# Scott v. Kauffman

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 15, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408848

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 15, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMAL SCOTT,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-00695

v. (MEHALCHICK, M.J.)1

KEVIN KAUFFMAN, et al,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Jamal Scott, an inmate currently housed at the State Correctional Institution
(SCI) at Huntingdon, commenced this action pro se on April 29, 2019, asserting violations of
his federal civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for which he seeks injunctive and monetary
relief. (Doc. 1). He asserts causes of action against ten defendants: (1) the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (DOC); (2) SCI-Huntingdon staff including Facility Manager
Kevin Kauffman, Facility Chaplaincy Program Director Mr. Wireman, Corrections
Classification Program Manager Ms. Sipple, Deputy Superintendent Scott Walters, Facility
Chaplain Bilgan Erdogan, and Corrections Officers Hawn and Mills; (3) John Wetzel, the
Secretary of Corrections; and (4) Ulrich H. Klem, DOC’s Religion Volunteer and
Recreational Services Program Administrator (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1, at 1-2).
Defendants move to dismiss Scott’s complaint pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules

1 In November 2019, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties consented to the
undersigned’s jurisdiction to adjudicate all pretrial and trial proceedings relating to this action.
(Doc. 16).
of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 14). Scott filed a brief in opposition (Doc. 17), and the motion to
dismiss is now ripe for review.
For the reasons discussed herein, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND2
Scott’s allegations are divided into six parts, each of which is addresses below.

1. First Set of Allegations: “Denial of Free Exercise of Religion and First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause (Wireman, Sipple, Klemm, Kauffman,
Bilgan).
Scott is a practicing Sunni Muslim and a member of the Ahlus-Sunnah Muslim
Community (ASMC) at SCI-Huntingdon, which community is a result of a settlement
agreement Scott allegedly reached with defendants in Jamal Scott v. Bilgan Erdogan, et al., No.
12-CV-2041 (“Settlement Agreement”). (Doc. 1, at 1). In 2018, Scott intended to perform his
obligatory month of fasting for Ramadan. (Doc. 1, at 1-2). Defendant Wireman distributed a
“2018 Ramadan Sign-Up Form,” which Scott signed and submitted. (Doc. 1, at 3). Wireman
returned the sign-up form and provided Scott with a letter from Defendant Klemm because
Scott initially did not check any of the boxes on the form. (Doc. 1, at 3). Scott checked the
boxes where indicated and resubmitted the form “with a request slip”; apparently, he did not
sign the form. (Doc. 1, at 3). Wireman again returned the sign-up form, indicating, in red ink,
“NEED SIGNATURE ON FORM!” (Doc. 1, at 3). Wireman insisted that Scott sign the
form in order to be permitted to fast for Ramadan. (Doc. 1, at 3).
Separately, about one year earlier, in March 2017, Scott submitted an “Eid Proposal”

2 The Court’s recitation of facts is drawn from Scott’s complaint, the allegations of
which the Court must presume are true for purposes of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See
Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
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to Superintendent J. Thomas and Defendants Sipple and Wireman, none of whom
responded. (Doc. 1, at 3). While it is not entirely clear what Scott’s Eid Proposal consisted of,
construing his allegations liberally, it appears that he proposed that Muslim inmates be
permitted to observe certain ceremonies, including on the day after Ramadan is complete.

(Doc. 1, at 3). In April 2017, Scott submitted a “Ahlus-Sunnah Muslim Community’s
Proposal” to Defendant Kauffman, who responded that the proposal was under review.”
(Doc. 1, at 3-4). In June 2017, Defendant Sipple responded, denying Scott’s Eid Proposal.
(Doc. 1, at 4).
Then, in March 2018, Scott wrote to Defendants Kauffman and Wireman asking for,
“among other things, ‘Id Holy day observances,” to which a Ms. Spyker responded that Scott
should submit a Religious Accommodation Request Form (“RAR Form”). (Doc. 1, at 4).
Scott alleges that Spyker’s “advice [wa]s invalid” because, under DC-ADM 819, the RAR
Form is for requests for non-grooming-related religious accommodations “not already
approved, whereas the DOC has approved Faith Group Ceremonial Meals for the celebration

of major religious holy days. (Doc. 1, at 4). In connection with these allegations, Scott also
asserts that “Central Office constructed a form with questions seeking to gauge the quality of
the religious services that each Faith Group is provided in the prisons.” (Doc. 1, at 4). Two
ASMC inmates filled out forms in a 2017 “Religious Audit interview,” and Scott and another
ASCM inmate filled out the same forms in 2018 – this process was overseen by the Facility
Chaplaincy Program Director (FCPD) of SCI-Fayette.

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2. Second Set of Allegations: “Violations of Rights of Equal Protection Section
1983, and Fourth and Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause Without
Due Process of Law in Implementation of Racist Ramadan Sign-Up Form
That Does Not Further Any Legitimate Penal Interest and Creates a
Substantial Burden under [the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA)] (Mr. Klemm, Mr. Wireman, Mr. Erdogan)”.
Scott next alleges that the sign-up form required to participate in Ramadan serves no
legitimate purpose and unfairly targets Muslims, who are predominantly black inmates. (Doc.
1, at 5). The sign-up form requires the participant to agree to only a 30-day fast, “whereas
Islam has more than the 30 day fasting period.” (Doc. 1, at 5-6). Further, inmates of other
faith groups – such “Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Jehovah Witness, . . . and Native
American” – are permitted to observe holidays without having to sign a form. (Doc. 1, at 5).
Because of Scott’s refusal to sign the Ramadan observance form, he was not permitted, during
the 2018 Ramadan, to take his allergy medicine during the morning and was left only with
the option to take it at night in violation of his fasting. (Doc. 1, at 5).
3. Third Set of Allegations: “Denial of Free Exercise of Religion Under Section
1983 and First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause Without Due Process
Under Section 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
(Wireman, Kauffman, Klemm, Mr. Erdogan)”.
In his third set of allegations, Scott alleges that because of DOC’s policy of prohibiting
an inmate from taking food from the kitchen but for one piece of fruit, he was unable to fast
in a healthy manner during Ramadan. (Doc. 1, at 6). He further alleges that Defendant
Kauffman signed off on but never implemented the Settlement Agreement, and that
Defendants Kauffman, Wireman, Sipple, and Walters feigned attempts to comply with the
Settlement Agreement until the “time ran for the agreement to become binding.” (Doc. 1, at
6). In March 2018, Scott wrote Defendants Wireman and Kauffman and field a grievance
complaining about “our lack of holy day observances, religious activities, volunteers, lack of
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classes, and literature, and having our own oil.” (Doc. 1, at 6).
Regarding Scott’s attempt to observe Ramadan in 2018, Scott indicates that in 2017
he did not sign or check any of the boxes in the sign-up form and yet was still permitted to
fast. (Doc. 1, at 7). He therefore alleges that the April 2018 rejection of his unsigned sign-up

form was in retaliation for complaints and grievances. (Doc. 1, at 7).
4. Fourth Set of Allegations: “Retaliatory Cell Search”.
In June 2018, after Scott’s “numerous request[s] and filing of grievances to
[Defendants Kauffman, Wireman, and Walters,” two corrections officers searched his cell.
(Doc. 1, at 7). The officers dumped Scott’s property, mixed his religious property with other
of his belongings, placed Scott’s Quran on the top of the cell’s toilet, ripped open a package
of food, threw his clean clothes on the trash, and disputed Scott’s ownership of property that
was clearly identified as being owned by Scott. (Doc. 1, at 7). Scott told Defendant Mills, who
was walking through that tier, about the other officers’ conduct, and Mills told Scott to file a
grievance, which he did. (Doc. 1, at 7).

5. Fifth Set of Allegations: “Retaliatory Placement in the Restricted Housing
Unit (RHU) (Mr. Walters, Mr. Kauffman, Mr. Wireman)”.
In January 2018, Scott provided a six-page informative listing to Defendants
Wireman, Kauffman, Klem, Walters, and Bilgan and Connie Green indicating “all of the
instances the administration was not complying with the settlement agreement, and violating
administrative policy, and Plaintiff’s rights to practice his religion.” (Doc. 1, at 8). On January
7, 2018, as Defendant Walters was making his rounds through the laundry, he became irate
and angry at Scott. (Doc. 1, at 8). He asked Scott, in part, whether there was a prison Scott
wished to be transferred to where “other inmates believed as he did.” (Doc. 1, at 8). Walters
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then insulted the ASMC members and indicated he was “upset about the reference to women
walking pas[t] with the door open distracting the ASMC service.” (Doc. 1, at 8).
On February 1, 2019,3 Scott was denied his noon meal and then taken to the Restricted
Housing Unit (RHU) under administrative custody. (Doc. 1, 8). There, RHU staff took items

of Scott’s property without a confiscation slip, and left Scott with a box containing only some
of his property for which he was given a confiscation slip. (Doc. 1, at 8). Scott was then
ordered to have that box of property sent out or destroyed, even though he was promised that
he would be allowed to keep the box of property. (Doc. 1, at 8). During this time of RHU
confinement, Scott was denied, inter alia, of a shower and the right to observe prayer services,
only to be released without a misconduct report ever being issued. (Doc. 1, at 8). He alleges
that he was held in the RHU for weeks beyond what is permitted under administrative
custody. (Doc. 1, at 8). He was told no cell was available, despite that a corrections officer
later told him that one cell had been open for days. (Doc. 1, at 8-9).
Scott was released from RHU and administrative custody only to be placed back into

the RHU several weeks later, in March 2019, without any misconduct report having been
issued. (Doc. 1, at 9). During his second stint in the RHU, he was denied his allergy
medication, he was wrongfully directed to throw away some of his property, and some of his
property was missing or destroyed, including a prayer schedule.

3 Scott alleges that he was first placed in the RHU under administrative custody in
February 1, 2018, not 2019. (Doc. 1, at 8). However, Scott alleges that he was placed back in
the RHU “two and a half weeks” after first being released from the RHU, on March 3, 2019.
Scott later alleges that he was in the RHU on February 1, 2019. (Doc. 1, at 13). Further, a
February 2019 initial-placement-in-RHU date fits with the general timeline set forth by Scott
in his complaint. (See Doc. 1, at 7-9).
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6. Sixth Set of Allegations: Violation of Rights by Establishment of Religion
under Section 1983 and First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.
Conspiracy to Establish a Religious Practice under Section 1983 and First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause (Kauffman, Klemm, Wireman, Sipple,
Erdogan, Walters, Wetzel).
Scott’s final set of allegations consists of a range of claims that Defendants
intentionally impeded and frustrated the ASMC community and Scott from observing their
religious holy days and practicing their religion generally. The allegations appear to take place
during late 2018 through 2019, although Scott does not specifically indicate when all the
alleged conduct occurred. (Doc. 1, at 10-19).
Scott alleges, among other things, that (1) Defendants “promoted and fostered the
prison’s Jumuah service led by prison staff instead of the ASMC’s Friday prayer service”; (2)
Defendants placed ASMC service in a distracting area of the prison and demanded ID cards;
(3) the ASMC services are not called over the loudspeaker, which frustrates new inmates’
ability to learn about the ASMC services; (4) the rug provided to Scott is too thick and is “not
a rug meant to pray on”; (5) Defendant Wireman is a consistent distraction, refuses to sit in
the back during the prayer service, and leaves the door open to a busy corridor where staff
talk to one another; (6) Defendants Wireman, Erdogan, and Klem have not attempted to
recruit a volunteer religious teacher or Imam for the ASMC; (7) Defendants Wireman and
Erdogan refuse to provide religious reading material to the ASMC; (8) there is no water source
in the ASMC services room, which is essential for prayer, and the room is always dirty and
not set up; and (9) Defendant Erdogan “preached the message that[] the creation of the ASMC
was an act of deviation from the ‘community.’”’ (Doc. 1, at 10-13).
7. Assertion of RLUIPA Violations and Demand for Relief
At the end of his complaint, Scott asserts that Defendants placed a substantial burden
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on his religious exercise of the 2018 Ramadan fast by enforcing “food-control regulations
without first considering whether the purpose of those regulations could be accomplished by
other means that would be less burdensome to the religious exercise.” (Doc. 1, at 13). He
further asserts that Defendants substantially burdened his religious exercise on two ‘Id

celebrations without considering other, less-burdensome means. (Doc. 1, at 13). Finally, he
asserts that due to these RLUIPA violations, he has suffered injuries as alleged in his
complaint. (Doc. 1, at 13).
For relief, Scott seeks the following: (1) declaratory relief “by finding that the
Defendants violated his constitutional and statutory rights”; (2) injunctive relief “by enjoining
DOC to provide accommodations to enable [him] to observe the fast of Ramadan
henceforth”; (3) compensatory damages; (4) punitive damages; and (5) litigation costs. (Doc.
1, at 14).
II. DISCUSSION
Defendants submit that Scott’s complaint does not comply with the Rule 8 standard

because it is a “lengthy document” naming ten defendants and several claims, does not
include specifically numbered paragraphs, and asserts allegations that span over two years.
(Doc. 15, at 1). They further argue that the complaint “includes a few averments that have
several paragraphs each, naming several defendants and non-defendants within a multitude
of overlapping facts relating to each claim.” (Doc. 15, at 5). The lack of clarity and Scott’s
varying reliance on the Settlement Agreement in a different action before the Court makes it
difficult for Defendants to discern the extent to which his claims are based on that Agreement.
(Doc. 15, at 5). Finally, Defendants argue that “[t]o the extent that [Scott] is directly
challenging compliance with the terms” of the Settlement Agreement, “a motion to seek
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specific performance is the appropriate procedural mechanisms to do so, and not via this new
lawsuit.” (Doc. 15, at 5).
A. LEGAL STANDARDS
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), “in order to give the defendant fair notice

of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93-94 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Phillips v. Cty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
545 (2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must
contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570. If a complaint fails to comply with the threshold pleading requirements of Rule 8, a
defendant may move for its dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Sally-Harriet v. Northern Children Svcs.,
No.CV 17-4695, 2019 WL 1384275, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2019) (“A motion under Rule

12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements
of Rule 8(a).”).
As already noted, supra, in considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all
allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to
be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. However, a
court “need not credit a complaint’s bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a
motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal
citations omitted). Additionally, a court need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that
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the plaintiff has not alleged. Assoc’d. Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
With these standards in mind, pro se documents must “be liberally construed.” Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be

held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be
dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520–21 (1972). Nevertheless, pro se plaintiffs are still subject to the base pleading
requirements of Rule 8. Rhett v. NJ State Superior Court, 260 F. App’x 513 (3d Cir. 2008). If a
complaint fails to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless
an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,
108 (3d Cir. 2002).
Scott asserts federal civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983

provides a private cause of action for violations of federal constitutional rights. The statute
provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but instead provides remedies for rights
established elsewhere. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To succeed on
a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants, acting under color of state
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law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution. Mark v. Borough
of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995).
B. ANALYSIS
Upon considering the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that Scott’s complaint
substantially complies with Rule 8. The complaint contains 12 pages of allegations organized

under six headings indicating Scott’s theories of liability, and under each heading Scott has,
for the most part, set forth the allegations into coherent paragraphs. The Court was, without
much difficulty, able to discern the crux of Scott’s allegations, including that he was
wrongfully denied the right to fast during Ramadan, that he was denied a diet consistent with
his religion, that the sign-up form for observing Ramadan both unfairly infringes on his right
to exercise his religion and discriminates on the base of race, and that Defendants placed him
in the RHU in retaliation for his complaints and grievances.4
It therefore cannot be said that “the complaint [is] so long and confusing as to
overwhelm [Defendants’] ability to understand or to mount a response.” See Jordan v. Wetzel,

No. CV 16-307, 2019 WL 1382512, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2019) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Further, while some of Scott’s claims are not a model of
clarity, “it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss an entire complaint if it contains some claims

4 That these are discernable claims is evidenced in the decisions of the Third Circuit,
including Mincy v. Deparlos, 497 F. App’x 234 (3d Cir. 2012), where the Third Circuit affirmed,
on summary judgment, judgment in favor of defendants on claims, e.g., that the plaintiff was
denied food in accordance with a religious diet, the plaintiff was denied requests that prison
medical staff provide medications according to an altered schedule to accommodate religious
beliefs, and that different implementations of sign-up forms did not violate equal protection.
While Mincy is distinguishable on its facts, the claims asserted therein were, at the least,
cognizable and understandable to the district and appellate courts there.
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that satisfy Rule 8.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140
S. Ct. 1611 (2020). While the Court observes deficiencies in the complaint, the allegations are
sufficient to put Defendants on notice of Scott’s claims. The complaint may “contain[]
repetitious and irrelevant matter,” but it is error to dismiss such a complaint where the

“disposable husk” surrounds “a core of proper pleading.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 94 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 14) is DENIED, without prejudice
to the Defendants filing a renewed motion to dismiss to address substantive deficiencies, per
their request in their brief in support. (Doc. 15, at n. 1).
An appropriate order will follow.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: June 15, 2020 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408848. Public record. Not legal advice.