# Picarella v. Brouse

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · January 14, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408157

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 14, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHARLES PICARELLA, JR., : CIVIL NO. 1:16-CV-501
:
Plaintiff : (Chief Judge Conner)
:
v. :
:
KRISTA BROUSE, et al., :
:
Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Charles Picarella (“Picarella”), an inmate formerly housed at the
Northumberland County Prison, Sunbury, Pennsylvania, commenced this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). The matter is proceeding via a second
amended complaint. (Doc. 35). The remaining defendant is sergeant Krista Brouse.
Before the court is defendant’s motion (Doc. 84) for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons set forth below, the court will
grant the motion.
I. Allegations of the Second Amended Complaint
Picarella was housed at the Northumberland County Prison from
approximately June 23, 2014 through December 10, 2014. (Doc. 35 ¶ 19). From
November 3, 2014 through December 10, 2014, he was assigned to cell thirty-nine in
the left wing of the prison. (Id. at ¶ 20).
During his incarceration, Picarella alleges that he “create[d] pen and ink
drawings as a creative outlet, form of expression, and form of speech.” (Id. at ¶ 21).
Picarella displayed the drawings in his cell, on his cell door, and on the walls

adjacent to his cell. (Id. at ¶ 22). He asserts that the drawings did not obstruct the
view into his cell. (Id. at ¶ 23). Picarella further states that he gave drawings to
fellow inmates and prison staff, and “trade[d]” the drawings with fellow inmates
and prison staff for various commodities. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25).
On November 16, 2014, while Picarella was sleeping, defendant Brouse
allegedly confiscated ten of his drawings. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-27). Later that afternoon,
Picarella asserts that fellow inmates informed him that defendant Brouse removed

the drawings. (Id. at ¶ 30). Picarella claims that he was not provided any official
notice of the intended seizure of his drawings. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-29). Picarella further
alleges that he did not receive any compensation for the taking of his property. (Id.
at ¶ 31).
On November 22, 2014, Picarella filed a grievance regarding the confiscation
of his artwork. (Id. at ¶ 32; Doc. 35, at 9). After Picarella filed the grievance,

defendant Brouse informed him that she did not approve of the drawings, and she
would confiscate any new drawings and place him in the restricted housing unit if
he created new drawings. (Doc. 35 ¶ 33). On November 29, 2014, a lieutenant
denied the grievance because the drawings depicted naked women and were
considered pornography. (Doc. 35 ¶¶ 34-36; Doc. 35, at 9). On December 2, 2014,
Picarella appealed the denial of his grievance. (Doc. 35 ¶ 38; Doc. 35, at 11).
Picarella claims that he did not receive a response to his grievance appeal. (Doc. 35
¶¶ 39-40).
II. Legal Standard

Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that
do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and for which a jury trial
would be an empty and unnecessary formality. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The burden of
proof tasks the non-moving party to come forth with “affirmative evidence, beyond
the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief. Pappas v. City of
Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The court is to view the evidence “in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s
favor.” Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). This
evidence must be adequate, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the
non-moving party on the claims. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-
57 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89
(1986). Only if this threshold is met may the cause of action proceed. See Pappas,

331 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
III Discussion
A. First Amendment Claim
Picarella asserts that the confiscation of artwork violated his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and expression. The First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84
L.Ed. 1213 (1940), offers protection for a wide variety of expressive activities. See
U.S. CONST. amend I. These rights are lessened, but not extinguished in the prison
context, where legitimate penological interests must be considered in assessing the

constitutionality of official conduct. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
For purposes of this memorandum, the court will assume that Picarella’s
right to possess artwork is entitled to Constitutional protection. Once a protectable
First Amendment interest has been demonstrated, an inmate may show that a
prison regulation or practice violates his Constitutional rights by demonstrating
that it violated the “reasonableness test” set forth in Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, and
O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). This test examines the following four

factors: (1) whether the regulation or practice in question furthers a legitimate
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression; (2) whether there
are alternative means of exercising First Amendment rights that remain open to
prison inmates; (3) whether the right can be exercised only at the cost of less liberty
and safety for guards and other prisoners, and the effect on prison resources in
general; and (4) whether an alternative exists which would fully accommodate the

prisoners’ rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415-18; Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91. “The objective is to
determine whether the regulation is reasonable given the prison administrators’
penological concerns and the inmate’s interest in engaging in the constitutionally
protected activity.” DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 59 (3d Cir. 2000). However, prison
administrators need not choose the least restrictive means possible in trying to
further penological interests, Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 411, and it is the burden of
the plaintiff to disprove the validity of a prison regulation or practice. Williams v.
Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 217 (2003) (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003)).
With respect to the first Turner factor, defendant asserts that the confiscation

of Picarella’s artwork was rationally related to legitimate security interests at the
Northumberland County Prison. (Doc. 85, at 8-10). It is important to note that
prison officials are “accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution
of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal
order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
The Northumberland County Prison Inmate Handbook defines contraband

as: “any item not issued or authorized by the facility”, and “[u]se of items as barter
or payment is also contraband and may be redistributed.” (Doc. 84-6, at 5).
Additionally, the prison handbook expressly states that “[n]o items shall be
attached to the walls, including pictures.” (Doc. 84-6, at 10).1 Pursuant to these
prison policies, defendant Brouse confiscated Picarella’s drawings. Picarella was
informed, on an inmate request slip and grievance form, that the drawings were

confiscated because they were prohibited contraband. (Docs. 84-2, 84-3). The
confiscation of these items was done in accordance with the prison rules which
were directed at maintaining the safety and security of the prison. Picarella

1 As an example of the prison’s stance on sexually explicit items, the
Northumberland County Prison Inmate Handbook prohibits inmates from
receiving any mail that includes photographs of cleavage, bathing suits, or
suggestive items intending to sexually arouse, or any forms of pornography, and
provides that any such mail items will be destroyed. (Doc. 84-6, at 7).
concedes that he placed the drawings in his cell, on his cell door, and on the walls
adjacent to his cell. (Doc. 35, ¶ 22). He further concedes that he traded his
drawings with other prisoners and staff members for various commodities. (Id. at

¶¶ 24-25). Picarella also acknowledges that his drawings were confiscated because
they depicted nude persons and pornography. (Doc. 84-3; Doc. 84-5, at 19-20,
Deposition of Charles Picarella, Jr. (“Picarella Deposition”), 82:24-83:12). At his
deposition, Picarella specifically testified that defendant Brouse advised him that
“she didn’t like the nude drawings and that I was done drawing.” (Doc. 84-5, at 19-
20, Picarella Deposition, 82:24-83:12). However, Picarella asserts that this is
irrelevant to his claim and not all of the drawings depicted nude persons. (Doc. 84-

3; Doc. 94). Regardless of whether each confiscated drawing depicted a nude
person and was hanging on the wall, it is undisputed that Picarella traded the
drawings with other individuals in the prison in direct contravention of the prison
rules prohibiting bartering. Bartering in the prison setting has the potential to give
one inmate control over another and certainly poses a security risk. It is clear that
the prison confiscation policy was rationally related to legitimate security concerns,

and the facts reveal that Picarella violated prison policy by hanging the pictures on
the prison walls and trading the pictures with other individuals in the prison in
exchange for various items. Thus, the first Turner factor weighs in favor of
defendant.
The second Turner factor requires the court to assess whether alternative
means exist for Picarella to express the asserted right. “‘[T]he right’ in question
must be viewed sensibly and expansively.” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418. Picarella
has not presented any evidence that he had no alternative means of expression.
Indeed, he admits that his art supplies were not confiscated, he continued to draw,
and he was never denied any art supplies. (Doc. 84-5, at 21, Picarella Deposition,

94:9-10). Further, defendant Brouse advised Picarella that she would refer him for
the opportunity to draw a mural in the prison. (Doc. 84-2). Picarella failed to
present any evidence that he was prevented from artistically expressing himself.
There were alternative means of artistic expression available to Picarella, and the
second Turner factor weighs in favor of defendant.
The third Turner factor requires consideration of “the impact
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other

inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.” Turner, 482 U.S. at
90. Pursuant to the prison handbook, accommodating Picarella’s asserted right
would raise security concerns because bartering is not allowed in the prison setting
and hanging any items on the walls is prohibited. (Doc. 84-6, at 5, 10). Therefore,
the court finds that the third Turner factor weighs in favor of defendant.
As to the final Turner factor, “if an inmate claimant can point to an

alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at a de minimis cost to
valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the
regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.” Turner, 482 U.S.
at 91. “The absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a
prison regulation.” Id. at 90. Picarella has not identified any alternative to the
challenged conduct. (See Doc. 94, at 12). Thus, the fourth Turner factor weighs in
favor of defendant.
In sum, the balancing test required under Turner clearly supports a finding
that the confiscation of Picarella’s drawings did not violate his First Amendment
rights. Thus, defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to this claim.

B. Qualified Immunity
Even if Picarella had stated a colorable claim relating to the confiscation of
his artwork, defendant Brouse is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity from
this claim for damages. In order to establish a civil rights claim, Picarella must
show the deprivation of a right secured by the United States Constitution or the
laws of the United States. However, government officials performing “discretionary
functions,” are insulated from suit if their conduct did not violate a “clearly

established statutory or constitutional right[ ] of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818
(1999).
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need
to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the
need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. It “provides ample
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “Thus, so long as an official
reasonably believes that his conduct complies with the law, qualified immunity will
shield that official from liability.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244). Although qualified immunity is generally a

question of law that should be considered at the earliest possible stage of
proceedings, a genuine dispute of material fact may preclude summary judgment
on qualified immunity. Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2009).
A qualified immunity determination involves a two-pronged inquiry: (1)
whether a constitutional or federal right has been violated; and (2) whether that
right was “clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled
in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (permitting federal courts to exercise discretion

in deciding which of the two Saucier prongs should be addressed first). As stated,
the court finds that Picarella failed to establish the violation of a constitutional
right. Defendant Brouse simply could not have recognized that her actions in
enforcing the prison contraband confiscation policy would violate “clearly
established statutory or constitutional right[ ] of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609. Therefore, defendant Brouse is protected

from liability by qualified immunity.
C. Conversion Claim
Picarella contends that defendant Brouse committed the tort of conversion
by interfering with his right to possess his personal property. Specifically, Picarella
claims that defendant Brouse seized his property for her own use. Conversion is
“an act of willful interference with the dominion or control over a chattel done
without lawful justification, by which any person entitled to the chattel is deprived
of its use and possession.” Baram v. Farugia, 606 F.2d 42, 43 (3d Cir. 1979).
Defendant Brouse contends that she is immune from liability with respect to

this state law claim of conversion. (Doc. 85, at 16-17). State prison officials are
immune from suit for those actions within the scope of their duties, except in
instances in which the immunity has been specifically waived. See 1 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2310. The allegations of Picarella’s second amended complaint do not
fall under any one of the nine listed categories for which immunity has been waived
by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.2 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522(b).
As such, defendant Brouse is entitled to immunity on the state law claim and the

motion will be granted in this regard.
In the exercise of caution, we also note that the issue on the merits of this
conversion claim is whether defendant Brouse wrongfully exercised dominion or
control over Picarella’s property. As the court determined, defendant
demonstrated that she did not wrongfully deprive Picarella of his property.
Defendant Brouse confiscated Picarella’s drawings because they were prohibited

contraband in clear violation of prison policy. Picarella failed to present any
evidence that defendant Brouse acted without lawful justification and failed to

2 The nine categories for which sovereign immunity will not apply are: (1)
vehicles in the possession or control of a Commonwealth party; (2) acts of health
care employees of Commonwealth agency medical facilities or institutions; (3) the
care, custody, or control of personal property; (4) a dangerous condition of
Commonwealth agency real estate and sidewalks; (5) dangerous conditions of
highways created by potholes or sinkholes; (6) the care, custody, or control of
animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8) National Guard activities; and (9) toxoids and
vaccines. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522(b).
present any evidence that Brouse took the drawings for her own personal use.
(Doc. 84-5, Picarella Deposition, at 19, 82:5-83:1).
For all of these reasons, the court will enter judgment in favor of defendant

Brouse on the conversion claim.
VI. Conclusion
The court will grant defendant’s motion (Doc. 84) and enter summary
judgment in her favor. An appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: January 14, 2020

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408157. Public record. Not legal advice.
