# Taylor v. Superintendent of FCI-Hazleton

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · April 30, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408682

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 30, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES :

: CRIMINAL NO. 3:18-282

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

STEPHANI TAYLOR, :

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM
I. Background
On April 23, 2020, defendant Stephani Taylor, an inmate serving her
36-month federal sentence imposed by this court at FCC-Hazelton in
Bruceton Mills, West Virginia, filed a letter Motion for Immediate Release to
Home Confinement seemingly pursuant to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act, (“CARES Act”), §12003(b)(2), based on COVID-19.1
(Doc. 80). The motion could also be construed as one for compassionate

1On February 2, 2019, Taylor pled guilty to possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. §924(c). On May 20,
2019, this court sentenced her to 36 months of imprisonment followed by 2-
years supervised release. (Doc. 74). The court then committed Taylor to the
custody of the BOP and recommended that she serve her sentence in a
prison proximal to her family in Northeastern Pennsylvania.
release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A).2 Taylor does not allege that
there are presently any cases of the COVID-19 virus at FCC-Hazelton and

she does not allege any medical conditions that would make her more
susceptible to complications if she did contract the virus, but she nonetheless
requests the court to immediately release her to home confinement to care

for family members, including her son. Nor does Taylor complain about the
conditions of confinement at FCC-Hazelton or allege that the BOP is not
taking adequate measures to protect inmates from the COVID-19 virus.
Taylor also states that she has served 19 months in prison and that she is

eligible for release to a halfway house on October 6, 2020. According to
Taylor, her BOP projected release date is April 3, 2021. She also points out
that she has not received any incident reports during her confinement and is

enrolled in a parenting class and in RDAP, which is certainly commendable.
As such, Taylor requests the court to immediately order her released from
FCC-Hazelton to home confinement to serve the remainder of her sentence
“due to the current circumstances”, clearly referring to COVID-19.

2Since Taylor is proceeding pro se, and since she did not state the
statutory basis for her motion, the court liberally construes her letter motion
as also seeking relief pursuant to the CARES Act as well as a motion
compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A).
For the reasons set forth below, the court will construe Taylor’s letter
motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241,

and it will transfer her case to the Northern District of West Virginia, where
jurisdiction properly arises.3
On April 30, 2020, the government filed a brief in opposition to Taylor’s

motion. (Doc. 81). The government construes Taylor’s motion as one
seeking the court to reduce her sentence of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C.
§3582(c)(1)(A) and order her immediate release, based on the threat posed
by the COVID-19 pandemic, and contends that the court should deny it

without prejudice due to her failure to exhaust BOP administrative remedies.
The court concurs with the government that insofar as Taylor intended
her motion to be one for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§3582(c)(1)(A), the court will dismiss the motion without prejudice for lack of

3“There is a judicially created exhaustion requirement for habeas
petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. §2241.” Furando v. Ortiz, 2020 WL
1922357, *3 (D.N.J. April 21, 2020) (citing Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627,
633-34 (3d Cir. 2000)). Even though it appears that Taylor has not exhausted
all of her administrative remedies available with the BOP regarding her
habeas petition, the court will leave it up to the District Court that has
jurisdiction over her petition to decide whether it should be dismissed without
prejudice. See Furando, supra (court dismissed without prejudice the habeas
petition of inmate serving his federal sentence at FCI-Fort Dix who sought
immediate release to home confinement under the CARES Act, based on
the COVID-19 virus, due to his failure to exhaust his BOP administrative
remedies available under 28 C.F.R. §§542.10 to 542.19.).
jurisdiction. Further, to the extent Taylor’s motion is under the CARES Act, it
will be dismissed since the court lacks authority to direct the BOP to release

her to home confinement under this Act.

II. Discussion

No doubt that a habeas petition under §2241 is the proper vehicle for
an inmate to challenge “the fact or length of confinement”, Presser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973), or the “execution” of her confinement.
Woodall v. Fed. BOP, 432 F.3d 235, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2005). Further, the court

must look to the remedy requested by the inmate to determine if she is
seeking relief available in a habeas petition. “When a petitioner seeks
immediate release from custody, the ‘sole federal remedy’ lies in habeas

corpus.” Camacho Lopez v. Lowe, 2020 WL 1689874, *8 (M.D.Pa. April 7,
2020) (citing Presser, 411 U.S. at 500).
In Camacho Lopez, the petitioner was an ICE detainee subject to a
final removal order whose removal was set for March 30, 2020, but delayed

due to his COVID-19 diagnosis. The petitioner filed a §2241 habeas petition
seeking immediate release from confinement based on “the threat posed by
the COVID-19 viral pandemic.” The respondent argued that Camacho

Lopez’s petition should be construed as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§1983. The court found that “the extraordinary conditions of confinement”
“where the petitioner tested positive for and had been hospitalized by a

potentially deadly pandemic virus and claims that officials cannot properly
treat him---constitute the extreme case in which habeas relief might be
available.” Id. at 13. The court then concluded that based on the case’s

unique circumstances, “both the claim brought and the remedy sought are
cognizable in habeas corpus.” Id. The court found, however, that Camacho
Lopez’s continued detention in prison was proper and dismissed his habeas
petition. See also Verma v. Doll, Civil No. 4:20-14, (M.D.Pa. April 9, 2020)

(court found petitioner, an ICE detainee, “plainly seeks a habeas remedy”
where he requested immediate release from custody based on alleged
“constitutionally deficient conditions of confinement that threaten his life and

health” in light of the COVID-19 pandemic); Saillant v. Hoover, 2020 WL
1891854, *3 (M.D.Pa. April 16, 2020) (the court agreed with the conclusions
of the courts in Verma and Camacho Lopez “finding that a claim based on
the COVID-19 pandemic [ ] is exactly the sort of ‘extreme case’ contemplated

in [Ali v. Gibson, 572 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1978)]” “in which a petitioner may
challenge the conditions of his confinement through a petition for writ of
habeas corpus.”).
In the present case, as in Camacho Lopez, although Taylor is not an
ICE detainee awaiting her removal, she similarly seeks immediate release

from BOP custody at FCC-Hazelton due to the COVID-19 virus, which “is
unequivocally a habeas remedy.” Id. (citation omitted). See also United
States v. Serfass, 2020 WL 1874126, *2 (M.D.Pa. April 15, 2020) (citation

omitted). As the court in Camacho Lopez explained, id. at 11 the term
“execution” of a petitioner’s sentence is broadly defined by the Third Circuit
“to include such matters as administration of parole, sentence computation,
prison disciplinary proceedings, prison transfers, and even ‘conditions’

generally.” (citing Woodall, 432 F.3d at 241-44).
In her motion, Taylor clearly seeks relief that affects the execution of
her 36-month prison sentence since she requests the court alter its terms

which ordered her into BOP custody to serve her sentence and to
immediately release her to home confinement. See Serfass, supra. Taylor
does not challenge the conditions of her confinement at FCC-Hazelton and
seek damages, and thus her filing is not a civil rights action. See Parmeley

v. Trump, 2020 WL 1987366, *2 (S.D.Ill. April 27, 2020) (court held that
proposed class action civil rights complaint filed by inmates incarcerated in
federal prison and in BOP custody who sought release from prison due to

the COVID-19 virus was not a remedy that was available under Section 1983
or Bivens, and that “[a] petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper route
if a prisoner is seeking ‘what can fairly be described as a quantum change in

the level of custody—whether outright freedom, or freedom subject to the
limited reporting and financial constraints of bond or parole or probation.’”)
(citation omitted). See also Simmons v. Warden, FCI-Ashland, 2020 WL

1905289 (E.D.Ky. April 17, 2020).
As noted, the court also construes Taylor as claiming that due to the
threat that she may contract the COVID-19 virus at FCC-Hazelton she
qualifies to be immediately released to home confinement based on the

CARES Act and pursuant to the FSA, 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A). “As
amended by the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes courts
to modify a criminal defendant’s sentence for ‘extraordinary and compelling

reasons’ ‘upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons’ or ‘upon
motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a
motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of

such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is
earlier.’” United States v. Feiling, 2020 WL 1821457, *4 (E.D.Va. April 10,
2020). As the government represents, (Doc. 81 at 2), “Taylor has not

requested compassionate release at [FCC-Hazelton], as she is required to
do.”4 Thus, to the extent that Taylor’s motion is construed as seeking
compassionate release, it would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since

Taylor has not exhausted her administrative remedies under §3582(c)(1)(A),
“which requires that a defendant seeking compassionate release present
[her] application to the BOP and then either (1) administratively appeal an

adverse result if the BOP does not agree that [her] sentence should be
modified, or (2) wait for 30 days to pass.” United States v. Zukerman, 2020
WL 1659880, *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2020). See also United States v. Raia,
954 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. April 2, 2020).

Secondly, Taylor has not demonstrated that “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” warrant a reduction of her sentence since she does not
state that she has any recognized medical condition putting her at a higher

risk if she contracts COVID-19, i.e., she has not alleged that she is at risk of
experiencing serious complications from COVID-19 due to any medical
conditions, and since she does not allege that there are any cases of the
virus currently at FCC-Hazelton. See Zukerman, 2020 WL 1659880, *2 (“in

order to be entitled to relief under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i), [Berry] must

4The government also points out that FCC-Hazelton has implemented
and follows “all BOP COVID-19 protocols”, and that “[a]s of April 29, 2020,
no inmates or staff have tested positive for COVID-19 at the FCC Hazelton
facility.” (Doc. 81 at 9).
both meet the exhaustion requirement and demonstrate that ‘extraordinary
and compelling reasons’ warrant a reduction of [her] sentence.”); Raia, 954

F.3d at 597 (“The First Step Act empowers criminal defendants to request
compassionate release for ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’” after the
defendant exhausts administrative remedies with the BOP.) (citing 18 U.S.C

§3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). The Third Circuit in Raia, id., also held that defendant’s
failure to comply with §3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement “presents a
glaring roadblock foreclosing compassionate release at this point.”
Further, Taylor does not allege any “catastrophic health

consequences” to make exhaustion futile or show that she could be unduly
prejudiced if she had to wait to exhaust her administrative remedies with the
BOP. See Zukerman, 2020 WL 1659880, *3. Rather, she appears to

speculate that she may be exposed to COVID-19 if someone at FCI-Hazelton
contracts the virus in the future.
As the Third Circuit in Raia, 954 F.3d at 597, explained, “the mere
existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a

particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release,
especially considering BOP’s statutory role, and its extensive and
professional efforts to curtail the virus’s spread.” (citation omitted). See also

Feiling, 2020 WL 1821457, *5 (“the Court agree[d] with the Third Circuit [in
Raia] and the district courts cited [in its decision] and will join them in holding
that the mere existence of COVID-19 among the prison population and an

inmate’s susceptibility to it do not justify waiver of the administrative
exhaustion requirement under §3582(c)(1)(A).”) (string citations omitted of
several cases finding that since defendant failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies with BOP, the Court does not possess authority to
grant relief under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i), even if based on COVID-19, and that
§3582(c)(1)(A) provided no authority to waive the exhaustion requirement).
Moreover, the Third Circuit in Raia, 954 F.3d at 597, stated, ”[g]iven

BOP’s shared desire for a safe and healthy prison environment, we conclude
that strict compliance with §3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement takes on
added—and critical—importance.” See also Feiling, 2020 WL 1821457, *7

(“Because Defendant has failed to exhaust administrative remedies under
§3582(c)(1)(A), the Court lacks authority to grant a sentence modification
under that provision.”).
Additionally, insofar as Taylor is construed as relying on the CARES

Act, which was signed into law on March 27, 2020, as the basis for her
release to home confinement, such reliance is misplaced. The government
points out that Taylor has served about 54% of her sentence. Taylor states
that she will be eligible to qualify for halfway house placement on October 6,
2020.

As the court in United States v. Sawicz, 2020 WL 1815851, *1
(E.D.N.Y. April 10, 2020), recently explained:
[The] CARES Act expanded the maximum amount of time that a
prisoner may spend in home confinement: “if the Attorney General
finds that emergency conditions will materially affect the functioning of
the [BOP], the Director of the Bureau may lengthen the maximum
amount of time for which the Director is authorized to place a prisoner
in home confinement ....” CARES Act §12003(b), Pub. L. No. 116-136,
134 Stat. 281 (2020). Attorney General William Barr made the requisite
“finding that emergency conditions are materially affecting the
functioning of the Bureau of Prisons” on April 3, 2020, thereby
triggering the BOP’s authority to expand the amount of time that a
prisoner may spend in home confinement.

The determination of which inmates qualify for home confinement
under the CARES Act is with the BOP Director. See United States v. Doshi,
2020 WL 1527186, *1 (E.D.Mi. March 31, 2020) (The CARES Act
“temporarily permits the Attorney General to ‘lengthen the maximum amount
of time for which [it] is authorized to place a prisoner in home confinement’
under §3624(c)(2)”, and “the authority to make this determination is squarely
allocated to the Attorney General, under whose authority is the Bureau of
Prisons.”). In fact, the CARES Act “does not mandate home confinement for
any class of inmate.” Valenta v. Ortiz, 2020 WL 1814825, *1 (D.N.J. April 9,
2020).
While the BOP has the authority to make this determination, sua
sponte, under the CARES Act, Feiling, 2020 WL 1821457, *6, Taylor does

not indicate that she has requested a transfer to home confinement to the
warden at FCC-Hazelton pursuant to the CARES Act. Nor does she indicate
that she is a vulnerable inmate who the BOP Director should consider for

home confinement under the Act. Thus, Taylor does not claim to be part of
the “cohort of inmates who can be considered for home release” under the
CARES Act which includes “all at-risk inmates” at facilities “where [the BOP]
determine[s] that COVID-19 is materially affecting operations.” Id. (citing

Mem. from Att’y Gen. to Dir., BOP (Apr. 3, 2020)).
In short, the court agrees with my colleagues in this district who, to
date, have unanimously concluded that emergency petitions for release,

based on COVID19 are properly construed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. (In
addition to Camacho Lopez and Verma, see also Brown v. U.S. Dept of
Homeland Security, 3:20-cv-119; Umarbaev v. Warden, 1:20-cv-413;
Saillant, supra; and Thakker v. Doll, 1:20-cv-480.) I agree with my

colleague’s well reasoned analysis and join in their conclusion that 28 U.S.C
§2241 is the proper vehicle to proceed. Therefore, the court finds that
Taylor’s motion should be construed as a §2241 habeas petition since she

seeks relief affecting how her sentence is executed, i.e., serving her
sentence in home confinement as opposed to confinement in prison to which
she was sentenced, and not a reduction or release from her sentence (i.e. a

compassionate release). See United States v. Serfass, 2020 WL 1874126
(M.D.Pa. April 15, 2020).
A petitioner may seek §2241 relief only in the district in which she is in

custody. United States v. Figueroa, 349 F. App’x 727, 730 (3d Cir. 2009).
This Court has no jurisdiction over Taylor’s habeas claims as she is not
detained within this district at the time of the filing of her motion. As such,
Taylor must file her §2241 habeas petition in the U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of West Virginia since she is confined in prison in that
district. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2243, “[t]he writ, or order to show cause shall
be directed to the person having custody of the person detained. These

provisions contemplate a proceeding against some person who has the
immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce the body
of such party before the court or judge.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,
434 (2004). Thus, for purposes of a habeas action, the petitioner’s custodian

is the warden of the institution holding the petitioner. Id. at 442. In the instant
case, the only appropriate respondent is the Warden at FCC-Hazelton,
where Taylor is currently confined.
In light of the foregoing, the court will direct the clerk of court to docket
Taylor’s Doc. 80 letter motion as an emergency §2241 habeas petition and

to assign it a separate civil number. The court will then direct the clerk of
court to transfer Taylor’s habeas petition to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia.

III. Conclusion
Taylor’s letter Motion for Immediate Release to Home Confinement,
(Doc. 80), is construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §2241, and the clerk of court will be directed to docket Taylor’s Doc.
80 motion as an emergency §2241 habeas petition and to assign it a civil
number. The clerk of court will then be directed to transfer Taylor’s §2241

habeas petition to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West
Virginia District as the proper jurisdictional court. An appropriate order shall
be issued.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion _____
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge

Dated: April 30, 2020

18-282-01

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408682. Public record. Not legal advice.