deciding which of the two Saucier prongs should be addressed first). As stated,
the court finds that Hitner failed to establish the violation of a constitutional right.

Defendants could not have recognized that their actions of routinely searching
inmate property would violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional right[
] of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609.
Therefore, defendants are protected from liability by qualified immunity.
IV. Conclusion
We will grant defendants’ motion (Doc. 65) and enter summary judgment in
their favor. An appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: June 18, 2020

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408875. Public record. Not legal advice.
